Judgment Syed Md.Mahfooz Alam, J. 1. This second appeal has been preferred by the plaintiffs- appellants against the judgment and decree dated 31.5.1990 passed by Sri Eric Mechyari, 5th Additional District Judge, Saran at Chapra in Title Appeal No. 61 of 1981 reversing the judgment and decree dated 31.3.1981 passed by Sri Chandeshwar Mochi, 1st Additional Munsif, Chapra in Title Suit No. 60 of 1969. 2. The brief facts of the case are as follows: The plaintiff-appellant, Grahan Mahto brought a suit for declaration that defendant nos. 1 and 2 had no concern with the property of Laljee Mahto and the plaintiff being the nearest agnate of Laljee Mahto is entitled to inherit the suit property and also for declaration that the gift deed executed in favour of defendant no. 1 was illegal and inoperative document. The plaintiff has also claimed that his title to the suit land was also perfected by way of adverse possession. The said suit was disposed of by Sri Chandeshwar Mochi, 1st Additional Munsif, Chapra on 31.3.1981 who decreed the suit of the plaintiff. Against the said judgment, the defendants-respondents preferred appeal which was disposed of by Sri Eric Mechyari, 5th Additional District Judge, Saran at Chapra, who by his judgment dated 31st May, 1990 allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. 3. The case of the plaintiff, in brief, is that one Gudar Mahto was the common ancestor, who had two sons, namely, Chait Mahto and Bali Mahto. Chait Mahto had a son, namely, Jiut Mahto. Laljee Mahto was the son of Jiut Mahto, who died issueless in the state of jointness. After his death, his widow Kabutari Devi (original defendant no. 2) solemnised second marriage with one Nona Mahto as a result of which she forfeited her right in her husbands property. Though the second son Bali Mahto had two sons, namely, Bhola Mahto and Jiwan Mahto but Bhola Mahto died issueless in the state of jointness. Jiwan Mahto had one son, namely, Grahan Mahto, who was original plaintiff. Balmiki Mahto and Tulsi Mahto are sons of Grahan Mahto, who are appellants before this Court. After death of Laljee Mahto Grahan Mahto was the sole surviving male heir of the family of Gudar Mahto and as such, he came in possession of the entire property of Laljee Mahto. Balmiki Mahto and Tulsi Mahto are sons of Grahan Mahto, who are appellants before this Court. After death of Laljee Mahto Grahan Mahto was the sole surviving male heir of the family of Gudar Mahto and as such, he came in possession of the entire property of Laljee Mahto. Defendant No. 1 Kishun Mahto is the brother-in-laws son of Laljee Mahto and defendant no. 2 was the wife of Laljee Mahto, who died during the pendency of the suit. Further case is that Laljee Mahto was of weak mind and taking advantage of his weak mind, the defendant no. 1 fraudulently got a farzi deed of gift executed in his favour in respect of the property of Laljee Mahto on 29.1.1944 and thereafter the said Kishun Mahto executed a farzi sale deed on 22.6.1946 in favour of Hoti Raut in respect of the property of Laljee Mahto and fraudulently obtained the signature of Laljee Mahto as a witness on the said sale deed. It is said that at that time Laljee Mahto was not in a position to understand things correctly but when the fraudulent act of defendant no. 1 came to the knowledge of Laljee Mahto, he cancelled the gift deed by registered deed of cancellation dated 21.6.1946. It is further stated that on the strength of the said sale deed, the vendee never came in possession of the property sold by virtue of the sale deed. Further case is that Laljee Mahto died issueless in 1947 in the state of jointness leaving behind the original plaintiff as the sole surviving heir. Further case of the plaintiff is that after death of Laljee Mahto his name (the name of Grahan Mahto) was mutated in the landlords Sherishta with respect to the property of Laljee Mahto and he started paying rent to the landlord. After vesting of Zamindari, jamabandi was submitted in the name of the original plaintiff, namely, Grahan Mahto and his name was mutated in the Shrista of the State of Bihar and the plaintiff started making payment of rent to the State of Bihar and getting rent receipts. After vesting of Zamindari, jamabandi was submitted in the name of the original plaintiff, namely, Grahan Mahto and his name was mutated in the Shrista of the State of Bihar and the plaintiff started making payment of rent to the State of Bihar and getting rent receipts. it is stated that Kishun Mahto and original defendant Kabutri filed an application for permission to sell the land of Laljee Mahto before the Anchal Adhikari, Marhowrah on the basis of which Case No. 10 of 1969-70 was registered and on getting information, the plaintiff filed his objection petition but in spite of that the Anchal Adhikari granted permission to sell the land. It has been submitted that the original plaintiff has also perfected his title by adverse possession by remaining in possession for several twelve years openly, uninterruptedly and within the knowledge of defendants and others. It has been stated that since cloud has been cast on the title of the plaintiff, as such the necessity of filing of the suit arose. 4. Original defendant no. 2, Kabutri Devi and defendant nos. 3 and 4 who are purchasers of the suit property from defendant no. 1 filed separate written statements whereas defendant no. 1 Kishun Mahto adopted the written statement filed by defendant nos. 3 and 4. The case of the defendants is that Laljee Mahto, who was the husband of defendant no. 2 Kabutri Devi, was the son of Jiut Mahto. The said Jiut Mahto was the son of Chart Mahto who was son of Pargari Mahto and not Gudar Mahto. The original plaintiff had no concern with the family of Laljee Mahto. Defendant No. 1 Kishun Mahto was the son of brother- in-law of Laljee Mahto, who used to look after Laljee Mahto and the said Laljee Mahto had also love and affection with Kishun Mahto (defendant no. 1). Out of love and affection and being pleased with the service of Kishun Mahto, Laljee Mahto executed a deed of gift in favour of Kishun Mahto on 29.1.1944 with respect to the suit property which was accepted by Kishun Mahto and thereafter Laljee Mahto put Kishun Mahto in possession of the suit property. It is further said that the deed of gift became operative and Kishun Mahto came in possession of the gifted property. It is further said that the deed of gift became operative and Kishun Mahto came in possession of the gifted property. It is further stated that at the time of gift, Kishun Mahto was minor and was under the guardian of his mother Pan Kuer who, in the capacity of guardian of Kishun Mahto, executed a sale deed on 22.1.1946 in respect of 7 kathas 11 dhurs of land out of the land gifted to Kishun Mahto by Laljee Mahto through the gift deed. The said sale deed was executed in favour of Hoti Raut for valuable consideration of Rs. 660/- who came in possession of the said land and has been coming in possession of the same. It is stated that the recital of the sale deed dated 22.1.46 will show that defendant no. 1 had acquired the said property through the gift deed dated 29.1.1944. It will further show that L.T.I. of Pan Kuer was attested by no other person than Laljee Mahto himself. Further case is that defendant no. 1 Kishun Mahto used to reside in tne house of Laljee Mahto and the original deed of gift was in his custody but somehow the same had lost. It is further said that prior to his death, Laljee Mahto had lost his power of understanding and became incapable of understanding things properly due to illness and old age. It is further said that during his illness the plaintilt took Laljee Mahto to Marhowrah on his bullock-cart for the purpose of his treatment and obtained L.T.I. of Laljee Mahto on some blank stamped paper which was later converted into a deed of cancellation. It is said that Laljee Mahto never executed the deed of cancellation nor he was mentally sound to execute the same nor he had right to execute the deed of cancellation. Further case of the defendants is that Kishun Mahto sold all the lands of Laljee Mahto except the house and homestead land to defendant nos. 3 and 4, namely, Jamuna Singh and Etwar Mahto, respectively and they are in possession of the lands sold to them. The plaintiff in collusion with the Amalas of the ex-landlord might have forged and fabricated some documents in his favour which are not binding upon the defendants and the sale deeds executed by defendant no. 3 and 4, namely, Jamuna Singh and Etwar Mahto, respectively and they are in possession of the lands sold to them. The plaintiff in collusion with the Amalas of the ex-landlord might have forged and fabricated some documents in his favour which are not binding upon the defendants and the sale deeds executed by defendant no. 1 are valid documents as the same were executed after obtaining permission of the authority concerned. The defendants have also denied that after death of Laljee Mahto, Kabutri Devi had married with another man. It has further been stated that on the strength of the sale deeds executed by defendant no. 1, defendant nos. 3 and 4 came in possession of the lands sold to them whereas Hoti Mahto has also come in possession of the land sold to him. He also got his name mutated after the purchase. However, it appears-that Mahabir Mahto (substituted defendant no. 2) has supported this fact that after the death of Lalojee Mahto, Kabutri had performed second marriage with his father Nona Mahto and thus, Kabutri Devi was his step mother. He has also supported this fact that after the death of Laljee Mahto the plaintiff came in possession of the property left by Laljee Mahto. 5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court framed as many as six issues which are as follows: (1) Whether the suit as framed is maintainable? (2) Whether the plaintiffs-respondents have got cause of action for the suit? (3) Whether the deed of gift dated 29.1.44 executed by Laljee Mahto in favour of defendant Kishun Mahto is genuine, valid and operative? (4) Whether the plaintiffs-respondents have perfected their title over thesuit land by adverse possession? (5) Whether the suit is bad for nonjoinder of necessary party? (6) Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 6. It appears from the judgment of the trial court that the trial court took up issue nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 a the main issues to be decided in this case and after making full discussions on these issues, the trial court held that the deed of gift dated 29.1.1944 is not genuine, valid and operative and as such, the vendee of defendant no. 1 had acquired no right and possession over the suit land. 3, 4, 5 and 6 a the main issues to be decided in this case and after making full discussions on these issues, the trial court held that the deed of gift dated 29.1.1944 is not genuine, valid and operative and as such, the vendee of defendant no. 1 had acquired no right and possession over the suit land. The court further held that the plaintiff has got title and possession to the suit land and as such, the trial court decreed the suit. But in appeal, the learned appellate court reversed the finding and held that the gift deed dated 29.1.1944 executed by Laljee Mahto in favour of defendant no. 1 Kishun Mahto is genuine, valid and operative. It further held that the plaintiffs have failed to prove that they have perfected their title by adverse possession. The learned first appellate court has further held that the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary party and finally held that the suit instituted by Grahan Mahto was not maintainable and hence, the appellate court set aside the findings of the trial court and dismissed the suit. Against the said finding of the first appellate court, this second appeal has been preferred. 7. From perusal of the record of this second appeal, it appears that on 31.8.1990 at the time of admission of this appeal, altogether four substantial questions of law were formulated in this appeal but during the hearing of the appeal the same were recast and on recast, the. following substantial questions of law were formulated for determination which are as follows: (i) Whether the learned lower appellate court had committed a serious error of law in holding that the suit is bad for the defect of the parties for not impleading the vendee of the alleged donee, when the deed of gift itself was challenged? (ii) Whether the learned lower appellate court while reversing the findings of the trial court on the point of genuineness, operativeness of the deed of gift (Ext. 6) committed a serious error of law in not meeting the reasonings of the trial court while arriving at such findings? (iii) Whether the judgment of the first appellate court is perverse due to non-consideration of oral as well as documentary evidence of the parties and also due to misreading and misinterpretation of oral and documentary evidence available on record? 6) committed a serious error of law in not meeting the reasonings of the trial court while arriving at such findings? (iii) Whether the judgment of the first appellate court is perverse due to non-consideration of oral as well as documentary evidence of the parties and also due to misreading and misinterpretation of oral and documentary evidence available on record? (iv) Whether the finding of the first appellate court on adverse possession is also perverse? Substantial Question No. (i): 8 It has been submitted by the learned Advocate of the appellants that the first appellate court while deciding point no. 5 i.e. regarding non-joinder of necessary party held that the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary party. The learned Advocate submitted that this finding of the appellate court is not in accordance with law as the learned first appellate court failed to consider this fact that Hoti Mahto, - the alleged vendee of defendant no. 1, was not a necessary party when the validity of the gift deed itself executed in favour of defendant no. 1 was under challenge in the suit and the plaintiff has specifically asserted that the gift deed dated 29.1.1944 had remained inoperative and by virtue of the said gift deed, defendant no. 1 Kishun Mahto had not acquired any title to the suit land. 9. From perusal of the written statement of the defendant no. 2 Kabutri Devi and defendant nos. 3 and 4 which was also adopted by defendant no. 1 it appears that the specific case of the defendants is that Lafjee Mahto was issueless, he had love and affection for defendant no. 1 who rendered service to Laljee Mahto and Laljee Mahto, being pleased with the service of defendant no. 1, executed a gift deed in his favour on 29.1.1944. Further case of the defendants is that the said gift deed was accepted by defendant no. 1 and became operative and on the strength of the said gift deed, the mother of defendant no. 1 in the capacity of the guardian of Kishun Mahto, who was then minor, executed a sale deed on 22.1.1946 in respect of 7 kathas 11 dhurs of the land to one Hoti Raut for a consideration of Rs. 660/- only. 1 and became operative and on the strength of the said gift deed, the mother of defendant no. 1 in the capacity of the guardian of Kishun Mahto, who was then minor, executed a sale deed on 22.1.1946 in respect of 7 kathas 11 dhurs of the land to one Hoti Raut for a consideration of Rs. 660/- only. From perusal of the plaint it appears that the plaintiff has also admitted this fact in the plaint and has stated that Laljee Mahto was of weak mind and taking advantage of his weak mind, the defendant no. 1 fraudulently got a farzi deed of gift executed in his favour in respect of the property of Laljee Mahto on 29.1.1944 and thereafter the said Kishun Mahto (defendant no. 1) executed a farzi sale deed on 22.1.1946 in favour of Hoti Raut in respect of the property of Laljee Mahto and fraudulently obtained the signature of Laljee Mahto as a witness on the said sale deed. 10. Thus, from perusal of the pleadings of all the parties it is apparent that it is admitted case of all the parties that on the strength of gift deed executed by Laljee Mahto in favour of defendant no. 1 Kishun Mahto, he executed a sale deed in favour of Hoti Raut on 22.1.1946 with respect to 7 kathas 11 dhurs of land out of the lands acquired through the gift deed and since the subject matter of the suit also includes the suit land sold by Kishun Mahto in favour of Hoti Raut through the said sale deed dated 22.1.1946, as such there cannot be any two opinions that Hoti Raut was also a necessary party to the suit but l am of the view that only because of the fact that Hoti Raut, who was a necessary party to the suit and he was not impleaded as a party to the suit, it cannot be held that the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary party. The question as to who should be made party in the suit and without impleading him as a party to the suit, the, suit will fail, depends upon the averments made in the plaint and reliefs claimed by the plaintiff in the suit. The question as to who should be made party in the suit and without impleading him as a party to the suit, the, suit will fail, depends upon the averments made in the plaint and reliefs claimed by the plaintiff in the suit. It appears from the pleadings of the plaintiff that the plaintiff had challenged the very genuineness and validity of the gift deed executed in favour of defendant no. 1 Kishun Mahto by Laljee Mahto on 29.1.1944 and he has specifically made out a case that the gift deed dated 29.1.1944 was illegal and inoperative document and as such, Kishun Mahto was not entitled to execute the sale deed either to Hoti Raut or to any other person. Thus, in view of the specific case of the plaintiff that the very gift deed dated 29.1.1944 was an illegal and inoperative document, the subsequent execution of any deed or sale deed by the donee of the gift deed was automatically without jurisdiction and so, there was no necessity for the plaintiff to implead the vendee of the deed dated 22.1.1946, namely, Hoti Raut as a party to the suit. Accordingly, I hold that in view of the specific pleading of the plaintiff that the very gift deed dated 29.1.44 is illegal and inoperative document and the subsequent transfer of some of the gifted properties to Hoti Raut by the donee of the gift is also illegal and void, it cannot be held that due to the non-joinder of the vendee of the sale deed dated 22.1.1946, namely, Hoti. Raut as a party to the suit, the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary party. Therefore, the finding of the first appellate court that the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary party, namely, Hoti Raut is set aside and accordingly, this substantial question of law is decided in favour of the plaintiff- appellants. Substantial Questions of Law Nos. (ii) & (iii). 11. Both these substantial questions of law are inter-linked and as such they are being taken up together for consideration. Substantial Questions of Law Nos. (ii) & (iii). 11. Both these substantial questions of law are inter-linked and as such they are being taken up together for consideration. The contention of the learned Advocate of the appellants is that the first appellate court did not properly appreciate oral as well as documentary evidence of the parties and without application of the mind, the first appellate court reversed the findings of the trial court that the gift deed dated 29.1.44 was inoperative, invalid and not a genuine document besides other findings of the trial court and as such, the findings of the first appellate court are perverse. 12. It is the admitted case of the parties that on 29.1.44 Laljee Mahto had executed a gift deed in favour of defendant no. 1 Kishun Mahto, who is the son of brother-in-law (Sala) of Laljee Mahto but in this regard the plaintiffs averment is that Laljee Mahto was of weak mind and taking advantage of his weak mind the defendant no. 1 Kishun Mahto fraudulently got a forged deed of gift executed in his favour on 29.1.44 in respect of the properties of Laljee Mahto and when this fraud came to the knowledge of the said Laljee Mahto he cancelled the said gift deed by a registered deed of cancellation dated 21.6.46. Further case of the plaintiff is that the said gift remained ineffective and inoperative. The gift deed dated 29.1.44 executed by Laljee Mahto in favour of Kishun Mahto is Exhibit-6 in this case and the registered deed of cancellation dated 21.6.1946 executed by Laljee Mahto through which document Laljee Mahto cancelled the gift deed dated 29.1.44 is Exhibit-5 in this case. Thus from Exhibit-5 it is established that the executor of the gift deed, namely, Laljee Mahto had already cancelled the gift deed, in question (Exhibit-6). Therefore, the first and foremost question is that whether the gift deed dated 29.1.44. executed by Laljee Mahto in favour of defendant no. 1 was a valid and legal document and the same still exists, In this regard, I would like to give a look on the definition of gift. Gift has been defined under section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter to be referred as "T.P. Act"). executed by Laljee Mahto in favour of defendant no. 1 was a valid and legal document and the same still exists, In this regard, I would like to give a look on the definition of gift. Gift has been defined under section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter to be referred as "T.P. Act"). Section 122 of the T.P. Act is quoted below: "Gift" is the transfer of certain existing movable or immovable property made voluntarily and without consideration, by one person, called the donor, to another, called the donee and accepted by or on behalf of the donee". "Such acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the donor and while he is stiff capable of giving". "If the donee dies before acceptance, the gift is void." 13. Thus, from the definition of gift, it is apparent that acceptance of gift by donee or on his behalf by his guardian if the donee is minor is a condition precedent for a valid and legal gift. Through judicial pronouncements certain guidelines have been given to come to the conclusion that the gift was accepted by the donee. These guidelines are as follows: (I) Obtaining the signature of donee or of his guardian if the donee is minor on the gift deed. (II) Delivery of gift deed to donee or to any other person on his behalf. (III) Possession of donee over the gifted property. 14. In this regard, I would like to place reliance upon the decision in the case of Balwant Singh V/s. Chatin Singh and Ors. reported in A.I.R. 1985 Punjab & Haryana page 74 and the decision of our own High Court given in the case of Chhedi Tanti and Ors. V/s. Smt. Gangati Devi & Ors. reported in 1985 PLJR page 91. From both the decisions, it is clear that the acceptance of the gift can be inferred from the fact that the deed of gift after its execution was handed over to the donee or in token of acceptance the donee or on his behalf his guardian had put his signature or its thumb impression. But, in the instant case neither the gift deed was produced on behalf of the donee nor the gift deed (Exhibit-6) bears the signature of donee or on his behalf of his guardian. But, in the instant case neither the gift deed was produced on behalf of the donee nor the gift deed (Exhibit-6) bears the signature of donee or on his behalf of his guardian. Thus, from the facts stated above one of the most important ingredients of the valid gift i.e. acceptance of the gift deed by the donee appears to be lacking in this case. It has been pleaded by the defendants in their written statement that the gift was accepted by defendant no. 1 Kishun Mahto. Defendant No.2 Kabutri Devi at para 28 of the written statement has stated that Laljee Mahto (her husband) had duly executed the gift deed dated 29.1.44 in favour of defendant no. 1 which was also accepted by defendant no. 1. It appears from para 21 of the written statement filed on behalf of defendant nos. 3 and 4 that they have also made averments that defendant no. 1 had accepted the said gift deed. From the written statement filed on behalf of the defendant no. 1, it appears that he had adopted the written statement filed on behalf of defendant nos. 2, 3 and 4. Thus, there appears no controversy that it becomes the admitted case of the defendants that at the time of execution of the gift deed defendant no. 1 had accepted the gift. It appears that in evidence the defendant no. 1, who has been examined as D.W. 9, has tried to make out a case that the gift was accepted by his mother on his behalf but in my view this case of the defendant is beyond pleading, as such, it has got no evidenciary value. 15. Admittedly, at the time of execution of the deed, defendant no. 1 was minor and from his evidence it appears that at that time he was aged about 4-5 years old. It is unthinkable that a boy aged about 4-5 years only can understand the nature of contents of the deed and can give his consent regarding the acceptance of the gift deed. The law is very clear on this point which says that a minor is not competent to accept the gift. In this regard, I place reliance upon the decision reported in A.I.R. 1985 Punjab and Haryana Page 74 (supra). The law is very clear on this point which says that a minor is not competent to accept the gift. In this regard, I place reliance upon the decision reported in A.I.R. 1985 Punjab and Haryana Page 74 (supra). Para 4 of the said decision clearly says that as the donee was only 14 years old at the time of execution of gift deed, therefore, he was not competent in the eye of law to accept the gift. 16. From the above discussion, it is established beyond doubt that one of the most important ingredients of the gift could not be fulfilled as the defendant no. 1 was not competent to accept the gift being minor and, as such, in the eye of law it will be deemed that there was no acceptance of deed in question. I, therefore, hold that the deed in question cannot be held to be a valid and genuine document. It is also established from the fact that the original gift deed i.e. Exhibit-6 and the original deed of cancellation i.e. Exhibit-5 were produced from the side of the plaintiff which establish this fact that the alleged gift remained inoperative. 17. It is true that on behalf of the defendants a sale deed dated 22.1.1946 executed by Pan Kunwari, mother of defendant no. 1, in favour of Hoti Raut has been brought on record which is Exhibit A-1. This document has been brought in support of the fact that on the strength of gift deed dated 29.1.44 executed by Laljee Mahto in favour of defendant no. 1, the defendant no. 1 came in possession of the properties of Laljee Mahto and since at that time he was minor, Pan Kunwari, the mother of defendant no. 1 sold some property out of the gifted property to Hoti Raut and the said deed was attested by no other person than Laljee Mahto himself. The argument of learned Advocate of the appellant is that this document has been brought in existence by playing fraud upon Laljee Mahto in order to create evidence that the gift deed dated 29.1.44 became operative but when Laljee Mahto came to know about the fraud played upon him by the mother of defendant no. 1, he cancelled the gift deed dated 29.1.44 by a registered deed of cancellation dated 21.6.46. 1, he cancelled the gift deed dated 29.1.44 by a registered deed of cancellation dated 21.6.46. I am of the view that the argument of the learned Advocate of the appellant has got much strength in view of the fact that only after five months of the execution of the sale deed (Exhibit-A/1) Laljee Mahto cancelled the entire gift deed on .21.6.1946. Regarding this fact that on the sale deed dated 22.1.46 (Exhibit-A/1) the signature of Pan Kunwari was attested by no other person than the Laljee Mahto himself, learned Advocate of the appellant argued that only because of the fact that Laljee Mahto had attested the signature of Pan Kunwari on the sale deed (Exhibit-A/1), it cannot be presumed that he had knowledge about the contents of the sale deed and he had also accepted the contents of the sale deed. In this regard he has placed reliance upon the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Pandurang Krishnaji V/s. Markandeya Tukaram and Ors. reported in 1922 Privy Council page 20. The relevant lines of the decision are quoted below: "The attestation of a deed by itself estops a man from denying nothing whatsoever excepting that he has witnessed the execution of the deed, it conveys, neither directly nor by implication, any knowledge of the contents of the document and it ought not to be put forward alone for the purpose of establishing that a man consented to the transaction which the document effects." 18. Thus, from the above discussion, I have come to the conclusion that on the basis of Exhibit-A/1 also it cannot be held that the deed of gift executed in favour of defendant by Laljee Mahto had become operative, rather, the discussions made above establishes beyond doubt that the gift deed, in question, (Exhibit-6) always remained inoperative and ineffective. It was also cancelled by the donor vide Exhibit-5. This further finds support from the fact that the originai gift deed as well as the deed of cancellation both were produced from the side of the plaintiff and not from the side of the defendants. 19. Although for a valid gift the delivery of possession of the property is not at all essential but I would like to examine the case of the parties from this aspect also and would like to see whether the defendant no. 19. Although for a valid gift the delivery of possession of the property is not at all essential but I would like to examine the case of the parties from this aspect also and would like to see whether the defendant no. 1 ever came in possession of the gifted property. Exhibit-A-1/1 and Exhibit- A-1/2 are two sale deeds executed by defendant no. 1 Kishun Mahto in favour of defendant nos. 3 and 4. Both the safe deeds were executed on 1.8.69 i.e. during the pendency of the suit and as such, these two documents cannot be used as evidence of proof of possession of defendants over the suit property. Exhibit-B/1 to B/5 are Chaukidari receipts produced on behalf of the defendants but all these chaukidari receipts stand in the name of Kabutri (original defendant no. 2) meaning thereby that the defendant no. 1 on the basis of the gift deed never came in possession of the house occupied by Laljee Mahto. Exhibit-C to C-1/2 are Zamindari rent receipts. These rent receipts also stand in the name of Laljee Mahto and not in the name of defendant no. 1. Exhibit-C-1/3 to C-1/4 are the state rent receipt showing that the name of purchaser Hoti Raut was mutated in respect of the land sold by virtue of Exhibit-A/1 but in my view these rent receipts also do not prove that defendant no. 1 had come in possession of entire properties of Laljee Mahto. Exhibit-D/1 is the voter list which has been filed in support of the fact that Kabutri wife of Laljee Mahto had not performed second marriage. Thus, from the perusal of the documents adduced on behalf of the defendants, I have come to the conclusion that from these documents the possession of defendant no. 1 over the properties left by Laljee Mahto cannot be established. 20. On the other hand, the plaintiff has filed overwhelming documentary evidence to prove this fact that they are in possession of the properties left by Laljee Mahto. Exhibit-1 is the Award prepared in Land Acquisition Case No. 154/1974-75/28 of 1975-76 showing that the land of Plot Nos. 269, 279 area 0.45 and 0.25 decimals d Khata No. 45 of village Bij Bahuara belonging to Laljee Mahto was acquired by the Land Acquisition Department for Gandak Project for which compensation of Rs. 237.95 was awarded to the plaintiff Grahan Mahto. 269, 279 area 0.45 and 0.25 decimals d Khata No. 45 of village Bij Bahuara belonging to Laljee Mahto was acquired by the Land Acquisition Department for Gandak Project for which compensation of Rs. 237.95 was awarded to the plaintiff Grahan Mahto. Exhibit-2 is the withdrawal slip of the said compensation amount awarded in the abovementioned case. Exhibit-3 to 3/g are state rent receipts in the name of plaintiff Grahan Mahto with respect to the land of Khata No. 45. Exhibit-3/H to 3/Q are the zamindari receipts in the name Grahan Mahto with respect to the land of Khata No. 45, Jamabandi No. 21. Exhibit-3/R, 3/T, 3/U are again the rent receipts granted by the State of Bihar in respect of Khata no. 45. All these rent receipts establishes that the plaintiff was paying rent of the suit land to the ex-landlord and after vesting of the zamindari he is paying the rent of the suit land to the State of Bihar which supports the possession of the plaintiff over the suit land. Exhibit-4 to 4/n are the chaukidari receipts which also stand in the name of Grahan Mahto and establishes the possession of Grahan Mahto over the house of Laljee Mahto. Exhibit-8 is the R.S. Khatiyan of the year 1920 which establishes that the plaintiff Grahan Mahto and Laljee Mahto were coming from same family and this is why Khatiyan was jointly prepared in their names. 21. Thus, from the abovementioned documents it is established beyond doubt that the plaintiff is in possession of the properties left by Laljee Mahto and from Exhibit-8 (R.S. Khatiyan of the year 1920) it is also established that Grahan Mahto and Laljee Mahto were of same family. It further transpires from Exhibit-7 that Sharadh ceremony of Laljee Mahto was also performed by the plaintiff. It appears from perusal of judgment of the first appellate court that the first appellate court did not properly scrutinise the documentary evidence as well as oral evidence of the parties and that is why the first appellate court came to the wrong conclusion that the gift deed executed in favour of the defendants was a genuine and operative document and had dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs. 22. 22. I, therefore hold that due to non- consideration and improper appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence of the parties by the first appellate court the judgment of the first appellate court has become perverse and requires interference. Accordingly, l find and hold that the deed of gift dated 29.1.44 (Exhibit-6) executed by Laljee Mahto in favour of defendant no. 1 is not a genuine and operative document and the finding of the first appellate court in this regard are perverse, whereas, the finding of the trial court is correct and in accordance with law. I further find and hold that the judgment of the first appellate court is perverse due to non- consideration and misinterpretation of oral as well as documentary evidence of the. parties and, accordingly, both the substantial question of law are decided. Substantial Question of Law No. (iv): 23. It has been submitted by the learned Advocate of the appellants that the finding of the first appellate court that the defendants are in adverse possession of the suit land is also perverse because of the fact that it is not the case of the defendants that they had acquired title by adverse possession, rather, the specific case of the defendants is that Laljee Mahto had executed a deed of gift dated 29.1.44 in favour of defendant no. 1 with respect to the suit property and by virtue of the said gift deed the defendant no. 1, who was vendor of defendant nos. 3 and 4, had acquired title to the suit land. There appears much strength in the argument of learned advocate of the appellant that the plea of adverse possession is not available to defendants as the case of the defendants is based upon title and not upon the adverse possession. I am of the view that this is the correct position of law as the plea of adverse possession is not available to the defendants because the defendants case is based upon title and as such I hold that the finding of the first appellate court regarding adverse possession is also perverse. 24. Before concluding my judgment, I would like to say that while discussing substantial question of law no. 24. Before concluding my judgment, I would like to say that while discussing substantial question of law no. 1, l have held that although Hoti Raut was a necessary party to the suit but even then the suit is not bad for non-joinder of Hoti Rout, the purchaser of a portion of suit property by virtue of sale deed dated 22.1.1946. It is admitted position that Hoti Raut was not impleaded as party to the suit in spite of the fact that the plaintiff had knowledge that defendant no. 1 had executed a sale deed in his favour on 22.1.1946 on the strength of gift deed. Now, it has been held by me that the gift deed executed in favour of defendant no. 1 on 29.1.44 was illegal and inoperative document and, so, the natural question is whether the sale deed dated 22.1.1946 executed in favour of Hoti Raut will also become a void document and due to that the plaintiffs will be entitled to get the recovery of the land sold to Hoti Raut without impleading him as party. In my view, the answer is in negative because of the fact that the sale deed of Hoti Raut was executed about fifteen years ago from the date of filing of the suit. At the relevant time, the gift deed executed by Laljee Mahto was in existence although the same was an illegal and inoperative document but Hoti Raut might have obtained the sale deed in good faith presuming that the defendant no. 1 had valid title. In such situation, if Hoti Raut came in possession of the land sold to him through Exhlbit-A/1 and he continued to remain in possession for a period of more that twelve years then it can be safely held that Hoti Raut had perfected his title to the land purchased by him through Exhibit-A/1 by way of adverse possession. I, therefore, hold that in absence of Hoti Raut the plaintiffs will not be entitled to get the decree of the land sold to Hoti Raut through Exhibit-A/1 even when the said sale deed is held to be invalid document. 25. I, therefore, hold that in absence of Hoti Raut the plaintiffs will not be entitled to get the decree of the land sold to Hoti Raut through Exhibit-A/1 even when the said sale deed is held to be invalid document. 25. In the result, I find merit in this appeal and, accordingly, the same is hereby allowed and the judgment and decree of the first appellate court are hereby set aside and the judgment and decree of the trial court are hereby restored and affirmed with observation that the plaintiff shall not be entitled to get decree with respect to the land sold to Hoti Raut by registered sale deed dated 22.1.1946 (Exhibit-A/1). 26. No order as to costs.