Honble RATHORE, J.–The petitioner preferred a writ petition which was registered as S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4618/99 seeking writ order or direction to quash and set aside the order dated 7.4.97 and 20.5.99 and further prayed that the Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur be directed to examine the application filed by the petitioner company under section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 on merits in relation to the enquiry on the basis of which the workman was dismissed from service vide order dated 8.4.92. (2). The writ petition was dismissed vide order dated 19.8.2002. While dismissing the writ petition, the learned Single Judge observed that the learned Industrial Tribunal in the order dated May 20, 1999 was of the view that the Tribunal had no power to review the earlier order and since the petitioner indirectly sought the review of the order dated April 7, 1997 after an inordinate delay, the application of the petitioner dated January 8, 1999 deserved to be dismissed. As held by the Division Bench of this court in the case ``K.C. Bajaj vs. State of Rajasthan 2001 (3) RLR 120 = (RLW 2001(3) Raj. 1794) that ``Tribunal being quasi judicial authority has no inherent power to review its earlier judgment unless the earlier judgment is ex parte.. And without interfering with the observation made by the learned Tribunal dismissed the writ petition being devoid of merit vide judgment dated 19.8.02. (3). The appellant petitioner preferred this D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1006/02 against the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 19.8.2002 as well as against the award dated 7.4.97 and 20.5.99. It is not disputed that the services of the respondent No. 2 were terminated with effect from 8.8.81 on account of failure of conciliation proceedings the matter was preferred to the Labour Court. The Labour Court Vide award dated 1.8.85 reinstated the respondent No. 2 with back wages. (4). The award dated 1.8.85 is challenged by the petitioner before this court in the writ petition bearing SB Civil Writ Petition No. 2130/85 wherein this court passed interim order dated 29.1.86 by which it was ordered to reinstate the respondent No. 2 with effect from 19.2.86 with 50% back wages. Pursuant to the interim direction issued by the learned Single Judge, the petitioner was reinstated with 50% back wages and in lieu of 50% Rs. 18,146/- was paid to the respondent No. 2. (5). Pursuant to the interim direction issued by the learned Single Judge, the petitioner was reinstated with 50% back wages and in lieu of 50% Rs. 18,146/- was paid to the respondent No. 2. (5). During the pendency of the aforesaid writ petition, the respondent No. 2 committed a grave misconduct in discharge of his duties, hence the employee was served with two charge sheets dated 2.6.90 and 8.6.90 and after holding the regular enquiry and after observing the principle of natural justice, the Enquiry Officer in enquiry report found the charge proved against the employee and on the basis of finding given by the enquiry officer, the services of the petitioner were dismissed vide order dated 8.4.92 and after passing the order of dismissal an approval application was filed under section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. (6). Learned Single Bench in writ petition No. 2130/85 vide judgment dated 13.5.93 allowed the writ petition and set aside the award dated 1.8.85 and the case was remanded back to the Labour Court for fresh adjudication in the light of observation made by the court. (7). Pursuant to the judgment dated 13.5.93 passed by the learned single bench in the writ petition No. 2130/85, the petitioner moved an application on 22.6.93 mentioning therein that since the award dated 1.8.85 has been set aside by the High Court, the application stands infructuous and no further action required in the matter. (8). The labour court vide its award dated 21.4.94 passed the reinstatement order of the respondent No. 2 with full back wages. Immediately after the award was passed in favour of the respondent No. 2, the petitioner moved a restoration application on 9.5.94 restoring the application filed under section 33(2)(b) and the labour Court on 30.10.94 rejected the application of the petitioner for restoration. An application was also filed by the respondent No. 2 on 28.7.95 for restoration of the case. The restoration application filed by the respondent No. 2 was accepted vide order dated 15.11.96 and fixed for fairness of enquiry. (9). The award passed by the labour court dated 21.4.94 was challenged by the petitioner by way of filing writ petition No. 4127/94. The respondent No. 2 also challenged the award passed by the labour court by way of another writ petition registered as SB Civil Writ Petition No. 2860/95. (9). The award passed by the labour court dated 21.4.94 was challenged by the petitioner by way of filing writ petition No. 4127/94. The respondent No. 2 also challenged the award passed by the labour court by way of another writ petition registered as SB Civil Writ Petition No. 2860/95. In the writ petition filed by the petitioner, learned Single Judge pleased to stay the operation of the award vide its interim order dated 1.8.94 and both the writ petitions were heard together and observed finally vide order dated 20.3.97 that there was violation of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act and thus the workman employee should be reinstated. (10). The petitioner also preferred a review petition against the final order passed in DB Special Appeal decided on 8.11.01 by which the services of respondent No. 2 reinstated with back wages. And review petition filed by the petitioner also stands dismissed by the Division Bench vide judgment dated 22.1.04. (11). The judgment passed by the learned Single Judge is challenged by the petitioner on the ground that the learned single judge has not discussed the issue involved in the matter. The issue involved in the matter was altogether different than the issue decided by Honble the Supreme Court relied by the learned single judge. (12). Further submits that as per the verdict of Honble Supreme Court if the approval application is rejected then consequence of the same is to reinstate the employee after treating the order of dismissal as illegal and nullified. In the present matter the issue involved was quite different in as much the appellant- petitioner had in fact challenged the dismissal of the approval application without considering the same on merit and without considering provisions of section 33(2)(b). (13). The petitioner preferred a Special Leave to Appeal before Honble the Supreme Court against the judgment passed by the Division Bench in review petitions No. 2255 and 2275 of 2002 dated 22.1.04 arising in D.B. Special Appeal Nos. 589 and 591 of 1997 decided on 8.11.2001. (14). Honble the Supreme Court held as under:– ``As the present litigation has acquired chequered history with several proceedings pending, it would be necessary to set out the few relevant facts which are necessary to adjudicate upon the controversy raised in these appeals. 589 and 591 of 1997 decided on 8.11.2001. (14). Honble the Supreme Court held as under:– ``As the present litigation has acquired chequered history with several proceedings pending, it would be necessary to set out the few relevant facts which are necessary to adjudicate upon the controversy raised in these appeals. Services of Shri Shankar Lal Sharma, (the respondent herein) who was employed as workman with the appellant company since 19.9.1977 were terminated with effect from 8.8.1981. The respondent raised an industrial dispute against the action of the appellant. The matter was taken up by the Conciliation Officer- cum-Joint Labour Commissioner, Jaipur to conciliation but the parties failed to arrive at a settlement. The Conciliation Officer submitted failure report to the State Government on 23.2.1982. The State Government in exercise of powers conferred upon it under Section 10(1) of the Act made a reference of the dispute to the Labour Court, Jaipur for adjudication. The respondent filed his statement of claim on 3.12.1982 and challenged the legality of termination of his services on the ground of violation of Section 25-F and 25-F of the Act and also on the ground that fresh hands were employed subsequently without complying with the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Appellant in its reply pleaded that the workman was engaged as a casual labour to do the temporary work after recovery of his accident. He was again recruited on 11.12.1980 on temporary basis and was employed for the last time between 29.5.1981 to 8.8.1981 on temporary basis. After the expiry of the period of temporary employment on 8.8.1981 his services were terminated as no work was available with the employer and that the respondent did not opt to come forward to join when fresh appointments were made by the appellant. It was also pleaded that the respondent had not completed the period of 240 days of service immediately preceding the date of termination of his service i.e., 8.8.1981 and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F, 25-F and 250H of the Act were attracted in the case. The Labour Court on the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties and after affording due opportunity of hearing to them passed its award on 1.8.1985. The Labour Court declared the termination of the services of the respondent as illegal and unjustified and ordered his re-instatement with consequential benefits. The Labour Court on the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties and after affording due opportunity of hearing to them passed its award on 1.8.1985. The Labour Court declared the termination of the services of the respondent as illegal and unjustified and ordered his re-instatement with consequential benefits. This award was challenged by the appellant-company by filing S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2130 of 1989 which was ultimately allowed on 13.5.1993 and the award of the Labour Court dated 1.8.1985 was set aside and the matter was remitted back to the Labour Court for a fresh decision within a period of six months in the light of the observations made in the judgment. Since no stay was granted on the order of re-instatement and payment of 50% back wages, the appellant company re-employed the respondent on 19.2.1986 in terms of the award dated 1.8.1985 passed by the Labour Court, Jaipur. During the pendency of the writ petition, on 2.6.1990 the respondent was placed under suspension for subsequent gross misconduct and was charge sheeted for the same. After holding departmental enquiry and giving due opportunity to the respondent, he was ordered to be dismissed from service on 8.4.1992. But as the dispute was pending adjudication before the Labour Court, the appellant made an application under Section 33(2) of the Act before the industrial tribunal for approval of action of the dismissal of respondent proposed to be taken by the appellant. This application was dismissed on 6.11.1993 as having become infructuous in view of the judgment of the Single Judge dated 13.5.1993 setting aside the award dated 1.8.1985. After the fresh award made by the labour court on 21.04.1994 in view of the remand of the case by the High Court, the appellant filed an application for revival of its application filed under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act seeking approval of the subsequent dismissal of the respondent on 8.4.1992. This application was dismissed by the industrial tribunal on 7.4.1997. In compliance to the directions of the Single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2130 of 1985 the Labour Court after hearing the parties and on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence available on record passed the award on 21.4.1994 declaring the termination of the service of the respondent as illegal and unjustified. In compliance to the directions of the Single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2130 of 1985 the Labour Court after hearing the parties and on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence available on record passed the award on 21.4.1994 declaring the termination of the service of the respondent as illegal and unjustified. This award was challenged by both the parties i.e., the appellant by filing S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4127 of 1994 and by the respondent by filing S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2860 of 1995. Both these petitions were heard and decided by a Single Judge. The Single Judge vide its judgment dated 20.3.1997 disposed of the writ petition by observing thus:– ``I am of the considered view that in the facts and circumstances of the case, there was a genuine mis-appreciation on the part of the Judge, Labour Court in not having made a proper computation as regards the period of continuity in service within the meaning of Sec. 25-F of the Act and on this score, the matter should go back before the Labour Court. Labour Court is further to appreciate whether it went beyond its scope of jurisdiction in deliberating on the question that interviews were taken after 8.8.1981 in respect of juniors to the present workman Shanker Lal, and whether he should be deemed to be a permanent workman within the meaning of law. As the matter stands now, I am of the considered view that the petitioner should be deemed to be in continuous service. On the question of the subsequent termination of his service, no formal approval having been taken within the meaning of Sec. 33 (2)(b) of the Act, the net effect is that he continues in service and the subsequent order of termination of his services would not be deemed to be operative. While the final decision is to be arrived at by the Labour Court again on these two specified questions. I would make it clear that the petitioner Shanker Lal would be deemed to be in continuous service and it would not be construed that the Award as made by the Labour Court as regards directing reinstatement of the workman Shanker Lal Sharma has in any manner been set aside or recalled. I would make it clear that the petitioner Shanker Lal would be deemed to be in continuous service and it would not be construed that the Award as made by the Labour Court as regards directing reinstatement of the workman Shanker Lal Sharma has in any manner been set aside or recalled. Since both the writ petitions were disposed of by the aforesaid common judgment, the appellant filed two special appeals against the aforesaid judgment. The special appeal No. 589 of 1997 was filed by the appellant against the decision of the Single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4127 of 1994 on the ground that the learned Single Judge had examined the factual aspect of the matter as if it was a court of appeal and the conclusion arrived at with regard to the number of days the workman had worked with the appellant company during 12 months immediately preceding his termination on 8.8.1981 was factually incorrect. It was prayed that the order of the Single Judge be set aside and the writ petition be allowed and the relief be granted in terms of the prayers made in the writ petition. Special Appeal No. 591 of 1997 was filed by the appellant against the decision of the Single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2860 of 1997 on the ground that the learned Single Judge had exceeded in the exercise of its jurisdiction I holding that the order of termination of the respondents services would be inoperative as formal approval under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act for subsequent dismissal had not been obtained. The Division Bench dismissed the Special Appeal No. 589 of 1997 by observing that the Single Judge could examine the factual aspect of the matter on the basis of the evidence available and upheld the order of remand passed by the Single Judge to ascertain as to whether the workman had completed 240 days of service or not. The learned counsel for the appellant does not challenge this finding of the Division Bench. The learned counsel for the appellant does not challenge this finding of the Division Bench. The Division Bench dismissed the Special Appeal No. 591 of 1997 as well and rejected the contention advanced on behalf of the appellant that the Single Judge had exceeded in the exercise of his jurisdiction that the subsequent dismissal of the respondent on 8.4.1992 will be inoperative because of the lack of formal approval under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act for the subsequent dismissal. The appellant has filed the present appeals for setting aside the observations made by the Single Judge, reproduced in para 5 of the judgment, and its affirmation by the Division Bench. The counsel appearing for the respondent-workman fairly concedes that the aforesaid observations made by the Single Judge as affirmed by the Division Bench did not arise in the present proceedings and therefore, unwarranted and uncalled for being obiter. He has no objection to the setting aside the above quoted observations made by the Single Judge as affirmed by the Division Bench. Accordingly, the above quoted observations made by the Single Judge in its order which have been later on affirmed by the Division Bench are set aside. Learned counsel for the appellant prayed that in view of the setting aside of these observations, the tribunal be directed to decide the application filed by the appellant for approval of the subsequent proceeding with regard to the subsequent dismissal afresh, we do not agree with this contention. The appellant filed an application before the tribunal on 8.1.1999 for fixing the date in application under Section 33(2) (b) of the Act pursuant to the tribunals order dated 7.4.1993 on the ground that the order of Single Judge had been stayed by the Division Bench. Tribunal dismissed the application filed by the appellant on the ground that the appellant was indirectly seeking review of its order dated 7.4.1997. Appellant being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the tribunal filed CWP No. 4618 of 1997. This writ petition was dismissed by the Single Judge on 19.8.2002. Aggrieved against the order passed by the Single Judge in CWP No. 4618 of 1997, the appellant has filed DBSAW No. 1006 of 2002 which is still pending. Appellant being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the tribunal filed CWP No. 4618 of 1997. This writ petition was dismissed by the Single Judge on 19.8.2002. Aggrieved against the order passed by the Single Judge in CWP No. 4618 of 1997, the appellant has filed DBSAW No. 1006 of 2002 which is still pending. The appellant would be at liberty to urge the point regarding the approval under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act to the subsequent dismissal of the respondent-workman in DBSAW No. 1006 of 2002. We agree in substance with the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant is entitled to get a decision on merits on the application filed by its under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act seeking approval on the subsequent action taken but for that we cannot send the case back to the industrial tribunal as the tribunal has already decided the said application and the matter is now pending for adjudication before the High Court in DBSAW No. 1006 of 2002. Remittance of the case to the tribunal would amount to deciding the matter pending before the High Court in DBSAW No. 1006 of 2002 which we refrain ourselves from doing. The Division Bench shall decide DBSAW No. 1006 of 2002 without being influenced by any of the observations made by the Single Judge, the Division Bench or by us regarding the approval to the application filed by the appellant under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act with regard to the subsequent dismissal of the respondent-workman. All contentions are left open to the parties in this regard. The Civil Appeals are allowed and the impugned judgment is set aside to the limited extent indicated in the judgment. No costs. And vide judgment dated 30.3.05 their Lordships of Honble Supreme Court have directed this Division Bench to decide the DBSAW No. 1006/02 without being influenced by any of the observations made by the Single Judge, the Division Bench or by us regarding the approval to the application filed by the appellant under section 33(2) (b) of the Act with regard to the subsequent dismissal of the respondent-workman and Honble Supreme Court also left open all contentions to the parties in this regard. (15). (15). After carefully examining the judgments passed by the learned single judge dated 19.8.02 and judgment passed by Honble the Supreme Court dated 30.3.05 and upon bare perusal of Section 33(2)(b) it reveals that during the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, the employer may, in accordance with standing orders applicable to a workman concerned in such dispute or where there are no such standing orders, in accordance with the terms of the contract, whether express or implied, between him and the workman for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, that workman: Provided that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer (16). Thus, approval under section 33(2)(b) is mandatory and the petitioner has moved the application for approval of action taken by the petitioner but since the reinstatement order was passed therefore in view of the award passed earlier the application so moved for seeking approval of action became infructuous and same was dismissed as infructuous. (17). Now subsequently, on account of misconduct the fresh enquiry was conducted for the alleged misconduct of the respondent workman and on the recommendation made by the enquiry officer, the services of the respondent was dismissed and again the employer required to seek approval of their action from the authority before which the proceeding is pending. Thus, in view of this and in view of the ratio decided by Honble the Supreme Court vide judgment dated 30.3.2005 passed in S.L.P. filed by the petitioner, we are of the view that the application moved on behalf of the petitioner for revival of earlier application seeking approval of the dismissal of the respondent workman from service should be revived and restored and should be decided strictly in accordance with the provisions of Section 33(2)(b) after giving opportunity of being heard to the parties concerned. (18). (18). Thus, in view of the observation made by the Honble Supreme Court in SLP filed by the petitioner vide judgment dated 30.3.05, we hereby quash and set aside the judgment dated 19.08.2002 passed by the learned single Judge and direct the Tribunal to restore the application filed by the petitioner under section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and hear the parties and decide the same strictly in accordance of the law. Since the matter is pending since long, it is expected from the Tribunal to decide the application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 expeditiously, but in any case not beyond the period of three months. (19). With these observations, the special appeal stands allowed.