JUDGMENT Per P.D. DINAKARAN, J. The appellant is the first accused in Sessions Case No.44 of 1998 on the file of learned Additional Sessions Judge cum Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ramanathapuram. He was convicted under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. He challenges the said conviction and sentence in this appeal. 2. Totally there are three accused (A-1 to A-3) in the case. Accused Nos. 1 and 2 are brothers and A-3 is their mother. The charge against Accused No.1, the present appellant, was under Section 302 IPC and the charge against Accused Nos.2 and 3 were under Sections 341 and 302 read with Section 34 IPC. To prove the charges against the accused, the prosecution examined 10 witnesses as P.Ws.1 to 10, marked Exs. P-1 to P-9 as well as M.Os.1 to 4. On the side of defence, the brother of A-3 was examined as D.W.1. However, no documentary evidence was brought before the Court at the instance of the accused. At the end of trial, the trial Court, while acquitting Accused Nos.2 and 3, found Accused No.1 guilty under Section 302 IPC, convicted him thereunder and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life, against which Accused No.1 has preferred the above appeal. However, there is no appeal by the State against the acquittal of Accused Nos.2 and 3. For the purpose of convenience, hereinafter the appellant will be referred to as Accused No.1. 3. The case of the prosecution, as discerned from the evidence of prosecution witnesses, is as under: (a) Accused No.1 is the husband of the deceased Palaniammal. P.W.1 is the younger brother of the deceased and P.W.5 is the father of the deceased. The marriage between the deceased and Accused No.1 took place 16 years prior to the occurrence. At that time, 3 marakkal (a measurement) Nanja land was given to the deceased as “Sridhana” and Accused No.1 was cultivating that land. After sometime, Accused No.1 refused to cultivate the lands and therefore P.W.1 was cultivating the land, because of that there was dispute between the deceased and the Accused No.1. (b) On the occurrence day, i.e. 30.11.1997, at about 3.30 p.m., by informing to P.W.1 that peacocks are causing damage to the crops, the deceased went to the land to chase away the peacocks. P.W.1 followed the deceased. At that time, Accused Nos.2 and 3 waylaid the deceased. (b) On the occurrence day, i.e. 30.11.1997, at about 3.30 p.m., by informing to P.W.1 that peacocks are causing damage to the crops, the deceased went to the land to chase away the peacocks. P.W.1 followed the deceased. At that time, Accused Nos.2 and 3 waylaid the deceased. Accused No.1 attacked the deceased with a stick and that injury landed on her left eye brow. Her upper lip also got injured. Accused No.1 ran way with the stick. Hearing the hue and cry, P.Ws. 2 and 3 came to the scene of occurrence and found Palaniammal dead. P.W.1 went to the police station. He sent a message to his mother through one Boomi. Ex.P-1 is the complaint given by him. M.O.1 is the stick used by A-1. (c) P.Ws. 2 and 3 are owning lands next to the land of the deceased. On hearing the hue and cry of P.W.1 and the deceased, they rushed to the scene and found Accused No.1 running with a stick in his hand. They also saw Palaniammal dead with injuries. P.W.4 is the father of the deceased and he came to the scene village on hearing about the occurrence. P.W.5 is the mediator, who speaks about the land dispute between the deceased and the accused. (d) P.W.9 was the Sub-Inspector of Police in the investigating police station during the relevant time. He, on receipt of Ex.P-1 complaint, registered a case in Crime No.156 of 1997 under Sections 341 and 302 IPC and prepared Ex.P-7, printed first information report. He sent the material records to the Inspector of Police. (e) P.W.10, Inspector of Police, on receipt of first information report took up the investigation. He reached the scene of occurrence at 8.30 p.m. on 30.11.1997, observed it and prepared Ex.P-2, observation mahazar. He also drew Ex.P-8, rough sketch. He conducted inquest over the dead body and prepared Ex.P-9, inquest report. He sent the dead body for postmortem through P.W.9, Police Constable 1060, with Ex.P-5, requisition. He enquired P.Ws.1 to 3 and others and recorded their statements. (f) P.W.7 is the Doctor who conducted autopsy on the body of the deceased. She found the following three external injuries on the body of the deceased: “1. A lacerated injury of about 4 x 2 cm x bone depth joint above left eye brow. 2. Contusion 6x6 cm over left forehead on exploration fractured left frontal bone. 3. (f) P.W.7 is the Doctor who conducted autopsy on the body of the deceased. She found the following three external injuries on the body of the deceased: “1. A lacerated injury of about 4 x 2 cm x bone depth joint above left eye brow. 2. Contusion 6x6 cm over left forehead on exploration fractured left frontal bone. 3. Lacerated injury about 3x2x2 cm over left side of upper lip.” On completion of postmortem, she gave Ex. P-6, postmortem certificate. The doctor was of the opinion that the deceased would was of the opinion that the deceased would have died of shock and haemorrhage due to head injury. After postmortem, P.W.8, constable, recovered M.O.s. 2 to 4, personal wearing apparels of the deceased, from the body and handed over the same to the Investigating Officer. He handed over the body to the relatives. (g) P.W.10 continued the investigation. At 4.00 p.m. on 1.12.1997, he arrested Accused No.1 and enquired him in the presence of P.W.6, Village Administrative Officer. Ex.P-3 is the admissible portion of the voluntary statement given by Accused No.1, pursuant to which M.O.1, stick, was recovered under Ex.P-4, mahazar, attested by P.W.6. He sent Accused No.1 to the Court for judicial remand. He arrested Accused No.2 on 2.12.1997. Accused No.3 surrendered before Court. He examined the postmortem doctor and recorded her statement. He completed the investigation and filed the final report in the Court against the accused under Sections 341 and 301 IPC on 15.12.1997. 4. When the accused were questioned under Section 313 Crl.PC, they denied their involvement in the crime. On the side of defence, D.W.1 was examined. On appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, the learned Sessions Judge convicted and sentenced Accused No.1, but acquitted Accused Nos.2 and 3, as referred to earlier. Hence the above appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant fairly submits that he is not disputing neither the occurrence nor the motive behind the attack made by Accused No.1 on his wife, which resulted in her death. On the other hand, taking advantage of the findings on motive aspect and the weapon used by Accused No.1 and the single blow inflicted by him on the deceased, the learned counsel attempts to bring the act of Accused No.1 punishable under Section 304(ii) IPC. On the other hand, taking advantage of the findings on motive aspect and the weapon used by Accused No.1 and the single blow inflicted by him on the deceased, the learned counsel attempts to bring the act of Accused No.1 punishable under Section 304(ii) IPC. The learned counsel for Accused No.1 invited our attention to the statement of P.W.1 in Ex.P-1, wherein it is stated that prior to the occurrence there was a quarrel between the deceased and Accused Nos.1, 2 and 3 in the land and in that quarrel, Accused No.1, warned the deceased that if she continues the cultivation in the land it would lead to cause an embarrassment to their family and beat her with the stick (M.O.1) on the left eye brow. It is contended that there is no evidence to prove that Accused No.1 had any intention to commit the murder of the deceased. Drawing our attention to the overt acts attributed against Accused No.1 that he gave only single blow on the deceased, the learned counsel contends that the act of Accused No.1 gets attracted to Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC and therefore he seeks modification of the conviction and sentence imposed on Accused No.1. 6. Per contra, learned Additional Public Prosecutor submits that though the defence is not disputing the prosecution case in respect of motive and the involvement of Accused No.1 in attacking the deceased, the evidence of P.W.1, corroborated by the evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 3 and that of the medical evidence (P.W.7), would clearly bring home the guilt of Accused No.1 under Section 302 IPC and therefore there is no reason to bring the act of Accused No.1 under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC. 7. We have given our careful consideration to the rival submissions of the learned counsel on either side. 8. The evidence of P.W.1, the brother of the deceased, is that at the time of occurrence, Accused No.1 attacked his sister with M.O.1 stick on her left eye brow and on receiving such injury she fell down. It is his further evidence that on hearing their hue and cry, P.Ws. 2 and 3, who were in their nearby lands, came to the scene of occurrence and saw the deceased dead. P.Ws. 2 and 3 would depose that they saw Accused No.1 was running away with the weapon M.O.1, stick, from the scene of occurrence. It is his further evidence that on hearing their hue and cry, P.Ws. 2 and 3, who were in their nearby lands, came to the scene of occurrence and saw the deceased dead. P.Ws. 2 and 3 would depose that they saw Accused No.1 was running away with the weapon M.O.1, stick, from the scene of occurrence. The collective evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3 substantiates that Accused No.1 attacked the deceased and caused injury on her left eye brow, which later proved to be fatal. P.W.7, the doctor who conducted autopsy on the body of the deceased, opined that the deceased would have died of shock and haemorrhage due to head injury as recorded in Ex.P-6, postmortem certificate. Accordingly, the evidence of P.W.1 corroborates with that of the medical evidence. From the above discussion, we have no hesitation to conclude that Accused No.1 caused bodily injury on the deceased, which caused her death. 9. The consequent question that arises for consideration is whether the act of Accused No.1 would fall under the 4th Exception to Section 300 IPC and thereby requiring the modification of the conviction and sentence imposed on Accused No.1. 10. P.W.1 does not speak anything about the motive of Accused No.1 to commit the murder of his wife, who is nonetheless the sister of P.W.1. On the other hand, P.W.1 himself clearly states that there was a worldly quarrel between Accused No.1 and his wife. The quarrel is related to the ‘Sridhana’ land given to the deceased by her father (P.W.4), which was an embarrassment for Accused No.1 (husband) and the deceased (wife) to carry on cultivation activities in the said ‘Sridhana’ land on account of menace caused by peacocks. Accused No.1 never demanded anything more. Thus, there is no premeditation. Just immediately before the occurrence, there was a wordy quarrel between the husband and wife (Accused No.1 and the deceased) criticizing the ‘Sridhana’ land and in the heat of passion upon such a sudden quarrel, Accused No.1 gave one blow with a stick on the deceased, which unfortunately landed on the left eye-brow to the deceased. No more overt act was attributed against Accused No.1 by the prosecution and therefore, there is no evidence to show that he had acted in a cruel manner. 11. No more overt act was attributed against Accused No.1 by the prosecution and therefore, there is no evidence to show that he had acted in a cruel manner. 11. The scanning of the whole events would go to show that Accused No.1 had no intention either to cause the death of the deceased or to cause such bodily injuries which would cause the death of the deceased. However, Accused No.1 gave only one blow in the spur of the moment in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel, but not acted in a cruel manner. At the same time, it cannot be ruled out that Accused No.1 had the knowledge that the single blow inflicted by him on the deceased was likely to cause death, attracting conviction under Section 304 (ii) IPC. 12. Where there was a sudden quarrel leading to an exchange of abuses and in the heat of the moment a solitary blow with a hockey stick had been given on the head, it was held that the offence amounted to culpable homicide punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC., vide Willie (William) Stanley v. State of M.P. AIR 1956 SC 116 : 1956 CrLJ 291 . A Full Bench of the Apex Court in Jai Prakash v. State (Delhi Admn.), 1991 SCC (Cr) 299: (1991) 2 SCC 32 , after considering the deci (1991) 2 SCC 32 , after considering the decisions relating to solitary blow and causing one injury during sudden quarrel, viz., held as follows: (i) Tholan v. State of T.N., (1984) 2 SCC 133 : 1984 SCC (Cr) 164; (ii) Jagrup Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1981 SC 1552 : (1981) 3 SCC 616 : 1981 SCC (Cr) 768; (iii) Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 55 : (1981) 4 SCC 484 : 1981 SCC (Cr) 856; (iv) Kulwant Rai v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 126 : (1981) 4 SCC 245 : 1981 SCC (Cr) 826; (v) Hari Ram v. State of Haryana, AIR 1983 SC 185 : (1983) 1 SCC 193 : 1983 SCC (Cr) 159; (vi) Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 463 : (1983) 2 SCC 342 : 1983 SCC (Cr) 459; (vii) Ram Sunder v. State of U.P., Crl. A. No. 555 of 1983, decided on October 24, 1983; and (viii) Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 ; “... 18. In all these cases, injury by a single blow was found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The Supreme Court took into consideration the circumstances such as sudden quarrel, grappling etc. as mentioned above only to assess the state of mind viz., whether the accused had the necessary intention to cause that particular injury i.e. to say that he desired expressly that such injury only should be the result. It is held in all these cases that there was no such intention to cause that particular injury as in those circumstances, the accused could have been barely aware i.e. only had knowledge of the consequences. These circumstances under which the appellant happened to inflict the injury it is felt or at least a doubt arose that all his mental faculties could not have been roused as to form an intention to achieve the particular result. We may point out that we are not concerned with the intention to cause death in which case it will be a murder simpliciter unless exception is attracted. We are concerned under Clause Thirdly with the intention to cause that particular injury which is a subjective inquiry and when once such intention is established and if the intended injury is found objectively to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, Clause Thirdly is attracted and it would be murder unless one of the exceptions to Section 300 is attracted. If on the other hand this ingredient of ‘intention’ is not established or if a reasonable doubt arises in this regard then only it would be reasonable to infer that Clause Thirdly is not attracted and that the accused must be attributed knowledge that in inflicting the injury he was likely to caue deathin which case it will be culpable homicide punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC.” 13. In Mavila Thamban Nambiar v. State of Kerala AIR 1997 SC 687 : 1997 SCC (Cr) 726, where the accused gave one blow on the chest of the deceased and the death was on account of such one blow by the accused, the Apex Court held that the intention to cause death cannot be imputed to him but it would be reasonable to infer that he had knowledge that any injury on the vital part of the body of the deceased would cause death and so he can be convicted under Section 304 Part II IPC. 14. In the instant case, we have already discussed that the act of Accused No.1 had occurred in a heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel between the husband (Accused No.1) and the husband (Accused No.1) gave a single blow causing one injury on his wife (deceased) using a wooden stick, which cannot be said as a deadly weapon in common parlance and therefore the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the decisions referred to supra squarely applies to the facts of the case to modify the offence as one punishable under Section 304 (ii) IPC. 15. In the result, the conviction and sentence of the appellant/Accused No.1 under Section 302 IPC are set aside and instead, he is convicted under Section 304 (ii) IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years. The sentence already served by the appellant shall be given set off. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above.