Judgment VINEY MITTAL, J. 1. This judgment shall dispose of three regular second appeals being RSA No.4156 to 4158 of 2002 as in all the appeals similar facts are involved and defendant No.1 in all the three appeals is the same. For the sake of convenience, the facts are borrowed from 2. The plaintiffs have remained unsuccessful before the two courts below in their suit for declaration, joint possession and for permanent injunction. The plaintiffs claimed that they are owners of the suit land and that the sale deed dated November 16,1989, executed by the office bearers of the Society-defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.1, was illegal, bad , without authority and not binding upon the rights of the plaintiffs. The facts which emerge from the record show that the plaintiffs had entered into an agreement on October 23,1986 for selling the land in dispute to defendant No.1. They had received Rs.20,000/- as earnest money. Subsequently, another agreement dated February 6,1987 was entered between the parties. The entire sale consideration of Rs.3,00,000/-was received by the plaintiffs from the defendant-Society. On the aforesaid date, a general power of attorney was also executed by the plaintiffs in favour of the office bearers of the defendant-Society authorising them to execute the sale deed for and on behalf of the plaintiffs subsequently. It was also mentioned in the aforesaid agreement that the general power of attorney executed by the plaintiffs would be irrevocable since they had received the entire sale consideration. On the strength of the general power of attorney dated February 6,1987 and on account of the agreement of the aforesaid date, the office bearers of the defendant-Society executed the sale deed in question on November 16,1989 in favour of the defendant-Society. 3. The plaintiff, thereafter, filed the present suit claiming that they had cancelled the said power of attorney vide cancellation/revocation deed dated april 29,1987 and,therefore, the sale deed executed by the office bearers of the defendant-Society in favour of the defendant-Society was illegal, bad, unauthorised and not binding upon their rights. Both the Courts below have appreciated the entire evidence on the record. On the basis of the aforesaid appreciation, it has been found as a fact that originally an agreement had been entered between the parties on october 23,1986 for sale of the land in question of the plaintiffs to defendant No.1. Both the Courts below have appreciated the entire evidence on the record. On the basis of the aforesaid appreciation, it has been found as a fact that originally an agreement had been entered between the parties on october 23,1986 for sale of the land in question of the plaintiffs to defendant No.1. Subsequently, the aforesaid agreement was substituted by another agreement dated February 6,1987 when the entire sale consideration was received by the plaintiffs. On the aforesaid day, a separate general power of attorney was also executed by the plaintiffs in favour of the office bearers of the defendant-Society. In the agreement in question, it was specifically mentioned that the said general power of attorney shall be irrevocable because of the fact that the entire sale consideration had been received by the plaintiffs. In these circumstances, both the courts below have rightly held that the revocation of the aforesaid general power of attorney by the plaintiffs on April 29,1987 was irrelevant and was not legal. Consequently, the validity of the sale deed dated November 16,1989 in favour of the defendant-Society has been upheld. The suit filed by the plaintiffs had been dismissed by the learned trial Court and their appeal failed before the learned first appellate Court. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance have also gone through the record of the case. Shri C. M. Munjal, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffappellants has vehemently argued that in view of the cancellation of the general power of attorney vide revocation deed dated April 29,1987, the office bearers of the Society had ceased to be the attorneys of the plaintiffs and,therefore, the sale deed executed by them for and on behalf of the plaintiffs on November 16,1989 was without any legal authority. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel but find myself unable to agree with the same. 5. It has been very fairly conceded by the Shri Munjal, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-appellants,because of the statement made by the plaintiffs while appearing as witnesses, that the agreement had been executed by the plaintiffs in favour of the defendants on October 23,1986 originally. 5. It has been very fairly conceded by the Shri Munjal, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-appellants,because of the statement made by the plaintiffs while appearing as witnesses, that the agreement had been executed by the plaintiffs in favour of the defendants on October 23,1986 originally. It is also further conceded by the learned counsel that on february 6,1987 another agreement was entered between the parties and at that point of time, the plaintiffs had received the entire sale consideration. In view of the aforesaid fact it was only natural for the plaintiffs to have executed the general power of attorney on February 6,1987 in favour of the office bearers of the defendant-Society. The said general power of attorney could not have been revoked by the plaintiffs under any circumstances since they had received the entire sale consideration. The said fact is even mentioned in the agreement dated February 6,1987. Therefore, both the courts below have rightly come to the conclusion that the general power of attorney dated February 6,1987 was irrevocable and,therefore, the sale deed dated November 16,1989 was legal and valid. 6. No other point has been urged. Nothing has been shown that the findings recorded by the two courts below suffer from infirmity or are contrary to the record. No question of law, much less any substantial question of law, arises in the present three regular second appeals. Dismissed.