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Gujarat High Court · body

2006 DIGILAW 797 (GUJ)

Shrushti Organizers Pvt. Ltd. v. STATE OF GUJARAT

2006-12-06

D.A.MEHTA

body2006
Judgment D.A. Mehta, J.—This petition has been filed challenging the order dated 25.09.2006 made by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in Appeal No. TEN/AA/1/2006. Though, the petition is styled as a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, in effect, it is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. 2. Respondent No. 2 is admittedly a Public Charitable Trust which came into existence vide Trust-deed executed on 20.10.1972. The trust was registered on 17.12.1973. The property in question came to be gifted in two parcels vide gift-deeds executed on 23.03.1974 and 25.07.1975. Sometime in 1997 the trust sought permission to dispose of the property in question under Section 36 of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 (the Act). On 11.02.1998, permission came to be granted. 3. However, as admittedly the property was not sold, despite the said permission dated 11.02.1998 on 05.06.2005 a public notice inviting offers was published. On 21.06.2005, the petitioner herein made an offer to purchase the property for a sum of Rs. 4,77,00,000/- accompanied by a demand draft for a sum of Rs. 71,55,000/- being 15% of the upset price. The date fixed fro submitting the offers as well as objections, if any, was 22.06.2005. The Charity Commissioner fixed 27.06.2005 for opening the sealed tenders and hearing the offers and others, and accordingly, hearing took place on the said date. It is necessary to record that one Shreeji (Shaibaugh) Housing Co-operative Society Ltd. has also made an offer for a sum of Rs. 4,70,00,000/- but at the time of hearing on 27.06.2005, the said party withdrew its offer stating that it did not want to enhance the offer and bid in the auction which may take place. On 28.06.2005, the Trust passed a resolution accepting the highest offer of the petitioner. 4. After the hearing on 27.06.2005 as orders were not made, notice was issued once again on 11.07.2005 for hearing the parties because the then Charity Commissioner had retired and the new date fixed for hearing was 03.09.2005. 5. On 03.09.2005, one Shri Jagdishbhai Patel appeared and made an offer for a sum of Rs. 4,85,00,000/- However, on 18.01.2006 the Charity Commissioner passed an order under Section 36 of the Act in favour of the petitioner accepting the offer made by the petitioner as resolved by the Trust. 6. 5. On 03.09.2005, one Shri Jagdishbhai Patel appeared and made an offer for a sum of Rs. 4,85,00,000/- However, on 18.01.2006 the Charity Commissioner passed an order under Section 36 of the Act in favour of the petitioner accepting the offer made by the petitioner as resolved by the Trust. 6. On 25.01.2006, Shri Jagdishbhai Patel preferred an appeal before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in terms of Section 36(3) of the Act. The Tribunal granted stay of further proceedings on 7.01.2006. 7. On 05.04.2006, Shri Jagdishbhai Patel moved an application seeking permission to withdraw the appeal. After hearing the parties on 25.09.2006, the impugned order came to be made by the Tribunal quashing and setting aside order dated 18.01.2006, made by the Charity Commissioner while refusing the permission to withdraw the appeal. 8. Respondent Nos. 12 and 13 herein are third party applicants before the Tribunal having moved an application for being joined in the pending appeal filed by Shri Jagdishbhai Patel. It is also necessary to record that Respondent No. 13 herein filed an independent appeal being Appeal No. 34/06 in which the Tribunal granted stay of proceedings vide order dated 21.09.2006. 9. The learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner has assailed the impugned order principally on the ground that the right to prefer an appeal or proceedings, once granted under the statute, is unconditional, subject to the powers and jurisdiction of the authority. That, therefore, withdrawal of an appeal proceedings is part of the same right, namely, to prefer an appeal/proceedings. The permission to withdraw the appeal ought to be granted by the authority and the authority cannot force a party to continue litigation. That in case, the authority felt that it was necessary to continue an appeal or proceedings, in exercise of its suo-motu powers, it can always issue a direction to publish a public notice and then in the event some other person appears, such person can be transposed as the appellant. That once the third party applicant had filed an appeal which was pending before it, the Tribunal could have given notice in the said appeal. That once the third party applicant had filed an appeal which was pending before it, the Tribunal could have given notice in the said appeal. In support of the submissions, reliance was placed on Section 9 of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957, under which Gujarat Revenue Tribunal has been constituted vide Section 3 of the 1957 Act, as well as rules framed under the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act with special reference to Rule 22 and Rule 29 of the said Rules. 9.1 Relying on decision of this Court in the case of Thakorebhai Gangaram vs. Ramanlal Maganlal Reshanwala, 1993 (1) GLH 473 , it was submitted that the powers of the Charity Commissioner to accord sanction for sale of properties of a public trust under Section 36 of the Act are specified and the Tribunal, when called upon to decide whether the order of Charity Commissioner is correct or not, cannot exercise powers beyond this statutory limit granted to the Charity Commissioner. That this Court has specifically stated that before granting sanction to alienate the trust property the following three question have to be posed and answered by the authority: (i) Whether there is a compelling necessity to justify the alienation in question? (ii) Whether the proposed alienation is fair and just? (iii) Whether the proposed alienation in any way, adversely affects the interest of the trust? 9.2. On merits it was submitted that the order made by the Charity Commissioner was correct because the petitioner had made an offer on 21.06.2005 for a sum of Rs. 4,77,00,000/- while Shri Jagdishbhai Patel had made an offer of Rs. 4,85,00,000/- only on 03.09.2005, and therefore, considering the interest that would have accrued on the earnest money deposit, the difference between the offers made by the petitioner Shri Jagdishbhai Patel could be termed to be negligible. That even otherwise, the Tribunal has proceeded on an entirely erroneous premise by making out a case which was never pleaded by any of the parties before the Tribunal.That there was no basis/material either in the appeal memorandum filed by Shri Jagdishbhai Patel or in any of the submissions made regarding fraud. 9.3. That even otherwise, the Tribunal has proceeded on an entirely erroneous premise by making out a case which was never pleaded by any of the parties before the Tribunal.That there was no basis/material either in the appeal memorandum filed by Shri Jagdishbhai Patel or in any of the submissions made regarding fraud. 9.3. That the concept of fraud invoked by the Tribunal suo-motu being without basis, should not be a valid ground for upholding the order of the Tribunal for the simple reason that fraud has to be the alleged in the first instance and proved by evidence. In absence of any allegations, there cannot be any proof and hence, the Tribunal has proceeded on surmises and conjectures vitiating the order in entirety. 9.4. Lastly, an alternative contention was raised that if the Tribunal felt that it was necessary to entertain an appeal against the order made by the Charity Commissioner, the Tribunal could have called for inter-se offers between various parties present before the Tribunal, including the third party applicants, and the petitioner was ready and willing to take part in such inter-se bidding. 9.5. In support of the submissions, reliance was placed on a decision in the case of Bharat Dharma Syndicate Ltd. vs. Harish Chandra, AIR 1937 PC 146. 10. Permission granted by the Charity Commissioner to put the property in question to sale specifies that the property in question is in possession of one Kantilal Manilal Hospital Trust and the offers are invited for the property on the “as is where is whatever there is” basis. In other words, the offer was for a property with tenant. In the impugned order, the Tribunal has recorded its decision broadly in two parts, the first one being in relation to the issue as to whether an appellant is entitled in absolute to withdraw the appeal, and second part is on merits of the appeal and the order made by the Charity Commissioner. 11. In so far as the first issue is concerned, it has been recorded by the Tribunal that the application seeking permission under Section 36 of the Act is a proceeding invoking quasi-judicial powers of the Charity Commissioner and the appeal is continuation of such proceedings, namely, involving interest of a public trust. The Tribunal has then stated that there is no unconditional right vested in the appellant to withdraw the appeal. The Tribunal has then stated that there is no unconditional right vested in the appellant to withdraw the appeal. The right to withdraw an appeal is subject to certain exceptions, namely. (i) a case where a fraud is taking place qua parties or the Court, (ii) there is lack of bona-fides in the application for withdrawal moved by the appellant, (iii) a right or interest created in favour of other side is being affected, (iv) it appears to be a case of abuse of process of Court or overreaching the Court. In such circumstances, if the Court finds that there is an ulterior motive and the application for withdrawal is against “social interest” and “public good” then the Court is entitled to refuse the appellant to withdraw the appeal in exercise of its inherent powers. That such orders are required to be made to achieve the ends of justice. 12. After setting out the aforesaid principles, it is recorded by the Tribunal that appellant Shri Jagdishbhai Patel had made an offer before the Charity Commissioner which offered the highest bid and yet the same was not accepted by the Charity Commissioner. Therefore, appeal was filed challenging the process adopted by the Charity Commissioner and seeking a direction to quash and set aside the order of Charity Commissioner as well as publish a fresh public notice inviting better offers for the Trust. The Tribunal has therefore, considered the appeal as having been filed in public interest and not for personal interest. 13. The Tribunal has further recorded that along with the appeal Shri Jagdishbhai Patel had prayed for stay of proceedings, and at the hearing submitted that the stay as prayed for, if not granted, the appeal may become infructuous; therefore, to test the bona-fides of Shri Jagdishbhai Patel directed him to deposit a sum of Rs. 74 Lacs as earnest money. The same was deposited by way of Bankers cheque and hence, after hearing the parties the Tribunal granted the stay as prayed for. In this context, the Tribunal has stated that any reasonable person can appreciate that a person who has deposited a large sum of Rs. 74 Lacs as earnest money for obtaining stay of proceedings would not withdraw the appeal unless and until there are circumstances which indicate some hidden interest. In this context, the Tribunal has stated that any reasonable person can appreciate that a person who has deposited a large sum of Rs. 74 Lacs as earnest money for obtaining stay of proceedings would not withdraw the appeal unless and until there are circumstances which indicate some hidden interest. The Tribunal has noted that in the withdrawal application moved by Shri Jagdishbhai Patel, it has been stated that if the offer made by the petitioner is accepted as per order made by Charity Commissioner Shri Jagdisbhai Patel would have no objection, which statement itself indicates that between the point of time when stay of proceedings was obtained and the application for withdrawal is made Shri Jagdishbhai Patel had arrived at a Tacit/ clandestine understanding with the petitioner; and the application for withdrawal of appeal has categorically been made in favour of the petitioner which would indicate that the petitioner and said Shri Jagadishbhai Patel have joined hands. Therefore, according to Tribunal the conduct of Shri Jagdishbhai Patel itself indicates that after having attained the position to bargain Shri Jagdishbhai Patel has in-fact arrived at an understanding with the petitioner resulting in the application for withdrawal of the appeal. 14. The Tribunal has recorded one more reason. That the appeal has reached such a stage, once stay of proceedings was granted, that the Trust is in a position to obtain better price for the property in question and therefore, the application for withdrawal of an appeal is because of collusion between Shri Patel and the petitioner. That the application for withdrawal of appeal does not contain any specific reasons. The appellant having filed the appeal principally on the basis of the interest of the Trust being jeopardized, has thereafter because of aforesaid circumstances, changed his intention and sought to withdraw the appeal which would amount to abuse of the legal process as well as legal fraud committed with the Court. It is in this context, that the Tribunal has rejected the application seeking withdrawal of the appeal. 15. In light of the aforesaid findings recorded by the Tribunal, it is not possible to state that any infirmity exists either on facts or in law in the impugned order so as to warrant interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. 15. In light of the aforesaid findings recorded by the Tribunal, it is not possible to state that any infirmity exists either on facts or in law in the impugned order so as to warrant interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. In the circumstances, it is not necessary to enter into any discussion on merits as such, however, as the learned advocate for the petitioner has made detailed submission only for the purpose of testing whether the order of the Tribunal in so far as discussion on merits is concerned is suffering from the vice of perversity or not the same may be briefly examined. But before that, the position in law. 16. It is an accepted position in law that powers of an appellate authority are co-terminus with the powers of the original authority and therefore, the appellate authority, in this case, the Tribunal, would be justified in testing the order of the Charity Commissioner on the same principles namely, whether sanction to alienate the Trust property should be granted under Section 36 of the act or not. Once this position is clear, whether the appellant can or cannot permitted to withdraw the appeal is required to be decided at the anvil of the principles of law enunciated by the Apex Court and the house of lords as well as the Court of appeal in the following decisions. 16.1 In the case of Rex vs. Special Commissioner of Income Tax, 20 Tax Cases 381, the Chief Justice Lord Hewart observed thus on behalf of the Kings Bench Division: “ The fact that the notice of appeal had been given not merely made it possible but made it obligatory upon the Commissioner that they should take certain steps, not merely or primarily in the interest of the individual appellant but in the performance of their duties imposed upon them in the interest of the general body of the tax payers, to see what the true assessment ought to be, and that process, a public process directed to public ends, cannot be stopped at the option or the whim of the appellant who after giving notice begins to realise that if the pursues his appeal it may be the worse for him. The matter has passed out of his hands; he has given rise by his notice of appeal not merely to the opportunity but to the duty of performing a public task which may have an effect entirely opposite to that which he contemplated and desired. It seems to me that there is no ground at ever for suggesting that these Commissioners acting in this way, on these facts, are seeking to do something which they are not entitled to do. On the contrary they are performing their plain duties and there is no case at all for prohibition.” The matter was carried further before Court of appeal and came to be confirmed. 16.2. In the case of Commissioner of Income Tax (Central), Calcutta vs. Rai Bahadur Hardutroy Motilal Chamaria, (1967) 66 ITR 443, the Supreme Court of India while dealing with the powers of the appellate authority pronounced as follows: “It is also well-established that an assessee having once filed an appeal cannot withdraw it. In other words, the assessee having filed an appeal and brought the machinery of the Act into working cannot prevent the appellate Assistant Commissioner from ascertaining and setting the real sum to be assessed, by intimation of his withdrawal of the appeal. Even if the assessee refuses to appear at the hearing, the appellate assistant Commissioner can proceed with the enquiry and if he finds that there has been an under assessment, he can enhance the assessment (see Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Nawab Shah, Nawaz Khan). In this context reference may be made to the decision of the Court of Appeal in King vs. Income Tax Special Commissioner in which the taxpayer sought to withdraw a notice of appeal which had been given on his behalf against an additional assessment under Schedule-D. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue were not satisfied that the assessment was adequate. The Special Commissioners then proposed to proceed with the hearing of the appeal in the ordinary way. At that stage the taxpayer sought a writ of prohibition to prohibit the Special Commissioners from hearing the appeal. It was held the Court of appeal that notice of appeal having once been given, the Commissioners were bound to proceed in accordance with the Income-Tax Acts and determine the true amount of the assessment. At page 493 of the report Lord Wright observed as follows: “. . . . . . . It was held the Court of appeal that notice of appeal having once been given, the Commissioners were bound to proceed in accordance with the Income-Tax Acts and determine the true amount of the assessment. At page 493 of the report Lord Wright observed as follows: “. . . . . . . in making assessment and in dealing with the appeals, the Commissioners are exercising statutory authority and a statutory duty which they are bound to carry out. They are not in the position to Judges deciding an issue between two particular parties. Their obligation is wider than that. It is to exercise their judgment on such material as comes before them and to obtain any material which they think is necessary and which they ought to have, and on that material to make the assessment or the estimate which law requires them to make. They are not deciding a case inter parties; they are assessing or estimating the amount on which, in the interest of the country at large, the tax payer ought to be taxed.” 17. Thus, underlying principle that emerges is that in case of the taxing statutes once an appeal has been filed and the powers of the appellate authority invoked, the appellate authority is bound to act in consonance with the powers granted under the statute in performance of the duty imposed in the interest of general body of tax payers. In other words, the appellate authority is not only entitled to, but is obliged to act in public interest. In the present case, it cannot be stated that the dispute is only between the parties considering the fact that the dispute is under the provisions of Bombay Public Trust Act, which is a statute for the administration of public religious and charitable trusts. The petitioner cannot be heard say that the Tribunal, which is the appellate authority herein, cannot reject the application for withdrawal of the appeal. Once the Tribunal comes to the conclusion that public interest is involved and in furtherance of such public interest it is necessary to proceed with the appeal, the Tribunal is not only entitled to but obliged to refuse permission to withdraw the appeal, where the Tribunal finds that the purpose of withdrawal is not bona-fide. Once the Tribunal comes to the conclusion that public interest is involved and in furtherance of such public interest it is necessary to proceed with the appeal, the Tribunal is not only entitled to but obliged to refuse permission to withdraw the appeal, where the Tribunal finds that the purpose of withdrawal is not bona-fide. The Tribunal is, in the facts of the present case, having the same powers that the Charity Commissioner has under Section 36 of the Act. In the circumstances, before any permission granting alienation of immovable property of public trust is allowed, the Tribunal has to take into consideration the fact that the property in question is a Trust property, wherein public interest is involved, and it is no longer a lis between the Trust on one hand and the offerers on the other. If this underlying object is borne in mind, it cannot be stated that the Tribunal, as an appellate authority has committed any error of law in not permitting the petitioner to withdraw the appeal. 18. The contention that there were other appeals pending and/or that the Tribunal could have directed the appellant to issue a public notice by way of advertisement and call for intervention, if any, then transpose such interveners qua the appellant and permit the appellant to withdraw his appeal does not merit acceptance for the aforestated reasons. Though, such a course may be adopted by the Tribunal, the Tribunal as an Appellate Authority is not bound to do so. Once the appellate jurisdiction of the Tribunal has been invoked all the powers available to the original authority, namely, Charity Commissioner under Section 36 of the Act are available to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal is obliged to act in accordance with statutory requirements of the Act keeping in view the object of the statute, namely, better and correct administration of public property. At the cost of repetition, it is required to be stated that the dispute herein is not a dispute between the private parties, is not a dispute in relation to any private property, is not a dispute in relation to any personal rights, but is a dispute wherein public property and public interest are involved. Therefore, tests as applicable in relation to the public exchequer, are the appropriate tests for deciding whether the appellate authority should permit or decline withdrawal of an appeal. 19. Therefore, tests as applicable in relation to the public exchequer, are the appropriate tests for deciding whether the appellate authority should permit or decline withdrawal of an appeal. 19. In this context, it is necessary to take note of Section 9 of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957, which is applicable to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. The said provision deals with jurisdiction of the Tribunal and stipulates that the Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to entertain and decide the appeals and revise decisions and orders of the specified officers. Therefore, once the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to revise a decision and an order of Charity Commissioner as per provision of Sub-section (3) of Section 36 of the Act read with Section 9 of the BRT Act, 1957, it cannot be gainsaid that exercise of all such powers as are necessary to record a correct decision in accordance with the object and the requirement of the statute is the only way the Tribunal can pass an order. The facts and the evidence available on record of the Charity Commissioner are eloquent enough to permit the Tribunal to proceed with the appeal after rejecting the application for withdrawal of the same in light of the statutory duties cast on the Tribunal and the jurisdiction available with the Tribunal. 20. It is necessary to record that in the final operative portion the Tribunal holds that the order dated 18.01.2006 made by the Charity Commissioner is illegal and hence quashed. The Trust is directed to return the earnest money to the petitioner immediately. A further direction is made that in the event the Trust initiates any fresh proposal for seeking permission under Section 36 of the Act for selling the property in question than the petitioner as well as the third party applicants and others must be intimated by the Trust. 21. Before dealing with the remaining part of the order of the Tribunal, it is necessary to take note of contention raised on behalf of the petitioner during course of the hearing that the Tribunal has considered certain documentary evidence without giving an opportunity to meet with the same. As to whether any additional evidence was or was not considered need not be gone into for the simple reason that as the facts show, there is no additional evidence, which has been taken into consideration by the Tribunal. 22. As to whether any additional evidence was or was not considered need not be gone into for the simple reason that as the facts show, there is no additional evidence, which has been taken into consideration by the Tribunal. 22. Before entering into any discussion on the facts of the case, the Tribunal has culled out three principles enunciated by this Court in the case of Thakorebhai Gangaram (Supra) to test the order made by the Charity Commissioner. After reproducing the three posers formulated by this Court the order of the Charity Commissioner has been tested by the Tribunal and found the order of the Charity Commissioner wanting in relation to all the three principles. 23. In relation to the first principle as to whether there was any compelling necessity to justify alienation in question, the Tribunal has taken into consideration reasons advanced by the Trust in the application moved under Section 36 of the Act before the Charity Commissioner and found that the application was made in 1997, the permission was in fact granted on 11.02.1998, but no sale took place in pursuance of the permission nor was the trust in position to establish that any steps had been taken in furtherance of the proposed sale. The Tribunal has also further noted that the explanation tendered by the learned Advocate of the Trust as to why the permission dated 11.02.1998 was not actually converted into a sale as being ridiculous because the reason advanced was that due to earthquake in 2001 no sale took place. That in 2005 on the same grounds permission has been sought by the Trust to alienate the property, which shows, according to Tribunal that the Trust is not really interested in pursuing the proposal considering the time span, permission was granted in 1998 and the fresh application in 2005. It is further recorded that the Trust in fact was not carrying on any activity worth its name and appeared to be interested only in earning interest on funds by disposing of the properties. Therefore, the Tribunal finds that the Charity Commissioner has committed an error in accepting the application and granting permission under Section 36 of the Act to sell the property even in absence of any compelling necessity to alienate property. 24. The next test is in relation to whether the proposed sale is fair and just. Therefore, the Tribunal finds that the Charity Commissioner has committed an error in accepting the application and granting permission under Section 36 of the Act to sell the property even in absence of any compelling necessity to alienate property. 24. The next test is in relation to whether the proposed sale is fair and just. In this context, the Tribunal finds that the property in question is a large parcel of land, except for a small portion on which construction has been put up, and is in occupation of another Trust which has been leased out the property in question on a token rent of Rs. 1/- vide agreement entered into on 22.02.1976 for a period of 11 months and 29 days. That the property in question has been put to sale along with the occupation of the tenant. That when the application under Section 36 was moved by the Trust, it was stated that the property has been rented since 1983 and rent has been recovered from the said date. However, vide affidavit dated 29.04.2005 and written explanation (Page Nos. 196 to 206) of the record before the Charity Commissioner) it is stated that 1983 has been mentioned by way of typing error and the correct year should be 1976. That both the Trust as well as the tenant Trust have appeared before the Charity Commissioner and resolution dated 26.06.2005 made by the tenant Trust has been produced before the Charity Commissioner. In this context, the Tribunal has found that Section 36(1)(b) of the Act prohibits leasing out of a Trust property for a period exceeding three years in the case of the non-agricultural land or a building belonging to a public trust without previous sanction of the Charity Commissioner. Therefore, the lease of the property stated to be in existence since 1976 without any extension of lease period cannot be termed to be a valid lease even in light of the aforesaid provisions. 25. However, the Tribunal has noted that the record revels that Smt. Pushpavali Kantilal Mehta executed a Will on 25.07.2978 and in terms of the said Will, executor Smt. Rupande Prafulbhai Shah declared a Trust, by an instrument of Trust, dated 25.04.1981. 25. However, the Tribunal has noted that the record revels that Smt. Pushpavali Kantilal Mehta executed a Will on 25.07.2978 and in terms of the said Will, executor Smt. Rupande Prafulbhai Shah declared a Trust, by an instrument of Trust, dated 25.04.1981. The Tribunal therefore, categorically records that the Trust which has come into existence in 1981 could not have entered into any lease agreement in 1976 and the so-called agreement is a got-up document by backdating the same by the Trustees. That such document was fraudulently prepared by the Trustees of the Trust to mis-lead the Charity Commissioner. The Tribunal, therefore, finds that this one fact is sufficient to hold that the order made by the Charity Commissioner is neither fair just nor in the interest of the Trust. 26. The aforesaid dates are not in dispute as they form part of the record of the Charity Commissioner. Apart from what has been found by the Tribunal, it is necessary to take note of the fact that Will was executed on 25.07.1988 and the lady expired on 23.09.1978. Therefore, till that point of time the Will could not have come into operation and the property in question could not have been declared a public trust property by the executor of the Will. Therefore, to state that in 1976, the hospital trust had been put into possession as a lessee is a fact which is contrary to the record. It is not necessary to deal any further this aspect of the matter. Suffice it to state that in the aforesaid set of circumstances, the Tribunal was perfectly justified in applying the tests laid down by this Court and finding the order made by the Charity Commissioner granting permission under Section 36 of the Act as being bad in law. It is not necessary to enter into any further discussion of various other reasons assigned by the Tribunal in the subsequent part of the order. Further the reason, on given facts, advanced by the Tribunal do not give an indication that the order suffers from any legal infirmity or vice of perversity so as to call for intervention. 27. It is not necessary to enter into any further discussion of various other reasons assigned by the Tribunal in the subsequent part of the order. Further the reason, on given facts, advanced by the Tribunal do not give an indication that the order suffers from any legal infirmity or vice of perversity so as to call for intervention. 27. Before parting, it is necessary to take note of the fact that the Tribunal has issued a direction to the Trustees to inform the petitioner and other interveners by a registered post acknowledgment due notice in the event the Trust intends to apply afresh for alienating the Trust property. In case, such an application is moved by the Trust needless to state that the Charity Commissioner shall not be influenced by any observation made by the Tribunal at the same time, the Charity Commissioner is bound by the settled principles of law. 28. Therefore, to sum up, the impugned order made by the Tribunal does not suffer from any jurisdictional error, legal infirmity or factual perversity so as to warrant interference. The petition is accordingly summarily rejected. * * * * *