JUDGMENT A. K. PARICHHA, J. — This appeal is directed against the order of learned Asst. Sessions Judge, Kamakhyanagar in S.T. No.76-D of 1998/18 of 1998 convicting the appellant under Sec¬tions 457/376, I.P.C. and sentencing him to undergo R.I. for ten years and a fine of Rs.1,000/- in default to undergo R.I. for three months and R.I. for one year and a fine of Rs.500/- in default to undergo R.I. for one month respectively. 2. Prosecution case in brief is that in the night of 12.10.1997 while the victim lady (P.W.4) was sleeping inside her house at village-Kanakhai with her child, the appellant trespassed into the room at about midnight and forcibly committed sexual intercourse with her against her will. On arrival of her husband in the following morning the victim lady narrated the incident and both the husband and wife went to Bhuban Police Station where they lodged a report, Ext.5. Basing on this report a case was registered under Sections 457 and 376, I.P.C., inves¬tigation was conducted during the course of which the victim lady and the appellant were subjected to medical examination, the clothes of the victim lady stained with semen were seized and sent for chemical and serological examinations and finally on completion of investigation, charge-sheet was submitted for the above noted offences. The appellant denied the allegations and took the plea that he has been falsely implicated by P.W.4 and her husband because of his previous enmity with them. To substan¬tiate the charges, prosecution examined seven witnesses, P.W.4 being the prosecutrix, P.W.7 the husband of the prosecutrix, P.Ws.1 and 3 the co-villagers of the victim, P.W.2 the lady doctor, who examined the prosecutrix, on police requisition, P.W.5 the doctor, who examined the appellant and P.W.6 the Inves¬tigating Officer. No witness or document was produced by the appellant in his defence. On assessment of evidence on record learned trial Judge felt that there is sufficient evidence to establish the charges under Section 457 and 376, I.P.C. Accord¬ingly, he recorded the conviction and sentence indicated above. 3. Mr. S. K. Tripathy, learned counsel appearing for the appellant contends that the evidence and circumstances on record clearly belie the prosecution allegation, but without considering the contradictions, omissions and procedural lacuna in the evi¬dence learned trial Judge arbitrarily recorded the order of conviction. To substantiate his contention Mr. 3. Mr. S. K. Tripathy, learned counsel appearing for the appellant contends that the evidence and circumstances on record clearly belie the prosecution allegation, but without considering the contradictions, omissions and procedural lacuna in the evi¬dence learned trial Judge arbitrarily recorded the order of conviction. To substantiate his contention Mr. Tripathy points out that although the victim lady claimed that she sustained multiple injuries on her hands,back and breast, the doctor while examining her on police requisition did not find any injury; although the victim lady claimed that immediately after the occurrence she took shelter in the neighbour’s house and narrated the incident to some of the neighbours, none of those neighbours came forward to support her plea, rather one such neighbour P.W.1 contradicted the claim of the prosecutrix in this regard. It is also pointed out by the learned counsel that although P.W.4 admitted in cross examination that she was raped on the floor of the room in totally naked condition and that her wearing clothes were lying on the cot, the prosecution claimed presence of semen stains of the appellant on the saree, which was highly improba¬ble. In substance learned counsel for the appellant claims that the impugned judgment is totally contrary to the materials on record and based on improbable reasons. In support of his argu¬ments Mr. Tripathy relies on the case of Kubera Mahanta v. State, 1991 (II) OLR 83. 4. Mr. A. K. Mishra, learned Standing Counsel argues per contra stating that in case of rape, the evidence of the victim lady is sufficient to warrant a conviction and no corroboration is necessary.According to him, the statement of P.W.4 being clear and direct, rightly the trial Court relied on her statement. Mr. Mishra also submits that even otherwise the reports of the chemical examiner and serologist are there to support the version of the victim lady and so it is not correct to say that corrobo¬ration to the statement of P.W.4 is totally wanting. He further contends that absence of injury on the person of the victim does not negative the evidence of rape and therefore, absence of injury on the person of P.W.4 was of no consequence. To support the above noted contentions Mr. He further contends that absence of injury on the person of the victim does not negative the evidence of rape and therefore, absence of injury on the person of P.W.4 was of no consequence. To support the above noted contentions Mr. Mishra relied on the cases of Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1983 S.C. 753 ; Dinesh @ Budha v. State of Rajasthan, (2006) 33 OCR (SC)-830; Visveswaran v. State Rep. By S.D.M. 2003 (3) Supreme 566 ; Prithi Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1989 S.C.702 and Dinabandhu Behera v. State of Orissa, (1995) 8 OCR 123. 5. As has been said in the cases of Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai (supra) and Dinesh @ Budha (supra) conviction can lie against an accused on the sole uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix as an offence of rape is generally committed out of sight of others. It was, however, clarified in those judgments that the sole testimony of the prosecutrix must be clear, cogent irrevocable, unassailable and above-board. So before acting on the sole statement of the prose¬cutrix the Court must closely scrutinize her evidence to find out the aspect of the reliability. 6. In the present case, P.W.4 in her evidence stated that while she was sleeping in her room the accused trespassed into that room, climbed on her in naked condition, removed her clothes, laid her on the floor of the room and committed sexual intercourse with her despite her resistance. She stated that in the process of forcible intercourse and struggle all the glass bangles which she was wearing on her hands were broken causing several bleeding injuries on her hands and some abrasion were also sustained on her back. She also said that because of the teeth bite of the appellant she sustained pain and bruises on her breast and the bruises were available for 7 to 8 days. According to her, while the appellant forcibly removed her clothes, her saree and saya were torn into pieces and she threw away those clothes on the following day. The Investigating Officer (P.W.6) stated that on the day following night of occurrence he sent the victim lady and the appellant for medical examination and the doctors P.W.2 and 5 examined the victim lady and the appellant and submitted their reports Exts.2 and 4 respectively. The Investigating Officer (P.W.6) stated that on the day following night of occurrence he sent the victim lady and the appellant for medical examination and the doctors P.W.2 and 5 examined the victim lady and the appellant and submitted their reports Exts.2 and 4 respectively. The evi¬dence of P.Ws.2, 5 and the reports show that there was absolutely no injury or mark of violence on the person of the victim lady and that of the appellant. P.W.4 stated that soon after the occurrence she went to the house of P.W.1 and narrated the inci¬dent to P.Ws.1,3 and some others and took shelter in the house of P.W.1 during the night till the arrival of her husband next morning. P.Ws.1 and 3 did not support this statement of P.W.4. The other neighbours whom P.W.4 named were not examined by the prosecution. Despite the above noted contradictions and lacuna, learned trial Court relying on the ratio noted in Dinabandhu Behera’s Case (supra) and Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai’s Case (supra) accepted the evidence of P.W.4 as reliable. In the case of Dinabandhu Behera (supra) this Court simply made the observa¬tion that absence of injury on the person of the victim may not be fatal to case of rape but the said principle is not meant for universal application. The fact and circumstance of each case has to be considered before applying the ratio laid down. In the present case, the victim lady herself claimed sustaining of multiple injuries on her person, but when she was examined on the following day no injury was there on her person. She claimed that soon after the occurrence she told the neighbours about the inci¬dent and also took shelter in neighbours’ house but those neigh¬bours denied this claim of P.W.4 and did not support her in any way. In such situation, the ratio of the above noted cases were not at all applicable and the statement of P.W.4 could not have been taken as unblemished, irrevocable and above board. Law is settled that if the uncorroborated testimony of prosecutrix is not itself reliable enough some amount of corroboration should be sought for in the shape of medical evidence, circumstantial evidence or post occurrence happenings. In the present case medi¬cal evidence does not support the allegation of the prosecutrix. The post occurrence witnesses also do not support her. Law is settled that if the uncorroborated testimony of prosecutrix is not itself reliable enough some amount of corroboration should be sought for in the shape of medical evidence, circumstantial evidence or post occurrence happenings. In the present case medi¬cal evidence does not support the allegation of the prosecutrix. The post occurrence witnesses also do not support her. Despite her claim that her wearing clothes were torn, two dozen of ban¬gles which she was wearing were broken into pieces. Those items were never seized by the police. The victim herself admitted in her evidence that she did not specifically tell the I.O. about the broken bangles and torn clothes, which is itself an improba¬ble conduct. 7. Learned trial Court has observed that corroboration to the statement of P.W.4 comes from the report of the chemical examiners and serologist. The I.O. P.W.6 stated that he seized the wearing apparels of P.W.4, collected the sample semen of appellant and sent those items for chemical and serological examination. The report of the Serologist Ext.7 shows that the sample semen of the appellant belongs to ‘O’ Group and semen stain found on the saree of P.W.4 was also of ‘O’ Group. The question is whether this similarity in the semen group can be taken as evidence to link the appellant with the alleged offence of rape. P.W.4 herself admitted that first the accused removed her clothes and thereafter laid her on the floor of the room and per¬formed sexual intercourse with her in naked condition. She speci¬fically said that her saree was there on the cot when such sexual intercourse was being performed on the floor of the room. If that is so, there was no occasion for semen stain of the appellant on the saree. That apart, no effort was made by the I.O. to col¬lect the semen sample of P.W.7, the husband of P.W.4 to rule out the possibility of semen stain on the saree M.O.I. being that of P.W.7. In such situation, it was not proper on the part of the learned trial Court to conclusively say that semen stain on the saree M.O.I. was that of the appellant and thereby linking the appellant to the alleged rape. Here Mr. Mishra indicates the ratio of the case of Visveswaran v. State Rep. In such situation, it was not proper on the part of the learned trial Court to conclusively say that semen stain on the saree M.O.I. was that of the appellant and thereby linking the appellant to the alleged rape. Here Mr. Mishra indicates the ratio of the case of Visveswaran v. State Rep. By S.D.M. (supra) to highlight that minor discrepancies in a case of rape should be ignored and the evidence should be considered in broad probabili¬ty. There is absolutely no quarrel with the proposition laid down in the Viveswaran’s case, but the above noted contradictions in the present case are significant and cannot be considered as minor. The revision of P.W.4 and the evidence of other witnesses are virtually contrary to each other. When the evidence of P.W.4 was not unblemished and unimpeachable and when no corroboration was available to support her stand, it was no proper on the part of the learned trial Court to hold the appellant guilty under Sections 457 and 376, I.P.C. basing on the sole testimony of P.W.4. 8. On reanalysis of the evidence on record in the light of the propositions of related law, I am of the considered view that the evidence of the prosecution was not at all sufficient to establish either the charge of house trespass or rape. In fact, there was ample scope for awarding benefit of doubt to the appel¬lant, particularly when long enmity of seven years between the appellant and P.W.7 is admitted. 9. For the above said reasons, the order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Court against the appellant is unsustainable and is accordingly set aside. Appeal is allowed. The appellant, who is said to be in custody, be released forth¬with if his detention is not required in connection with any other case. Appeal allowed.