JUDGMENT R. N. BISWAL, J. : This is an appeal against the order of acquittal dated 22.5.1987 passed by the Sessions Judge, Keonjhar in Sessions Trial case No.9 of 1986 acquitting both the accused persons of the charge under Sections 302/34 and 201 of I.P.C. and further acquitting accused Maguni Charan Sahu of the charge under Section 498-A of I.P.C. under benefit of doubt. 2. The facts leading to filing of this appeal succinctly stated run as follows : On 10.10.1985 at the instance of accused Natabar Sahu, since dead, P.W.11 reported before the A.S.I. of Anandapur Police Station that on the previous night Tova, the daughter-in-law of accused Natabar and the wife of present accused-Respondent being attacked by epileptic fit, fell down over a heap of stones, sustained severe injuries and succumbed to the same on the very night. In absence of the O.I.C., the A.S.I. (P.W.17) registered U.D. case No.51 of 1985 and enquired into the matter. In course of enquiry he held inquest over the dead body, sent it to the hospital for autopsy over it, examined some witnesses and handed over the charge of the case to the O.I.C., P.W.18 on the next day. As it was found from the Post-mortem report that the de¬ceased Tova died a homicidal death, P.W.18 asked P.W.17 to close the U.D. case and accordingly he closed it. On his own informa¬tion P.W.18 drew up plain paper F.I.R. and registered P.S. Case No.180(9) of 1985 under Section 302 I.P.C. against unknown per¬sons and investigated into the case. In course of investigation he examined the witnesses, arrested both the accused persons, forwarded them to Court, seized some incriminating objects in¬cluding a stone (M.O.III) and handed over charge of the case to P.W.19 who submitted charge sheet under Sections 302/498-A of I.P.C. against accused persons. The case having been committed to the Court of session, charge under Sections 302/34 and 201 I.P.C. was framed against both the accused persons and accused Maguni Charan Sahu was further charged for the offence under Section 498-A of I.P.C. 3. The plea of the accused persons is that the deceased was suffering from epilepsy since long and on the night of occurrence while returning home after answering the second call of nature, being attached by epilepsy she fell down over a heap of stones in the back-yard of the house and sustained severe injuries. The plea of the accused persons is that the deceased was suffering from epilepsy since long and on the night of occurrence while returning home after answering the second call of nature, being attached by epilepsy she fell down over a heap of stones in the back-yard of the house and sustained severe injuries. Finding the deceased in such injured state accused Natabar Sahu removed her inside the house. It is the further plea of accused Maguni Charan Sahu that on the night of occurrence he had been to watch the sugar cane crops and returned home on the next date. He denied to have tortured the deceased with cruelty. 4. In order to establish its case prosecution examined as many as 19 witnesses as against none on behalf of the accused persons. Admittedly there is no eye witness to the occurrence. The fate of the case solely depended upon the circumstantial evidence. To bring home the charges against the accused persons, prosecution mainly relied upon the evidence of the parents of the deceased (P.Ws. 1 and 3), doctor (P.W.16) who conducted autopsy over the dead body, witness to the seizure of the stone (P.W.10) and the main I.O. (P.W.18), the statement of accused Maguni Charan Sahu, leading to discovery of the stone with which it was alleged that he thrashed his wife, Tova on her face and head causing her death. After assessing the evidence on record the trial Court held that the accused persons might have killed the deceased, but there is long gap between might have and must have. Prosecution having failed to bridge that gap, he acquitted the accused persons of all the charges, under benefit of doubt vide his order dated 22.5.1987. Being aggrieved with this order the State has preferred the present appeal as mentioned earlier. During pendency of the appeal accused Natabar expired on 10.12.1996 and as such the appeal against him was abated vide order dated 25.8.2006. 5. Learned Standing Counsel submits that thee is material to show that the deceased died a homicidal death in the house of the accused persons, that too during night time. During pendency of the appeal accused Natabar expired on 10.12.1996 and as such the appeal against him was abated vide order dated 25.8.2006. 5. Learned Standing Counsel submits that thee is material to show that the deceased died a homicidal death in the house of the accused persons, that too during night time. The prosecution also could be able to prove the motive behind the murder by establishing that the present accused-appellant was very often assaulting the deceased for non-fulfilment of the demand of one gold ring and a radio and when the same could not be complied with accused persons including the respondent were prompted to murder her. The plea of the accused-Respondent that being at¬tacked by epileptic fit the deceased fell down on a heap of stones, sustained severe injuries on the head and face and suc¬cumbed to the same was found to be false in view of the evidence of the doctor. It was also amply proved that while in police custody the accused-Respondent confessed his guilt and led the police and the witnesses to the discovery of the stone (M.O.III) with which the deceased was killed. All these circumstances unerringly go to show that the accused-Respondent and his father (since dead) committed the murder and to screen the evidence against them declared that the deceased, being attacked by epi¬leptic fit fell down on a heap of stones and expired. So the learned Standing Counsel prayed to set aside the order of acquit¬tal and persuaded us to convict the accused-Respondent for all the offences under which he was charged. 6. It is the fundamental principle of criminal juris¬prudence that circumstantial evidence should unerringly point to the conclusion that it was the accused and the accused alone who was the perpetrator of the crime and such evidence should be incompatible with innocence of the accused. It is also a cardi¬nal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the circumstantial evidence should be proved to the hilt. Now, it is to be seen whether in the present case the evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution satisfy these tests. It is also a cardi¬nal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the circumstantial evidence should be proved to the hilt. Now, it is to be seen whether in the present case the evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution satisfy these tests. It transpires from the evidence of P.W.16, the doctor that on 11.10.1985 he conducted autopsy over the dead body of deceased Tova Sahu, wife of the present accused-Respondent and found the following external injuries : (i) lacerated injury of size 2" X 1.1/2" on the right side of the face extending over the cheek and eye of right side, (ii) lacerated injury of size 1/2" X 1/2" on the nose, (iii) lacerated injury of size 1/2" X 1/2" on the nose, by the side of injury no.(ii), (iv) extensive lacerated injury 6" X 4" beginning from chin to manubrium sternil on the anterior side of the chest and neck, on which epithelial layer was peeled off, (v) both the ear lobes were found torn off, (vi) two old injuries 1/2" X 1/2", size 2" below the right elbow and 2" above the right wrist. On dissection he noted the following : (i) subcutaneous blood clots were present, (ii) the mandible was fractured into three pieces of which the middle piece was about 2" long to which the incise tooth was attached, (iii) on opening the cranial fossa, membranes were found congested and the brain matters normal. Here was blood clot of about 50 Ccs. in anterior cranial fossa near the right orbit in between meninges and brain matter, (iv) the mouth & pharynx were found to have contained some amount of clotted blood, (v) trachea and larynx were congested and contained some amount of blood and frothy matters, (vi) stomach was found containing 10 C.C. of blackish fluid only, (vii) lungs were congested, (viii) left chamber of the heart was empty, but right changer was full of unclotted blood, (ix) liver, spleen, kidney were all pale, (x) uterus was normal and empty, (xi) the ear lobes were peeled off As per his evidence, except the two injuries found in the ear lobes all other injuries were ante mortem and sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature. He opined that the cause of death of the deceased was due to shock and intracranial haemorrhage inside anterior carnial fossa and flatly denied the suggestion that it was due to fall. The defence did not seriously challenge the homicidal death of the deceased, so the trial Court rightly held that the deceased died a homicidal death. 7. It transpires from the evidence of P.W.1, the father of the deceased that once when he visited the house of accused-Respondent, his father, the co-accused (since dead) told him that his son (accused-Respondent) was very often assaulting the de¬ceased and torturing her as he (P.W.1) failed to give a gold ring and one radio towards dowry. In another occasion, as per local custom when P.W.1 had been to the house of accused-Respondent with ‘SADA’ since the deceased was in the family way, the de¬ceased told him that the present accused-Respondent was assault¬ing her due to non-fulfilment of demand of one gold ring and a radio towards dowry. It further transpires from the evidence of P.W.1 that some days thereafter he told Sankar Sahu, P.W.4, a co-villager of the accused-Respondent to request the latter not to assault the deceased. But it is found from the evidence of P.W.18, the I.O. that he had not stated all these before the A.S.I. while he was enquiring into the U.D. case. P.W.4 also did not support the evidence of P.W.1 that the latter told him to request the accused-Respondent not to assault the deceased. It transpires from the evidence of P.W.3, the mother of the deceased that six to seven days prior to the death of her daughter, when she had been to the house of her in-laws she disclosed before her crying that the accused-Respondent was assaulting her as one gold ring and a radio were not given to him as dowry and that she pacified the accused-Respondent saying they would invite him and his wife for ‘PUNEI KHIA’ during the ensuring KALI PUJA and at that time they would give him one gold ring and a radio. But she fairly admitted that she had not stated before the I.O. while being examined under Section 161 Cr.P.C. about pacifying the accused-Respondent by stating that they would give one gold ring and a radio when he would go with his wife to her house during KALI PUJA. But she fairly admitted that she had not stated before the I.O. while being examined under Section 161 Cr.P.C. about pacifying the accused-Respondent by stating that they would give one gold ring and a radio when he would go with his wife to her house during KALI PUJA. So this part of her evidence cannot be relied upon. It transpires from the spot map that Ratha Muduli and Natha Muduli are the immediate neighbourers of the accused-Respondent, but neither of them has been examined in this case. It further tran¬spires from the evidence of P.W.11 that Maheswar Sahu, the broth¬er-in-law of the deceased is a co-villager of the accused-Respondent. If in fact the accused-Respondent was very often assaulting the deceased for non-fulfilment of demand of dowry, the latter was expected to disclose the same to her brother-in-law, but he has also not been examined. As stated earlier, P.W.1 had not stated about the torture said to have meted out by the accused-Respondent to the deceased while he was being examined under Section 161 Cr.P.C. by the A.S.I. in the U.D. case. P.W.4 did not support the evidence of P.W.1 that he asked him to re¬quest the accused-Respondent not to assault the deceased. P.W.3 also had not stated before the I.O. about consoling the accused-Respondent not to assault the deceased and assuring him to give the gold ring and radio during the time of PUNEI KHIA. It is also found from the evidence of P.W.1 that he was present in the house of the accused-respondent by the time inquest over the dead body was held. If in fact he had known that the accused-Respondent was very often assaulting the deceased, most likely he would have suspected that she was killed and would have brought it to the notice of the I.O., but he had not done so. The newly married daughter of P.Ws.1 and 3 suffered untimely homicidal death. So they were expected to be annoyed with the accused-Respondent and his father in whose house she expired. The possibility that they falsely tried to rope the accused-Respondent for the offence under Section 498-A of I.P.C., besides other offences cannot be ruled out, particularly when none of the co-villagers of the accused-Respondent including Moheswar, another son-in-law of P.Ws.1 and 3 deposed against him regarding any harassment to the deceased. The possibility that they falsely tried to rope the accused-Respondent for the offence under Section 498-A of I.P.C., besides other offences cannot be ruled out, particularly when none of the co-villagers of the accused-Respondent including Moheswar, another son-in-law of P.Ws.1 and 3 deposed against him regarding any harassment to the deceased. Hence, the trial Court rightly held that it was not proved to the hilt that the deceased was being tortured by the accused-Respondent because of non-fulfilment of demand of dowry. 8. As regards the statement of the accused-Respondent before P.Ws. 10 and 18, leading to the fact of discovery of the alleged weapon of offence (M.O.III), It appears from the evidence of P.W.18 that on 26.10.1985 while the accused-Respondent was in police custody, led him and P.W.10 to his backyard and showed a stone which was lying there, stating that he killed the deceased with that stone and accordingly it was seized under seizure list Ext.4. On the other hand, it transpires from the evidence of P.W.10 that on the same date while in police custody the accused-Respondent confessed to have assaulted his wife with a stone and when the police Officer enquired as to where he kept it, he went to the backyard of his house and picked up one stone after another from a heap of stones and showed the last stone to the I.O. saying that he assaulted his wife with that stone. During cross-examination it was elicited from P.W.10 that at the first instance the accused-Respondent told before himself and P.W.18 that the deceased fell down over a heap of stones and died. Since P.W.18 did not believe it, he persuaded the accused-Respondent to say the truth, so that he would be let off. Then only he con¬fessed his guilt as stated earlier. 9. Confession made by an accused before a Police Officer whether while in custody or not is not admissible under Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. But Section 27 of the said Act is an exception to it, which reads as follows : “Sec.27. Then only he con¬fessed his guilt as stated earlier. 9. Confession made by an accused before a Police Officer whether while in custody or not is not admissible under Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. But Section 27 of the said Act is an exception to it, which reads as follows : “Sec.27. How much of information received from accused may be proved - Provided that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a Police Officer, so much of such information whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact there by discovered, may be proved.” Though this Section is an independent Section, it opens in the manner of a proviso to Section 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. As per this Section if an accused while in police custody gives a statement, even by way of confession which distinctly relates to the fact discovered, is admissible as evidence against the ac¬cused. The information given by the accused must lead to the discovery of the fact. In the case at hand as found from the evidence of P.W.18 after the last stone was picked up by the accused-Respondent he confessed to have killed his wife with it. His statement before the I.O. did not lead to the discovery of M.O.III. Furthermore, the evidence of P.W.10 contradicts this part of evidence of P.W.18 in material particulars. The evidence of P.W.10 also does not depict that on the basis of the statement of the accused-Respondent the fact that the latter had concealed the stone (M.O.III) in his backyard was discovered. Moreover, as found from the Serologist’s report no blood stain was found with M.O.-III. So seizure of it would in no way improve the prosecution case. Admittedly two post-mortem injuries were found on both the ear lobes of the deceased. It is also an admitted fact that two ear-rings belonging to the deceased have been seized in connection with this case. So in view of the post mortem report, it appears that after the death of the deceased the accused-Respondent or any other member of his family pulled out the same, causing injury on the ear lobes. This part of evidence also can not strengthen the prosecution case. 10. So in view of the post mortem report, it appears that after the death of the deceased the accused-Respondent or any other member of his family pulled out the same, causing injury on the ear lobes. This part of evidence also can not strengthen the prosecution case. 10. It is found from the evidence of P.W.12 that on the succeeding morning of the alleged incident when he went to the house of the accused-Respondent, the latter was found absent since he had been to watch the sugar cane crops, about two miles away from his house. This part of his evidence has not been challenged by the prosecution. So it cannot be said that the ac¬cused-Respondent was not absent in his house in the night of occurrence. As stated earlier, it was the defence plea that being attacked by epileptic fit, the deceased fell down over a heap of stones, received injuries and expired, while in fact she died a homicidal death. It is also the positive evidence of the doctor, P.W.16 that the death of the deceased was not due to fall. So the plea that deceased died due to fall is found to be false, but the plea that the deceased was suffering from AKASHMARI BATA (epilep¬sy) is supported by P.W.12. So this part of defence plea cannot be said to be false. Furthermore, as stated earlier, according to P.W.-12, accused-Respondent had gone to watch his sugar cane crops in the night of occurrence. If is so, he cannot say about the cause of death of the deceased. He stated in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that on the next date of occurrence he came to know that the deceased died because of falling down over a heap of stones being attacked by epileptic fit. It appears that he heard about the manner of death of the deceased from others, most likely from his father (since dead). So, it can not be positively said that knowing fully well that the deceased was murdered, he took the false plea that she died on falling down over a heap of stones. Moreover, falsity of the defence plea cannot take the place of proof of the prosecution case. Such a plea by the defence can at best be considered as an additional circumstance against the accused, provided other circumstances unerringly point to his guilt. Moreover, falsity of the defence plea cannot take the place of proof of the prosecution case. Such a plea by the defence can at best be considered as an additional circumstance against the accused, provided other circumstances unerringly point to his guilt. In the present case the circum¬stances adduced in evidence by the prosecution are not sufficient to prove that the accused-Respondent or the co-accused since dead and none else was the perpetrator of the crime in question. 11. As held by the trial Court, from the facts and circum¬stances of the case it appears that the accused might have killed the deceased, but there is a long gap between might have and must have. It is the duty of the prosecution to bridge that gap, but it failed there. In an appeal against acquittal, it is to be seen as to whether the finding recorded by the trial Court is reasona¬bly possible. Even if another view can be taken, the finding of the trial Court ought not to be interfered with, if it is a plausible one. The trial Court has acquitted the accused-Respon¬dent on benefit of doubt which is based on sound reasonings. Accordingly, we do not find any ground to interfere with the finding of the trial Court and as such the appeal stands dis¬missed. The bail bonds furnished on behalf of the accused-Respondent be cancelled. P. K. MOHANTY, J. I agree. Appeal dismissed.