JUDGMENT Amitava Roy, J. 1. The jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is sought to be invoked to annul the judgment and order dated 15.7.1997 passed by the Standing Appeal Committee, Gauhati Municipal Corporation (hereafter referred to as the Corporation) passed in Appeal Case No. GCL 1/1996 and the demand notices dated 21.9.1994 and 2.1.1998 under Section 187 of the Gauhati Municipal Corporation Act, 1971 (hereafter referred to as the Act). 2. I have heard Mr. Borthakur, learned Counsel for the Petitioner and Mr. Samaria, learned Standing Counsel for the Corporation. 3. The facts, in brief, as pleaded by the Petitioner are that it is a Christian Hospital under the Council of Baptist Churches in North East India (hereafter referred to as the Council) and a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. It owns and possesses, amongst others, a plot, which is covered by Holding No. 180 of Ward No. 18 of the Corporation.- During the general assessment of the 1984-85 the Petitioner's holding was assessed whereupon its Annual Rateable Value was fixed at Rs. 5,71,740/- and accordingly Municipal Tax (Property Tax) was fixed at Rs. 33,312/- payable per quarter. The Urban Immovable Property Tax (hereafter referred to as the Urban Tax) was fixed at Rs. 17,152/- per annum. Being aggrieved, the Petitioner preferred an appeal before the then Commissioner of Gauhati Municipal Corporation contending that it being a non-profit making institution was not in a position to afford payment of tax at the above rates. According to the Petitioner, subsequent thereto, the Respondent Corporation submitted bills at the reduced rate i.e. Municipal Tax at Rs. 12,433.19 per quarter and Urban Tax of Rs. 5,292.90/- payable annually. The Petitioner accordingly at the said rates from 1984-85 regularly made payments of the tax. It was thereafter that by the impugned notice No. GTX/CZ/478 dated 21.9.1994, an amount of Rs. 12,50,463.08 was sought to be recovered from the Petitioner for the same holding being outstanding by way of arrear Municipal Tax and Urban Tax. The period of arrears was specified from the fourth quarter of 1984-85 to the second quarter of 1994-95. In response thereto, the Petitioner submitted a reply pleading that it had been regularly paying the municipal taxes and that there was no amount in default on that count. The period of arrears was specified from the fourth quarter of 1984-85 to the second quarter of 1994-95. In response thereto, the Petitioner submitted a reply pleading that it had been regularly paying the municipal taxes and that there was no amount in default on that count. As the Respondent Corporation was found to be insistent on the demand, the Petitioner preferred an appeal before the Standing Appellate Committee questioning the validity of the demand notice date 21.9.1994 and the letter dated 15.12.1995 issued by the Respondent No. 2 following of the same. The appeal, which was registered as G.C.L./1/96, was, however, dismissed on 15.7.1997 and the demand was upheld. Being aggrieved, the Petitioner is before this Court. 4. The Respondent Corporation in its counter has asserted that following the general assessment of the Petitioner's holding as above in the year 1984-85, the Municipal Tax payable was assessed to be Rs. 40,696.90 w.e.f. October, 1984-85 and the Urban Tax at Rs. 17,152.00. The Corporation has disputed the Petitioners contention of reduction or remission of the rates of the Municipal Tax and the Urban Tax and has maintained that payment of Municipal Tax and the Urban Tax of Rs. 12,133.19 and Rs. 5,292.00 was without any order of assessment and that, therefore, the amount demanded was legally payable by the Petitioner. As the appeal filed by the Petitioner has been dismissed by the Standing Appeal Committee of the Corporation on due consideration of all relevant aspects, no interference of this Court is warranted. 5. The Petitioner in its reply affidavit, however, has asserted that the rates of Municipal Tax and the Urban Tax fixed on the assessment of its holding in the year 1984-85 were reduced on being appealed against and that it had been paying the taxes at the reduced rates as demanded by the notices issued by the Corporation under Section 186 of the Act. 6. It is a fact admitted by both the parties that following the assessment of the Petitioner's holding in 1995-96, it has been paying the Municipal Tax and the Urban Tax at the newly assessed rates thereafter. 7. Mr. Borthakur has argued that the Petitioner having paid the taxes at the reduced rates for the period referred to in the demand notices issued under Section 186 of the Act, no further amount is payable in and, therefore, the demand of Rs. 7. Mr. Borthakur has argued that the Petitioner having paid the taxes at the reduced rates for the period referred to in the demand notices issued under Section 186 of the Act, no further amount is payable in and, therefore, the demand of Rs. 12,50,463/- is per se illegal, arbitrary and unauthorized. The Respondent Corporation having admitted to have received the taxes at the rates paid by the Petitioner in response to the bills issued by it, Mr. Borthakur has urged that the impugned notices are liable to be interfered with. According to him, the approach of the Standing Appeal Committee of the Corporation in sustaining the demand on the basis of a re-assessment of the Petitioner's holding during 1995-96, by disregarding the other contemporaneous materials on record demonstrating that the Petitioner paid the taxes as demanded by it under the law, is apparently untenable and thus the impugned judgment and order dated 15.7.1997 is clearly unsustainable and is liable to be set aside. 8. Mr. Samaria as against this has argued that though the Petitioner had deposited taxes at the rates claimed by it, the payment was not in full in terms of the assessment of its holding made in the year 1984-85 and that, therefore, the demand is legal and justified. According to him, though the payments of the Petitioner had been in terms of the notices/bill under Section 186 of the Act, the Corporation having detected the mistake, the impugned demand was raised and as in any view of the matter, the amount mentioned in the impugned notices is payable by the Petitioner in law, no interference therewith is called for. According to him, issuance of notices/bills under Section 186 did not create any estoppel against the Corporation to demand its legitimate dues. Questioning the maintainability of the petition, Mr. Samaria has argued that in terms of Section 204 of the Act following the dismissal of the appeal, the forum available to the Petitioner was the Court of the District Judge and that the alternative remedy not having been exhausted, the instant proceeding is not entertainable in law. 9. The rival submissions have been duly considered. The plea against maintainability of the writ petition, considering the year of registration of the petition cannot be sustained at this distant point of time. 9. The rival submissions have been duly considered. The plea against maintainability of the writ petition, considering the year of registration of the petition cannot be sustained at this distant point of time. As it is availability of an alternative remedy per se is not a bar for the exercise of the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The restraint comprehended is only a self imposed one and is not stipulated by any statute. On a consideration of the above, I am not inclined to dismiss the Petitioner on the ground of non-exhaustion of alternative remedy. 10. Some admitted facts may be recapitulated. The Petitioner's holding had been assessed in the year 1984-85. Following such assessment, the Corporation had issued notices/bills under Section186 of the Act for realization of the taxes assessed. That the bills for the relevant period for the Municipal Tax and the Urban Tax had been issued for amounts of Rs. 12,433.19 and Rs. 5,292/- have been admitted by the Corporation. Whereas the Petitioner contends that this was following the reduction of rates of taxes on the assessment of its holding during 1984-85, it is the Corporation's stand that the amount was short of the sum assessed and had been received having been offered by the Petitioner and that thereby it was not prevented in law to realize the actual amount due. 11. A bare perusal of the bill/notices annexed to the petition reveal that those had been issued under Section 186 of the Act. Under the aforementioned provision, when any tax becomes due, the Commissioner is required to present to the person liable for the payment thereof, a bill for the amount due. Sub-section (2) of Section 186 prescribes that every such bill would specify the particulars of the tax and the period for which the charge is made. Section 187 empowers the Commissioner to issue a notice of demand in the form prescribed if the amount of tax mentioned in a bill under Section 186 is not paid within a period of 15 days from the presentation day or any other eventuality as envisaged therein. A conjoint reading of the above provisions of the Act, therefore, makes it obvious that the demand under Section 187 can be made only if the tax assessed and liable to be paid in terms of the bill issued under Section 186 remains unpaid. A conjoint reading of the above provisions of the Act, therefore, makes it obvious that the demand under Section 187 can be made only if the tax assessed and liable to be paid in terms of the bill issued under Section 186 remains unpaid. The prescription of Section186 mandates that the bills to be issued thereunder have to essentially bear the particulars of the tax payable and the period for which the same is charged. It is, therefore, the bills issued under Section186 of the Act on the basis of which payment of the tax specified therein would have to be made. In other words, the demand of tax by the Corporation under the law would be of the amount mentioned in such bill. This assumes importance in the context of the present case where admittedly for a period of 10 years, the Corporation had issued bills under Section 186 of the Act demanding and receiving Municipal Tax and Urban Tax @ Rs. 12,433.19 and Rs. 5,292/-. The learned Standing Counsel for the corporation could not draw the attention of this Court to any contemporaneous official record to substantiate the impugned demand. 12. A plain reading of the impugned judgment and order passed by the Standing Appeal Committee of the Corporation indicates that on the assessment of the Petitioner's holding in the year 1984-85, the annual rateable value thereof was fixed at Rs. 5,71,740/- and the Municipal Tax payable quarterly was fixed at Rs. 31,312/- as recorded in the demand registers and that an amount of Rs. 12,433.19 per quarter had been realized from the Petitioner in terms of the bills issued by its office at that rate. The impugned judgment and order also bears out the fact that there had been reassessment of the rates of taxes under the signature of the then Deputy Commissioner of the Corporation and that the quarterly rate of Municipal tax payable thereafter was Rs. 12,433.19, is also recorded in the demand register of 1989-90. The Standing Appeal Committee held the view that as after the reassessment of the Petitioner's holding during the year 1995-96, the quarterly rate of Municipal tax fixed at Rs. 39,266.35/- was being paid by it from the first quarter of 1995-96 without any demur, the rate of quarterly tax at Rs. The Standing Appeal Committee held the view that as after the reassessment of the Petitioner's holding during the year 1995-96, the quarterly rate of Municipal tax fixed at Rs. 39,266.35/- was being paid by it from the first quarter of 1995-96 without any demur, the rate of quarterly tax at Rs. 33,312.31 was, thus correct, and that due to collection of taxes at reduced rates the outstanding dues upto 1994-95 stood at Rs. 12,50,430.04. On the above logic, the demand was upheld. 13. In view of the admitted fact that taxes on the above two counts had been realized from the Petitioner under Section 186 of the Act following a reduction in the rates as evidenced by the demand registers of the Corporation as well as the mandatory essentials of Section 186 of the Act, the reason recorded by the Standing Appeal Committee in support of the demand do not appear to be logical and acceptable. The demand to be raised in terms of Section 186 of the Act unmistakably cannot be mechanical more particularly when the same is to be made by a public authority. Not only the same has to be in meticulous compliance of the provisions thereof, no departure therefrom is permissible in absence of convincing, cogent and coherent reasons. There is none in the instant case. Acceptance of the taxes at the rates paid by the Petitioner for a decade without any reservation also has a decisive bearing on the issue. It is inconceivable that a public Corporation had remained unmindfully unaware of its duties and dues under the law to raise a demand for the purported arrears after such an enormous time lag. Not only the demand visibly appears to be against the letter and spirit of Section 186 of the Act, the same is not founded on a rational and plausible explanation. The bills/notices under Section 186 of the Act annexed to the petition clearly mention the rates of the taxes in response to which the Petitioner had made the payments. 14. It is, therefore, in my considered opinion, not open for the Corporation now to turn around and demand any additional amount. In the above view of the matter, the decision recorded by the Standing Appeal Committee and the demand raised in the impugned notice cannot be sustained in law and are, therefore, interfered with. 14. It is, therefore, in my considered opinion, not open for the Corporation now to turn around and demand any additional amount. In the above view of the matter, the decision recorded by the Standing Appeal Committee and the demand raised in the impugned notice cannot be sustained in law and are, therefore, interfered with. Consequently, the impugned judgment and order dated 15.7.1997 and the notices dated 21.9.94 and 2.1.1998 are hereby quashed. The petition succeeds and is thus allowed. No costs.