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2006 DIGILAW 789 (GAU)

Prafulla Kumar Deka v. Gauhati University

2006-08-24

RANJAN GOGOI

body2006
JUDGMENT Ranjan Gogoi, J. 1. The Petitioner who is the Controller of the Gauhati University assails an order dated 12.12.2005 placing him under suspension. 2. The brief facts which will be necessary to be noticed for an adjudication of the issues arising in the present writ petition may be conveniently set out below: On 20.6.2005 a news item came to be reported in a leading local newspaper of the State to the effect that a College Principal and five College Teachers along with two Ors. have been arrested by the Nagaon Police in connection Nagaon P.S. Case No. 449/2005 under Sections 120-B/407/468/420/34, IPC. As per the aforesaid newspaper report the arrested persons were involved in serious anomalies in the evaluation of the answer scripts of B.A. Part-I and Part-II examinations of the year 2005 held by the Gauhati University. The Vice-Chancellor of the University immediately deputed the Petitioner and one Prof. J. N. Ganguly of the University to make an enquiry in the matter. The Petitioner along with Prof. Ganguly went to Nagaon, investigated into what was reported in the media and also met the persons who were arrested. Thereafter, the team constituted by the Vice-Chancellor submitted its report on 24.6.2005 wherein the commission of serious anomalies in the evaluation of answer scripts by the arrested persons were mentioned. Shortly put, in the report submitted it was mentioned that answer scripts which were allotted to some examiners were found in the custody and possession of the arrested persons and one of the arrested person, Abdul Matlib, had established contact with some of the candidates and had given them an opportunity to write the answers again so as to enable them to improve their performance. 3. On receipt of the report of the enquiry team as aforesaid the Vice Chancellor placed the matter before the Executive Council of the University. The said Body constituted a two member Enquiry Committee consisting of Mr. Justice D. N. Choudhury (Retd.) and one Sri K. K. Bora, former Chairman, Assam Higher Secondary Education Council. The aforesaid Enquiry Committee, upon due verification of the relevant facts and circumstances, submitted its report to the Vice Chancellor on 29.8.2005. In the report so submitted the Enquiry Committee had found the Petitioner to be responsible for certain lapses which had facilitated the commission of the illegalities/irregularities as noticed above. The aforesaid Enquiry Committee, upon due verification of the relevant facts and circumstances, submitted its report to the Vice Chancellor on 29.8.2005. In the report so submitted the Enquiry Committee had found the Petitioner to be responsible for certain lapses which had facilitated the commission of the illegalities/irregularities as noticed above. Shortly put, the committee in its report dated 29.8.2005 had recorded that the Examination Reforms Committee, which was constituted pursuant to a decision of the Academic Council dated 15.10.2001, in a meeting held on 5.10.2002 had recommended that a meeting of the Zonal Officers be held to discuss the measures necessary to streamline the examination system. The University, it must be noticed, had divided the area under its jurisdiction into 16 Zones with a Zonal Officer as the head of each zone. Thereafter, a meeting of the Zonal Officers was held on 21.1.2003 wherein, amongst Ors., it was decided that the appointment of examiners will henceforth be made by the Zonal Officers. The aforesaid practice which came in vogue from the year 2003 was identified by the Justice Choudhury Committee to be the primary reason responsible for the irregularities committed. The Enquiry Committee, in its report, also recorded that though the decision taken in the meeting of the Zonal Officers was approved by the Vice chancellor, such approval was granted without any meaningful consultation and deliberations for which initiative should have been taken by the Petitioner as the Controller of Examinations. The Committee in its report dated 29.8.2005 had also recorded that the controller of Examinations ought to have apprised the Vice Chancellor of the implications of the decision taken in the meeting of the Zonal Officers before presenting the proposal for the Vice Chancellor's approval. 4. On receipt of the report dated 29.8.2005 of the two-member Committee the same was put up before the Executive Council of the University. The said body by a resolution dated 7.9.2005 recommended that a three-member Committee be constituted to examine the said report. Accordingly by order dated 7.9.2005 a three-member Committee was constituted which after completion of its deliberations approved the report of the two member Committee and recommended that the same be accepted by the Executive Council. The three-member Committee in its report had also recommended necessary action against the Petitioner as the Controller of Examinations for his lapses and negligence in performance of duties. 5. The three-member Committee in its report had also recommended necessary action against the Petitioner as the Controller of Examinations for his lapses and negligence in performance of duties. 5. Thereafter on 1.10.2005 the Executive Counsel of the University considered the report dated 29.8.2005 submitted by the Committee headed by Mr. Justice D. N. Choudhury (Retd.) as well as the recommendations of the three-member Committee constituted pursuant to the Executive council's resolution dated 7.9.2005. In the said meeting the Executive Council took the decision that the Controller of Examinations, Gauhati University, be asked to show cause on the basis of the findings of the Enquiry Committee constituted to enquiry into the malpractices committed in the B.A. Part-I and Part-II Examinations, 2005. Pursuant to the said decision of the Executive Council, on 7.10.2005, a show cause notice was served on the Petitioner with the direction to submit his reply thereto within 10 days of receipt of the same. The Petitioner in several communications addressed by him after receipt of the show cause notice dated 7.10.2005 expressed his difficulties in submitting an effective reply as according to the Petitioner the report of Justice Choudhury Committee was not made available to him. According to the University, the said report was shown to the Petitioner and he was allowed to take extracts therefrom. While the matter was so situated, by an order dated 12.12.2005 issued by the Registrar of the University the Petitioner was placed under suspension. The aforesaid suspension order of the Petitioner was issued notwithstanding an order dated 16.11.2005 passed by the Civil Court at Guwahati in Title Suit No. 368 of 2005 directing maintenance of status quo with regard to the service condition of the Petitioner. The said civil suit was filed by the Petitioner on the basis of an apprehension of adverse act on being taken against him. 6. Aggrieved, the present writ application has been filed calling into question the aforesaid suspension order dated 12.12.2005. It must be noticed at this stage that during the pendency of the present writ petition the suspension of the Petitioner has been approved by the Executive Council in its meeting held on 7.1.2006. The appeal filed by the Petitioner against the suspension has also been dismissed by the Executive Council of the University in the said meeting held on 2.1.2006. The appeal filed by the Petitioner against the suspension has also been dismissed by the Executive Council of the University in the said meeting held on 2.1.2006. The other significant fact that must be noted at this stage is that a charge-sheet dated 1.2.2006 under Rule 9 of the Assam Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964 has been issued to the Petitioner. In the said charge-sheet allegations of lapses, negligence and dereliction of duty emanating from facts other than those pertaining to the evaluation of the answer scripts of the B.A. Part-I and Part-II Examinations have been levelled against the Petitioner. 7. Having noticed the necessary facts the Court may now proceed to understand the arguments advanced by Sri A. C. Barbora, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioner and Sri P. Pathak, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the Respondent-University. The impugned order of suspension dated 12.12.2005 was challenged in the pleadings made as an order of the Registrar of the University and, therefore, to be wholly unauthorized under the provisions of the Gauhati University Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). However, on perusal of the records in original as placed before the Court by the learned Counsel for the University, Sri Barbora, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, has submitted that though the impugned action had been taken by the Vice Chancellor and the order dated 12.12.2005 is a mere communication of the said action, the decision of the Vice Chancellor will be equally unauthorized. Sri Barbora has submitted that the power of suspension which is ordinarily vested in the Executive Council would be available to be exercised by the Vice Chancellor only in an emergent situation as contemplated in Section 8B(4)of the Act. According to Sri Barbora, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, the incident for which the Petitioner has been placed under suspension was reported in the media in the month of June 2005 following which an Enquiry Committee headed by Mr. Justice D. N. Choudhury (Retd). was constituted. Thereafter, the said Committee submitted its report on 29.8.2005 which was accepted by the three- member Committee on 7.9.2005 and was finally approved by the Executive Council on 1.10.2005. The Executive Council had also resolved that a show cause notice be issued to the Petitioner in the matter which was also issued on 7.10.2005. Thereafter, the suspension order was issued. Thereafter, the said Committee submitted its report on 29.8.2005 which was accepted by the three- member Committee on 7.9.2005 and was finally approved by the Executive Council on 1.10.2005. The Executive Council had also resolved that a show cause notice be issued to the Petitioner in the matter which was also issued on 7.10.2005. Thereafter, the suspension order was issued. According to Sri Barbora, the situation was certainly not emergent so as to justify the very extraordinary power conferred on the Vice Chancellor by Section 8B(4) of the Act. In this regard Sri Barbora has relied on a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Varanaseya Sanskrit Vishwavidyalaya and Anr. v. Dr. Rajkishore Tripathi and Anr. reported in (1977) 1 SCC 279 and Anr. judgment in the case of Kurukshetra University and Anr. v. Jyoti Sharma and Anr. reported in (1998) 6 SCC 763 . Sri Barbora, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, on due perusal of the records in original as placed before the Court on behalf of the University, has further submitted that the Vice Chancellor while ordering the suspension of the Petitioner in the file did not record any satisfaction as to how and in what manner an emergent situation had arisen so as to justify recourse to the extraordinary power under Section 8B(4) of the Act. Sri Barbora, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, has submitted that admittedly the power of suspension of the Petitioner is vested in the Executive Council as would be evident from a reading of Section 8B(6) of the Act. The conditions precedent to the exercise of the power of suspension by the Vice Chancellor under Section 8B(4) of the Act not being present and the Executive Council, at no point of time, having taken any decision to suspend the Petitioner, the impugned order dated 12.12.2005 is wholly without jurisdiction, authority of law and ultra vires the provisions of the Act. In this regard, Sri Barbora, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, has further submitted that under Section8B(4) of the Act the Vice Chancellor, after exercising the power vested in the Executive Council, has to report the matter to the Executive Council and the action taken by the Vice Chancellor has to be ratified by the Executive Council. In this regard, Sri Barbora, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, has further submitted that under Section8B(4) of the Act the Vice Chancellor, after exercising the power vested in the Executive Council, has to report the matter to the Executive Council and the action taken by the Vice Chancellor has to be ratified by the Executive Council. In the present case, the initial exercise of power by the Vice Chancellor being ultra vires the provisions of the Act and such exercise being null and void, such action could not have been ratified subsequently by the Executive Council in order to confer legitimacy to an otherwise null and void action. 8. Sri Barbora, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, has also submitted that the Petitioner in the additional affidavit filed by him on 18.7.2006 has explained in details the mechanisms of the examination system prevalent in the University and the circumstances in which the meeting of the Zonal Officers held on 21.1.2003 had taken a decision to the effect that, henceforth, the Zonal Officers would be appointing the examiners. According to Sri Barbora, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, the said proposal was approved by the Vice Chancellor. The approval granted by the Vice Chancellor would make the said authority a party to the decision and therefore it would not be correct to require the Petitioner to shoulder the sole responsibility in this regard, as has been done. In the aforesaid facts, Sri Barbora has submitted that the suspension order is wholly unjustified. Sri Barbora has also submitted that the Respondent No. 4, Prof. Srinath Baruah, is inimically disposed towards the Petitioner and had taken several steps to have the Petitioner removed from his office. Yet the Respondent No. 4 participated in the meeting of the Executive Council held on 7.1.2006 wherein the decision to ratify the suspension of the Petitioner was taken. According to Sri Barbora, the said decision is vitiated on account of bias on the part of the Respondent No. 4. 9. Yet the Respondent No. 4 participated in the meeting of the Executive Council held on 7.1.2006 wherein the decision to ratify the suspension of the Petitioner was taken. According to Sri Barbora, the said decision is vitiated on account of bias on the part of the Respondent No. 4. 9. Opposing the contentions advanced on behalf of the Petitioner, Sri Pathak, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondent-University, has submitted that in connection with the evaluation of the answer scripts of the B.A. Part-1 and Part-II Examinations of 2005 certain very sordid and scandalous events had surface which fact has been admitted by the Petitioner in his initial report submitted to the Vice Chancellor after the Petitioner had investigated the matter along with Prof. J. N. Ganguly in the month of June 2005. The Petitioner is the Controller of Examinations of Gauhati University and in that capacity had the over-all responsibility of overseeing the conduct of the examinations held by the University. The report of the two member committee headed by Mr. Justice D. N. Choudhury (Retd.) found the Petitioner to be guilty of lapses and negligence in the conduct of his official duties. The said report was approved by the three member committee appointed by the Executive Council and thereafter by the Executive council itself. The discharge of duties by the Petitioner, as the Controller of Examinations, had the effect of lowering the reputation of the University and tarnishing its image. According to Sri Pathak, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondent-University, in such circumstances the Vice Chancellor was fully justified in invoking his emergency power under Section 8B(4) of the Act and in ordering for the suspension of the Petitioner. Sri Pathak, has further submitted that the action of the Vice Chancellor placing the Petitioner under suspension has been approved by the Executive Council in its meeting held on 7.1.2006. The authority vested by the Act to exercise the power had eventually approved the actions of the Vice Chancellor. Therefore, according to Sri Pathak, the defect, if any, in the initial exercise of power by the Vice Chancellor stood cured by the approval granted by the Executive Council. The authority vested by the Act to exercise the power had eventually approved the actions of the Vice Chancellor. Therefore, according to Sri Pathak, the defect, if any, in the initial exercise of power by the Vice Chancellor stood cured by the approval granted by the Executive Council. Sri Pathak, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondents, has submitted that it is really for the authorities of the University to take a decision on the necessity of the suspension of the Petitioner and the power of the Court in this regard will be highly circumscribed. The Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226of the Constitution will not sit in appeal over the decision of the University authorities and interference will be justified only if there is any mala fide exercise of powers or if has been exercised on non-existent or irrelevant grounds. The facts and circumstances in which i the suspension of the Petitioner was resorted to, according to Sri Pathak, cannot be said to be reflective of any irrelevant or extraneous considerations. The impugned suspension was made to protect and preserve the Image and reputation of the University. Therefore, interference of the Court will not be justified, according to Sri Pathak. Sri Pathak, learned Counsel for the Respondent-University, has also pointed out that in the affidavit filed by the Registrar of the University the allegation of bias on the part of the Respondent No. 4 in the decision making process has been denied. The Respondent No. 4 was a nominee of the Chancellor in the Executive Council and the composition of the Executive Council is fairly large. As the said body consists of element persons in their respective walks of life, it is submitted that the Respondent No. 4 could not have possibly influenced the other members of the Executive Council. The affidavit filed by the Respondent No. 4 is more or less to the same effect. 10. An order placing an employee under suspension emanates from the decision of the employer to keep in abeyance the contract of service entered into by him with the employer. Such contract of service could be statutory or otherwise. Though no penal ingredient attends such a decision, yet, a suspension of the contract of employment is a prima facie reflection of the lack of confidence of the employer in the concerned employee. Such contract of service could be statutory or otherwise. Though no penal ingredient attends such a decision, yet, a suspension of the contract of employment is a prima facie reflection of the lack of confidence of the employer in the concerned employee. It is a decision in the making of which the employee has no role though the effects of such decision fall on the employee. Being asked to stay away from work pending a fuller investigation of the allegations levelled against the employee and denial of his regular pay and allowances and, instead payment of a subsistence allowance does prejudicially affect an employee. However, such a power in the employer must be recognized in the interest of a sound administration as a full investigation into the alleged misconduct or misdeeds of the employee is bound to be time consuming. The need, therefore, is to strike a balance and not to permit the power of the employer to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or oppression. Courts, therefore, have always tried to ensure that the power of suspension is exercised for a legitimate purpose connected with the need to maintain the purity of the administration and to maintain the public trust in the administrative process which is vital to sustain the said process. The power to suspend, therefore, has been recognized by the Courts to be a necessary adjunct to the administrative process and Courts have always recognized the employer to be the best judge of the situations for its exercise. Sufficiency of the reasons, therefore, has never been a matter of judicial determination. Rather, it is the relevance of the grounds for the suspension and the bonafide of the action that have been the touchstones in the exercise of judicial review in matters relating to suspension. Adherence to laid down norms, if any, including the exercise of the power by the repositories thereof would therefore, be the minimum safeguards for the employee in a situation where the affected employee must otherwise how down to the decision of the employer because his right to be 'heard' is yet to mature. Courts, therefore, do not normally enter into questions of the necessity of the suspension or the adequacy of the grounds for suspension. Courts, therefore, do not normally enter into questions of the necessity of the suspension or the adequacy of the grounds for suspension. These are questions that the employer is more advantageously placed to determine and answer; the judicial process has always felt self-inhibited from deciding such questions, primarily, because such questions belong to the field of administration and Courts do not sit in appeal over the decision of the administrator. Additionally, there being an inherent lack of the basic tools in the judicial process to arrive at the right answer, Courts have, therefore, carved out for themselves a very limited role in the matter of scrutiny of actions relating to suspension of employees, the core principles of which are self-evident from the discussions that have preceded. 11. The above enumeration of what this Court understands to be the correct position in law would sufficiently take care of the very emphatic submissions advanced by Sri A. C. Barbora, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioner that in the facts of the present case the suspension of the Petitioner was neither necessary nor justified. As already noticed, Sri A. C. Barbora, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, by placing before the Court the detailed facts of the case, has submitted that not only the Petitioner as the Controller of Examinations but several other persons including the Vice Chancellor himself were parting to the decision by which examiners were required to be appointed by the Zonal Officers which fact was identified by the Justice Choudhury Committee to be the core reason for the anomalies that had occurred in the evaluation of the answer scripts of the B.A. Part-I and Part-II Examinations, 2005. Sri A. C. Barbora, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, has argued that when the final approval to the decision vesting power in the Zonal Officers to appoint the examiners was accorded by the Vice Chancellor and the Petitioner as the Controller of Examinations was a mere clog in the wheel, the impugned order dated 12.12.2005 placing the Petitioner under suspension could neither be justified nor can it be termed to be necessary. 12. The Petitioner is the Controller of Examinations. He is one of the topmost functionaries of the University vested with the ultimate responsibility of fair conduct of the examinations. Conduct of examinations, in turn, is the key function of the University. 12. The Petitioner is the Controller of Examinations. He is one of the topmost functionaries of the University vested with the ultimate responsibility of fair conduct of the examinations. Conduct of examinations, in turn, is the key function of the University. If anything had gone wrong in the holding of the examinations by the University it is the Controller who, in the last resort, would be answerable in view of the responsibilities reposed in the said office. This is precisely what the Justice Choudhury Committee had recorded in its report together with the fact that though the approval of the Vice Chancellor to the decision to vest power in the Zonal Officers to appoint examiners was obtained the same was not after due deliberations in the matter, the holding of which deliberations was the responsibility of the Petitioner as the Controller of Examinations. The above view has been approved by the three-member Committee constituted by the Executive Council and thereafter by the Executive Council itself. On these facts, if the University, as the employer, had taken the decision to proceed departmentally against the Petitioner and to place him under suspension, it is difficult to see how the Court exercising the power of judicial review can proceed to supplant its views over those of the Executive Council in the matter of the necessity or justification of the impugned suspension. Any such exercise will amount to sitting in appeal over the decision and thus beyond the parameters of the exercise of the power of judicial review, principles of which have already been noted in the proceeding part of this order. 13. The Petitioner has alleged that the Respondent No. 4, Prof. Srinath Baruah, a member of the Executive Council was inimically disposed towards the Petitioner and the said Respondent No. 4 was conspiring to remove the Petitioner from the office of Controller of Examinations for an illegal purpose. The Petitioner has also relied on a letter dated 30.11.2004 written by the Respondent No. 4 to the Vice Chancellor highlighting certain illegalities allegedly committed by the Petitioner. That apart, the Petitioner has also placed on record the fact that the Respondent No. 4 was instrumental in publication of a false and fabricated news-item with regard to repetition of questions in the M.A. Final Examination. That apart, the Petitioner has also placed on record the fact that the Respondent No. 4 was instrumental in publication of a false and fabricated news-item with regard to repetition of questions in the M.A. Final Examination. On the said premises, an argument has been sought to be built that the participation of the Respondent No. 4 in the meeting of the Executive Council held on 7.1.2006 vitiates the decision taken in the said meeting on account of bias. As already noticed, in the said meeting, the Executive Council had ratified the decision of the Vice Chancellor to place the Petitioner under suspension and had also dismissed the appeal filed by the Petitioner. 14. It is difficult to see as to how the aforesaid plea of the Petitioner can be accepted by the Court. If the Respondent No. 4, as a Professor of the University and as a member of the Executive Council, had pointed out certain facts which in his comprehension were illegal and the same pertained to the Petitioner, the said fact, by itself, may not be conclusive to uphold the plea of bias, as advanced. At best, it can be said that the Respondent No. 4 ought not to have participated in the proceedings of the Executive Council in so far as the issue relating to the suspension of the Petitioner is concerned. Any such incapacity is for the Respondent No. 4 to perceive and not for the Court to point out unless such participation fundamentally affects the decision taken. In the present case from the proceedings of the Executive Council dated 7.1.2006 which have been placed before the Court it appears that apart from the Respondent No. 4 there were 13 other persons who had participated in the meeting of the Executive Council held on 7.1.2006. Each one of the aforesaid 13 persons had distinguished himself in his own walk of life in recognition of which he had been inducted in the Executive Council. It is, therefore, difficult for the Court to accept that the Respondent No. 4, even if any preconceived notions can be attributed to him, could have influenced the other persons in the making of the decision relating to the suspension of the Petitioner. 15. It is, therefore, difficult for the Court to accept that the Respondent No. 4, even if any preconceived notions can be attributed to him, could have influenced the other persons in the making of the decision relating to the suspension of the Petitioner. 15. This will bring the Court to a consideration of the last issue involved in the case i.e. whether the power of suspension was available to the Vice Chancellor for due exercise. The power to suspend the Controller of Examinations, under Section 8B(6) of the Act is vested in the Executive Council and the Vice Chancellor is only required to implement the said order. However, under Section 8B(4) of the Act in case of an emergency, if the Vice Chancellor is of the opinion that immediate action should be taken, the Vice Chancellor is empowered to take such action as deemed necessary. Section 8B(4) of the Act, however, casts upon the Vice Chancellor the duty to report, at the earliest opportunity, the action taken by him to such authority who in the normal case would have dealt with the matter. 16. In the pleadings advanced on behalf of the University there is some mention that the order of suspension in the present case was passed by the Vice Chancellor in exercise of power under Section8B (4) of the Act. The question that, therefore, confronts the Court is whether having regard to the facts of the case it can be reasonably said that an emergency or immediate situation had arisen which had required the Vice Chancellor to exercise the power of suspension which power is otherwise vested by the Act in the Executive Council. The order of the Vice Chancellor placing the Petitioner under suspension has been placed before the Court in original. The said order is to the following effect: In the interest of public service and for smooth running of the University Sri P. K. Deka be placed under suspension immediately pending drawal of departmental proceedings." Sd/-Illegible 12.12.2005 17. A reading of the order of the Vice Chancellor, as quoted above, makes it abundantly clear that the Vice Chancellor himself was not aware that he was exercising his emergency powers as conferred by Section 8B(4) of the Act. There is no reference, whatsoever, to the emergence of an extraordinary situation in the order of the Vice Chancellor. A reading of the order of the Vice Chancellor, as quoted above, makes it abundantly clear that the Vice Chancellor himself was not aware that he was exercising his emergency powers as conferred by Section 8B(4) of the Act. There is no reference, whatsoever, to the emergence of an extraordinary situation in the order of the Vice Chancellor. Rather, the said order would go to show that it was a routine exercise of powers in the interest of public service and for smooth running of the University. If the Vice Chancellor who had passed the order of suspension himself was not aware and conscious that an extraordinary situation had arisen which necessitated the exercise of his emergency powers and, instead, power was exercised in the routine manner, it cannot be held that the present exercise of power was under Section 8B(4) of the Act so as to clothe the action of the Vice Chancellor with the necessary jurisdiction in law. 18. In Varanaseya Sanskrit Vishwavidyalaya (supra) the Apex Court while examining the purport of similar emergency powers under Section 13(7) of the Varanaseya Sanskrit Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1956 had laid down that such emergency powers' are obviously intended for certain emergent situation necessitating 'immediate action'. The Apex Court further laid down that "before they can be exercised it must appear that there is, in fact, such a situation as to warrant the exercise of extraordinary powers conferred under Section 13(7) of the Act." In Kurukshetra University (supra) the Apex Court took a similar view that the exercise of emergency powers under the Kurukshetra University Act, 1986 must be in situations which warrants immediate action. In the present case, not only the Vice Chancellor was not conscious that he was exercising his emergency powers under Section 8B(4) of the Act, the facts of the case leave the Court satisfied that no emergent situation had arisen so as to warrant the exercise of emergency powers. Illegalities in the evaluation of the answer scripts were reported in the month of June 2005. The situation was enquired into by several Committees including the Justice (Retd.) Choudhury Committee and eventually the Executive Council in its meeting held on 1.10.2005 took the decision that the Petitioner be asked to show cause. The Executive Council did not, however, take any decision to place the Petitioner under suspension. There was Anr. The situation was enquired into by several Committees including the Justice (Retd.) Choudhury Committee and eventually the Executive Council in its meeting held on 1.10.2005 took the decision that the Petitioner be asked to show cause. The Executive Council did not, however, take any decision to place the Petitioner under suspension. There was Anr. meeting of the Executive Council on 21.11.2005, as evident from the records placed before the Court. In the said meeting some related aspects of the examination scandal were discussed. In that meeting also no decision to place the Petitioner under suspension was taken. The next meeting of the Executive Council was held on 7.1.2006 in which meeting the decision taken by the Vice Chancellor on 12.12.2005 to place the Petitioner under suspension was ratified and the appeal filed by the Petitioner against the suspension was dismissed. The above facts would clearly indicate that the Executive Council had met at frequent intervals and there was no impediment in calling a meeting of the Executive Council, even at short notice, prior to placing the Petitioner under suspension. The situation having developed way back in the month of June 2005 it cannot be said that any emergent situation had occurred in December 2005 so as to warrant the exercise of the emergency powers of the Vice Chancellor under Section 8B(4) of the Act. 19. In view of the above conclusions reached this Court has to hold that the exercise of power under Section 8B (4) of the Act by the Vice Chancellor to place the Petitioner under suspension was not legally permissible. Consequently, the order of suspension dated 12.12.2005 does not represent a valid and legally sustainable exercise of power. The said order, therefore, is set aside and the writ petition is allowed. However, it must be made clear that the interference made by this Court with the impugned order dated 12.12.2005 will not preclude the competent authority of the University i.e. the Executive Council to take a fresh decision in the matter in accordance with the provisions of the Act, if it is so inclined. Petition allowed