JUDGMENT H.N. Sarma, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 5.3.1997 passed by the learned Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation, Sibsagar in Case No. 9/94 allowing the compensation to the claimant/respondent on account of accidental death of her husband during the course of employment under the appellant. 2. I have heard Mr. G.N. Sahewalla, learned senior counsel for the appellant. None appears for the respondent/claimant. 3. The substantial question of law that falls for decision in this appeal may be stated as follows: Whether the learned Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation was right in holding that the death of the deceased was caused by an accident arising out of and in course of employment, in terms of Section 3 of the Workman's Compensation Act ? 4. To put in short the relevant facts for deciding the appeal are as follows: Late Paban Kurmi, the husband of the claimant-respondent was a permanent workman under the appellant. He was serving as Dresser in the Hanumanbag Garden Hospital belonging to the appellant. On 21.7.1994, while the workman was discharging his duty as a Dresser in the Hanumanbag Garden Hospital at about 12 O'clock noon, he was killed by some miscreants. The Garden Manager-appellant lodged an F.I.R. with the Nazira Police Station to that effect. After the death of her husband the claimant-respondent filed a claim case before the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation, Sibsagar alleging that the death of her husband was caused by an accident in course of his employment in the Garden Hospital and prayed for necessary compensation under the Workman's Compensation Act. The appellant resisted the claim by filing written statement, denying the allegation that the death of the victim was caused by an accident arising out of employment, although they have admitted the fact of killing of the deceased during the working hours. According to the appellant, there is no relationship between the accident and employment of the deceased worker. 5. During the course of the proceeding, the claimant examined 2 witnesses including herself. But the appellant did not adduce any evidence. After the conclusion of the proceeding the learned Commissioner, held that the death of the victim was caused due to an accident arising out of employment as Dresser in the Garden Hospital during the working hours and accordingly on the basis of the earnings of the deceased, awarded a sum of Rs. But the appellant did not adduce any evidence. After the conclusion of the proceeding the learned Commissioner, held that the death of the victim was caused due to an accident arising out of employment as Dresser in the Garden Hospital during the working hours and accordingly on the basis of the earnings of the deceased, awarded a sum of Rs. 60,623 as compensation, which is the subject-matter of challenge in this appeal. 6. In the premises the substantial question of law as referred to above, it is to be seen, whether the death of the deceased was caused by an accident arising out of and in course of employment in the garden owned by the appellant. 7. Mr. G. N. Sahewalla, learned senior counsel referring to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mackinnon Mackenzie and Co. (P.) Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mahommad Issak (1970) I LLJ 16 SC submits that the death of the victim is even not remotely connected with the employment and/or nature of the job required to be done by him as garden employee and as such the learned Tribunal committed manifest error of law in passing the impugned award, saddling with the liability against the appellant. 8. In Mackinnon (supra) the compensation was claimed on account of missing of a seaman, namely, Ibrahim Mahommad Issak, who was employed as a deck-hand, a seaman of Category II on the ship s.s. "Dwarka". The seaman was suffering from some ailments for which necessary medical treatment was provided to him, but later on he was found missing from the Ship with effect from 16.12.1961 and he could not be found out. On such allegation an application under Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act was filed and the learned Commissioner' having found that such allegation do not constitute an accident arising out of and in course of employment and rejected the claim, which was ultimately travelled upto the Apex Court. The Apex Court on the background of the aforesaid fact held, inter alia, that the expression "arising out of employment" is not confined to the mere nature of the employment. The expression "applies to employment as such to its nature, its conditions, its obligations and its incidents. If by reason of any of those factors the workman is brought within the zone of special danger, the injury would be one which arises 'out of employment'. The expression "applies to employment as such to its nature, its conditions, its obligations and its incidents. If by reason of any of those factors the workman is brought within the zone of special danger, the injury would be one which arises 'out of employment'. It was also held that if the accident had occurred on account of a risk which is an incident of the employment, the claim for compensation must succeed, unless of course the workman has exposed himself to an added peril by his own imprudent act. In the instant case, however, there is no dispute at the bar that the deceased was killed while he was in course of employment under the appellant during working hours. But the question that rose whether the death was caused due to such employment ? 9. In this connection we may refer to a decision of the Privy Council rendered m the case of Lords Atkin, Tomlin, Macmillan, Wright and Sir George Lowndes Margaret Brooker v. Thomas Borthwick & Sons (Australasia), Ltd. In this case Privy Council held that "whether an accident arises out of the employment depends on the particular facts. If a workman is injured by some natural force such as lightning, the heat of the sun or extreme cold which in itself has no kind of connection with employment he cannot recover compensation unless he can sufficiently associate such injury with his employment. This he can do if he can show that the employment exposed him in a special degree to suffering such an injury. But if he is injured by contract physically with some part of the place where he works then apart from questions of his own misconduct he at once associates the accident with his employment. This he can do if he can show that the employment exposed him in a special degree to suffering such an injury. But if he is injured by conduct physically with some part of the place where he works then apart from questions of his own misconduct he at once associates the accident with his employment and nothing further need be considered. So that if the roof or walls fall upon him or he slips upon the premises there is no need to make farther enquiry as to why the accident happened. So that if the roof or walls fall upon him or he slips upon the premises there is no need to make farther enquiry as to why the accident happened. Privy council further held that - it is sufficient for their Lordships to say that it appears to them to have been authoritatively decided that where a workman is injured by the falling upon him of the premises where he is employed the accident necessarily arises out of the employment. This conclusion decides the two cases of Brooker and Ryan ; Prendergast's case speaks for itself and in their Lordships' view the case of Ashwell is within the decisions as to street risks and gives rise to a claim for compensation. Their Lordships, therefore, will humbly advise His Majesty that these appeals be allowed and that the judgment in each case be varied by substituting yes for the answer to the second question. The respondents should pay the appellants costs of these appeals. 10. Again in the case of Divisional Railway Manager, Western Railway v. Smt. Shamsaid 1988 (56) FLR 347, the Rajasthan High Court held that a worker who was bitten on his finger while on duty and was admitted as an indoor patient and while in the hospital developed tetanus and died, hold that the said workman died due to an accident in course of employment. Similar view was also taken by the same High Court m the case of U.O.I. v. Harphcol 1988 (56) FLR 347, which was a case of injury caused by a workman by a poisonous insect during working hours. 11. It is undisputed that the deceased victim who was working as Dresser under the management of the appellant was to be provided with necessary security in his working place. Such security is inherent with the concept of employment provided to him, otherwise without having any such express or implied condition, workman would be exposed to such hazard in course of his duty. The death of the victim was caused by the miscreant while he was working in the hospital as Dresser. There is no dispute to that effect that the Workman Compensation Act is a piece of social legislation having its social objective behind providing compensation in case of injury or death of a workman by accident arising out of and in course of employment. There is no dispute to that effect that the Workman Compensation Act is a piece of social legislation having its social objective behind providing compensation in case of injury or death of a workman by accident arising out of and in course of employment. The principal enunciated by various High Courts as well as Apex Court disclose that a liberal approach and embarrassing interpretation to the provision arising out of an in course of employment to be given, more particularly keeping in mind our constitutional goal of social justice. 12. Keeping in view of the objective for which the aforesaid enactment was made a restricted view or a narrow interpretation is not to be given to the said phalanges. To provide security to an employee is the duty of the employer as indicated above, such employment carries an inherent existence of security although out the employment period. 13. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the view taken by the learned Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation cannot be said to be unreasonable, arbitrary or against the legislative objective under the Act. Consequently, I hold that the Commissioner has not committed any illegality in granting the compensation on account of death of the husband of the claimant. It is put it on record that the appellant has not made any complaint regarding the fact that the death of the claimant was caused during the course of employment of the deceased. 14. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I do not find any merit in this appeal. Accordingly, the appeal stands dismissed. The interim order dated 9.5.1997 passed by this Court earlier stands vacated. 15. It is open for the Commissioner to release the amount of compensation so deposited by the appellant, which shall be done as expeditiously as possible. Registry is directed to transmit the L.C.R. forthwith. Appeal dismissed.