Judgment ( 1. ) UNSUCCESSFUL plaintiff, who has lost from both the two Courts below has assailed the judgment and decree of the two Courts below by filing this second appeal. ( 2. ) THE plaintiff/appellant filed suit for declaration and possession of Bhumiswami right in respect to certain agricultural land, the description whereof has been mentioned in the plaint and in the relief clause of the plaint. The defendants denied the averments made in the plaint as a result of which the Trial Court framed necessary issues and after recording the evidence dismissed the suit. An appeal which was filed by the plaintiff before the First Appellate Court was also dismissed. ( 3. ) DURING the pendency of the first appeal, a compromise was arrived at between the parties out of the Court and an agreement in that regard was executed and the parties put their thumb impression agreeing the terms of the compromise. That agreement (Ex. P-1) was placed before the First Appellate Court. Since the compromise was arrived at between the parties, the plaintiff/appellant submitted an application on 6-2-1989 under Order XXIII Rule 3, CPC before the Appellate Court praying therein that since the lawful compromise had been arrived at between the parties on 4-2-1988, therefore, the decree in terms of the compromise may be passed. The terms and conditions of the compromise have been mentioned in the agreement (Ex. P-1) as well as in Para 1 of the application under Order XXIII Rule 3, CPC, which reads thus: 1- ;g fd mijksdr kh"kzd nhokuh vihy laca/kh fo"k;olrqoknxzlr Hkwfe ds laca/k esa vihykav ,oa fjlikamsav-l dschp vkilh jkthukek fnukad 4and2and88 dks bl izdkj gks x;kgs fd oknxzlr Hkwfe ukeh mij dks dqaok esa vihykav dk1@3 fgllk gs A vksj vc fjlikamsav-l mdr oknxzlr Hkwfe esa ls vihykav dk 1@3 fgllk mls nsus ds fy;s rs;kj gs Aftldh jftlvz-h fjlikamsav-l] vihykav ds gd esa djknsosaxs A jftlv-zh dk [kpkz vihykav ,oa fjlikamsav-logu djsaxs A oknxzlr Hkwfe esa [kqns dqa,wa dk [kpkzvihykav ,oa fjlikamsav-l leku Hkkx esa ogu djsaxs Avihykav dqavkwa gsrq dtz yh xbz jde esa ls 1000 @and :i;kcsad dks vnk djsxk A fo|qr iai dh jde esa jsgv dh jdeewtjk dj ks"k jde esa 1@3 fgllk vihykav] fjlikamsav-ldks vnk djsxk A ( 4. ) THE respondents/defendants denied the averments made in the application of compromise as a result of which the Appellate Court recorded the evidence of the, parties. Appellant - Diviya examined himself and proved the agreement executed between the parties and the same was placed on record as Ex. P-1 before the Appellate Court. Beside his own statement, appellant also examined Bhan Singh, Maheep Singh and Jalam. Defendant Pyarelal examined himself and also examined one Brijlal. The First Appellate Court vide its order dated 12-4-1990, after X-raying the evidence and the agreement Ex. P-1, though came to the conclusion that the parties did compromise the matter out of the Court on 4-2-1988 and a document of agreement in that regard Ex. P-1 was executed, but, since the plaintiff did not comply the terms of the agreement, therefore, compromise cannot be accepted and eventually dismissed the application of compromise dated 6-2-1989 filed under Order XXIII, Rule 3, CPC. ( 5. ) THEREAFTER, learned First Appellate Court heard the appeal on its merit and dismissed the same by the impugned judgment and decree. Hence, this second appeal has been filed by the plaintiff. ( 6. ) THIS Court on 22-10-1991 admitted the second appeal on following substantial questions of law: (1) Whether after having held that a lawful compromise had been entered into between the parties, the Lower Appellate Court committed error in law in refusing to pass a decree in terms of the compromise under Order 23, Rule 3, CPC ? (2) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the impugned judgment of the Lower Appellate Court stands vitiated ? ( 7. ) I have heard Shri Chandrahas Dubey, learned Counsel for the appellant and Shri R. K. Samaiya, learned Counsel for respondents. Regarding Substantial Question of Law No. 1: ( 8. ) IT has been submitted by Shri Dubey, learned Counsel for appellant that after scanning the document of agreement Ex. P-l and after the close scrutiny of the evidence recorded on compromise application, the First Appellate Court arrived at a conclusion that there was a compromise between the parties. On 4- 2-1988 a document of agreement Ex. P-1 was executed between the parties mentioning the conditions and terms of the compromise. According to learned First Appellate Court the plaintiff failed to comply the conditions embodied in the agreement Ex. On 4- 2-1988 a document of agreement Ex. P-1 was executed between the parties mentioning the conditions and terms of the compromise. According to learned First Appellate Court the plaintiff failed to comply the conditions embodied in the agreement Ex. P-l as he did not pay the requisite amount as contained in the agreement Ex. P-l, therefore, the application of compromise cannot be allowed and eventually the same was rejected. By placing reliance on the Division Bench decision of this Court Durga Prasad v. Bhaggo Bai 1961 JLJ 1285, learned Counsel for appellant has submitted that once the Court has come to the conclusion that a lawful compromise has been arrived at between the parties a decree must be passed in accordance therewith, irrespective of whether the condition of compromise has been implemented or not. According to learned Counsel if any of the condition mentioned in compromise has not been implemented, the other party may have right to put the decree to execution. But in any case, the Court cannot reject the compromise application if the compromise had arrived at between the parties by a lawful agreement. By placing reliance on the decision of Supreme Court in Jineshwardas (D) by L. Rs. and Ors. v. Smt. Jagrani and Anr. 2003 (4) M. P. H. T. 52 (SC), it has been submitted by learned Counsel that the agreement of compromise was in writing and all the parties but their thumb impression. The compromise was also lawful and therefore the First Appellate Court erred in substantial error of law in not allowing the application under Order XXIII, Rule 3, CPC. ( 9. ) ON the other hand, it has been submitted by Shri Samaiya, learned Counsel for the respondents that the decision of Durga Prasad (supra) is not applicable in the present factual scenario, because, implementation of the conditions is one thing while the compliance of the conditions embodied in the agreement (Ex. P-1), on the other hand is altogether different, and therefore, the decision of Durga Prasad (supra), is not applicable in the present case. It has also been argued by learned Counsel that the agreement of compromise (Ex. P-l) is suspicious for the simple reason that it was not produced in the Court for a considerable long period and it was submitted only on 6-2-1989 though the compromise agreement is dated 4-2-1988. It has also been argued by learned Counsel that the agreement of compromise (Ex. P-l) is suspicious for the simple reason that it was not produced in the Court for a considerable long period and it was submitted only on 6-2-1989 though the compromise agreement is dated 4-2-1988. In order to substantiate his argument, learned Counsel has placed reliance on Single Bench decision of this Court Ramavtar v. Ramavtar 1985 MPWN 280 . While placing reliance on the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) by L. Rs. [2001 ]251 ITR84 (SC ), JT2001 (2 )SC 407 , (2001 )2 MLJ69 (SC ), 2001 (3 )MPHT71 , 2001 (1 ) SCALE712 , (2001 )3 SCC179 , [2001 ]1 SCR948 , it has been argued by learned Counsel that the substantial question of law framed, indeed is not a substantial question of law. According to the learned Counsel, it is not even a question of law, because the First Appellate Court, after appreciating the evidence came to the conclusion that the conditions embodied in the agreement (Ex. P-l) were not complied with and, therefore, the First Appellate Court rightly rejected the application filed by the appellant under Order XXIII, Rule 3, CPC. ( 10. ) CONSIDERED the rival contentions of learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. ( 11. ) ON going through the order dated 12-4-1990 of the First Appellate Court by which the application of plaintiff/appellant filed under Order XXIII, Rule 3, CPC, dated 6-2-1989 was dealt with and was dismissed, it is gathered from Paras 10 to 12 that the compromise was arrived at between the parties and a document of agreement (Ex. P-1) was executed in that regard. The First Appellate Court on the basis of the evidence came to the conclusion that the plaintiff has not complied with the conditions embodied in the agreement Ex. P-1, therefore, the decree in terms of compromise application cannot be passed. There is no finding of the First Appellate Court in the said order that the compromise so arrived at between the parties was not lawful. Learned Counsel for the respondent also could not point out that the terms of the compromise were not lawful in order to draw a decree in terms of compromise as envisaged under Order 23, Rule 3, CPC. Learned Counsel for the respondent also could not point out that the terms of the compromise were not lawful in order to draw a decree in terms of compromise as envisaged under Order 23, Rule 3, CPC. I have also gone through the terms of the compromise which are embodied in the agreement (Ex. P-l), dated 6-2-1988 and the same has been reproduced in the compromise application filed by plaintiff under Order XXIII, Rule 3, CPC, dated 6-2-1989 and after going through the conditions, I am of the firm opinion that the conditions which are embodied are lawful. There is a finding of fact of the First Appellate Court that the compromise had arrived at between the parties. The terms embodied in the compromise are also lawful. ( 12. ) THE First Appellate Court dismissed the compromise application of plaintiff and refused to pass a decree in terms of the compromise for the simple reason that the plaintiff did not comply the condition mention in the agreement (Ex. P-l) as he did not pay the requisite amount mentioned in Ex. P-l. In the case of Durga Prasad (supra), almost similar situation was there, a compromise was arrived at between the parties, but certain conditions were not complied with. In that situation, the Division Bench of this Court held that as soon as the Court comes to the conclusion that there had been a lawful compromise a decree must be passed in accordance therewith, irrespective of whether it has been implemented or not. The Division Bench further came to hold that if the terms mentioned in the agreement has not been implemented, the decree can be put to execution and if there is any extraneous agreement the remedy is by way of a separate suit for its enforcement. It would be apposite to quote Para 17 of the said decision, which reads as under: 17. What is to be seen under Order 23, Rule 3, CPC is whether a compromise has really been reached or not. As soon as the Court finds that there has been a lawful compromise, a decree must be passed in accordance therewith, irrespective of whether it has been implemented or not. Likewise, a separate agreement subsequent to the compromise cannot be as impediment to the recording of the compromise and passing a decree in accordance with it. As soon as the Court finds that there has been a lawful compromise, a decree must be passed in accordance therewith, irrespective of whether it has been implemented or not. Likewise, a separate agreement subsequent to the compromise cannot be as impediment to the recording of the compromise and passing a decree in accordance with it. If the Court finds that a compromise is not implemented, as alleged, the decree based on the compromise can be put to execution. If there is any extraneous agreement, the remedy is by way of a separate suit for its enforcement. In this view of the matter, I see no technical or procedural error in the passing of the decree appealed against. The Division Bench decision of Durga Prasad (supra), is squarely applicable in the present case. ( 13. ) SINCE the First Appellate Court came to the conclusion that the appellant had not paid the requisite amount mentioned in Ex. P-1, at the most the First Appellate Court could have passed the decree putting a rider that the appellant should deposit the said amount. But, once having arrived at a finding by the First Appellate Court that there is a lawful compromise arrived at between the parties, there was no option left to the First Appellate Court, except to pass a decree in terms of the compromise. ( 14. ) THE decision of Ramavtar (supra), placed reliance by learned Counsel for the respondent is not applicable at all in the present case. In that case, the compromise was found to be suspicious. However, in the present case, there is a definite finding of the First Appellate Court that the compromise has been arrived at between the parties. ( 15. ) IN the case of Sourendra Nath Mitra and Ors. v. Tarubala Dasi AIR 1930 Privy Council 158, it has been held that an agreement to compromise a suit must be established by general principles which govern the formation of contracts. Their Lordships further came to hold that the words of Rule 3 of Order XXIII do not in terms appear to confer a discretion on the Court in recording a compromise and passing decree according to it. Their Lordships further came to hold that the words of Rule 3 of Order XXIII do not in terms appear to confer a discretion on the Court in recording a compromise and passing decree according to it. But, without deciding whether discretion is inherent or not even if the discretion is inherent, where no injustice of any kind is established, and it is established that the suit had been adjusted either wholly or in part by a lawful compromise, it is the duty of the Court to record the agreement and pass a decree in accordance therewith. In the present case also, there is a lawful compromise and there is a categorical finding of the Court that the compromise was arrived at between the parties and a document of agreement in terms of compromise (Ex. P-l) was also executed and, therefore, it was the duty of the Court to pass a decree in terms to the compromise. ( 16. ) ON going through the wordings of Order XXIII, Rule 3, CPC, I am of the firm view if the terms and conditions of compromise are lawful, and the parties have arrived the compromise willfully, in that situation the Courts has no option, except to pass a decree in terms of the compromise. ( 17. ) THE Supreme Court in the case of K. Venkata Seshiah v. Kandru Ramasubbamma JT1991 (1 )SC 642 , (1991 )2 MLJ1 (SC ), 1991 (1 ) SCALE257 , (1991 )3 SCC338 , [1991 ]1 SCR538 , 1991 (1 )UJ538 (SC ), has held that if the compromise is lawful the same has to be acted upon, the Court has no option except to pass a decree in terms of the compromise. In the given case, I am of the firm opinion that there had been a lawful compromise and because Order XXIII, Rule 3, CPC, did not authorize the Court to refuse to record the compromise hence the application of compromise, which has been rejected by the First Appellate Court by its order dated 12-4-1990 is in total contravention to Order XXIII, Rule 3, CPC, and thus the First Appellate Court has committed a substantial error of law. The decision of Santosh Hazari (supra), placed reliance by learned Counsel for the respondent also says that this Court gets jurisdiction under Section 100, CPC, only when there is a substantial question of law. The decision of Santosh Hazari (supra), placed reliance by learned Counsel for the respondent also says that this Court gets jurisdiction under Section 100, CPC, only when there is a substantial question of law. I have already held hereinabove that by dismissing the application under Order XXIII, Rule 3, CPC, by First Appellate Court when the compromise arrived at between the parties was lawful and there is a finding that compromise, indeed, was arrived at between the parties, the First Appellate Court erred in substantial error of law. ( 18. ) THE substantial question of law No. 1 is thus answered that the Appellate Court committed substantial error of law in refusing to pass a decree in terms of compromise under Order XXIII, Rule 3, CPC, after having arrived at a conclusion that a lawful compromise had been entered into between the parties. Regarding substantial question of law No. 2: ( 19. ) AS I have held hereinabove that the First Appellate Court committed a substantial error of law in not passing a decree in terms of compromise, therefore, the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court is vitiated. The substantial question of law No. 2 is answered accordingly. ( 20. ) IN the result, appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the two Courts below are set aside. The compromise application filed by appellant/plaintiff before First Appellate Court is hereby accepted and allowed on the terms mentioned in it. The decree is passed in terms of compromise. The terms of compromise shall be the part of the decree. The applicant is hereby directed to deposit the requisite amount mentioned in agreement dated 4-2-1988 (Ex. P-1) on or before 31-10-2006 before the Trial Court. In case the appellant fails to deposit the said amount, respondents shall be free to put the compromise decree in execution in order to realize the said amount. ( 21. ) LOOKING to the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.