JUDGMENT 1. After getting un success in both the Courts below the appellant/defendant preferred this appeal under section 100 of CPC being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 31 .3.1997 passed by First Additional Judge Hoshangabad in Regular Civil Appeal No. 7-A/96 affirming the judgment and decree dated 29.2.1996 passed by 1st Civil Judge Class II, Hoshangabad in Civil Original Suit No. 49-A/91, regarding eviction under section 12 (1) (a) and 12 (1) (f) of Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (in short 'the Act'). 2. The facts giving rise to this appear are that a suit for eviction on the available ground under section 12 (1) (a), 12 (1) (c), 12 (1) (f) and 12 (1) (h) of the Act as filed by the predecessor of respondents against the predecessor of appellant. According to plaint allegation the eviction was prayed for bona fide genuine non-residential need of the wife and daughter of the deceased plaintiff, now respondents No.1, 4 and 5. It was further pleaded that the house being in dilapidated condition requires for major alteration which could not be carried out without vacating the premises. 3. In the written statement of appellant the aforesaid grounds for eviction have been denied. In addition to it, it was pleaded that respondent had a sufficient alternate accommodation regarding their alleged need and the condition of the house as said by the respondents is also denied and prayed for dismissal of the suit. 4. In view of the aforesaid pleadings as many as 10 issues were framed and evidence was recorded by the trial Court. On appreciation of evidence the bona fide genuine requirement and for repairing of the house as said above were found to be proved and suit was decreed in favour of the respondent. On appeal the decree was partly set aside on the ground under section 12 (1) (h) but by affirming the decree under section 12 (1) (f) the appeal was dismissed. Hence, this second appeal was preferred and the same was admitted on the following substantial question of law: (1) Whether the respondents were entitled to file a suit for seeking benefit under section 12 (1) (f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 and also on the ground of section 12 (1) (h) of the aforesaid Act, for reconstruction of the suit premises? (2) Whether in view of the pleadings of the respondents, the respondents could get a decree under section 12 (1) (f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 ? 5. Shri Virendra Verma learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently submitted that the ground under section 12 (1) (f) and 12 (1) (h) are based on different footing, one is for non-residential need while the another is for building, rebuilding or alteration of premises and, therefore, both the grounds could not be taken simultaneously in one suit and decreed the same by the Court. According to him suit was not filed in accordance with law and procedure. 6. So far on another question of law is concerned he has submitted that in view of the pleadings and evidence on record the respondent had a sufficient alternate accommodation to satisfy their alleged need but the same have not been considered by the Courts below in passing the decree under section 12 (1) (f) of the Act. According to him, the evidence was not appreciated as per settled principles of law and he prayed for re-appreciation of the evidence with a prayer for setting aside the judgment and decree impugned by allowing this appeal. 7. While on the other hand Shri Chandrahas Dubey, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that suit for eviction can be filed on both the grounds simultaneously, he cited a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in support of his contention. 8. On other question of law he has submitted that the finding in respect of genuine requirement being finding of fact cannot be interfered at the stage of second appeal, he has also placed his reliance on the decision of the apex Court and submitted that as such the question framed in the appeal are not covered by section 100 of CPC as substantial question of law, and therefore, this appeal has no merits and prayed for dismissal of the same. 9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties; I have gone though the record of Courts below. So for first substantial question of law is concerned, I am of the considered view that suit under on both the ground section 12 (1) (f) and 12 (1) (h) of the Act can be filed by the landlord/ plaintiff simultaneously in one suit. Having heard learned counsel for the parties; I have gone though the record of Courts below. So for first substantial question of law is concerned, I am of the considered view that suit under on both the ground section 12 (1) (f) and 12 (1) (h) of the Act can be filed by the landlord/ plaintiff simultaneously in one suit. The said view is fortified by law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in the matter of T.R. Shah v. Smt. Kundan Kaur and others in Second Appeal No. 478/96 vide order dated 25.8.2005 [ 2006 (1) JLJ 20 ] in which held as under: "12. The answer of the question of law formed in the order of reference is as under: When a suit is filed by a landlord under section 12 (1) (e) and 12 (1) (h), pleading that he requires the accommodation for his own use and also states that he wants to demolish and reconstruct the building and he establishes a case for eviction under section 12 (1) (e), he will be entitled to an order under section 12 (1) (e) and the averments relating to demolition and reconstruction will be construed as a part of ground under section 12 (1) (e). In such an event, it will be immaterial whether he demolishes the building or not. When a Court grants an eviction under Clause immaterial whether he demolishes the building or not. When a Court grants an eviction under Clause (e), it shall dispose of the claim under Clause (h) as having become infructuous or rendered redundant. When granting a decree under section 12 (1) (e) the question of applying section 12 (7) or 18 does not arise. On the other hand if the ground under section 12 (1) (e) is rejected, then the Court may consider the ground under section 12 (1) (h) independently subject to section 12 (7) of section 18. 13. The question of law on which the petition was admitted, is answered thus: Mere invoking the ground under section 12 (1) (h) or filing the case under section 12 (1) (h) in addition to the ground under section 12 (1) (e) will not invalidate the claim for eviction under Clause 12 (1) (e). 13. The question of law on which the petition was admitted, is answered thus: Mere invoking the ground under section 12 (1) (h) or filing the case under section 12 (1) (h) in addition to the ground under section 12 (1) (e) will not invalidate the claim for eviction under Clause 12 (1) (e). Where the bona fide requirement of the landlord under section 12 (1) (e) of the Act is proved, the claim can be allowed under section 12 (1) (e), ignoring the ground under section 12 (1) (h). 14. In this case, as already noticed, the plaint did not even refer to Clause (g) or (h) in the suit. After pleading that he required the premises bona fide for occupation of himself and his family, he also stated that the premises was in a damaged condition and required repairs. Therefore, the averments relating to dismantling the roof and reconstruct it is not an independent ground but a part of the ground under Clause (e). As a consequence, the concurrent finding that the landlord has made out a case for eviction under section 12 (1) (e) of the Act does not call for interference. The second appeal is therefore dismissed with costs." 10. It is apparent circumstance in the case at hand that decree under section 12 (1) (h) of the Act has already been set aside by the appellate Court and the decree on the ground under section 12 (1) (f) has been affirmed. Thus, the appellate Court has not committed any error in confirming the decree hence it is held that the suit was maintainable on both the grounds. 11. So far second substantial question of law is concerned there is a concurrent finding in respect of alleged bona fide genuine requirement of the respondents and in view of law laid down by the apex Court and also on various occasion by this Court that the findings in respect of bona fide genuine requirement are the findings of fact and the same cannot be disturbed or interfered at the stage of second appeal as it does not involve any question of law much less the substantial question of law. The aforesaid law was laid down by the apex Court in the matter of Dr. Ranbirsingh v. Asharfilal reported in [ (1995) 6 SCC 580 ] in which held as under: "14. The aforesaid law was laid down by the apex Court in the matter of Dr. Ranbirsingh v. Asharfilal reported in [ (1995) 6 SCC 580 ] in which held as under: "14. Sub-secton (1) of section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure contemplates that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. Sub-section (4) of section 100 further provides that when the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. But it may be pointed out that the High Court formulated no such question of law on basis of which it proposed to interfere with the findings of facts. It has been the consistent view of this Court that there is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of fact, based upon an appreciation of the relevant evidence. There is a plethora of case-law in support of this view. To quote a few, references may be made to the decision in V. Ramachandra Ayyar v. Ramalingam Chettiar [ AIR 1963 SC 302 : 1963 All LJ 67 : (1963) 1 Andh LT 86] wherein this Court took the view that even if the appreciation of evidence made by the lower appellate Court is patently erroneous and the finding of fact recorded in consequence is grossly erroneous, that cannot be said to introduce a substantial error or defect in the procedure and the High Court cannot interfere with the conclusions of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court. This view has been reiterated by this Court in Bhhagwan Dass v. Jiley Kaur [1991 Supp (2) SCC 300 : AIR 1991 SC 266 ]. This being conclusions for the well-reasoned findings recorded by the Courts of fact." 12. The aforesaid case was decided on the ground of bona fide genuine requirement under the Act and same is applicable to the case in hand also. 13. Even otherwise, I have not found any in consistency or perversity in between the evidence and impugned judgment or in the procedure regarding appreciation of evidence. The aforesaid case was decided on the ground of bona fide genuine requirement under the Act and same is applicable to the case in hand also. 13. Even otherwise, I have not found any in consistency or perversity in between the evidence and impugned judgment or in the procedure regarding appreciation of evidence. Thus, it is held that the Courts below have not committed any error in passing the decree under section 12 (1) (f) of the Act, resultantly, said second question also could not be treated as substantial question of law. 14. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid answers of the framed questions this appeal has no merits, resultantly by affirming the impugned judgment and decree of the appellate Court this appeal is hereby dismissed. However, with the consent of the counsel for the respondent, appellants are given time up to 30th September 2006 for vacating the disputed premises subject to deposit the entire arrears of rent, decretal amount and payment of monthly mesne profit @ monthly rent and also on submitting an usual undertaking in the trial Court within 30 days for vacating the premises in compliance of the impugned decree within aforesaid period. If such condition is not complied by the appellant within said period from the date of this order then respondent would be at liberty to execute the same in accordance with law. 15. Appeal is dismissed with aforesaid observation. 16. Decree be drawn up accordingly. 17. There shall be no order as to costs.