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2006 DIGILAW 773 (RAJ)

Moti Lal Joshi v. State of Rajasthan

2006-03-07

PREM SHANKAR ASOPA, S.N.JHA

body2006
Judgment S.N. Jha, CJ.-These two writ petitions were heard together and are disposed of by this common order. 2. The petitioners are directed against the common order of the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal (in short the Tribunal) dated 011.1993 rejecting the appeals of the petitioners. The petitioners had approached the Tribunal seeking direction to regularize their services as Teacher Grade III in Panchayat Smit Umrain, District Alwar. By the impugned order the Tribunal rejected their appeals holding that they are not entitled to the relief . 3. The dispute lies in narrow campass. Briefly stated, facts of the case are that petitioners were appointed respectively on 01.08.1985 and 011.1985 as ad hoc teacher Grade III for a period of six moths or till selected candidates are available. In course of time their services were terminated on 27.06.1987. They preferred writ petition being S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1738/1987. By order dated 03.02.1993, a learned Judge of this Court allowed the writ petition and set-aside the order dated 27.06.1987 as being illegal. Pursuant to the said order the petitioners were re-instated. However, even though they continued in service, they were paid fixed salary. In the meantime the petitioners approached his Court seeking direction to regularise their services. 4. Regularisation is often understood to mean regularization of service i.e., making the service permanent. Sometimes the term is used in the sense of granting regular scale of pay. In the instant case the petitioners stand reinstated pursuant to the order of this Court dated 012.1993 in Writ Petition No. 1738/1987. Their permanent status at this stage cannot be questioned. In the facts and circumstances, their grievance is limited to grant of scale. The controversy apparent arose on account of their initial appointment on ad hoc basis but the question is whether their employment can still be called ad hoc despite passage of twenty years. 5. We may notice the decision of a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Rudra Kumar Sain & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors., 2000 (8) SCC 25 . While considering the nature of ad hoc/fortuitous/stopgap appointment, the Court noticed the meaning of the terms in various Law Dictionaries. We may usefully notice the meaning of ad hoc as noticed by their Lordships. The expression ad hoc in Blacks Law Dictionary means "something which is formed for a particular purpose". While considering the nature of ad hoc/fortuitous/stopgap appointment, the Court noticed the meaning of the terms in various Law Dictionaries. We may usefully notice the meaning of ad hoc as noticed by their Lordships. The expression ad hoc in Blacks Law Dictionary means "something which is formed for a particular purpose". In Oxford Dictionary, ad hoc means "for a particular purpose; specially". In P. Ramanatha Aiyars Law Lexicon (2nd Edn.) ad hoc is described as "For particular purpose. Made, established, acting or concerned with a particular (sic) and or purpose." After noticing the definitions their Lordships observed that if the appointment order itself indicates that the post is created to meet a particular temporary contingency and for a period specified in the order, then the appointment to such a post can be aptly described as "ad hoc" or "stopgap". If a post is created to meet a situation which has suddenly arisen on account of happening of some event of a temporary nature then the appointment of such a post can aptly be described as "fortuitous" in nature. If an appointment is made to meet the contingency arising on account of delay in completing the process of regular recruitment to the post due to any reason and it is not possible to leave the post vacant till then, and to meet this contingency an appointment is made then it can appropriately be called as a "stapgap" arrangement and appointment in the post as "ad hoc appointment". 6. The following observation appears to be more apposite in the instant case. "In service jurisprudence, a person who possesses the requisite qualification for being appointed to a particular post and then he is appointed with the approval and consultation of the appropriate authority and continues the post for a fairly long period, then such an appointment cannot be held to be "stopgap or fortuitous or purely ad hoc." (emphasis added) 7. In the instant case, the petitioners were appointed in 1985. By now they have completed 20 years in service. Their services were sought to be terminated at one point but this Court came to their rescue and set aside the order. We do not think the label of ad hoc with which they came to be appointed in the year 1985 would continue sine die and they should be regarded as ad hoc teachers for all times to come. Their services were sought to be terminated at one point but this Court came to their rescue and set aside the order. We do not think the label of ad hoc with which they came to be appointed in the year 1985 would continue sine die and they should be regarded as ad hoc teachers for all times to come. Their position having become permanent with the passage of time and by reason of their continued officiation, the question is whether they can be denied the pay in the time scale of pay admissible to Teacher Grade III. There is no dispute that though called ad hoc teachers, they perform the same functions and discharge same duties as regular teachers. 8. It was stated on behalf of respondents that the petitioners are now being paid Rs. 4,000/-but admittedly that is the revised corresponding pay of the pay at which the petitioners were initially appointed in 1985. It was also submitted on behalf of the respondent that long continuation of the petitioners cannot be a ground to give them same pay as admissible to regular teachers. It was submitted that the petitioners do not possess the requisite qualification and lack of qualification is a relevant factor for denying parity of pay. 9. From the Judgment in Writ Petition No. 1738/97 it appears that question of eligibility of petitioners was one of the issues raised on behalf of the respondents, and the same was answered in the negative in these words:- "In my opinion, in the light of the circulars issued by the Government including the circular dated 28.09.1991, it is not open to the respondents to plead that the petitioners are in-eligible for appointment as General Teachers." 10. In view of the above finding the respondents cannot question the eligibility of the petitioners at this stage, nor it is permissible for this Court to re-open the issue as the Judgment attained finality between the parties. The question of eligibility of a person is undoubtedly a relevant consideration but it cannot be allowed to be raised in view of the inter-party finding. The finding is binding on the respondents vis a vis the petitioners. The respondents can take this plea in other cases but not in the case of the petitioners. 11. The question of eligibility of a person is undoubtedly a relevant consideration but it cannot be allowed to be raised in view of the inter-party finding. The finding is binding on the respondents vis a vis the petitioners. The respondents can take this plea in other cases but not in the case of the petitioners. 11. The up-shot of the discussions is that the status of the petitioners must be held to be permanent by reason of their long continuance in service and they cannot be treated as ad hoc teachers nor they can be denied the regular salary of the posts in the time scale of pay admissible to their counter part regular teachers of the school. 12. It is clarified, to avoid any controversy in future that the entitlement of the petitioners is to be worked out from the date of decision in Writ Petition No. 1738/87 i.e., 03.02.1993. 13. The claim of the petitioners is accordingly upheld to the extent and in the manner indicated above and the petitions are allowed. 14. Before parting with the case, we may clarify that this order had been passed in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, and the order will not be cited as a precedent in other cases.