( 1 ) THIS petition if filed by the 1st accused, in p. R. C. 36 of 2004 on the file of the Judicial magistrate of First Class, Hindupur, to quash the said proceedings wherein she is charged of having committed an offence under section 304 part II IPC. ( 2 ) THE allegations in the charge sheet, in so far as the petitioner herein (A. 1) is concerned are that one Mrs. Asma Bhanu was admitted in the Government Hospital, Hindupur for delivery on 28-4-204 at about 10. 00 a. m. A-1 came after one and half hours, checked her gave her an injection, informed that her delivery would take place in the afternoon and left the place. A-3 to A-5 were on duty as nurses in the labour ward. A-3 wrote a prescripition chit and asked L. Ws. 1 to 3 to get the injection from outside. After the injections were procured, a-3 gave one injection to Mrs. Asma Bhanu, aked L. Ws. 1 to 3 to keep the remaining two injections with them and asked them to intimate as and when Mrs. Asma Bhanu got delivery pains. At about 2,00 p. m, A-3 to A-5 got down from duty and in their place A-6 to A-8 joined duty. L. Ws. 1 to 3 showed the injections to a-6 to A-8, who issued a prescription asking them to get other injections. At about 3. 00p. m, mrs. Asma Bhanu had delivery pains and, while A-1 and A-2 the duty doctors were not available, A-6 to A-8 exhibited negligence and did not attend on the patient immediately. Further, they did not even intimate the duty doctors A-1 and A-2 about the condition of mrs. Asma Bhanu. At about 5. 00 p. m. A-6 to a-8 took Mrs. Asma Bhanu into the delivery room and at about 5-30 p. m. she gave birth to a dead child. A-6 to A-8 thereafter informed a-2, the doctor, who checked up Mrs. Asma bhanu and directed her relatives to get her blood group, without even informing as to which blood group was required. It is alleged that A-2, deposit being an expert, neither informed them about the blood group nor took any steps to ensure survival of Mrs. Asma bhanu. At 6-30 p. m. A-2 declared Mrs. Asma bhanu dead. Asma bhanu and directed her relatives to get her blood group, without even informing as to which blood group was required. It is alleged that A-2, deposit being an expert, neither informed them about the blood group nor took any steps to ensure survival of Mrs. Asma bhanu. At 6-30 p. m. A-2 declared Mrs. Asma bhanu dead. It is alleged that A-1, being the gynaecologist on duty, had failed to attend on the patient, that A-1 to A-8, who were experts in the medical side, were well aware that the patient would die if the patient was not given proper treatment that they had exhibited gross negligence in giving treatment to the patient and that their negligence had resulted in the death of Mrs. Asma Bhanu and her just born baby. ( 3 ) SRI O. Monohar Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner 1st accused, would submit that in so far as A-1 is concerned, the allegations in the charge sheet are only that she attended on the deceased at 10. 00 a. m. gave heran injection, informed thatherdelivery would take place in the afternoon, and went away. Learned counsel would also referto that portion of the charge sheet wherein it is alleged that despite the critical condition of the deceased, A-6, to A-8, the nurses on duty, did not intimate the 1st accused about her condition. According to the learned counsel since the only allegation against A-1 is that, being a Gynaecologitst and having attended duty on that fateful day, she had failed to attend on that particular patient, the ingredients of part II of Section 304 IPC are not attracted and consequently the proceedings in P. R. C. 36 of 2004 are liable to be quashed in so far as a-1 is concerned. Learned counsel would place reliance on Jacob Mathew v. State of punjab in this regard. ( 4 ) SRI P. Narahar Babu learned counsel for the 2nd respondent, on the other hand, would refer to the allegations in complaint filed wherein it is alleged that on 28-4-2004 at about 7. 00 a. m. the brother and mother of the deceased had taken herto the hospital and at 11. 00 a. m. the 1st accused had come there, had given her an injection and left the place only to return at 6. 00 a. m. the brother and mother of the deceased had taken herto the hospital and at 11. 00 a. m. the 1st accused had come there, had given her an injection and left the place only to return at 6. 3 0 p. m. It is also alleged that sincethe deceased was three months pregnant, she was being treated in the private hospital of the 1st accused charged Rs. 5000/- for her delivery and since they were not in a position to pay the amount they had got her admitted in the Government Hospital. It is alleged that negligence of the 1st accused, who despite being on duty on that day had failed to attend on the deceased, had resulted in her death. Learned counsel would place reliance on Re papineni Ramaiah in this regard. Learned counsel would further submit that under Part ii of Section 304 IPC, a person who commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death but without an intention to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Learned counsel would refer to the definition of culpable homicide under Section 299 I. P. C. to submit that whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide. Learned counsel would submit that under Section 32 I. P. C. words referring to acts include illegal omissions and, in as much as the 1st accused had omitted to attend on the deceased which resulted in her death, she must be held to have acted with the knowledge that it was likely to cause death even if she had no intention to cause the death of mrs. Asma Bhanu and that the ingredients of section 304-II IPC were attracted. Learned counsel would submit that, in any event, these are all matters of evidence which the trial court was required to examine and that this Court, in proceedings under Section 482 cr. P. C. would be slow to interfere in such matters. He would rely on State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo3, in this regard. Learned counsel would submit that, in any event, these are all matters of evidence which the trial court was required to examine and that this Court, in proceedings under Section 482 cr. P. C. would be slow to interfere in such matters. He would rely on State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo3, in this regard. In Papinenu Ramaiah this Court held thus: ". . . . . . . . The third limb of Section 299 and clause 4 of Section 300 are intended to apply to cases in which there is no intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Whether offence is culpable homicide or murder depends upon the degree of risk to human life. If death is the likely result, it is culpable homicide. If it is the most probable result, it is murder. There are many cases falling within the phrase in section 299 "or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death". They do not fall within clauses 2,3, or 4 of Section 300 I. P. C. Thus although an accused might know that the act which he is committing is so dangerous that it is likely to cause death, it is not murder even if death is caused thereby, unless the offender knows that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. If on facts and circumstances of the case, the Court comes to the conclusion that the accused must have known that he was likely to cause death, he would be guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder unless it also finds that the risk of causing of death was such that the must have known and did know that his act which is imminently dangerous must in all probability cause dearth etc within the meaning of clause 4 of Section 300 I. P. C. this broadly speaking all acts of killing done with the intention to kill or to inflict bodily injury likely to cause death or with the knowledge that death must be the most probably result are prima facie cases of murder, while those committed with the knowledge that death will be likely result are culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Where, therefore, the act of accused does not fall within the first three clauses of the section 300, i. e. , where the act was done with the intention of causing death, the difference between the culpable homicide and murder is mainly a question of different degree of probability that death would case. It is culpable homicide where death must have been known to be a probable result. It is murder, where it must have been known to be the most probable result. Culpable homicide, may, therefore, not be a murder where the mental state through though within the definition of Section 299 is not of a special degree of criminality required by section 200 I. P. C. . . . . . " ( 5 ) PART II of Section 304 IPC applies to those rare cases of deliberate assault where the act of assault can be separated from the injury caused with the result that the knowledge of likelihood to cause death can be established without the intention, to cause vital injury, being established. Part II of Section 304 IPC is to be read with the last few words of Section 299 IPC. If a person commits an act which results in the death of another and does it with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death he would be said to have committed an offence under Section 304 -II I. P. C. Section 304 IPC divides the offence of culpable homicide into two different grounds of guilt, the graver of which depends on the intention proved or to be inferred from all the circumstances and the less serious in part II which does not depend on the intention at all. ( 6 ) CAN it be said that the 1st accused who, even according to the allegations in the compliant/charge sheet, was not even informed of the complications of Mrs. Asma Bhanu and her having developed delivery pains, be said to have committed culpable homicide not amounting to murder with the knowledge that it was likely to cause her death, but without any intention to cause death merely on account of not attending on the patient? Asma Bhanu and her having developed delivery pains, be said to have committed culpable homicide not amounting to murder with the knowledge that it was likely to cause her death, but without any intention to cause death merely on account of not attending on the patient? Under section 299 IPC a person commits culpable homicide if the act by which the death is caused is done with the knowledge that the act is lij\kely to cause death. Can it be said that, despite her not being informed of Mrs. Asma Bhanu having developed delivered pains the 1st accused, on the sole ground that she did not attend on Mrs. Asma Bhanu, had caused her death with the knowledge that her not attending on M/s. Asma Bhanu was likely to cause her death? Answers thereto can only be in the negative. ( 7 ) WHILE it is true that this Court would not weigh the evidence or examine the truth or otherwise of the allegations in the compliant/charge sheet, this Court must necessarily exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P. C. if the allegations, when read as a whole and accepted in its entirety as true, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused or where the allegations made in the compliant/charge sheet are so absurd/inherently improbable on the face of which no prudent person could ever reach a just conclusion that there was sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. On these counts, the charge sheet, in so far as the 1st accused is charged of having committed an offence under Section 304-II i. P. C, must necessarily be quashed. ( 8 ) WHILE the charge sheet seems to indicate that the 1st accused is charged of an offence under Section 304 part II IPC, in the petition filed before this Court, it is stated that the 1st accused was charged of an offence under section 304-A I. P. C. As such the question as to whether the ingredients of Section 304- A i. P. C. are attracted is also to be examined. ( 9 ) THE Supreme Court in Jacob Mathew (1 supra) held thus: ". . . . . . . ( 9 ) THE Supreme Court in Jacob Mathew (1 supra) held thus: ". . . . . . . We sum up our conclusion as under: (1) Negligence is the breach of a duty caused by omission to do something which a reasonable man guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. The definition of negligence as given in Law of Torts, Ratanal and Dhirajlal (edited by Justice G. P. Singh), referred to hereinabove, holds good. Negligence becomes actionable on account of injury resulting from the act or omission amounting to negligence attributable to the person sued. The essential components of negligence are three: "duty", "breach" and "resulting damage". (2) Negligence in the context of the medical profession necessarily calls for a treatment with a different. To infer rashness or negligence on the part of a professional, in particulara doctor, additional considerations apply. A case of occupational negligence is different from one of professional negligence. A simple lack of care, an error of judgment or an accident, is not proof of negligence on the part of a medical professional. So long as a doctor follows a practice acceptable to the medical profession of that day, he cannot be held liable for negligence merely because a better alternative course or method of treatment was also available or simply because a more skilled doctor would not have chosen to follow or resort to that practice orprocedure which the accused followed. When it comes to the failure of taking precautions, what has to be seen in whether those precautious were taken which the ordinary experience of men has found to be sufficient; a failure to use special or extraordinary precautions which might have prevented the particular happening cannot be the standard for judging the alleged negligence. So also, the standard of care, while assessing the practice as adopted, is judged in the light of knowledge available at the time of the incident, and not at the date of trial. Similarly, when the charge of negligence arises our of failure to use some particular equipment, the charge would fail if the equipment was not generally available at that particular time (that is, the time of the incident) at which it is suggested it should have been used. Similarly, when the charge of negligence arises our of failure to use some particular equipment, the charge would fail if the equipment was not generally available at that particular time (that is, the time of the incident) at which it is suggested it should have been used. (3) A professional may be held liable for negligence on one of the two findings: either he was not possessed of the requisite skill which he professed to have possessed, or, he did not exercise, with reasonable competence in the given case, the skill which he did possess. The standard to be applied for judging, whether the person charged has been negligent or not, would be that of an ordinary competent person exercising ordinary skill in that profession. It is not possible for every professional to possess the highest level of expertise or skills in that branch which he practices. A highly skilled professional may be possessed of better qualities, but that cannot be made the basis or the yardstick for judging the performance of the professional proceeded against on indictment of negligence. (4) The test for determining medical negligence as laid down in Bolam case 9, WLR at p. 586 $ holds good in its applicability in India. (5) The jurisprudential concept of negligence differs in civil and criminal law. What may be negligence in civil law may not necessarily be negligence in criminal law. For negligence to amount to an offence, the element of must be shown to exist. For an act to amount o criminal negligence, the degree of negligence should be much higher i. e. , gross or of a very highdegree. Negligence which is neither gross nor of higher degree may provide a ground for action in civil law but cannot form the basis for prosecution. (6) The word "gross" has not been used in Section 304-A IPC, yet it is settled that in criminal law negligence or recklessness, to be so held, must be of such a high degree as to be "gross". The expression "rash or negligent act" as occurring in Section 304-A IPC has to be read as qualified by the word "grossly". (6) The word "gross" has not been used in Section 304-A IPC, yet it is settled that in criminal law negligence or recklessness, to be so held, must be of such a high degree as to be "gross". The expression "rash or negligent act" as occurring in Section 304-A IPC has to be read as qualified by the word "grossly". (7) To prosecute a medical professional for negligence under criminal law it must be shown that the accused did something or failed to do something which in the given facts and circumstances no medical professional in his ordinary senses and prudence would have done or failed to do. The hazard taken by the accused doctor should be of such a nature that the injury which resulted was most likely imminent. (8) Res ipsa loquitur is only a rule of evidence and operates in the domain of civil law, specially in cases of torts and helps in determining the onus of proof in actions relating to negligence. It cannot be pressed in service for determining per se the liability for negligence within the domain of criminal law. Res ipsa loquitur has, if at all a limited application in trial on a charge of criminal negligence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . As we have noticed hereinabove that the cases of doctors (surgeons and physicians) being subjected to criminal prosecution are on an increase. Sometimes such prosecutions are filed by private complainants and sometimes by the police on an FIR being lodged and cognizance taken. The investigating officer and the private complainant cannot always be supposed to have knowledge of medical science so as to determine whetherthe act of the accused medical professional amounts to a rash or negligent act within the domain of criminal law under Section 304-A IPC. The Criminal process once initiated subjects the medical professional to serious embarrassment and sometimes harassment. He has to seek bail to escape arrest, which may or may not be granted to him. At the end he may be exonerated by acquittal or discharge but the loss which he has suffered to his reputation cannot be compensated by any standards. . . . . . . He has to seek bail to escape arrest, which may or may not be granted to him. At the end he may be exonerated by acquittal or discharge but the loss which he has suffered to his reputation cannot be compensated by any standards. . . . . . . " (emphasis supplied) ( 10 ) EVEN in case where allegation of a rash and negligent act, under Section 304-A I. P. C. , are alleged against an accused, the Apex court in Jacob Mathew (1 supra) held that the negligence or recklessness must be of such a high degree as to be "gross". While the 2nd respondent may have a justifiable grievance that, if the petitioner-1st accused had attended on his wife, her life could have been saved, it is altogether different to allege that on her failure to do so she had committed a rash and negligent act of culpable homicide. ( 11 ) THE uncontroverted allegations in the charge sheet are that the 1st accused came and gave an injection to the deceased at 11. 00 a. m. and informed that her delivery would take place in the afternoon. She is alleged not have attended on the deceased thereafter and to have come only at 6. 30 p. m. by which time mrs. Asma Bhanu had already expired. Failure of the petitioner-1st accused, to attend on the deceased, despite the fact she had attended duty at the Government Hospital on that day, is alleged to be culpable homicide by a rash and negligent act attracting Section 299 read with Section 304-II I. P. C. ( 12 ) FAILURE on the part of the doctor to attend on a patient can, at best, amount to lack of care. What may be negligence in civil law may not necessarily be negligence in criminal law. For negligence to amount to criminal offence, the element of mens rea must be shown to exist. Further the degree of negligence in a case of criminal negligence, is of a far higher degree. While negligence which is neither gross nor of a high degree, may provide a ground for action in civil law, it cannot form the basis of prosecution. Expression "rash or negligent act" as occurring in Section 304-A I. P. C. has to be read as qualified by the words "grossly". While negligence which is neither gross nor of a high degree, may provide a ground for action in civil law, it cannot form the basis of prosecution. Expression "rash or negligent act" as occurring in Section 304-A I. P. C. has to be read as qualified by the words "grossly". To prosecute a medical professional for negligence under criminal law it must be shown that the accused failed to do something which, in the facts and circumstances of the case, no medical professional in his ordinary senses and prudence would have failed to do. ( 13 ) THE allegations in the charge sheet, when read as a whole, would show that at 3. 00 p. m. when Mrs. Asma Bhanu developed delivery pains, A-6 to A-8 the duty nurses neither attended on the patient immediately nor did they intimate the duty doctors A-1 and a-2 about the condition of Mrs. Asma Bhanu. The patient was taken to the delivery room at 5. 00 p. m. by, A-6 to A-8, the nurses on duty and thereafter A-2, the doctor, on being informed, attended on her. There is not even an allegation, either in the complaint or in the charge sheet, that despite being informed a-1 had failed to attend on Mrs. Asma Bhanu. When A-2, a Doctor, had attended on Mrs. Asma Bhanu, it defies reason as to how A-1, who was neither informed of the condition of the patient nor did she attend on her, could be said to have committed an offence of culpable homicide by a rash and negligent act under section 304 Part II I. P. C. ( 14 ) THE only other contention which is required to be examined is that this Court would be slow to interfere in such matter under section 482 Cr. P. C. This Court, under section 482 Cr. P. C. exercises jurisdiction ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice. Any criminal action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice would necessitate exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P. C. ( 15 ) IN M/s. Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special judicial Magistrate, the Supreme Court held thus: ". . . . . It is settled that the High Court can exercise its powers of judicial review in criminal matters. P. C. ( 15 ) IN M/s. Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special judicial Magistrate, the Supreme Court held thus: ". . . . . It is settled that the High Court can exercise its powers of judicial review in criminal matters. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1 supra) this Court examined the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution and also the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which it said could be exercised by the High Court either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. While laying down certain guidelines where the court will exercise jurisdiction under these provisions, it was also stated that these guidelines could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. One of such guidelines is where the allegations made in thef irst information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. Under article 227 the power of superintendence by the High Court is not only of administrative nature but is also of judicial nature. This article confers vast powers on the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of law by the inferior courts and to see that the stream of administration of justice remains clean and pure. The power conferred on the high Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and under Section 482 of the Code have no limits but more the power more due care and caution is to be exercised while invoking these powers. When the exercise of powers could be under Article 227 or Section 482 of the Code it may not always be necessary to invoke the provisions of article 226. Some of the decisions of this Court laying down principles for the exercise of powers by the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 may be referred to. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Some of the decisions of this Court laying down principles for the exercise of powers by the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 may be referred to. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. . . . . . . . . . " (emphasis supplied ). ( 16 ) UNDER Section 482 of the Code, the high Court has inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of process of court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The expressions "abuse of the process of law" or "to secure the ends of justice" do not, however, confer unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court and the alleged abuse of the process of law or the ends of justice can only be secured in accordance with law including procedural law and not otherwise. Further, inherent powers are in the nature of extraordinary powers tobe used sparingly for achieving the object mentioned in Section 482 of the Code. Arun shankar Shukla v. State of U. P. ( 17 ) EXERCISE of power under Section 482 of the Code is the exception and not the rule. While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. While judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment, at the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Courts must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Courts must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. State of karnataka v. M. Devendrappa ; State of A. P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy. Cases which require interference, under Section 482 Cr. P. C. are few and far between. The most common cases where inherent jurisdiction is generally exercised is where criminal proceedings are required to be quashed because they are initiated illegally, vexatiously or without jurisdiction. The inherent power under Section 482 Cr. P. C. must be exercised only in the rarest of rare cases, State v. Navjot Sandhu, state of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla, m. Narayandas v. State of Karnataka, mohd. Malek Mondal v. Pranjal Bardalai, for such a power does not confer arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana. ( 18 ) IN State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal (1 supra), the Supreme Court laid down certain illustrative tests to serve as a useful guide in exercising the inherent power under Section 482 Cr. P. C. ". . . . . . In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under article 226 or the inherent powers under section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. 1. 1. Where the allegations made in the first Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the First information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F. I. R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under section 156 ( 1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155 (2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where, the allegations in the F. I. R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order or a magistrate as contemplated under section 155 (2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the f. I. R. or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon a enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F. I. R. or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice. . . . . . " (emphasis supplied) ( 19 ) AS observed by the Supreme Court in m/s. Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Md. Sharaful Haque :- ". . . . . In exercise of the powers Court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the Court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. In r. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1960 SC 866 )this Court summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings. (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e. g. want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) Where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. "in dealing with the last case, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That isthefunction of the trial Judge. Judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, moreso when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whetherfactual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. (See: Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhar ( 1992 (4) SCC 305 ), and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1964 SC 1 ). Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. (See: Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhar ( 1992 (4) SCC 305 ), and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1964 SC 1 ). lt would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the call of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in orderto determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In a proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainantthat the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannotbythemselves be the basis for quashing the proceedings. . . . . . It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannotbythemselves be the basis for quashing the proceedings. . . . . . " (emphasis supplied) ( 20 ) THE illustrative guidelines in State of haryana v. Bhajan Lal, have been extracted with approval in Saroj Kumar Sahoo (3 supra), the judgment relied upon on behalf of the 2nd respondent. Among the illustrations given of cases where the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr. P. C. should be exercised, are when the allegations in the complaint/charge sheet, if accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any office or make out a case against the accused. In the case on hand, even if the uncontroverted allegations in the complaint were to be read as a whole and accepted in its entirety as true, the ingredients of Section 304 Part II or 304-A IPC are not attracted in so far as the petitioner-1st accused is concerned. ( 21 ) THE Criminal Petition is allowed and the proceedings in P. R. C. 36 of 2004 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, hindupur, to the extent the petitioner-1st accused is concerned, is quashed. .