ORDER : ARIJIT PASAYAT, L.S. PANTA, JJ. Heard. Challenge in these appeals is to the judgment, Central Coalfields Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand, LPA No. 288 of 2001, order dated 29-11-2002 (Jhar) passed by a Division Bench of the Jharkhand High Court. The basic issue related to the scope and ambit of Section 9 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (in short "the Act"). The stand of the appellant before the High Court was that it is liable to pay royalty only on the minerals (in the instant case "coal") removed by it from the leased area after segregating minerals and other non-minerals from it. The stand of the State on the other hand was that royalty has to be calculated on what is removed from the mines and not what is ultimately removed from the leased area. 2. Though the High Court found substance in the plea of the appellant, yet it was noted that in view of the decision of this Court in State of Orissa v. Sail, (1998) 6 SCC 476 it was not in a position to grant relief to the appellant. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there is practically no discussion in SAIL case, (1998) 6 SCC 476 as to why this Court accepted the stand of the appellant State in that case to hold that processing amounts to consumption and therefore the entire mineral is to be subjected to levy of royalty. View of the High Court was that royalty can be levied on the calculated area mainly obtained after processing. The High Court was of the further view that quantity of mineral which has undergone certain process alone was liable to levy of royalty and it can only be after it is removed from the leased area. The distinction made was to the effect that there was a distinction between the removal from mines and removal from leased area, the same was held to be not a correct view. 4. A bare reading of this Court's judgment in SAIL case2 indicates that there is practically no reason indicated as to why the distinction made by the High Court was found to be unacceptable. As was noticed by the High Court in the impugned judgment in the said case the distinction is certainly of relevance. 4. A bare reading of this Court's judgment in SAIL case2 indicates that there is practically no reason indicated as to why the distinction made by the High Court was found to be unacceptable. As was noticed by the High Court in the impugned judgment in the said case the distinction is certainly of relevance. As we are unable to subscribe to the view expressed in SAIL case2, we refer the matter to a larger Bench. Records may be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for necessary directions. 5. Civil Appeals Nos. 5650-51 of 2005 6. Place these matters after the disposal of the matters which have been referred to a larger Bench i.e. Civil Appeals Nos. 5908-10 of 2004. 7. Court Masters.