JUDGMENT Amitava Roy, J. 1. The Assam Amusements and Betting Tax (Amendment) Act, 2001, introducing film surcharge and enhancing the rate of show tax, have been greeted with a challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 3 and 4 thereof, by the entertainment providers in cinematograph exhibition. The Assam Branch of the Eastern India Motion Picture Association (hereinafter referred to as the 'EMPA'), claiming itself as the sentinel of the rights and interests of the producers, distributors, exhibitors and others involved in the film industry of the State holds the cudgel. 2. This Court, while, issuing notice on 06.03.2002, stayed the realization of the levies in terms of the amended legislation. 3. I have heard Mr. S.S. Dey, learned Counsel for the Petitioner and Mr. D. Saikia, learned Standing counsel, Finance Department for the Respondents. 4. The factual foundation of the Petitioner's assailment is laid in its pleadings. It is admitted that the cinema houses in the State, are subjected to taxation as prescribed by the Assam Amusements and Betting Tax Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act' or 'Principal Act'), originally enacted by the provincial legislature in exercise of powers conferred on it by Entry-50 of List-II of the Government of India Act, 1935. After the forming of the Constitution, the legislative authority to levy taxes on luxuries including taxes on entertainment, amusement, betting and gambling has been located in Entry-62 of List-II of the Seventh Schedule thereof. Section 3 of the Act, provides for tax on payments for admission, inter alia, to cinematograph exhibition. The levy of show tax in addition to entertainment tax was introduced by Section 3A vide Assam Act-II of 1950. Thereafter, both the statutory provisions have undergone amendments. While, the entertainment tax imposed on payment for admission to cinematograph exhibition is 50% of such payment, if it is Re. 1/- or less in the minimum and 100% of such payment, if the same is more than Rs. 2/-, the existing rate of show tax before the impugned amendment was 10% per show of the total payment for admission received excluding the amount of tax payable under the Act or Rs. 10, whichever was less. This tax is levied and recovered from the proprietor of the cinematograph exhibition. 2/-, the existing rate of show tax before the impugned amendment was 10% per show of the total payment for admission received excluding the amount of tax payable under the Act or Rs. 10, whichever was less. This tax is levied and recovered from the proprietor of the cinematograph exhibition. The Assam Amusement and Betting Tax (Amendment) Act, 2001 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Amending Act'), which received the assent of the Governor on 21.03.2001 and thereafter published in the Assam Gazette Extraordinary on 29.03.2001, not only inter alia occasioned an amendment in the definition of "entertainment" engrafted in Section 2(4) thereof, but also introduced a surcharge named and styled as "film surcharge" at the rate of 20% of the entertainment tax in addition to the said tax by inserting Clause (e) in Section 3(1) of the Principal Act. Section 3A of the Principal Act, also underwent an amendment enhancing the minimum rate of show tax payable to Rs. 100/- instead of Rs. 10/-. According to the Petitioner, the imposition of film surcharge lacks authority in law, inasmuch as no machinery provisions has been prescribed for the collection, deposit and other ancillary activities. The Petitioner has construed the levy as a fee, distinguished from a tax contending the same to be without jurisdiction in absence of any corresponding service. The amendment bearing on the show tax has been impeached to be prohibitory and discriminatory against the cinema industry of the State in general and the cinema hall owners thereof, in particular. The cable television network as well as the other electronic devices for entertainment having been excluded from the purview of the said impost, the Petitioner has underlined that the amendments, if enforced would lead to imminent closure of the cinema halls, in the face of the growing market of pirated videocassettes and video compact discs causing serious inroads into the business prospects of the film exhibitors. The Petitioner has branded the show tax to be a tax on the income of a cinema hall exhibitor derived from the payment to admission collected from the cinegoers after defraying the Government revenue. This has been denounced as beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature. The Petitioner has branded the show tax to be a tax on the income of a cinema hall exhibitor derived from the payment to admission collected from the cinegoers after defraying the Government revenue. This has been denounced as beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature. On the promulgation of the Amending Act, the members of the Petitioner association submitted representations before the jurisdictional Superintendent of Taxes, as well as the Commissioner of Taxes pleading the above, whereupon, the departmental minister on 16.10.2001, as an interim measure suspended the collection of the levies at the increased rate in consequence of which the realization of film surcharge and the enhanced show tax was kept in abeyance. The cinema hall owners, however, continued to pay show tax at the prevailing rate of 10% per show. It was subsequent thereto, that the concerned Superintendents of Taxes served notices on the cinema halls requiring them to deposit the outstanding tax in terms of the Amending Act with retrospective effect on and from 29.03.2001. The Petitioner associations representation before the Commissioner & Secretary, Finance Department having failed to evoke any response, it has carried the impugnment to this Court. 5. In the written response of the Respondents, the amendments under challenge have been endorsed pleading that "film surcharge" was pursuant to a State Cabinet's decision to create a corpus with the Assam State Film (Finance and Development) Corporation for financing the production of regional films. The surcharge was to be utilized for the cause of encouraging the production of such films and was proposed to be collected for a period of five years, where after, it would automatically stand discontinued. The enhancement of the rate of show tax was sought to be justified contending that the ceiling of Rs. 10/- in the unamended provision had been fixed in the year, 1968 and with the depreciation in money value over the years, the enhancement of the minimum limit to Rs. 100/- was not arbitrary, more particularly, the rate of show tax at 10% earlier prescribed having been retained. According to the answering Respondents, the modalities for charging, collecting and paying the levies having been provided in Section 3(1)(e) itself, the contention of want of a machinery provision, therefor, is wholly untenable. 100/- was not arbitrary, more particularly, the rate of show tax at 10% earlier prescribed having been retained. According to the answering Respondents, the modalities for charging, collecting and paying the levies having been provided in Section 3(1)(e) itself, the contention of want of a machinery provision, therefor, is wholly untenable. Moreover, by the Assam Amusement and Betting Act (Amendment) Rules 2002, (hereinafter referred to as the 'Amending Rules') the procedure in particular for payment of film surcharge has been provided for collection and payment. The revenue has asserted that in terms of the statutory provisions, the proprietor of the cinema halls could collect film surcharge by charging the same in the admission ticket itself like the service tax. The Respondents have maintained that the film surcharge is essentially a tax on the act of entertainment squarely within the scope of Entry-62 of List-II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and not a fee. They have dismissed the challenge of want of legislative competence qua show tax asserting that it being one on the act of entertainment involved in a show is also encompassed in the above entry. Individual notices served on the cinema hall owners by the respective Superintendent of Taxes demanding payments in terms of the Amending Act, have been justified citing rejection of the representations on which the realization of the impugned levies had been temporarily suspended. 6. Mr. Dey, has urged that the statute being silent about the mode of charging, levying and collecting the film surcharge, it suffers from the vice of vagueness and unpredictability and being violative of the essence of Article 265 of the Constitution of India, Section 3(1)(e) of the Principal Act, is non est, null and void. As admittedly, the Assam Amusements and Betting Tax(Amending) Rules, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Amending Rules'), had come into effect from 17.08.2002, there being no machinery provision for the collection and levy of the film surcharge in between, the impugned impost is not realizable in law. According to the learned Counsel, even the provisions of the Amending Rules, more particularly, Rule 5 thereof, do not refer to any prescribed procedure under the Act for the said purpose either. According to the learned Counsel, even the provisions of the Amending Rules, more particularly, Rule 5 thereof, do not refer to any prescribed procedure under the Act for the said purpose either. As in terms of the interim order passed by this Court on 06.03.2002, realization of the film surcharge and the show tax at the enhanced rate had been stayed, no amount under the above heads is exactable as on date, the amount on account of payment for admission being non-collectable from the concerned cinegoers at this distant point of time. Mr. Dey, contended that the show tax by its very nature is a levy on income and thus is beyond the legislative competence of the State being within the domain of Entry-82 of List-I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. As cinema in the present day context compared to the distant past is no longer a luxury but an item of necessity, show tax as a levy on luxury is not comprehended in Entry-62 of List-II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India Considering the pitiful and distressed condition of the cinema houses in the State following the colossal losses suffered due to growing incursion in their business by entertainments through cable television network and other electronic devices as well as pirated video materials, cinematograph exhibition in the halls can by no means be construed to be an item of luxury and entertainment drawing it within the ambit of Entry-62 of List-II, he urged. Mr. Dey, was emphatic in contending that show tax being exactable on the amount realized byway of payment for admission, it is outrightly a levy on income and is thus beyond the competence of the State Legislature. Without prejudice to the above, the learned Counsel has assailed the validity of the sharp enhancement in the rate of show tax to be arbitrary, illogical, excessive and unconstitutional. The minimum ceiling of such tax having been hiked by 100% of the earlier impost, if is exorbitant and oppressive rendering it unsustainable in law, he urged. Mr. Dey to buttress his arguments relied on the decisions of the Apex Court in Bhagwan Das Jain v. Union of India and Ors. (1981) 2 SCC 135 , Elel Hotels and Investments Limited and Ors v. Union of India, (1989) 3 SCC 698 , Godfrey Phillips India Ltd. and Anr. Mr. Dey to buttress his arguments relied on the decisions of the Apex Court in Bhagwan Das Jain v. Union of India and Ors. (1981) 2 SCC 135 , Elel Hotels and Investments Limited and Ors v. Union of India, (1989) 3 SCC 698 , Godfrey Phillips India Ltd. and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors. (2005) 2 SCC 515 and of this Court in Gauhati Municipal Corpn. Contractors Association v. The Guwahati Municipal Corpn. Guwahati 1996 (1) GLT 385. 7. Controverting the above, Mr. Saikia, with reference to the relevant provisions of the Act pleaded that the procedure for charging levying and collecting the film surcharge and the show tax being adequately provided in the statute itself, the charge to the contrary, is per se untenable. Moreover, the draft rules following the Amending Act, published as far back as on 17.08.2002, not having elicited any objection thereto, the Amending Rules had been framed in the year 2004 and its is therefore, idle to contend the absence thereof. The relevant provisions of the Amending Act and the Rules being sufficiently demonstrative of the procedure to charge levy and collect the film surcharge and the show tax, the purported grievance bearing on want of adequate machinery provisions is unfounded, he urged. The levy of film surcharge being as a consequence of a conscious policy decision to provide a fillip to the regional film industry, the same cannot logically be denounced as arbitrary, discriminatory and unconstitutional. Moreover, as the impost is of a temporary nature limited in duration, the challenge thereto, is visibly unsustainable in law. Mr. Saikia, has further urged that show tax is out and out a levy on entertainment and amusement and not on the income of the cinematograph exhibitors and therefore, the impugned provisions of the Amending Act do not suffer from want of legislative competence. He reasted his submissions on the decisions of the Apex Court in Western India Theatres Limited v. Cantonment Board, Poona AIR 1959 SC 582 , Y.V. Srinivasamurthy and Ors. v. State of Mysore and Anr. AIR 1959 SC 894 Liberty Talkies and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Ors. (1971) 1 SCC 471 and Venkateswara Theatre v. State of A.P. and Ors. (1993) 3 SCC 677 . 8. v. State of Mysore and Anr. AIR 1959 SC 894 Liberty Talkies and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Ors. (1971) 1 SCC 471 and Venkateswara Theatre v. State of A.P. and Ors. (1993) 3 SCC 677 . 8. Before deliving into the merit of the rival contentions, it would be appropriate to notice the schematic layout of the Act and the Rules, having a bearing thereon. The Act, as the statements of objects and reasons, therefore indicate, is a legislation to augment the financial resources of the province by the imposition of tax on amusements and certain forms of betting considered as luxuries. The preamble recites it to be an enactment to make an addition to the public revenue of Assam by imposing a tax on entertainments and other amusements and on certain forms of betting. Section 2(1) defines "admission" to include admission as a spectator or as one of an audience and admission for the purpose of amusement by taking part in an entertainment. "Admission to entertainment" under Section 2(2) includes admission to anyplace in which the entertainment is held. The more comprehensive definition of "entertainment" after the amendment last effected is as hereunder: 2(4) "Entertainment" includes any exhibition, performance, amusements, game or sport, music, cultural and dramatic performances, entertainment by electronic devices and entertainment by cable television network or a series of exhibitions, performances, amusements, games or sports, cultural and dramatic performances, entertainment by electronic device and entertainment by cable television network, to which persons are admitted for payment, and the continuity of which is either broken or unbroken as the case may be, or is only broken by such intervals as are in the opinion of the State Government a normal or usual feature thereof. Section 2(7) of the impugned Act, defines payment for admission: 2(7)"Payment for admission" includes any payment made by a person who having been admitted to one part of a place of entertainment is subsequently admitted to another part thereof, for admission to which a payment involving a tax or a higher rate of tax is required, and any payment for seats or other accommodation in a place of entertainment and also includes any payment for cable service and payment made in any manner for an entertainment by any modern electronic devices. Section 2(8) defines "Proprietor" in relation to any entertainment, as the owner including the manager, organizer and any person responsible for, or, for the time being in the charge of the management thereof. The relevant excerpts of Section 3, which deals with tax on payment for admission to entertainments also deserve to be quoted as hereinbelow: 3. Tax on payments for admission to entertainments. (1)(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act there shall as from the date on which this Act comes into force, be charged, levied, and paid to the Government of Assam a tax, hereinafter referred to as the entertainments tax, on all payments for admission to any theatre, cinematograph exhibition, or circus or any class of entertainment to which the State Government may apply this Sub-section at the rates specified below. (b) In the case of cinematograph exhibition, where the payment of admission is: (i) Rupee one or less-fifty percentum of such payment; (ii) rupees two or less but more than rupee one - eighty percentum of such payment; (iii) more than rupees two - one hundred percentum of such payment: Provide that the maximum ceiling of such tickets including tax shall not exceed rupees twenty in case of cinematograph exhibition. (d) Notwithstanding anything contained hereinbefore in the Sub-section, a tax at the rate of twenty percentum shall be charged and paid to the Government of Assam on any enhancement of the existing payment for admission as service-charge. Such service-charge shall not exceed. (i) Rupee one per ticket where the existing payment for admission is below rupees three; (ii) Rupee one and fifty paise per ticket where the existing payment for admission is rupees three and above. (e) In case of cinematograph exhibition, in addition to the entertainment tax and the service charge payable under this Sub-section, a surcharge to be called 'film surcharge' at the rate of 20 percent on the entertainment tax shall be charged and paid to the Government of Assam: Provided that this provision for collection of film surcharge shall remain valid for a period of five years from the date of its commencement: (4) The entertainment tax, in the case of theatres, cinematograph exhibitions and circuses and any other class of entertainment which the State Government may direct, shall be charged, levied and paid with effect from the date on which this Act comes force. (6) The liability to pay the entertainments tax shall be one the proprietor of the entertainment. By Section 3A, in case of cinematograph exhibition, in addition to the tax under Section 3 as above, a tax for every show at the rate of 10% of the total payment for admission received excluding the amount of tax payable under the Act, has been levied. Whereas, the minimum of such impost payable before the amendment was Rs. 10, it has been raised to Rs. 100/- thereafter. Section 4 requires that except in the cases mentioned therein, no person without a ticket would be admitted to any entertainment, where the payment for admission is subject to the entertainment tax, except with a ticket stamped with an impressed, embossed, engraved adhesive stamp (not before used) issued by the State Government for the purpose of revenue and denoting that the proper entertainment tax has been paid. The manner of payment of the entertainment tax is outlined in Section 7, which prescribes that the same would be charged in respect of each person admitted for payment, and, in the case of admission by stamped ticket, shall be by means of stamp on the ticket and in the case of admission otherwise than by stamped ticket to be calculated and paid on the number of admissions. Section 12 confers the rule making powers in the State Government for securing the payment of the entertainment tax and carrying into effect the provisions of the Act. 9. A conjoint reading of the provisions alluded hereinabove, renders is apparent, that a tax designated as entertainment tax is chargeable and leviable on all payments for admission to any theatre, cinematograph exhibitions or circus or to any class of entertainment to which the State Government may specify. The rates of entertainment tax amongst others for the cinematograph exhibition have been clearly set out in Section 3(1)(b). In addition to the entertainment tax, another levy styled as service charge is payable on any enhancement of the existing payment for admission at the rates enumerated in Section 3(d). By the impugned impost in the case of cinematograph, exhibition, "film surcharge" at the rate of 20% of the entertainment tax is payable in addition to the entertainment tax and the service charge. The exaction of the levy however has been limited for a period of five years. By the impugned impost in the case of cinematograph, exhibition, "film surcharge" at the rate of 20% of the entertainment tax is payable in addition to the entertainment tax and the service charge. The exaction of the levy however has been limited for a period of five years. Section 3(6) makes it amply clear that the liability to pay the entertainment tax would be of the proprietor of the entertainment. The relevant clauses of Section 3 are unambiguous to the effect that the entertainment tax, service charge and the film surcharge would be chargeable by and payable to the Government of Assam. Section 4 & 7read together proclaim that the payment for admission of any person to any entertainment subject to the entertainment tax would include the said levy and would be evidenced by the adhesive stamp issued by the State Government for the purpose and affixed to the ticket for such admission. It is thus, obvious that a cinegoer for admission to any entertainment by cinematograph exhibition is required to pay only the entertainment tax at the rate prescribed on the value of the ticket fixed by the proprietor of the entertainment. No other levy is chargeable from a person to be admitted to such show. In other words, the liability of the proprietor of the entertainment to pay the entertainment tax, service tax and the film surcharge would have to be discharged from the realization of the payment for admission including the entertainment tax. Noticeably, though the payments for admission to any theatre, cinematograph exhibition or circus have been subjected to entertainment tax in clear terms, the government has reserved to itself the discretion and authority to specify any other class of entertainment to be similarly made exigible to such tax. Section 3(1) is admittedly not under challenge. Rule 14 of the Assam Amusement and Betting Tax Rules 1939 (hereinafter for short as the' 1939 Rules'), outlines the procedure for payment and/or the deposit of entertainment tax, service charge and show tax. It is apparent from Sub-clause (1) thereof, that the price of admission for entertainment means the price inclusive of the amount of tax. 10. Rule 14 of the Assam Amusement and Betting Tax Rules 1939 (hereinafter for short as the' 1939 Rules'), outlines the procedure for payment and/or the deposit of entertainment tax, service charge and show tax. It is apparent from Sub-clause (1) thereof, that the price of admission for entertainment means the price inclusive of the amount of tax. 10. The notification No. FTX.93/99/49, dated 17.08.2002 circulating the draft Assam Amusements and Betting Tax (Amendment) Rules 2002 and published in the issue dated 19.08.2002 of the Assam Gazette (Extraordinary), disclose that any objection or suggestion thereto, would be considered within a period of 30 days from the publication thereof. Eventually, by notification dated 04.12.2004, published in the issue dated 30.12.2004 of the Assam Gazette, the Assam Amusements and Betting Tax (Amendment) Rules, 2004 (for short also referred to as 'Amending Rules'), was brought on the statute book, maintaining the amendments as proposed in the draft rules. Thereby, amongst the others the procedure to be complied with by the proprietor of a cinematograph exhibition for depositing and accounting the film surcharge was prescribed. 11. Section 3(1)(e), introducing the levy of film surcharge, on a plain reading demostrates that the same is payable at the rate of 20% on the entertainment tax. Logically, therefore, the proprietor of the entertainment being solely made liable to pay the entertainment tax under Section 3(6) of the Act can be unmistakably identified to be the one required to pay the film surcharge. To that extent, there is no ambiguity with regard to the person liable under Section 3, on whom the film surcharge is chargeable. Thus the payer and payee of film surcharge are visibly ascertainable. The tax under Section 3A by its very nature is a levy quantified at 10% of the total payment for admission received excluding the amount of tax payable under the Act. Sub-section 2 makes it manifest that the tax is recoverable from the proprietor of the cinematograph exhibition. Total payment for admission noticeably is the price for admission inclusive of the entertainment tax and, therefore, the show tax (as nomenclatured by the Petitioner) is a percentage of the amount remaining in balance after payment of the tax payable. As noticed hereinabove a minimum ceiling of Rs. 10/- had been prescribed before the amendment which stood enhanced to Rs. 100/- thereafter. As noticed hereinabove a minimum ceiling of Rs. 10/- had been prescribed before the amendment which stood enhanced to Rs. 100/- thereafter. In other words a proprietor of a cinematograph exhibition under Section 3A is liable to pay at least Rs. 100 per show following the amendment. While, it is conspicuous from Section 3A that the show tax is payable to the Govt. of Assam, the cinegoer is not required to bear any extra burden apart from the entertainment tax payable at the time of admission to the entertainment. The amount is chargeable on and payable by the proprietor of the cinematograph exhibition on the amount in residue after the payment of the other taxes payable under the Act. Significantly, this levy remained unassailed till the impugned amendment. 12. Reading between the lines, film surcharge in Section 3(1)(e), does not even suggest a semblance of a fee. The levy is not contigent on any service either. The plea of quid pro quo as a sine qua non for such impost, is therefore, not borne out by the impugned provision. 13. In Western India Theatres Ltd. (supra) the imposition of V-tax on entertainments on Cinemas Talkies or dramas, by the Governor-in-Council with the previous sanction of the Governor General-in-Council, in the Cantonment of Poona was assailed. Referring to Section 100 of the Govt. of India Act, 1935 read with Entry-50 in Schedule VH thereto, which empowered the provisional legislature to make law with respect to "taxes on luxuries, including taxes on entertainments, amusement, betting and gambling", the learned Counsel for the Appellant contended that the impugned tax was not covered by the said entry. According to him, it contemplated a law for imposing taxes on persons, who received or enjoyed the luxuries or the entertainments or amusements and, therefore, no law made thereunder could impose a tax on the providers of such luxuries entertainments or amusements. The levy was impugned as being one really with respect to matters specified in Entry-46, namely, taxes on professions, trades and employment and, therefore, limited by Section 142A of the Govt. of India Act, 1935. 14. The levy was impugned as being one really with respect to matters specified in Entry-46, namely, taxes on professions, trades and employment and, therefore, limited by Section 142A of the Govt. of India Act, 1935. 14. The Apex Court ruled that an entry conferring legislative powers must be conceded the widest possible construction, which therefore, did not justify imposition of a restricted meaning to the words "taxes on luxuries or entertainments or amusements" in Entry-50, so as to confine the operation of law made thereunder, only to taxes on persons enjoying the same. The Apex Court elucidated that the entry contemplated luxuries, entertainments and amusement as objects on which the tax was to be imposed and, therefore, there could be no reason to differentiate between the giver and the receiver thereof and both might with equal property be made amendable to the tax. The same view was reiterated in Y.V. Srinivasamurthy and Ors. (supra). 15. In Liberty Talkies and Ors. (supra), by the impugned notification under the Bombay Entertainments Duty Act, 1923, entertainment duty was levied on the gross amounts paid by the visitors for admission to the theatres. The gross sum represented the net charge together with the entertainment duty under the Act, collected from the viewers. The Appellants assiduously urged before the High Court that the primary liability for payment of entertainment duty under the Act, being that of the visitor and that as the proprietor collects, the same as an agent of the Government to be deposited with it, it could not be required to pay an amount beyond the amount of duty. The consequence of the impugned notification as noticed by the Apex Court was that though the proprietor could collect from the visitor only the amount of entertainment duty, he was obliged to pay a duty computed on the total amount paid by the visitor at the appropriate rate. Resultantly, the difference between the entertainment duty computed on the total value of the ticket and the value of the stamp affixed thereon, was to be borne by the proprietor. Resultantly, the difference between the entertainment duty computed on the total value of the ticket and the value of the stamp affixed thereon, was to be borne by the proprietor. The Apex Court on an analysis of the scheme of the Act, held that the price which the visitor had to pay for a ticket for admission to an entertainment was the value of the stamp affixed and the net value of the ticket but the statutory liability to pay the entertainment was imposed on the proprietor and not the visitor. Though, the proprietor passed on a part of the duty payable by him to the visitor, he did not act as an agent of the Government. It therefore, upheld the determination of the High Court that the Appellant was liable to pay the duty on the total amount received by it. While noticing that thereby the proprietor was visited with some hardship, the Apex Court observed that such a consideration did not permit any departure from the mandate of the Act, it being a taxing statute. 16. In Venkateshwara Theatre (supra), under Section 4 of the Andhra Pradesh Entertainments Tax Act, 1939, levy of entertainment tax was prescribed at a rate fixed on the basis of percentage of the payment made by a person for admission to any entertainment. In addition thereto, a fixed amount byway of "show tax" for each show was also leviable. Consequent upon amendments to the Act, the earlier mode of levy of tax on the basis of percentage of payment for admission was replaced by the basis of prescribed percentage of the gross collection capacity per show. The constitutional validity of the amended provision was challenged, inter alia on the ground that the levy of entertainment tax on the basis of gross collection capacity without reference to the actual amount collected or the actual number of tickets sold or number of persons admitted was ultra vires the legislative power conferred on the State Legislature under Entry-62 of List-II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The Apex Court held that for examining the challenge to the legislative competence qua an enactment imposing a tax it has to be borne in mind that tax has two distinct elements viz. subject of the tax and the measure of the tax. The Apex Court held that for examining the challenge to the legislative competence qua an enactment imposing a tax it has to be borne in mind that tax has two distinct elements viz. subject of the tax and the measure of the tax. Whereas, the subject is the person, thing or activity on which the tax is imposed, the measure is the standard by which the amount of tax is to be assessed. The Apex Court observed that the competence of the legislature to enact a law imposing a tax under a particular head of the legislative list has to be examined in the context of the same and if the subject of the tax falls within the ambit of the legislative power conferred by the head of legislative entry, it would be within the competence of the legislature to impose such a tax. In the facts of the case, it was held that the amendment did not have the effect of altering the nature of the tax, so much so to take it beyond the field of legislative competence conferred on the State legislature by Entry-62 of List-H. It held that the levy of tax on the basis of gross collection capacity per show instead of being on the payment for admission made by the persons actually admitted in the theatre did not alter the nature of the tax or the subject matter thereof, which continued to be a levy on entertainment. It concluded that tax on entertainment was leviable by either of the two modes, i.e. on payment for admission or gross collection capacity per show. It was for the legislature to decide the particular mode or modes of levy to be adopted and no choice should be available to the proprietor of the cinema theatre in this regard. In deciding the method of levy, the legislature would not thereby transgress the limits of its legislative powers conferred under Entry-62 of List-III. Negating the plea of discrimination amongst different theatres situated within the same local area, the Apex Court held that in the field of taxation, the legislature has been permitted to exercise an extremely wide discretion in classifying items for tax purposes. Negating the plea of discrimination amongst different theatres situated within the same local area, the Apex Court held that in the field of taxation, the legislature has been permitted to exercise an extremely wide discretion in classifying items for tax purposes. In the facts, it held that different rates of tax had been prescribed by classifying theatres into different classes on the basis of amenities provided and the type of the local area in which those were situated. Observing that the State in the exercise of its governmental power has the necessity to make laws operating differently on different groups of persons within its territory to attain particular ends in giving effect to its policies, the Apex Court held that the classification involved would be valid, if the same satisfied the two conditions of intelligible differentia and its rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved thereby. The plea was rejected noticing that the legislature on its part could not be said to have omitted to make any attempt to classify the cinema theatres taking into consideration the differentiating circumstances for the purpose of imposition of tax. 17. This Court in Gauhati Municipal Corporation Association (supra) adjudged the deduction of tax under the Assam General Sales Tax Act, 1993, as impermissible in the absence of any manner for realization thereof, to be prescribed in terms of the mandate of Section 27(b) of the Act. Therein, Section 27(b) obtained that tax could be deducted as source only at the prescribed rate and manner. No such legislative constraint is discernible in Section 3 or 3 A in the instant case. This decision therefore, is of no assistance to the Petitioner. 18. The word "income" in the context of the Income Tax Act, 1961 came to be considered in Bhagwan Das Jain (supra). It was held that even in its ordinary economic sence the expression "Income" includes not merely what is received or comes in by exploiting the use of property but also what one saves by using it oneself. 19. The constitutional validity of the Hotel Receipts Tax Act, 1980, which imposed a special tax on the gross receipts of certain category of hotels was assailed in Elel Hotels & Investments Limited & Ors. (supra). 19. The constitutional validity of the Hotel Receipts Tax Act, 1980, which imposed a special tax on the gross receipts of certain category of hotels was assailed in Elel Hotels & Investments Limited & Ors. (supra). The enactment was limited in its application to those hotels, where the "room charges" for residential accommodation provided to any person during the previous year was Rs. 75/- or more per day per individual. The Act brought to charge such hotels "chargeable receipts". Whereas the Appellant assessee pleaded that the tax on the chargeable receipts was an impost under Entry-62 List-II reserved to the States, it was contended on behalf of the Union of India that it was a tax on income Entry-82 of List-I. The Apex Court upheld the contention on behalf of the Respondents that the word "income" in Entry-82 broadly indicated the topic or field of legislation and should not be read in a narrow and pedantic sense. It observed that the statutory definitions of and meanings given to "income", are matters of legislative policy and do not exhaust the content of the legislative entry by the particular manner and the extent in which the statutes chooses to define that expression. It held that the word "income" was of elastic import and that in understanding the scope and amplitude of the said expression in Entry-82 List-I, any meaning which fails to accord with the plentitude or concept of "income" in all its width and comprehensiveness should be avoided. It observed that the expression "income" in the legislative entry has always been understood in a wide and comprehensive connotation to embrace within it every kind of receipt or gain either of capital nature or of a revenue nature and therefore, "taxable" receipt as defined in the Hotel Receipt Tax Act, 1980 could not be held to fall outside such "wider connotation" or "income" in the wider constitutional meaning and sense of the term as understood in Entry-82, List-I. The challenge was thus negated. 20. The levy of luxury tax on tobacco and tobacco products by treating them as "luxuries" within the meaning of the word appearing in Entry-62 of List-II imposed by several State legislations was assailed in Godfrey Phillips India Ltd. (supra), principally on the ground that the word "luxury" signified activity of indulgence, comfort and enjoyment distinguished from an article of luxury for the purpose of Entry-62 of List-II. To put it differently, though the assesses did not dispute that tobacco is an articles of luxury, they contended that the articles of luxury are not covered by Entry-62 and what is comprehended therein, is the activity of indulgence, comfort or enjoyment. The perspective adopted by the Apex Court to deal with the issue was that taxing entries must be construed with clarity and precision, so as to maintain such exclusivity and any construction of taxation entry which may lead to overlapping ought to eschewed. If the taxing power is within a particular legislative field, the other fields in the legislative list must be construed to exclude that field so that there is no possibility of legislative trespass. While elaborating on the composition of tax, it observed that it had two elements, namely, the person, thing or activity on which the tax is imposed and the incidence of tax. While observing that every tax may be levied on an object or an event of taxation, it held that the law imposing the tax may also prescribe the incidence or the manner in which the burden of tax would fall on any person and would take within itself the amount and measure of tax. The Apex Court marked the distinction between the object and event of taxation on one hand and the incidence of taxation on the other hand enunciating that whereas, the first two have been extended a constitutional status, the incidence of tax would be a matter of statutory details. It illustrated by observing that the incidence of tax would be relevant in construing whether a tax is a direct or indirect one, but would be irrelevant in determining the subject matter of tax. 21. The Apex Court on an exhaustive analysis of the various entries in the legislative lists, the dichotomy of legislative powers of the State legislatures and the Parliament in the background of the settled principles of construction of entries in the legislative lists as well as the true purport of the expression 'luxuries' appearing in Entry-62 of List-II, held that the expression meant the activity of indulgence comfort and enjoyment in that which is generally recognized as thing beyond the necessary recruitments of a member of a society and not the articles of luxury. It therefore, concluded that Entry-62 of List-II did not permit the tax on goods or articles and the word 'luxuries' in the entry signified activities of indulgence enjoyment and pleasure. It thus determined the impugned statutes seeking to tax goods described as luxury goods to be legislatively incompetent. 22. The rival contentions may now be evaluated in the above backdrop. The levy of entertainment tax in terms of Section 3 of the Act is statutorily prescribed on all payments for admission to any theatre, cinematograph or circus or any class of entertainment to which the State Government may extend the applicability of the said provision. Whereas, it has been left to the State Government to include within the scope of Section 3(1), any other class of entertainment, the lawmakers in their wisdom categorically specified theatre, cinematograph exhibition and circus to be the species of entertainment to be subject to the entertainment tax on all payments for admission thereto. The complexion of the said legal provision has remained unchanged following the amendment of the definition of the word "entertainment" in Section 2(4) of the Act. In other words, entertainment by electronic devices and cable television network, though, brought within the sweep of the expression entertainment in Section 2(4) of the Act, no corresponding amendment was introduced in Section 3for exacting entertainment tax on all payment for admission to any entertainment by electronic devices or cable television network by statutory prescription thus leaving it to the State Govt. to bring the aforementioned two sources of entertainment within the tax net at its discretion. Section3(1), as its stands after the amendment of the definition of entertainment in Section 2(4) has not been impugned to be discriminatory on that count. This assumes significance, as film surcharge is evidently payable at the prescribed rate on the entertainment tax in case of cinematograph exhibition. Section3(1), as its stands after the amendment of the definition of entertainment in Section 2(4) has not been impugned to be discriminatory on that count. This assumes significance, as film surcharge is evidently payable at the prescribed rate on the entertainment tax in case of cinematograph exhibition. As alluded hereinabove, a cumulative reading of Sections 4 & 7 along with Rule 14 demonstrates that the payment for admission to entertainment means the price inclusive of the amount of the tax of the value of the adhesive stamp embossed, stamped or engraved on the ticket and that a person to be admitted to any entertainment is not required to make any further payment Mewed thus, it is conspicuous from Section 3(1)(e) that it is the proprietor of the entertainment in cinematograph exhibition, who is liable to pay the film surcharge at the rate of 20% of the entertainment tax to the Government. Section 3(1)(e) thus lodged in the framework of the Act and the Rules is not deficient in essential particulars to identify the payer and payee of film surcharge so much so to condemn the same as vague. This levy is obviously payable on the entertainment tax already realized from the cinegoers (in the context of cinematograph exhibition) by the proprietor of the entertainment for which the viewers are not required to be subjected to additional imposts on that count. Section 3(1)(e) therefore, presents with reasonable clarity the object of levy, the rate thereof, the person to suffer the same and authority to which it is payable. Noticeably, the draft Assam Amusement and Betting Tax Rules 1939, was published in the Assam Gazette on 19.08.2002, providing inter alia the manner in which the proprietor of a cinematograph is required to pay the film surcharge and submit a return accounting the same. The draft rules mentioned that the same would be taken up for consideration after the expiry of a period of 30 days from the date of their publication in the official Gazette and eventually by the notification No. FTX.93/99/53, dated 04.12.2004, published in the issued dated 30.12.2004 of the Assam Gazette (Extraordinary), the Assam Amusements and Betting Tax (Amendment) Rules, 2004 in the same form was notified. The delayed framing of the Amending Rules, however, in view of the above determination, qua Section 3(1)(e) of the Act, does not impinge upon the validity of the impost levied thereby. The delayed framing of the Amending Rules, however, in view of the above determination, qua Section 3(1)(e) of the Act, does not impinge upon the validity of the impost levied thereby. No semblance of any fee in the film surcharge is discernible. No concept of reciprocal service, having regard to the nature of the levy and the legislative setting is also perceptible. Film surcharge therefore, is out and out a tax and not fee as contended by the Petitioner. The unrefuted assertion that the levy of film surcharge is a consequence of a policy decision of the Govt. to promote the regional film industry coupled with the temporary nature of the impost, are of corroborative significance sustaining the validity of the imposition. 23. In terms of the prescription of Article 265 of the Constitution, no tax can be levied or collected except by the authority of law. It is thus manifest that not only the impost but also the collection thereof, must be under the authority of some law signifying that the tax proposed to be levied must be within the legislative competence of the legislature. The expression "levy and collection" appearing in Article 265 is intended to include the entire process of taxation commencing from the taxing legislation to the execution of the tax from the citizen. The constitutional provision therefore, enjoins that every stage in the process must be authorized by law. On a conjoint construction of Section3(1)(e) and the other cognate provisions in the Act and the rules, the levy and collection of film surcharge cannot be denounced to be wanting in legislative competence or authority of law. Reiterating the well settled principle of statutory interpretation favouring a presumption of validity of a legislation, the Apex Court in State of Karnataka and Anr. v. Hansa Corporation, (1980) 4 SCC 697 , held that if the language of an enactment is rather not clear and precise as it ought to be, the attempt of the Court should be to ascertain the intention of the legislature and put that construction which would lean in favour of the constitutionality unless such construction is wholly untenable. It underlined the extra discretion that a legislature enjoys in the matter of classification for the purpose of a taxing statute, as long it adhered to the fundamental principles underlying the doctrine of classification. It recalled its observations in Khyyerbari Tea Co. Ltd. and Anr. It underlined the extra discretion that a legislature enjoys in the matter of classification for the purpose of a taxing statute, as long it adhered to the fundamental principles underlying the doctrine of classification. It recalled its observations in Khyyerbari Tea Co. Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Assam and Ors. AIR 1964 SC 925 , to the effect that a legislature which is competent to levy a tax must inevitably be given full freedom to determine which article should be taxed, in what manner and at what rate. The Apex Court quoted with approval Willy's on Constitutional Law as "State is allowed to pick and chose districts, objects, persons, methods and even rate for taxation, if it does so reasonably". Restating the same view, the Apex Court in Gujarat Ambuja Cements Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr. (2005) 4 SCC 214 , observed that because of inherent complexity of fiscal adjustment of diverse elements in the field of tax, the legislature is permitted a large discretion in the matter of classification to determine not only what should be taxed but also the manner in which the tax may be imposed. It underlined that Courts ought to be extremely circumspect in questioning the reasonability of such classification but after a "judicial generosity is extended to the legislative wisdom, if there is writ on the statute perversity, madness in the method of gross disparity, judicial credulity may snap and the measure may meet with its funeral" vide Ganga Sugar Corporation Ltd. v. State of U.P. (1980) 1 SCC 223 . 24. Adverting to the facts, the plea of discrimination amongst proprietors of entertainment of cinematograph exhibition, electronic devices and cable television network, doers not appear to be convincing in the alignment of the Act and the Rules. Show tax having been levied on cinematograph exhibition uniformly, no differential treatment thereby, has been meted out to any particular proprietor of such entertainment. The proprietors or cinematograph exhibition form a homogenous class and consequently the levy of show tax on them equally cannot be branded as discriminatory. In the matter of imposition of entertainment tax as discernible in Section 3(1) of the Act, while it is statutorily imperative to subject a cinematograph exhibition theatre or circus thereto, discretion has been left to the Government to extend the application of the said provision to other sources of entertainment. In the matter of imposition of entertainment tax as discernible in Section 3(1) of the Act, while it is statutorily imperative to subject a cinematograph exhibition theatre or circus thereto, discretion has been left to the Government to extend the application of the said provision to other sources of entertainment. A choice therefore, has been left with the State Govt. to subject any other source(s) of entertainment within the meaning of Section 2(4) of the Act to the entertainment tax. A cinematograph exhibition by its very nature cannot be construed to be exactly akin under all circumstances to entertainments through electronic devices or cable network broadcast. Whereas, the essential traits of a cinematograph exhibition amongst others are a fixed situs for entertainment with amenities, scheduled show times, declared admission fees, public viewing, commercial element etc, these necessarily may not inform the entertainment through electronic devices and cable network telecast. Conceptually, therefore, entertainments through cinematograph exhibition, electronic device or cable network may not be wholly identical to sustain the challenge based on unintelligible classification. Apart from the wide discertion vested in the legislature vis-a-vis, a taxing statute for effecting classification for levying tax, the materials on record do not establish that the imposition of show tax only on cinematograph exhibition suffers from the vice of hostile discremination violative of the constitutional guarantee of equality rendering it invalid. Incidentally by the Assam Amusements and Betting Tax (Amendment) Act, 2005, Section 3 A presently stands amended as follows: Amendment of Section 3A In the Principal Act, in Section 3A, in Sub-section (1) for the words "rate often percentum of the total payment for admission received excluding the amount of tax payable under the Act or rupees one hundred whichever is less" the words "rate as the State Government may, by notification in the official gazette, tax in this behalf not exceeding this percentum of the total payment for admission received excluding the amount payable under this Act" shall be substituted. In State of West Bengal and Anr. v. Purvi Communication (P) Ltd. and Ors. (2005) 3 SCC 711 , the Respondent was a Multi System Operator (hereinafter for short as the 'MOS' and was engaged in receiving T.V. signal Broadcast by various satellite channels and distributing the same to sub-cable operators of various localities for aprice. In State of West Bengal and Anr. v. Purvi Communication (P) Ltd. and Ors. (2005) 3 SCC 711 , the Respondent was a Multi System Operator (hereinafter for short as the 'MOS' and was engaged in receiving T.V. signal Broadcast by various satellite channels and distributing the same to sub-cable operators of various localities for aprice. The individual sub-cable operators in return provided the said T.V. signals to the individual subscribers on the basis of monthly subscriptions. The vires of West Bengal Entertainment-cum-Amusement Tax Act, 1982 enacted to impose a tax on MSO and Cable Operators came to be impugned by the Respondent on the ground that its activity did not construe amusement or entertainment and therefore it could not be brought within the ambit of the expression, cable operator. Negating the plea, the Apex Court held it to be a cable operator, having direct and close nexus with the entertainment made available to the viewers through its cable television network and was thus taxable under the Act. It held that in any tax matter, the State Legislature is free, if it has the legislative competence to choose the person from whom tax levied on entertainments was to be collected. As the Respondent as a cable operator was engaged in the business of providing or offering entertainments the tax was validity imposable on such activities. It rejected the contention that taxable event was entertainment and that there could be no tax, if there is no entertainment. It ruled that the existence of the means of providing entertainment would be sufficient to support a law imposing tax thereon, if such means provide a nexus between the taxing power and the subject of tax. 25. Evidence is jejune to determine that the enhancement of the lower ceiling of show tax would be oppressive on the cinematograph exhibitors in view of the recurring losses suffered by them. On the contrary, the amendments of the Act from time to time demonstrate that the show tax has been gradually raised in view of the rising profits in business. The assertion that cinema as in the distant past cannot be regarded as an item of luxury as on date is also untenable. On the contrary, the amendments of the Act from time to time demonstrate that the show tax has been gradually raised in view of the rising profits in business. The assertion that cinema as in the distant past cannot be regarded as an item of luxury as on date is also untenable. In the perceptible perspective of the pitiful standard of living of the teeming millions of the country and the abject indigence, laden with social disadvantages, which plague the suppressed sector, entertainment through cinematograph exhibition still enjoys the exacted status of luxury in India. 26. The contention that in essence show tax is a levy on income has to be mentioned only to be rejected. The Apex Court in State of T.N. v. M. Krishnappan and Anr. (2005) 4 SCC 53 had held that the mode of collection or the incidence of tax cannot be the conclusive test to identify the nature of levy. It held the view that levy is a constitutional concept, whereas, the mode of collection of tax is a statutory concept and that these stand on different footings. This view found reiteration in Gujarat Ambuja Cements Ltd. and Anr. (supra) in the following terms: There is a distinction between the object of tax, the incidence of tax and the machinery for the collection of the tax. The distinction is important but is apt to be confused. Legislative competence is to be determined with reference to the object of the levy and not with reference to its incidence or machinery. It was held in unambiguous terms that legislative competence is to be determined with reference to the object of the levy and not its incidence or machinery. 27. The Act being a legislation to levy tax on the act of indulgence enjoyment and pleasure, Id est, entertainment it cannot be denounced to be lacking in legislative competence, merely because of the hardship or prejudicial consequences likely to visit the proprietor of cinematograph exhibition thereto. 28. In view of the above, I am not inclined to sustain the challenge to the validity of the Section 3(1)(e) and Section 3A of the Act. The aforementioned provisions do not suffer from any lack of legislative competence or vice of constitutional contraventions. The petition thus being without any merit is dismissed. The interim order passed earlier stands vacated. 28. In view of the above, I am not inclined to sustain the challenge to the validity of the Section 3(1)(e) and Section 3A of the Act. The aforementioned provisions do not suffer from any lack of legislative competence or vice of constitutional contraventions. The petition thus being without any merit is dismissed. The interim order passed earlier stands vacated. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties would bear their own costs. Petition dismissed