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2006 DIGILAW 797 (PAT)

Amrapali Cinema v. State Of Bihar

2006-09-04

NAVANITI PRASAD SINGH

body2006
Judgment 1. Heard. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the State. Having heard the parties at the stage of admission and with their consent, the writ application is being disposed of. 2. The present writ application is directed against Annexure-8, an order of the Licensing Authority-cum-District Magistrate, Patna being order dated 7.8.2006 by which he has ordered the temporary suspension of exhibition of cinema in the petitioners hall on the sole ground that the petitioner was in arrears of entertainment tax as informed by the entertainment tax authorities. His cinema exhibition would remain suspended till he cleared the entertainment tax dues. 3. Shri S.D. Sanjay, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the liability under the Bihar Entertainment Tax Act is a liability which is in dispute. Statutory remedies are being preferred and are pending. The Entertainment Tax Act has its own independent specific statutory remedies available to the State for recovery of the tax dues. The State cannot give up those specific remedies and resort to this indirect method of suspending temporarily exhibition to coerce payment of disputed dues. There is no provision under the-Bihar Cinema Regulation Act or the Rules framed thereunder where, there can be a temporary suspension of cinema exhibition merely to coerce recovery of dues. To the contrary, Shri Lalit Kishore, learned Additional Advocate General III submits, with reference to the counter affidavit and in particular to the statement made in paragraph 6 thereof which is quoted hereunder: "after 1.3.1995, the licence of the petitioner for exhibition of films has not been renewed and, therefore, it is manifest that the petitioner was exhibiting films without licence." 4. It is submitted that as the petitioner was exhibiting films without valid licence and if the order impugned in Annexure-8 is quashed, it would then permit petitioner to continue exhibiting films illegally under authority of this Court. In his submission, this is not permissible as if by setting aside an illegal order, another illegal order is revived. Court in this extraordinary jurisdiction will not interfere. Lastly, it is submitted by learned Additional Advocate General III that the petitioner having concealed the aforesaid fact, interference in writ jurisdiction should not be made. 5. In his submission, this is not permissible as if by setting aside an illegal order, another illegal order is revived. Court in this extraordinary jurisdiction will not interfere. Lastly, it is submitted by learned Additional Advocate General III that the petitioner having concealed the aforesaid fact, interference in writ jurisdiction should not be made. 5. Having considered the arguments as advanced on both the sides, I am of the opinion that Annexure-8 by which the Collector has suspended the licence of the petitioner cannot be sustained and must be quashed. It is quashed accordingly. The reason is simple. A statutory authority exercising statutory power is bound by the jurisdiction conferred on the said authority. Under the Cinema Regulation Act and the Rules framed thereunder, temporary suspension of cinema exhibition is not permitted on the ground of default in payment of entertainment tax. Thus, the order impugned is de hors the provisions of the statutory provisions and cannot be sustained. Secondly, where Entertainment Tax Act and the Rules framed thereunder which create the liability of entertainment tax provides for a specific procedure for its recovery, resort to indirect methods of recovery de hors the Entertainment Tax Act cannot be countenanced by this Court. The actions are wholly without jurisdiction, illegal and arbitrary. This Court would also like to observe that the licensing authorities should realise that for the purposes of recovery of entertainment tax if the cinema hall is to be closed, the result would be that the State having already been deprived with some entertainment tax will be further deprived of entire entertainment tax by virtue of its own action. It is this reason also that pursuant to this order, no one gains by closure of cinema hall rather the State and public loss by way of collection of entertainment tax falling. 6. The next submission on behalf of the State, that the licence has not been renewed and, as suclvthis Court should not interfere, is equally misconceived. A bare reference to Annexure-8 would show that it makes no mention of this fact. It is too late in the day to suggest that an order made by a statutory authority in exercise of its statutory powers can be supplemented or surplanted by fresh reasons contained in affidavit or otherwise. The Apex Court has, on a number of times, held that it cannot be so done. It is too late in the day to suggest that an order made by a statutory authority in exercise of its statutory powers can be supplemented or surplanted by fresh reasons contained in affidavit or otherwise. The Apex Court has, on a number of times, held that it cannot be so done. This Court cannot, therefore, take cognizance of the said statement. Further, even what is stated in the counter affidavit as quoted above is to be taken into account, all it says is that the licence of the petitioners has not been renewed since 1995. It does not say that the petitioner had not applied for renewal. It does not say that any order rejecting renewal was ever passed. Rather, to the contrary, the passing of Annexure-8 clearly predicts that petitioner was legally and legitimately exhibiting cinema films. If the licensing authority has not renewed the licence then those orders refusing renewal ought to" have been brought on record. There are no such orders. Therefore, this Court cannot hold or cannot take cognizance of the aforesaid fact. Lastly, it has been submitted that there being alternative remedy and the petitioner having concealed the aforesaid fact, this Court should not interfere. It is too late in the day to urge that where a statutory (authority?) acts without jurisdiction, his actions cannot be challenged in this Court and the Court must dismiss the writ application for non-availing the alternative remedy. I have already held that the order, as passed under Annexure-8 being wholly without jurisdiction, this Court in its discretionary jurisdiction considers it to be a fit and proper case for the exercise of writ jurisdiction to quash the order which was passed without jurisdiction. So far as suppression of facts are concerned, the petitioner was only aggrieved by Anexure-8. He was not aggrieved by any order of non-renewal of his licence. That matter was not a matter for which the present lis was initiated. There is not any suppression of material facts by the petitioner. 7. Thus, considering all the aforesaid facts, I am left with no option but to quash Annexure-8 of the licensing authority as being wholly without jurisdiction. This writ application is, accordingly, allowed.