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2006 DIGILAW 795 (BOM)

Sangita Sharad Kolse v. State of Maharashtra

2006-05-05

P.V.HARDAS, VASANTI A.NAIK

body2006
P. V. HARDAS, J.: - In both the petitions since the facts are identical, both these petitions are being decided by this common judgment. In Writ Petition No.337 of 2003, the petitioner has prayed for issuance of an appropriate writ for quashing and setting aside the impugned judgment and order dated 20 - 1 - 2003 passed by respondent no.2 Scrutiny Committee. The petitioner has also prayed for issuance of an appropriate writ for quashing and setting aside an order passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Aurangabad Division, Aurangabad on 29 - 1 - 2003 which is annexed as Exh.N to the petition, disqualifying the petitioner. The petitioner has also prayed for issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to treat the petitioner as a candidate belonging to Hindu Mahar caste, which is a Scheduled Caste and provide all the benefits of reservation of the said caste to the petitioner. After amending the petition, the petitioner has prayed for issuance of an appropriate writ challenging the election of respondent no.7 on the post of President, Zilla Parish ad, Aurangabad on 14 - 2 - 2003. 2. In Writ Petition No.5271 of 2002, the petitioner in Writ Petition No.337 of 2003 is respondent no.8 to the petition. In this petition the petitioners have prayed for issuance of an appropriate writ for quashing and setting aside the decision of the Scrutiny Committee validating the claim of respondent no.8 by judgment and order dated 31 - 5 - 2002. The petitioners in this petition have also prayed for declaration that the caste certificate issued in favour of respondent no.8 by the Sub - Divisional Officer, Vaijapur on 5 - 1 - 2002 as belonging to Hindu Mahar, Scheduled Caste, be declared as null and void as respondent no.8 belongs to Christian religion. 3. The facts in brief as are necessary for the decision of both these petitions can briefly be stated thus : According to the petitioner, the petitioner is a Hindu Mahar, which is recognised as a Scheduled Caste. Certificate to this effect have been issued by the Executive Magistrate, Gangapur on 16 - 6 - 1994 and by the SubDivisional Officer, Vaijapur on 5 - 1 - 2002. Certificate to this effect have been issued by the Executive Magistrate, Gangapur on 16 - 6 - 1994 and by the SubDivisional Officer, Vaijapur on 5 - 1 - 2002. On the strength that the petitioner is a "Mahar" i.e., a Scheduled Caste candidate, the petitioner contested the election as member of Zilla Parishad on a seat reserved for candidates belonging to Scheduled Caste. In the election, the petitioner was duly elected as member of Zilla Parishad. On 16 - 4 - 2002 the caste certificate of the petitioner was referred by the Collector, Aurangabad to the respondent Scrutiny Committee. The respondent - Scrutiny Committee, by its judgment and order dated 315 - 2002 validated the caste certificate of the petitioner. The election of the President of Zilla Parishad, Aurangabad was set aside and as a consequence of that the seat became vacant. Meanwhile, it appears that the petitioners in Writ Petition No.5271 of 2002, by filing this petition, challenged the judgment and order of t the Scrutiny Committee validating the caste claim of the petitioner in Writ Petition No.337 of 2003 and respondent no.5 in the other petition. As soon as the election of the President of Zilla Parishad, Aurangabad, was declared, according to the petitioner a complaint was sent in the name of one Shantaram Dharmaji Ubale, rlo Samata Nagar, Gangapur, Tq. Gangapur, Dist. Aurangabad, to the respondent Scrutiny Committee. According to the petitioner the respondent Scrutiny Committee entertained this complaint and suo motu started proceedings for reviewing its order on the basis of the said complaint. On 12 - 12 - 2002 the respondent Scrutiny Committee suo motu referred the matter to the vigilance cell and the vigilance cell in turn submitted its report on 12 - 12 - 2002. The Committee accordingly issued notice to the petitioner directing the petitioner to submit her reply within two weeks as to why the caste validity certificate issued in favour of the petitioner in Writ Petition No.337 of 2003 be not cancelled. On 16 - 12 - 2002 Writ Petition No.527! of 2002 came to be filed challenging the earlier decision of the Committee validating the caste claim of the petitioner as belonging to Mahar i.e. a Scheduled Caste. On 16 - 12 - 2002 Writ Petition No.527! of 2002 came to be filed challenging the earlier decision of the Committee validating the caste claim of the petitioner as belonging to Mahar i.e. a Scheduled Caste. On 20 - 12 - 2002 an interim order came to be passed by this Court in Writ Petition No.5271 of 2002 and this Court permitted the candidate, the petitioner in Writ Petition No.337 of 2003 would hereinafter be referred to in this judgment as "the candidate", to contest the election which was to be held on that day. This Court, however, directed the candidate not to use official vehicle, residence and draw such benefits that go to the post of President, Zilla Parishad, Aurangabad until further orders. This Court further directed the respondent Scrutiny Committee to ensure that copy of vigilance inquiry report along with copies of the documents in support of the said report are served on the candidate when the candidate would be appearing before the Committee either on 21 - 12 - 2002 or on 23 - 12 - 2002. The Court also directed the candidate to file reply and appear before the Committee on 27 - 12 - 2002 and submit the list of witnesses if the candidate so desire to adduce oral evidence. This court further directed the Scrutiny Committee that the review proceedings should be completed as expeditiously as possible and in any case before 24 - 1 - 2003. This Court further directed the respondent Scrutiny Committee to serve a copy of the judgment and order on the candidate before 31 - 1 - 2003. It appears that a challenge to this order at the behest of the candidate in the Supreme Court came to be withdrawn by the candidate. The respondent Scrutiny Committee, in pursuance to the order of this Court, heard the candidate and invalidated the caste claim of the candidate as belonging to Mahar, Scheduled Caste. The judgment and order invalidating the caste claim of the petitioner, pursuant to the reopening of this issue, is the subject - matter of challenge in Writ Petition No.337 of 2003. 4. Mr. Barlinge, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has urged before us the following grounds for quashing and setting aside the judgment and order of the Scrutiny Committee by which the caste claim of the candidate has been invalidated. 4. Mr. Barlinge, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has urged before us the following grounds for quashing and setting aside the judgment and order of the Scrutiny Committee by which the caste claim of the candidate has been invalidated. The grounds in support of the said challenge are: (i) In the show cause notice which has been issued to the candidate, the words "fraud" or that the candidate has obtained the earlier order of validation of her caste claim by "fraudulent" means is not pleaded; (ii) The certificates annexed by the candidate in the proceedings before the respondent Scrutiny Committee clearly demonstrate that the candidate is a Mahar i.e. Scheduled Caste; (iii) There is no express provision of review which is conferred on the Scrutiny Committee and, therefore, the Scrutiny Committee cannot exercise the powers of review. 5. Alternatively it was argued that the powers exercised by the Scrutiny Committee in upsetting the validity certificate issued to the candidate earlier, amounts to a review on merits and is not a procedural review and, therefore, in the absence of an express provision in the statute conferring the exercise of such power, the impugned order invalidating the caste claim of the candidate deserves to be quashed and set aside. Alternatively, it was also submitted that the fact that, the candidate had obtained the earlier order by fraudulent means has not been established. Mr. Barlinge, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgments of Supreme Court reported in AIR 1975 SC 1185 , 1971(3) SCC 844 , AIR 1970 SC 1273 ,2002 AIR SCW 2245, 2001(6) SCC 512 , 1976(3) SCC 411 and on the Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in 2006(1) Mh.L.J. 308 . 6. Mr. N. B. Patil, learned A.G.P., appearing on behalf of respondents no.1, 2 & 5 in Writ Petition No.337 of 2003 and on behalf of respondents no.1 to 4 & 6 in Writ Petition No.5271 of 2002 has urged before us that the power exercised by the respondent Scrutiny Committee is not a power of review at all. It was brought to the notice of the respondent Scrutiny Committee that the petitioner had been converted to Christianity and the petitioner had thus suppressed this fact and in order to verify the correctness of the complaint, the respondent Scrutiny Committee had undertaken this exercise. It was brought to the notice of the respondent Scrutiny Committee that the petitioner had been converted to Christianity and the petitioner had thus suppressed this fact and in order to verify the correctness of the complaint, the respondent Scrutiny Committee had undertaken this exercise. The exercise of the finding out the correctness of the allegations made against the candidate, that the candidate professes Christianity, is not an exercise which is undertaken by the respondent Scrutiny Committee in the exercise of a review jurisdiction. It was next urged by Shri. Patil, learned A.G.P. that if at all it is held that the respondent Committee has exercised the powers of review, the said powers are exercised as a procedural review as in the earlier proceedings the report of the vigilance cell had not been obtained. Lastly it was submitted that the findings of the Scrutiny Committee that the candidate belongs to Christian religion clearly justify the exercise of powers of review of the respondent Scrutiny Committee as the candidate has obtained the validity certificate by suppressing this fact and has misled the Committee. The candidate, therefore, has practised fraud or has fraudulently obtained an order from the respondent Scrutiny Committee validating her claim as belonging to Scheduled Caste. The learned A.G.P. has relied on the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) Mh.L.J. 306 . Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in AIR 1981 SC 606 , AIR 2005 SC 3330 , AIR 1996 SC 2592 and on the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in 2005 AIR SCW 1561. 7. The learned A.G.P. has relied on the Division Bench of this Court in 2006(1) Mh.L.J. 306 . Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in AIR 1981 SC 606 , AIR 2005 SC 3330 , AIR 1996 SC 2592 and on the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in 2005 AIR SCW 1561. 7. In view of the rival submissions which have been advanced before us by the learned Counsel for the parties, the questions of some importance which arise for our consideration in these petitions are :(a) Whether the statute has conferred express powers of review and whether in the absence of express powers of review impliedly it can be said that the respondent Scrutiny Committee can exercise the powers of review; (b) Whether the exercise undertaken by the respondent Scrutiny Committee is an exercise of review on merits or is a procedural review; and (c) Whether the judgment and order of the Scrutiny Committee by which the caste claim of the candidate has been invalidated is as a result of exercise of review because the earlier order of validating the caste claim of the candidate had been obtained by the candidate by suppressing material documents and has thus practised fraud on the respondent Scrutiny Committee. 8. In Laxmi R. Karhadkar Vs. Resident Deputy District Collector, Mumbai & others, 2003(1) ALL MR 715, the Division Bench of this Court has held in paragraph 4 thus: "So far as review is concerned, the learned counsel for the petitioner is right in urging that there cannot be inherent power of review in an authority and such power must be conferred by a statute. In Kumari Madhuri Patil & Anr. Vs. Addl. Commissioner, Tribal Development & Ors., (1994)6 SCC 241 , it has been specifically observed by Their Lordships that "the order passed by the Committee shall be final and conclusive only subject to the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution". The contention on behalf of the petitioners is that by the impugned action, the action of issuance of certificate in favour of the petitioner is sought to be reviewed. If it is so, obviously, the contention must be upheld, and since there is no express power of review, the action must be held to be illegal and unlawful. The contention on behalf of the petitioners is that by the impugned action, the action of issuance of certificate in favour of the petitioner is sought to be reviewed. If it is so, obviously, the contention must be upheld, and since there is no express power of review, the action must be held to be illegal and unlawful. It is, however, clear from the communication dated October 7, 2002 addressed by respondent No.1 to the President of the Regional Caste Scrutiny Committee, Konkan Division, Navi Mumbai, also from the affidavit - in - reply dated October 29, 2002 that the School leaving certificate was not correct, but was false and on the basis of such certificate, no caste certificate could have been granted to the petitioner." 9. Supreme Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi and ors. Vs. Shri. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, 1971(3) SCC 844 has held in paragraph 4 thus : "The first question that we have to consider is whether Mr. Mankodi had competence to quash the order made by the Saurashtra Government on October 22, 1956. It must be remembered that Mr. Mankodi was functioning as the delegate of the State Government. The order passed by Mr. Mankodi, in law amounted to a review of the order made by Saurashtra Government. It is well settled that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. No provision in the Act was brought to notice from which it could be gathered that the Government had power to review its own order. If the Government had no power to review its own order, it is obvious that its delegate could not have reviewed its order. The question whether the Governments' order is correct or valid in law does not arise for consideration in these proceedings so long as that order is not set aside or declared void by a competent authority. Hence the same cannot be ignored. The Subordinate Tribunals have to carry out that order. For this reason alone the order of Mr. Mankodi was liable to be set aside." 10. Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. Vs. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal and others, AIR 1981 SC 606 in paragraphs 6 & 7 of the report had held thus : "6. The Subordinate Tribunals have to carry out that order. For this reason alone the order of Mr. Mankodi was liable to be set aside." 10. Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. Vs. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal and others, AIR 1981 SC 606 in paragraphs 6 & 7 of the report had held thus : "6. We are of the opinion that the Tribunal had the power to pass the impugned order, if it thought fit in the interest of justice. It is true that there is no express provision in the Act or the rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to do so. But it is a well - known rule of statutory construction that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. In a case of this nature, we are of the view that the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the statute to the contrary. We do not find any such statutory prohibition. On the other hand, there are indications to the contrary. 7. Sub - section (1) of S.11 of the Act, as substituted by S.9 of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment & Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956, is in these terms: "11.( 1) Subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, an arbitrator or other authority concerned may think fit." The words shall follow such procedure as the arbitrator or other authority may think fit are of the widest amplitude and confer ample power upon the Tribunal and other authorities to devise such procedure as the justice of the case demands. Under Cls.(1) to (c) of the Sub - s.11, the Tribunal and other authorities have the same powers as are vested in civil courts under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, of (1) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath, (b) compelling the production of documents and material objects, and (c) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses. Under Cl.(d) thereof, the Tribunal or such authorities have also the same powers as are vested in civil courts under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in respect of such other matters as may be prescribed. Under Cl.(d) thereof, the Tribunal or such authorities have also the same powers as are vested in civil courts under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in respect of such other matters as may be prescribed. Although the Tribunal or other authorities specified in S.II are not courts but they have the trappings of a court, and they exercise quasi - judicial functions." 11. Supreme Court in K.M.E. Union Vs. Birla Cotton Spg. & Wvg., Mills Ltd., 2005 AIR SCW 1561, has held thus : "Where a Court or quasi - judicial authority having jurisdiction to adjudicate on merit proceeds to do so, its judgment or order can be reviewed on merit only if the Court or the quasi - judicial authority is vested with power of review by express provision or by necessary implication. The procedural review belongs to a different category. In such a review, the Court or quasi - judicial authority having jurisdiction to adjudicate proceeds to do so, but in doing so commits a procedural illegality which goes to the root of the matter and invalidates the proceeding itself, and consequently the order passed therein. Cases where a decision is rendered by the Court or quasi - judicial authority without notice to the opposite party or under a mistaken impression that the notice had been served upon the opposite party, or where a matter is taken up for hearing and decision on a date other than the date fixed for its hearing, are some illustrative cases in which the power of procedural review may be invoked. In such a case the party seeking review or recall of the order does not have to substantiate the ground that the order passed suffers from an error apparent on the fact of the record or any other ground which may justify a review. He has to establish that the procedure followed by the Court or the quasi - judicial authority suffered from such illegality that it vitiated the proceeding and invalidated the order made therein, inasmuch the opposite party concerned was not heard for no fault of his. In such cases, therefore, the matter has to be re - heard in accordance with law without going into the merit of the order passed. In such cases, therefore, the matter has to be re - heard in accordance with law without going into the merit of the order passed. The order passed is liable to be recalled and reviewed not because it is found to be erroneous but because it was passed in a proceeding which was itself vitiated by an error of procedure or mistake which went to the root of the matter and invalidated the entire proceeding. In the present case, the recall of the Award of the Tribunal was sought not on the ground that in passing the Award the Tribunal had committed any procedural illegality or mistake of the nature which vitiated the proceedings itself and consequently the A ward, but on the ground that some matters which ought to have been considered by the Tribunal were not duly considered. Apparently the recall or review sought was not a procedural review, but a review on merits. Such a review was not permissible in the absence of a provision in the Act conferring the power of review on the Tribunal either expressly or by necessary implication. 12. Thus, from the aforesaid authorities it is absolutely clear that powers of review cannot be exercised unless they are expressly conferred and/or available by necessary implication. The power of reviewing an order on merits is different from the procedural review which can be used only when there is breach of the procedure which is prescribed. In the present case, according to us there is no reason to hold that the order of the Scrutiny Committee invalidating the caste claim of the candidate would fall within the category of procedural review. It is no doubt true that the procedure which is prescribed in respect of deciding the claim for validation of caste or tribe requires the verification of the certificates by the vigilance cell. However, if reference is made to the provisions, it is clear that the Scrutiny Committee may call for the report of the vigilance cell in the event the Scrutiny Committee is not satisfied with the certificates which have been tendered. It is equally true that invariably the report of the vigilance cell is called for by the Committee before adjudicating upon the claim of a candidate as belonging to a particular caste or tribe. In the absence of such a report, it cannot be contended that the procedure prescribed is violated. It is equally true that invariably the report of the vigilance cell is called for by the Committee before adjudicating upon the claim of a candidate as belonging to a particular caste or tribe. In the absence of such a report, it cannot be contended that the procedure prescribed is violated. It would depend on facts of each case. In the present case, according to us the exercise undertaken by the Scrutiny Committee would not be an exercise of procedural review. 13. The learned A.G.P. appearing on behalf of the respondents has relied on para 5 of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Laxmi R. Karhadkar, [2003(1) ALL MR 715] (supra). Para 5 of the report reads thus : "Now, whether the allegation was correct and the certificate was false or not will have to be decided in the light of evidence before the Scrutiny Committee, and the Committee, after affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, as also to the contesting respondent, will record a finding, one way or the other. In our opinion, therefore, this is not a case of review of an earlier order, but a case wherein an allegation is made that a certificate, which has been obtained by the petitioner, and on the basis of which she was treated as belonged to "Muslim Bagwan", was not legal and valid. If it is lawful, and the defect goes to the root of the matter. In our considered opinion, therefore, this is not a case of reviewing the order but to ascertain the basis of certificate, came to be issued in favour of the petitioner. Such proceedings can always be initiated and Madhuri Patil is no bar to the proceedings in question." 14. On the basis of the observations at para 5 of the judgment, it is urged before us by the learned A.G.P. that the Division Bench ultimately held that the exercise undertaken by the Scrutiny Committee was not in exercise of the powers of review. On the basis of the observations at para 5 of the judgment, it is urged before us by the learned A.G.P. that the Division Bench ultimately held that the exercise undertaken by the Scrutiny Committee was not in exercise of the powers of review. Perusal of the judgment clearly reveals that what was complained before the Scrutiny Committee was that communication dated 7 - 10 - 2002 addressed by respondent no.1 therein to the President of the Regional Caste Certificate Scrutiny Committee, Konkan Division, Navi Mumbai and also from the affidavit in reply dated 29 - 10 - 2002 revealed that the school leaving certificate issued to the petitioner therein was not correct but was false and on the basis of such certificate no certificate could have been granted to the petitioner. In the light of the incorrect certificate which had been granted to the petitioner therein, the Division Bench held whether that allegation was correct and the certificate was false or not would have to be decided in the light of the evidence before the Scrutiny Committee and the Committee after affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, as also the contesting respondents, would record a finding one way or the other. The Division Bench further observed that, therefore, it was not a case of a review of an earlier order but a case wherein an allegation was made that the certificate which had been obtained by the petitioner and on the basis of which she was treated as belonging to "Muslim Bagwan" was legal and valid. This was a case where the petitioner had fraudulently obtained the validity certificate from the Caste Scrutiny Committee. 15. A perusal of the show cause issued to the petitioner dated 16 - 12 - 2002 clearly reveals that the Scrutiny Committee had informed the candidate that as per the report of the vigilance cell dated 12 - 12 - 2002, it was apparent that the candidate was baptised in "Christ the King Church", Mali Ghogargaon, Tq. Vaijapur, Dis1. Aurangabad on 17 - 12 - 1983. The Committee also had informed the candidate that the candidate at the age of 19 was administered the confirmation of sacrament in S1. Mary Church, Wahegaon. Vaijapur, Dis1. Aurangabad on 17 - 12 - 1983. The Committee also had informed the candidate that the candidate at the age of 19 was administered the confirmation of sacrament in S1. Mary Church, Wahegaon. The candidate was also apprised by the show cause notice that on 3-3-1996 the candidate had married one Sharad Fakira Kolse after obtaining the requisite permission from the Bishop as per the application submitted by the candidate on 3-61996. In pursuance to the said permission which was granted, the candidate was married to Sharad Fakira Kolse on 13-7-1997 in St. Mary's Church, Wahegaon as per the Christian religious rites (Canon Law 1125 and 1126) and the marriage was registered in the Church at Sr. No.161. The Committee further informed the candidate that the above information had been suppressed by the candidate deliberately and had kept the Committee in dark about the said information and had misled the Committee. Therefore, the candidate was called upon to submit her reply. Thus, what is hinted in the show cause notice and according to us which is explicit from the language of the show cause notice is that the Committee had alleged that the candidate had suppressed that she was a Christian or at least professing Christianity and had obtained the validity certificate as belonging to Scheduled Caste by practising fraud on the respondent Committee. Therefore, according to us not using the words "fraud" or "fraudulently" would not mean that the Committee had not put the candidate to notice t hat the candidate had obtained the said certificate by practising fraud on the respondent Scrutiny Committee. We are, therefore, not in agreement with the submission advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that in the absence of the use of the words "fraud" or "fraudulently", the show cause notice would stand vitiated or that it would not mean that the Committee had exercised the jurisdiction of setting aside its earlier order on grounds of fraud. 16. The report of the vigilance cell, dated 12-12-2002 clearly indicates that the petitioner was married on 13-7-1997 at Wahegaon in the St. Mary's Church according to the marriage ceremony of Christians. The marriage was performed by Father Wilfred Saldhana and the register bears the signature of the candidate, her husband and Father Wilfred Saldhana, one Kondiram Maghade, r/o. Manjari and Madhukarrao Gaikwad, r/o. Pimpalgaon had affixed their thumb impression as witnesses. Mary's Church according to the marriage ceremony of Christians. The marriage was performed by Father Wilfred Saldhana and the register bears the signature of the candidate, her husband and Father Wilfred Saldhana, one Kondiram Maghade, r/o. Manjari and Madhukarrao Gaikwad, r/o. Pimpalgaon had affixed their thumb impression as witnesses. The report further discloses that the original register which was maintained by the Church was examined by the Officers of the vigilance cell on 8-12-2002. The report further discloses that Maghade family had been converted to Christianity. It transpired during the inquiry that father of candidate by name Ramchandra Vithal Maghade had been converted to Christianity. It is stated that Ramnath Laxman Shirale, r/o. Gangapur and Wilfred Martin Saldhana, Priests in St. Mary's Church, Wahegaon had disclosed this fact in their statement. The report also highlights that the candidates maiden name was Teressa @ Sangita Ramchandra Maghade. On 17-12-1983, the candidate at the age of 9 was baptised as a Christian in the King's Church, Mali Ghogargaon, Tq. Vaijapur, Dist. Aurangabad. It is stated that Father Saldhana on 7-12-2002 had produced the baptism certificate and had issued a copy of the same to the vigilance cell. It is also stated that the original Baptism register had been perused by the Officers of the vigilance cell. The ceremony of baptism was performed by the Father Abraham Gomes. The report further discloses that the candidate and her fiance Sharad Fakira Kolse had sought permission for inter caste marriage by submitting application on 3-6-1996. The said application is signed by both of them. In the said application it was stated that the bride i.e. the candidate and the bridegroom i.e. Sharad Fakira Kolse were Christian and Baudha', respectively. In the light of that, therefore, the necessary, permission was sought for from the Bishop. Father Wilfred Saldhana had accordingly endorsed that permission be granted and had forwarded the said application to one Father Vinod Shelke. Father Vinod Shelke as per Canon Law No. 1129 and Canon Law Nos.1225 and 1126 had granted the necessary permission. Finally the Bishop had also granted the necessary permission for solemnization of the inter caste marriage of the candidate. The marriage as per the Christian rites was performed and thereafter the necessary rites in respect of Baudha Dharma were also performed. An invitation card in that behalf came to be issued in the name of the father of the bridegroom. Finally the Bishop had also granted the necessary permission for solemnization of the inter caste marriage of the candidate. The marriage as per the Christian rites was performed and thereafter the necessary rites in respect of Baudha Dharma were also performed. An invitation card in that behalf came to be issued in the name of the father of the bridegroom. It is also stated that the brother and sister of the candidate had also been baptised. The report of the Scrutiny Committee concludes by saying that the candidate had produced the certificates wherein her caste was recorded as Mahar, suppressing the fact that the candidate had been converted to Christianity. 17. The candidate has not annexed the copy of the reply which had been submitted by the candidate in pursuance to the said show cause notice. However, the said reply has been made available to us from the record and proceedings of the Scrutiny Committee. In the said reply, dated 27-12-2002 submitted by the candidate, the candidate has in terms accepted that she was baptised. However, the candidate has urged that baptism had been performed without her consent or willingness. The candidate has also admitted that her marriage was performed in the Church and thereafter as per the Baudha rites. 18. It is, therefore, crystal clear that the candidate had been converted to Christianity. The certificates which had been placed on record by the candidate showing that her caste is recorded as "Mahar" pertained to the period before her baptism. The candidate has also placed on record the marriage invitation card which had been issued by her father-in-law to indicate that the marriage was performed as per the Hindu rites. However, according to us the fact that the candidate had been converted to Christianity and had professed Christianity and in the absence of any evidence to indicate that the candidate has been reconverted as a Hindu Mahar, the candidate has obtained the validity certificate earlier by suppressing the fact that the candidate was a Christian. The evidence clearly indicates that the candidate is a Christian and, therefore, because of her conversion to Christianity, she would not be entitled to claim that she was a Mahar i.e. Scheduled Caste. The evidence clearly indicates that the candidate is a Christian and, therefore, because of her conversion to Christianity, she would not be entitled to claim that she was a Mahar i.e. Scheduled Caste. Since the candidate had not pleaded before the Scrutiny Committee that upon her marriage she had been converted to Scheduled Caste, according to us the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Valsamma Paul Vs. Cochin University, (1996)3 SCC 545 would not assist the candidate. The candidate had obtained an order validating her caste claim on the basis of the certificate tendered by the petitioner showing that she belonged to Mahar Scheduled Caste. The fact that she had been converted to Christianity had been completely suppressed by the candidate. The candidate, in order to derive advantage of the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Valsamma' s case, was under an obligation to plead all facts before the Scrutiny Committee. The candidate did not plead that in view of the ratio laid down therein, she ought to be treated as a Scheduled Caste. Since this was not her case before the respondent Scrutiny Committee, according to us the petitioner has fraudulently obtained the certificate from the respondent Scrutiny Committee by suppressing the fact of her conversion to Christianity. 19. A reference may usefully be made to the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Bhaurao Dagdu Paralkar Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 3330 : [2005(5) ALL MR (S.C.) 988]. In paras 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 the Supreme Court has held thus; "10. By "fraud" is meant an intention to deceive: whether it is from any expectation of advantage to the party himself or from the ill-will towards the other is immaterial. The expression "fraud" involves two elements, deceit and injury to the person deceived. Injury is something other than economic loss, that is, deprivation of property, whether movable or immovable or of money and it will include any harm whatever caused to any person in body, mind, reputation of such others. In short, it is a non-economic or non-pecuniary loss. A benefit or advantage to the deceiver, will almost always cause loss or detriment to the deceived. Even in those rare cases where there is a benefit or advantage to the deceiver, but no corresponding loss to the deceived, the second condition is satisfied. In short, it is a non-economic or non-pecuniary loss. A benefit or advantage to the deceiver, will almost always cause loss or detriment to the deceived. Even in those rare cases where there is a benefit or advantage to the deceiver, but no corresponding loss to the deceived, the second condition is satisfied. 11-A. "Fraud" is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another's loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. 12. "Fraud" as is well known vitiates every solemn act. Fraud and justice never dwell together. Fraud is a conduct either by letter or words, which includes the other person or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of the former either by words or letter. It is also well settled that misrepresentation itself amounts to fraud. Indeed, innocent misrepresentation may also give reason to claim relief against fraud. A fraudulent misrepresentation is called deceit and consists in leading a man into damage by willfully or recklessly causing him to believe and act on falsehood. It is a fraud in law if a party makes representation, which he knows to be false, and injury enures therefrom although the motive from which the representations proceeded may not have been bad. An act of fraud on Court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of the others in relation to a property would render the transaction void ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous. Although in a given case a deception may not amount to fraud, fraud is anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including res judicata. 13. "Fraud" and collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any civilized system of jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human conduct. Michael Levi likens a fraudster to Milton's sorcerer Comus, who exulted in his ability to, wing me into the easy-hearted man and trap him into snares. It has been defined as an fact of trickery or deceit. "Fraud" and collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any civilized system of jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human conduct. Michael Levi likens a fraudster to Milton's sorcerer Comus, who exulted in his ability to, wing me into the easy-hearted man and trap him into snares. It has been defined as an fact of trickery or deceit. In Webster's Third New International Dictionary "fraud" in equity has been defined as an act or omission to act or concealment by which one person obtains an advantage against conscience over another or which equity or public policy forbids as being prejudicial to another. In Black's Legal Dictionary, "fraud" is defined as an intentional perversion of truth for the purpose of inducing another in reliance upon it to part with some valuable thing belonging to him or surrender a legal right; a false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or by conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed, which deceives and is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury. In Concise Oxford Dictionary, it has been defined as criminal deception, use of false representation to gain unjust advantage; dishonest artifice or trick. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, a representation is deemed to have been false, and therefore a misrepresentation, if it was at the material date false in substance and in fact. Section 17 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 defines "fraud" as act committed by a party to a contract with intent to deceive another. From dictionary meaning or even otherwise fraud arises out of deliberate active role of representator about a fact, which he knows to be untrue yet he succeeds in misleading the represented by making him believe it to be true. The representation to become fraudulent must be of fact with knowledge that it was false. In a leading English case i.e. Derry and Ors. Vs. Peek, (1886-90) All ER 1, what constitutes "fraud" was described thus : (All ER p.22 B-C) "fraud" is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made (i) knowingly, or (ii) without belief in its truth, or (iii) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false". But "fraud" in public law is not the same as "fraud" in private law. But "fraud" in public law is not the same as "fraud" in private law. Nor can be ingredients, which establish "fraud" in commercial transaction, be of assistance in determining fraud in Administrative Law. It has been aptly observed by Lord Bridge in Khawaja Vs. Secretary of State for Home Deptt., (1983)1 ALL ER 765, that it is dangerous to introduce maxims of common law as to effect of fraud while determining fraud in relation to statutory law. "Fraud" in relation to statute must be a colourable transaction to evade the provisions of a statute. If a statute has been passed for some one particular purpose, a Court of law will not countenance any attempt which may be made to extend the operation of the Act to something else which is quite foreign to its object and beyond its scope. Present day concept of fraud on statute has veered round abuse of power or mala fide exercise of power. It may arise due to overstepping the limits of power of defeating the provision of statute by adopting subterfuge or the power may be exercised for extraneous or irrelevant considerations. The colour of fraud in public law or administrative law, as it is developing, is assuming different shades. It arises from a deception committed by disclosure of incorrect facts knowingly and deliberately to invoke exercise of power and procure an order from an authority or tribunal. It must result in exercise of jurisdiction which otherwise would not have been exercised. The misrepresentation must be in relation to the conditions provided in a section on existence or non-existence of which the power can be exercised. But nondisclosure of a fact not required by a statute to be disclosed may not amount to fraud. Even in commercial transactions nondisclosure of every fact does not vitiate the agreement. "In a contract every person must look for himself and ensure that he acquires the information necessary to avoid bad bargain". In public law the duty is not to deceive. (See Shrisht Dhawan (Smt.) Vs. M/s. Shaw Brothers, ( 1992(1) SCC 534 ). 14. In that case it was observed as follows: "Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any civilized system of jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human conduct. In public law the duty is not to deceive. (See Shrisht Dhawan (Smt.) Vs. M/s. Shaw Brothers, ( 1992(1) SCC 534 ). 14. In that case it was observed as follows: "Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any civilized system of jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human conduct. Michael Levi likens a fraudster to Milton's sorcerer, Comus, who exulted in his ability to, wing me into the easy-hearted man and trap him into snares. It has been defined as an act of trickery or deceit. In Webster's Third New International Dictionary fraud in equity has been defined as an act or omission to act or concealment by which one person obtains an advantage against conscience over another or which equity or public policy forbids as being prejudicial to another. In Black's Legal Dictionary, fraud in defined as an intentional perversion of truth for the purpose of inducing another in reliance upon it to part with some valuable thing belonging to him or surrender a legal right a false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or by conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed, which deceives and is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury. In Concise Oxford Dictionary, it has been defined as criminal deception, use of false representation to gain unjust advantage; dishonest artifice or trick. According to Halsbury's Laws or England, a representation is deemed to have been false, and therefore a misrepresentation, if it was at the material date false on substance and in fact. Section 17 of the Contract Act defines fraud as act committed by a party to a contract with intent to deceive another. From dictionary meaning or even otherwise fraud arises out of deliberate active role of representator about a fact, which he knows to be untrue yet he succeeds in misleading the representee by making him believe it to be true. The representation to become fraudulent must be of the fact with knowledge that it was false. In a leading English case Derry Vs. Peek, ((1886-90) All ER Rep 1 : (1889(14 AC 337 (HL)) what constitutes fraud was described thus: (All ER p.22-B-C). The representation to become fraudulent must be of the fact with knowledge that it was false. In a leading English case Derry Vs. Peek, ((1886-90) All ER Rep 1 : (1889(14 AC 337 (HL)) what constitutes fraud was described thus: (All ER p.22-B-C). Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made (i) knowingly, or (ii) without belief in its truth, or (iii) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false." The candidate has thus practised fraud on the respondent Scrutiny Committee by making a false representation that the candidate belonged to Mahar-Scheduled Caste being aware that the candidate had been converted to Christianity. The fact that the candidate had performed her marriage in Church after seeking the necessary permission from the Church authorities clearly negatives her plea in her reply to the show cause notice that she was baptised without being aware. In any event, we are not presently concerned with that aspect of the matter. The report of the vigilance cell further indicates that the candidate's father, mother and her brother and sister have all been converted to Christianity and had been accordingly baptised. This fact was deliberately suppressed by the candidate. The candidate was aware that she had ceased to be a Mahar and thus a Scheduled Caste on her conversion to Christianity. Thus the candidate has practised fraud on the respondent Scrutiny committee. The Supreme Court in Bhaurao (supra) at paragraph 16 has clearly held that suppression of material document would amount to a fraud on the Court. On the basis of fraud which was practised by the candidate, the respondent Scrutiny Committee was induced to grant a validity certificate in her favour. 20. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has placed reliance on the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Surendra Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2006(1) Mh.L.J. 308 . Reliance is particularly placed on paras 18 & 19 of the report, to which one of us (Mrs. V. A. Naik, J.) was a member. Paras 18 & 19 of the said report read thus : "18. In our view, if a claimant fails to substantiate and establish his caste claim because of insufficiency of evidence or lack of knowledge of traits or characteristics of his tribe, he cannot be termed as a person who has obtained and produced a false caste certificate. Paras 18 & 19 of the said report read thus : "18. In our view, if a claimant fails to substantiate and establish his caste claim because of insufficiency of evidence or lack of knowledge of traits or characteristics of his tribe, he cannot be termed as a person who has obtained and produced a false caste certificate. The phraseology false caste certificate or a certificate obtained fraudulently used in section 7 of the Act cannot and does not cover bona fide cases where a claimant fails to establish his caste claim. To hold that a person has obtained a false caste certificate or a certificate fraudulently there need to exist an element of mens area or a guilty mind and only on the establishment of the existence of said element, that a person could be branded as one who has obtained false caste certificate. It is in this sense, that we have observed in proposition "C" above, that a person can be denied the benefit of Government Resolution dated 15-6-1995, if he has procured appointment on the basis of false caste certificate. 19. Ordinarily the proceedings before the Committee are for adjudication of the caste claim but in some cases, the Committee may prima facie find that the claim is false, on the ground that the certificate itself is forged or that the certificate is obtained fraudulently, etc. then in that situation, the claimant will have to be put on notice in that regard and afforded an opportunity of being heard to explain as to why the Committee should not hold the claimant guilty of producing a false, forged of fabricated certificate. Solely on the ground that the claim is invalidated, the Scrutiny Committee will not be justified in reaching a conclusion that the claimant has obtained ~ false certificate or he has produced a false caste certificate. No one has disputed the proposition that only on establishment of the ingredients of section 7 and consequential cancellation and confiscation of the Caste Certificate, a claimant exposes himself to an action under section 10 or 11 of the Act and not otherwise." 21. According to us the reliance placed on behalf of the candidate on the aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench of this Court is wholly misplaced. According to us the reliance placed on behalf of the candidate on the aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench of this Court is wholly misplaced. The case of the candidate is not that the candidate has failed to establish and prove that the candidate belongs to Scheduled Caste. The case at hand is a case where the candidate had earlier obtained the validity certificate in her favour by suppressing the material fact which went to the root of the matter. Similarly, reliance placed on the judgment of Supreme Court in 1976(3) SCC 411 , is wholly misplaced as the case pleaded before the Committee by the candidate was not of deriving advantages of caste upon her reconversion. 22. A reference may usefully be made to the judgment of Supreme Court in Indian Bank Vs. M/s. Satyam Fibers (India) Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1996 se 2592. The Supreme Court in paras 20, 21, 22 & 23 of the report has held thus: "20. By filing letter No.2775 of 26-891 along with the Review Petition and contending that the other letter, namely, letter No.2776 of the even date, was never written or issued by the respondent, the appellant, in fact, raised the plea before the Commission that its judgment dated 16-11-93, which was based on letter No.2776, was obtained by the respondent by practising fraud not only on the appellant but on the Commission too as letter No.2776 dated 268-91 was forged by the respondent for the purpose of this case. This plea could not have been legally ignored by the Commission which needs to be reminded that the Authorities, be they Constitutional, Statutory or Administrative, (and particularly those who have to decide a lis) possess the power to recall their judgments 'or orders if they are obtained by fraud as Fraud and Justice never dwell together (Fraus et jus nunquam co-habitant). It has been repeatedly said that Fraud and deceit defend of excess no man (Fraus et dolus nemini partocinari debent). 21.In Smith Vs. East Elloe Rural District Central 1956 AC 736, the House of Lords held that the effect of fraud would normally be to vitiate any act or order. In another case, Lazarus Estate Ltd. Vs. Beasley, (1956)1 QB 702 at 712, Denning LJ said: "No judgment of a Court, no order of a Minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. In another case, Lazarus Estate Ltd. Vs. Beasley, (1956)1 QB 702 at 712, Denning LJ said: "No judgment of a Court, no order of a Minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything." 22. The judiciary in India also possesses inherent power, specially under Section 151, CPC to recall its judgment or order if it is obtained by Fraud on Court. In the case of fraud on a party to the suit or proceedings, the Court may direct the affected party to file a separate suit for setting aside the Decree obtained by fraud. Inherent power are powers which are resident in all courts, especially of superior jurisdiction. These powers spring not from legislation but from· the nature and the construction of the Tribunals or Courts themselves so as to enable them to maintain their dignity, secure obedience to its process and rules, protect its officers from indignity and wrong and to punish unseemly behaviour. This power is necessary for the orderly administration of the Court's business. 23. Since fraud affects the solemnity, regularity and orderliness of the proceedings of the Court and also amounts to an abuse of the process of Court, the Courts have been held to have inherent power to set aside an order obtained by fraud practised upon that Court. Similarly, where the Court is misled by a party or the Court itself commits a mistake which prejudices a party, the Court has the inherent power to recall its' order. (See: Benoy Krishna Mukherjee Vs. Mohanlal Goenka, AIR 1950 Cal 287; Gajanand Sha Vs. Dayanand Thakur, AIR 1943 Patna 127; Krishna Kumar Vs. Jawand Singh, AIR 1947 Nagpur 236; Devendra Nath Sarkar Vs. Ram Rachpal Singh, ILR (1926)1 Luckhow 341 : AIR 1926 Oudh 315; Saiyed Muhammad Raza Vs. Ram Saroop, ILR (1929)4 Lucknow 562 : AIR 1929 Oudh 385 (FB);Bankey Behari Lal Vs. Abdul Raheman, ILR (1932)7 Lucknow 350 : AIR 1932 Oudh 63; Lekshmi Amma Chacki Amma Vs. Mammen, 1955 Kerala Law Times 459). The Court has also the inherent power to set aside a sale brought about by fraud practised upon the Court (Ishwar Mahton Vs. Sitaram Kumar, AIR 1954 Patna 450) or to set aside the order recording compromise obtained by fraud. (Bindeshwari Pd. Chaudhary Vs. Debendra Pd. Singh, AIR 1958 Patna 618; Smt. Tara Bai Vs. The Court has also the inherent power to set aside a sale brought about by fraud practised upon the Court (Ishwar Mahton Vs. Sitaram Kumar, AIR 1954 Patna 450) or to set aside the order recording compromise obtained by fraud. (Bindeshwari Pd. Chaudhary Vs. Debendra Pd. Singh, AIR 1958 Patna 618; Smt. Tara Bai Vs. V. S. Krishnaswamy Rao, AIR 1985 Karnataka 270)." Since the candidate had obtained an order validating her caste by suppressing the material information of her conversion to Christianity and the said order validating her caste claim had been obtained by practising fraud on the respondent Scrutiny Committee, according to us the respondent Scrutiny Committee was clothed with the inherent jurisdiction of exercise of powers of review. The order of the respondent Scrutiny Committee subsequently invalidating the caste claim of the petitioner on grounds of fraud cannot be said to be an order without jurisdiction. 23. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has not pressed the ground that reconstituted Committee had not heard the petitioner and therefore the impugned order is vitiated. 24. In our considered opinion, therefore, in view of the overwhelming evidence indicating that the candidate i.e. petitioner in Writ Petition No.337 of 2003 had been converted to Christianity and this fact having been suppressed by the candidate/petitioner from the Scrutiny Committee, the order invalidating the caste claim of the candidate/ petitioner cannot be said to be either beyond the jurisdiction or an illegal order. Even on merits of the matter, we find that the overwhelming evidence clearly indicates that the candidate/petitioner had been converted to Christianity and this fact was suppressed by the candidate/petitioner from the Scrutiny Committee. No case was pleaded by the candidate/petitioner about reconversion before the respondent Scrutiny Committee and, therefore, in the absence of that we do not find any perversity in the order of the respondent Scrutiny Committee which is impugned by the candidate/petitioner in Writ Petition No.337 of 2003, invalidating the caste claim of the candidate/petitioner. In the light of that, therefore, according to us there is no merit in Writ Petition No.337 of 2003 and the same deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. 25. Insofar as Writ Petition No.5271 of 2002 is concerned, this petition primarily questions the correctness of the order by which the claim of respondent no.8 therein/petitioner in Writ Petition No.337 of 2003. 25. Insofar as Writ Petition No.5271 of 2002 is concerned, this petition primarily questions the correctness of the order by which the claim of respondent no.8 therein/petitioner in Writ Petition No.337 of 2003. Since the earlier order validating the caste claim had been reviewed and the caste claim had been subsequently invalidated, according to us Writ 'Petition No.5271 of 2002 has become infructuous. In the circumstances of the case, we do not pass any orders in respect of costs in both the petitions. Rule accordingly stands discharged in both the petitions. Petitions dismissed.