Honble K.C. SHARMA, J.–The above titled two appeals by 4 appellants, namely Mohan Lal, Dev Raj, Purushottam and Banwari arises one of the judgment and order dated 13.4.2004 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No. 2, Chhabra, whereby the learned Judge has convicted and sentenced the appellants in the following manner: Accused Banwari, Mohan Lal and Purushottam Under Section 302/149 IPC To undergo imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default of payment of fine, each to further undergo two months simple imprisonment Accused Dev Raj Under Section 302 IPC To undergo imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo two months simple imprisonment All accused appellants Under Section 325/149 To undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years with a fine of Rs. 500/- each, in default of payment of fine, each to further undergo one months simple imprisonment All accused appellants Under Section 323 IPC To undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year with a fine of Rs. 500/- each, in default of payment of fine, each to further undergo one months simple imprisonment All accused appellants Under Section 148 IPC To undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years with a fine of Rs. 500/- each, in default of payment of fine, each to further undergo one months simple imprisonment. Since the aforesaid two appeals arise out of the judgment and order dated 13.4.2004 of the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No. 2 Chhabra in Sessions Case No. 125/2003, they are being decided by this common judgment. (2). On 7.10.98 PW 2 Brij Mohan informed the police that Purushottam Karadia along with 8-10 persons of villages Hanumant- kheda and Kardia came to his house and belaboured his father and sister. His father was lying on the ground. He was not aware as to who belaboured his father. Having recorded this information in Rojnamcha, the police party left for village Padalia. On reaching there, the police recorded Parcha Bayan of Mst. Pana Bai W/O Laxmi Narain. In her Parcha Bayan, Mst. His father was lying on the ground. He was not aware as to who belaboured his father. Having recorded this information in Rojnamcha, the police party left for village Padalia. On reaching there, the police recorded Parcha Bayan of Mst. Pana Bai W/O Laxmi Narain. In her Parcha Bayan, Mst. Pana Bai stated that on the day of incident, she along with her husband, daughter Ram Kanya and ground daughter Sonu was on way to her house after collecting fodder and when they reached infront of the house of Banwari, the accused persons, namely Banwari, Shyoji, Mohan, Devraj, Lakha, Tikya, Hari Kishan and Purushottam came out of the house of Banwari and started belabouring her husband and daughter Kanya with lathis and Dharia. Lakha and Hari Kishan inflicted injuries on her. Accused Mohan also inflicted a lathi blow on her head. All the accused belaboured her husband and made him to fall on the ground. According to her, blood was oozing out from his head She further stated that wife of accused Banwari inflicted a lathi blow on the legs of her daughter Kanya. On her raising an alarm, Bhagwan, Dwarikalal and Chhotulal came there and saved them. She stated that accused Dev Raj had inflicted a Gandasi blow on the head of her husband. She further stated that it was not the Gandasi but `Kutia According to her the incident took place at 7.30 PM. (3). On the basis of aforesaid Parcha Bayan of Pana Bai (PW 2), the police registered a case for offence under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 323 and 324 IPC FIR Ex. P. 20 and proceeded with the investigation. Since injured Laxmi Narain Passed away while he was being shifted from Baran to Kota, the police added Section 302 IPC. (4). Having completed investigation, the police submitted a charges sheet against the accused persons. The learned trial Judge, on the basis of evidence and material on recorded framed the charges against the accused. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trail. In support of its case, the prosecution examined as many as 19 witnesses and got exhibited certain documents. Thereafter the accused were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. At the conclusion of trial, the learned trial Judge convicted and sentenced the accused appellants in the manner stated hereinabove. Hence this appeal. (5). The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trail. In support of its case, the prosecution examined as many as 19 witnesses and got exhibited certain documents. Thereafter the accused were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. At the conclusion of trial, the learned trial Judge convicted and sentenced the accused appellants in the manner stated hereinabove. Hence this appeal. (5). We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the impugned judgment and the evidence and material on record. (6). A perusal of the record shows that in all 7 accused persons namely, Banwari, Mohan Lal, Devraj, Tinkya, Purushottam, Laxmi Chand and Vimla Bai were charge sheeted. The learned trial Judge framed charges under Sections 148, 302, 323 and 325/149 IPC against appellant Dev Raj and under Sections 148, 302/149, 323 and 325/149 IPC as against rest of the accused persons including 3 appellants. At the conclusion of trial, the trial Judge did not believe the prosecution case as against accused Tinkya, Laxmi Chand @ Lakha and Vimla Bai and accordingly, while giving benefit of doubt, acquitted them of the offences charges with. In this view of the matter, since three accused have already been acquitted by the trial Judge, none of the appellants could have been convicted either for offence under Section 148 IPC or for any other offence with the aid of Section 149 IPC. It need be stated that even the trial Court has concluded that 3 appellants Devraj, Banwari, Mohan and accused Sheoji caused injuries on the person of Mst. Pana Bai, Ram Kanya, Sonu and deceased Laxmi Narain. Accused Sheoji has not been charge sheeted. The allegation against Purushottam was that he, at the point of gun, threatened the eye witnesses of dire consequences if they dare to intervene. However, no gun as such has been recovered from his possession and even there is no evidence to show that he used the gun alleged to be in his hands. The trial court has further concluded that relations between the complainant party and the accused party were not cordial and therefore, the possibility of over implication cannot be ruled out. However, no gun as such has been recovered from his possession and even there is no evidence to show that he used the gun alleged to be in his hands. The trial court has further concluded that relations between the complainant party and the accused party were not cordial and therefore, the possibility of over implication cannot be ruled out. That apart, it is also worthy to mention that according to the prosecution case itself, the incident took place all of a sudden at the time when members of the complainant side including the deceased while returning from their field reached in front of the house of accused Banwari. For the reasons therefore, the conviction of the appellants under Section 148 IPC and for other offences with the aid of Section 149 IPC cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside. (7). So far as conviction of the appellants under Section 325/149 IPC is concerned, it may be stated that injured eye witnesses have categorically deposed that it was accused Vimla who inflicted injury on the leg of Ram Kanya and this injury according to the medical report resulted in fracture of Tibia and Fibula bone. Since this injury on the leg of Ramkanya was attributed to accused Vimla and the learned trial Judge on critical analysis of the evidence has acquitted accused Vimla, the present appellants could not have been convicted for offence under Section 325 IPC with the aid of Section 149 IPC. (8). Similarly, none of the prosecution witnesses has attributed any role to any of the appellants. There is nothing on record to show that any of the appellants inflicted any injury on the persons of injured Pana Bai, Sonu and Ram Kanya so as to make out a case for offence under Section 323 IPC against them. As such the appellants could not have been convicted for offence under Section 323 IPC as well. (9). Now comes the conviction of appellant Devraj for offence under Section 302 IPC simpli-citor. Mr. Hasan learned counsel for the appellants strenuously contended that looking to the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the evidence brought on record, the case does not travel beyond Section 304 Part II IPC. Referring the medical evidence and the evidence of eye witnesses, Mr. Mr. Hasan learned counsel for the appellants strenuously contended that looking to the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the evidence brought on record, the case does not travel beyond Section 304 Part II IPC. Referring the medical evidence and the evidence of eye witnesses, Mr. Hasan submitted that it cannot reasonably be said that appellant Dev Raj inflicted a single blow by `Londi on the head of deceased with an intention to cause death or that he was knowing that this blow is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death of the deceased, inasmuch as the incident took place all of a sudden and appellant Devraj inflicted single blow and did not repeat further blow, for which he had an ample opportunity. (10). We have given our thoughtful consideration to the above argument. To bring the offence within the purview of Section 304 Part II IPC, what is required to be established is that the act of the accused was with the knowledge that it was likely to cause death but without intention to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause death. In the case at hand the prosecution has examined Pana Bai, Ramkanya and Sonu as eye witnesses of the incident who have also sustained injuries on their persons in the course of incident. PW 1 Pana Bai W/O deceased has deposed that accused Dev Raj inflicted a `Londi (stick wrapped with iron wires on its upper part) blow on the head of deceased Laxmi Narain. Another eye witness PW 7 Kanya, daughter of deceased has deposed that accused Devraj struck a Londi blow on the head of his father, as a result thereof, blood oozed out from his head. Yet another eye witness PW 12 Sonu, grand father of deceased has given similar statement that first of all accused appellant Devraj struck a Londi blow on the head of her grand-father Laxmi Narain. PW 11 Dr. N.D. Irani, conducted autopsy on the dead body. He noticed 4 injuries on the person of deceased including injury No. 3 i.e. lacerated wound of the size of 8 x 3 x 2 on left parietal region of head, which resulted in linear fracture. The post mortem report Ex. P. 19 discloses that cause of death of deceased was shock and haemorrhage due to injury. (11). He noticed 4 injuries on the person of deceased including injury No. 3 i.e. lacerated wound of the size of 8 x 3 x 2 on left parietal region of head, which resulted in linear fracture. The post mortem report Ex. P. 19 discloses that cause of death of deceased was shock and haemorrhage due to injury. (11). From the testimony of all the three injured eye witnesses, it is evident that appellant Devraj struck a single blow by Londi on the head of deceased and he did not repeat further blows, for which he had an ample opportunity. Had there been intention of the appellant to cause death of deceased, he would have inflicted much more blows. That apart, undisputedly, the incident took place all of a sudden at the time when the members of complainant party along with deceased while returning from their field reached infront of the house of accused Banwari. In this view of the matter, we are of the firm view that accused appellant Devraj neither intended to cause death of deceased not had the knowledge that the injury he has inflicted on the deceased is such that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, though it has factually so resulted in causing death of deceased Laxmi Narain. (12). The scenario in which appellant Devraj has been stated by the eye witnesses of the incident to have given one Londi blow on the head of deceased, it is difficult for us to hold that he gave the blow in question either with the intention of causing murder of deceased or with requisite knowledge that the death would otherwise be the inevitable result. In such a situation, while accepting the prosecution case qua appellant Devraj, we hold that he did not commit the offence under Section 302 IPC, but under Section 304 Part II IPC. We are fortified in our view by the law propounded by the Apex Court in Kunhayippu vs. State of Kerala (2000) 10 SCC 307 and in Camilo Vaz vs. State of Goa (2000) 9 SCC 1 ). In the first case the accused and deceased were in friendly mood when one asked for a glass of juice for the other. We are fortified in our view by the law propounded by the Apex Court in Kunhayippu vs. State of Kerala (2000) 10 SCC 307 and in Camilo Vaz vs. State of Goa (2000) 9 SCC 1 ). In the first case the accused and deceased were in friendly mood when one asked for a glass of juice for the other. Shortly thereafter while the deceased had left the shop of PW1, the accused went behind and gave the blow in question on the abdomen and further, the blow in question had been given from the back side and only a single blow had been given. In these circumstances, their Lordships were of the view that it is difficult for us to hold that the accused can be said to have the necessary intention of causing the murder of deceased while giving the blow in question, though ultimately the blow had become fatal. In the later case, the accused hit a danda on the head of deceased with such force that deceased fell down and later succumbed to his injury. The Apex Court found that there was no evidence to show that appellant was bent upon killing the deceased. In these circumstances their Lordships held that the act of the appellant in hitting the deceased was done with the knowledge that it was likely to cause death but without any intention to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause death. Again in Bhera vs. State of Rajasthan (2000) 10 SCC 225 , the accused while quarreling suddenly brought out a knife in anger and struck a knife blow on the chest of the deceased, which resulted in death of the deceased. Their Lordships, in these circumstances, held that it cannot be said that the accused gave knife blow with the requisite intention of causing murder of deceased and accordingly the accused was convicted under Section 304 Part II IPC. (13). On the question of sentence, learned counsel for the appellant contended that in the facts and circumstances of the case, and the manner in which the incident took place, some leniency may be extended to the appellants and they may be sentenced to the period already undergone by them. (14). We have considered the above argument. (13). On the question of sentence, learned counsel for the appellant contended that in the facts and circumstances of the case, and the manner in which the incident took place, some leniency may be extended to the appellants and they may be sentenced to the period already undergone by them. (14). We have considered the above argument. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, the manner in which the incident took place, the fact that appellant Devraj never wanted to kill the deceased, as also the fact that the appellant inflicted one blow on the head of deceased and did not repeat the blows and further that the incident took place all of a sudden, we deem that ends of justice would be met if appellant Devraj is sentenced to the term already undergone by him. (15). For the reasons aforesaid, we dispose of instant appeals in the following terms: (i) We allow the appeals of appellants Mohan Lal, Purshottam and Banwari and acquit them of the charges under Sections 302/149, 148, 323 and 325/149 IPC. Appellants Mohan Lal and Purushottam are on bail, they need not surrender and their bail bonds stand discharged. Appellant Banwari, who is in jail, shall be set at liberty forthwith, if not required to be detained in any other case. (ii) We partly allow the appeal of appellant Devraj and instead of Section 302, we convict him under Section 304 Part II IPC. In view of the fact that appellant Devraj has already suffered the sentence for a period of more than seven years and two months, the ends of justice would be met in sentencing him to the period already undergone by him in confinement. We however acquit him of the charges under Sections 148, 323 and 325/149 IPC. Appellant Devraj, who is in jail, shall be set at liberty forthwith, if not required to be detained in any case. (iii) The impugned judgment or trial court stands modified as indicated above.