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2006 DIGILAW 835 (RAJ)

Sulakhan Singh v. State of Rajasthan

2006-03-09

A.K.PUROHIT, M.D.KAURANI, R.B.PARMAR

body2006
Honble KAURANI, C.—Single Bench of this Board who heard Appeal /LR/71/2002/Hanumangarh arising out of the judgment of Revenue Appellate Authority, Hanumangarh dated 19.6.2002 has referred the following question for the opinion of the Larger Bench of the Board: "(1) What is the effect of Govt. Notification of dated 22.4.1991 (F4(27) Govt. Colonisation/84 on applicability of Sec. 13 & 13 A of the Rajasthan Colonisation Act, 1954? (2) Whether the decision of Division Bench of this Court Gurnel Singh vs. State, RBJ (ii) 2004 page 477 lays down the correct law? Whether permission of Distt. Collector is not required for transfer of Lands after State Government notification referred to above and lands transferred before dated 22.4.1991 compoundable or not. State Govt. extended time in this connection more than once". 2. The State Government through Tehsildar (Revenue) Hanumangarh initiated the proceedings u/Ss. 13 and 14 of the Rajasthan Colonisation Act, 1954 (in short the Act of 1954) against Akko widow of Vishnaram and Isra Ram son of Bhagu Ram before Addl. Collector, Hanumangarh with regard to sale of Agriculture land, Chak No. 5 M.O.D., Stone No. 79/274, Kila Nos. 15, 16, 17, 24 and 25 total 5 bighas land, without obtaining sanction from Collector. The Addl. Collector found that no action is required to be taken with regard to Kila No. 15 and for remaining 4 bighas land held that sale was by Harijan Akko who is Scheduled caste person, to a non-scheduled caste person and ordered to resume 4 bighas of the land by his order dated 31.3.2001. Aggrieved by this order an appeal was filed before R.A.A., Hanumangarh and the Revenue Appellate Authority, Hanumangarh vide his judgment dated 19.6.2002 rejected the appeal. Sulakhan Singh son of Isar Singh aggrieved with the judgment of Revenue Appellate Authority filed the second appeal before the Board, which was registered as Appeal/LR/71/2002/Hanumangarh. 3. The Single Member of the Board who heard the appeal felt that the important question of law referred in para No. 2 of this judgment are involved in the case for which the opinion of the larger bench is necessary to decide the appeal, consequently, he has framed above two questions referred to in the para No. 1 and requested Honble Chairman of the Board of Revenue to make reference to the Larger Bench to give opinion on these questions. Honble Chairman has constituted this Larger Bench to give opinion on these two questions. Hence, this reference came up for hearing and decision before us. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner Shri Brahamanand Sharma has contended that this reference is an incompetent reference because on the question of interpretation of Secs. 13 and 13-A of the Act of 1954 and with regard to the effect of government notification dated 22.4.1991, on these sections the Division Bench of this Court has in Gurnel Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, RBJ (ii) 2004 page 477 has already held that by issuing the notification dated 22.4.1991 Sec. 13(1) of the Act of 1954 has been deleted and since Sec. 13(1) of the Act of 1954 has been deleted, Sec. 13-A of the Act of 1954 will deem to have not been in existing in the statute from the beginning. He has further argued that Honble Rajasthan High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 73/2003, State of Rajasthan vs. Pritam Singh, by judgment dated 29.3.2005 has also decided the effect of notification dated 24.1.1991 vis-a-vis Sec. 13(1) of the Act of 1954 and has held that the land could not have been resumed u/S. 13(1) of the Act of 1954. In view of the above submissions Shri Brahamanand Sharma has urged that since legal position on above two questions in this reference made by learned Single Member is well settled, therefore, reference made by Single Member is not valid reference and is a incompetent reference. 5. Shri L.K. Pandya, advocate, addressing the 22.4.1991 the applicability of Sec. 13(1) of the Act of 1954 has been withdrawn and not deleted, therefore, for future sale made after issuing of the above notification dated 22.4.1991 no permission/sanction of the Collector is required for the area mentioned in the notification. 6. Shri P.S. Dashora, advocate, has also contended that by way of notification dated 22.4.1991 the application of Sec. 13(1) has been withdrawn and not deleted, therefore, judgment of the D.B. in Gurnel Singh vs. State reported in 2004(ii) RBJ page 477 is based on the basis of wrong assumption regarding the effect of notification on Secs. 13(1) and 13-A of the Act 1954. 7. 13(1) and 13-A of the Act 1954. 7. Shri Dunichand, Bhoop Singh and Vijay Soni, amicus curie, have also assisted this Court regarding the interpretation of notification dated 24.1.1991 as well as the correctness of D.B. Judgment of this reported in 2004(ii) RBJ page 477. 8. Shri J.P. Mathur, Govt. Advocate, has contended that the judgment of D.B., Gurnel Singh vs. State reported in RBJ (ii) 2004 page 477 of this Court is pre inquirium because it is against the express provisions of law and also because it is based on wrong assumption that Sec. 13(1) of the Act of 1954 has been deleted whereas by way of the notification dated 22.4.1991 applicability of provisions of Sec. 13(1) of the Act 1954 has been excluded from the area mentioned in the notification. He has further contended that in Division Bench in the judgment of Gurnel Singhs case has wrongly held that Sec. 13-A(1) will deem to have been not in existence in the Act because Sec. 13(1) has been deleted by the notification. 9. We have considered the arguments of learned counsel appeared on both sides as well as learned counsel who appeared and argued the case as amicus curie. 10. So far as the competence of the Single Member of the Board making this reference is concerned, Sec. 11 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 (in short "the Act of 1956") provides the provision for making reference which is as under: Section 11 : Power to refer to a Bench : The Chairman or any other Member of the Board Sitting singly for the disposal of any case or proceeding may, if he thinks fit, for reasons to be recorded in writing, refer any question of law or custom having the force of law or of the construction of any document arising before him in such case or proceeding, for the opinion of a Bench, and the case or proceeding shall be disposed of in accordance with such opinion. 11. (i) Bhala vs. Mst. Gulab Kanwar reported in 1977 RRD page 1 held as under: "Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, Sec. 11. R.T. Act Sec. 180(1)(b) Expl. 11. (i) Bhala vs. Mst. Gulab Kanwar reported in 1977 RRD page 1 held as under: "Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, Sec. 11. R.T. Act Sec. 180(1)(b) Expl. Division Bench whose reference, already answered by five Members Bench, bound to decide case in accordance with opinion provided to it and D.B. cannot request for reconsideration of opinion of five Members Bench in same case — Earlier pronouncement when reviewed on its own motion by 7 Member Bench." (ii) Ali Sher Khan vs. State of Rajasthan, 1986 RRD page 731 held as under: "Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, Sec. 11 — Reference by Single Bench to Larger Bench for opinion on hypothetical questions — Held, not maintainable and not to be answered — Ref. misconceived and called for no answer. Apparent conflict of decisions between 1978 RRD 422 and 1981 RRD 133 and as such needed reconsideration by Larger Bench, Single Bench referred two questions for its opinion, (a) whether law laid down in 1978 RRD page 422 that the holding of a wife, purchased by her without any assistance from her husband, is to be excluded from holdings of family and if so, (b) Whether the same will be applicable to holdings of wives of all assessees and therefore to Stridhan also, keeping in view Art. 15(1) of Constitution in supercession of decision in 1981 RRD 133. (iii) M/s. Pyarelal Lalchand vs. State reported in 1968 RRD page 589 held as under: "Reference by a Single Member u/S. 11 of Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 clearly authorised a Member who thinks that the opinion expressed by a Division Bench of the Board previously was according to him not correct, to refer any question of law for the opinion of a Larger Bench." 12. In view of the provisions of Sec. 11 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act and the cases law sited above this reference is quite competent and the Larger Bench of the Board has not previously given opinion on these grounds; hence this reference is maintainable. 13. To give opinion on the questions referred above, it is necessary for us to reproduce the provisions of Secs. 13. To give opinion on the questions referred above, it is necessary for us to reproduce the provisions of Secs. 13(1) and 13-A of the Colonisation Act, 1954 and notification dated 22.4.1991 : "Sec 13(1) — No tenant shall, without the previous consent in writing of the State Government or an officer of the State Government authorised by it in this behalf, to be given on the fulfilment of such conditions as may be prescribed, transfer his right or interest in land by way of sale, mortgage, exchange or gift or shall create thereon or shall sub-let the same for more than five years except by way of exchange under Sec. 12 or by way of mortgage or charge to be State Government or to a bank for the purpose of obtaining financial assistance from any of them." In Sec. 13(1) a proviso was added in the year 1988 to the effect that the State Government may exclude any area of class of tenant from operation of sub-sec. (1). Sec. 13-A was also included in the Act in the year 1984. "13-A — Validation of certain transfers and declaration of consent to transfer — (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sec. 13, or in any other provisions of this Act or in the rules made of statement of conditions issued thereunder, but subject to Sec. 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy act, 1955 (Rajasthan Act 3 of 1955), where any transfer in whom khatedari rights have vested by or under this Act in contravention of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 at any time before the commencement of the Rajasthan Colonisation (Amendment) Act, 1983, such transfer, sub-lease or charge may, on an application being made to the Collector in this behalf in such Form as may be prescribed and within 1 (1425 days of such commencement i.e. upto 30.6.1987) by the transferor, lessor or as the case may be, the person creating the charge or by the purported transferee, sub-lessee or, as the case may be, charge-holder or by any subsequent purported transferee, sub-lessee or, as the case may, charge-holder, be declared, after holding such enquiry as he deems proper, as valid by him subject to any of such persons as aforesaid making payment of the State Government, in the case of irrigated land or an amount of Rs. 20,000/- per 25 bighas and in the case of barani or uncommand land of an amount of Rs. 4,000/- per 25 bighas or of an amount equal to the allotment price of the land prescribed by the State Government in the statement of conditions issued under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 7 or any rule made under this Act in force on such commencement." 14. The Notification dated 22.4.1991 is also issued by the State Government is also reproduced hereunder: ^^jktLFkku mifuosku vf/kfu;e] 1954 ¼1954 dk jktLFkku vf/kfu;e la- 27½ dh /kkjk dh mi/kkjk 1 ds ijUrqd }kjk ÁnÙk kfä;ksa dk Á;ksx djrs gq, bfUnjk xka/kh] Hkk[kjk rFkk xaxugj ifj;kstuk ds vUrxZr fLFkr mu {ks=ksa dks ftu ij le; le; ij mä vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 2 ds mi[k.M ds vUrxZr dh /kkjk 13 dh mi/kkjk ds ÁorZu ls vioftZr djrh gSA** 2- /kkjk ¼1½ ds mYya?ku esa fd;k x;k dksbZ vUrj.k ;k mi iêk ;k l`ftr dksbZ Hkkj kwU; gksxk vkSj ;fn vUrfrjrh mi iêk/kkjh us ;k ;FkkfLFkfr Hkkfjr Hkwfe ;k mlds fdlh Hkkx dk dCtk vfHkÁkIr dj fy;k gS rks og mls rFkk vUrjdrkZ dks lquokbZ dk volj ns fn;s tkus ds ipkr~ dyDVj ds vknsk ds v/khu mlls csn[ky fd;s tkus dk nk;h gksxk vkSj ,slh Hkwfe dyDVj }kjk jkT; ljdkj ds Áfr iquxzfgr dh yh tk;sxhA 15. Sec. 2(ii) of the Rajasthan Colonisation Act, 1954 provides the definition of the colony, which reads as under: 2(ii) "Colony means any area to which this Act shall, by notification in the official gazette be applied by an order of the State Government, or in respect of minor irrigation projects, by an order of the Collector authorised by the State Government in this behalf. 16. On perusing the sections referred above, it is clear that Sec. 2(ii) provides definition of a colony which means that an area to which this Act by notification in official gazette applied by an order of the State Government in respect of minor irrigation projects, by a order of Collector authorised by the State in this behalf and Sec. 3 of the Act makes provisions that the Act will apply to the colony and the agricultural lands situated in colony area are governed by the provisions of this Act and the conditions for all purposes without any distinction. The Board of Revenue in Dhokal Ram and Ors. The Board of Revenue in Dhokal Ram and Ors. vs. Board of Revenue reported in 1986 RRD 372 discussed and explained the application of this Act in the Colony Area. Section 4 of the Act gives power to the State Government to withdraw a colony from operations of all Acts. 17. Sec. 13(1) of the Act of 1954 provides that without previous consent in writing by the State Government or an officer of the State authorised by it in this behalf no tenant shall transfer his rights, interest in the land by way sale, mortgage, exchange, gift or shall agree thereon or shall sublet the same for more than 5 years except by way of exchange u/S. 12 or way of mortgage or charge to the State Government or the Bank for the purpose of obtaining financial assistance from any of them. Sec. 13(1) of the Act of 1954 restricts the transfer by way of sale, mortgage, exchange or gift by a tenant without previous consent of the State Government or the officer authorised by the State Government. 18. Sec. 14 of the Act of 1954 provides penalty for the breach of the conditions. In case any sale, mortgage, exchange or gift has been made by a tenant without previous consent of the authorities mentioned Sec. 13(1) of the Act 1954, Sec. 14 of the Act of 1954 provides that a penalty will be imposed or the order of resumption of the tenancy can be passed. 19. In cases in which the tenants made transfers of the land in the colony area by sale, mortgage, exchange or gift without such previous sanction of the authorities mentioned in Sec. 13(1) of the Act of 1954 to save them from the penalty of resumption of tenancy the Act was amended and Sec. 13-A of the Act of 1954 was introduced which provides for validation of certain transfers and declaration of consent to transfer subject to payment of certain amount as compounding charges and penalty mentioned in Sec. 13-A of the Act of 1954 at different kinds of land. 20. 20. Sec. 13-A of the Act of 1954 provides that notwithstanding anything contains in Sec. 13 of the Act of 1954 or other provisions of the Act subject to Sec. 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, where a transfer of khatedari rights has been made in contravention of Sec. 13(1) of the Act of 1954 the affected person has been authorised in this section to file an application within a time prescribed in this section to file an application within a time prescribed in this section on making payment of amount mentioned in this section for various kinds of land such as irrigated or Barani, the tenancy of the land will not be resumed. In Sec. 13-A(1)(a) was further added which provides similar relaxation to the tenants who transferred land, which provided that the allottee to whom khatedari have not been vested even after 7 years of allotment even if they have transferred the land the similar relaxation has provided under Sec. 13-A(1) of the Act of 1954 will be applicable to them also. Sec. 13(1) of the Act of 1954 was further amended in the year 1988 and a proviso was added providing the power to the State Government to exclude any area to class of tenants from operation of sub-sec. (1). 21. The State Government exercising this power given in proviso of Sec. 13(1) of the Act of 1954 issued notification dated 22.4.1991 for the area of Indira Gandhi Canal, Bhakhra and Gang Nagar Projects from the applicability of Sec. 13(1) of the Act of 1954. The State Government by exercising the power conferred to it under proviso to Sec. 13(1) issued notification dated 22.4.1991 excluding the area of Indira Gandhi, Bhakhra, Gang Nagar projects from applicability of Sec. 13(1) of the Act of 1954. It is relevant to mentioned here that a similar notification issued by the State Government by exercising power conferred to it under proviso to Sec. 13(1) issued Notification dated 24.1.1990 excluding the area of Mahi, Chambal and Jawai project from the applicability of Sec. 13(1) of the Act of 1954. It is relevant to mentioned here that a similar notification issued by the State Government by exercising power conferred to it under proviso to Sec. 13(1) issued Notification dated 24.1.1990 excluding the area of Mahi, Chambal and Jawai project from the applicability of Sec. 13(1) of the Act of 1954. This Notification dated 24.1.1990 is reproduced as under: ^^jktLFkku mifuosku vf/kfu;e] 1954 ¼1954 dk jktLFkku vf/kfu;e la- 27½ dh /kkjk 13 dh mi/kkjk 1 ds ijUrqd }kjk ÁnÙk kfä;ksa dk Á;ksx djrs gq, ekgh] pEcy ,oa tokbZ ifj;kstuk ds vUrxZr fLFkr mu {ks=ksa dks ftu ij le; le; ij mä vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 2 ds mi[k.M II ds vUrxZr mä vf/kfu;e dks ykxw fd;k gS] jkT; ljdkj ,rn~}kjk mä vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 13 dh mi/kkjk 1 ds ÁorZu ls vioftZr djrh gSA** 22. The only different in Notification dated 22.4.91 and 24.1.1990 is with regard to the area for which these notifications are applicable. 23. The scope of Secs. 13, 13-A and 13(1) of the Act of 1954 came up for consideration before the Board of Revenue in case of Pritam Singh and Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in 2002 RRD page 654. In that case learned Single Member of the Board held that by issuing notification dated 24.1.1990 the provisions of Sec. 13(1) of the Act of 1954 has been withdrawn and also relying on the judgment reported in 2002 RRD 92, learned Single Member of the Board held that the State Government has "deleted" Sec. 13(1) of the Act of 1954 by way of Notification dated 24.1.1990 (Although in that case) the amount of penalty required under proviso to 13-A was already deposited by the petitioner, the Board in that case held that resumption of tenancy and eviction order is bad. 24. Against the judgment of the Board of Revenue in Pritam Singhs case, S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 73/2003 was filed before the Honble and Honble High Court by its judgment dated 19.3.2005 dismissed this writ petition of the State Government. The photocopy of the certified copy of the judgment dated 19.3.2005 has been submitted before us. 24. Against the judgment of the Board of Revenue in Pritam Singhs case, S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 73/2003 was filed before the Honble and Honble High Court by its judgment dated 19.3.2005 dismissed this writ petition of the State Government. The photocopy of the certified copy of the judgment dated 19.3.2005 has been submitted before us. We perused this judgment dated 19.3.2005 passed by Honble High Court and in para No. 2 of the judgment Honble High Court has observed as under: "Without going into the effect of the notification dated 24.1.1990, it is suffice to say that the land which was allotted in the year 1962 and alleged to have been sold in the year 1966 and which could have been sold with the prior permission of the State Government and the subsequent purchaser have deposited the required amount vice Challan No. 3953 dated 28.3.1989 (Rs. 2,000/-), vide challan No. 4041 dated 29.3.1989 (Rs. 2,610/-) and vide challan No. 795 dated 29.12.1992 (Rs. 5,200/-), therefore, there appears to be no reason for dispossessing the persons, who are in possession of the property since such a long period. It will be worthwhile to mention here that according to learned counsel for the State also the condition of seeking prior permission before the Sale of the land itself has been withdrawn by the State in the year 1991. 25. Honble High Court while dismissing the writ petition has also observed that the State will free to recover any amount if due in respondent for land in question in accordance with law. 26. The learned counsel of the petitioner Mr. Brahmanand on the basis of this judgment of Honble High Court emphasized before us that the principle laid down by Board of Revenue in Pritam Singhs case reported in 2002 RRD page 654 has been affirmed by the Honble High Court by deciding writ petition No. 73/2003 by judgment dated 19.3.2005 and also contended that the doctrine of merger will be applicable and the principle laid down in 2002 RRD page 654 has been upheld by the Honble High Court by decision of the writ petition. In our view the Honble High Court while deciding the writ petition has given finding that by way of Notification dated 24.1.1990 the provisions of Sec. 13(1) of the Act of 1954 have been withdrawn by the State Government. In our view the Honble High Court while deciding the writ petition has given finding that by way of Notification dated 24.1.1990 the provisions of Sec. 13(1) of the Act of 1954 have been withdrawn by the State Government. Therefore, the land could not have been resumed u/S. 13(1) of the Act, however, Honble High Court has specifically observed that without going into the effect of Notification dated 24.1.1990 since the sale was prior to issue of notification, i.e., in the year 1966 and purchaser has deposited the requirement amount, therefore, there appears to be no reason for dispossessing the persons who are in possession of property since such a long period. 27. The finding of the Board of Revenue in Pritam Singhs case that "Sec. 13(1) of the Act of 1954 has been deleted" was not at all affirmed by the Honble High Court. 28. This controversy again came up for consideration before the Board of Revenue in Special Appeal/LR/104/2000 Gurmel Singh vs. State of Rajasthan and the Division Bench of the Board considered the scope of Secs. 13, 13(1) and 13-A(1) and relying on the previous judgment of the Board reported in 2002 RRD page 92 and page 654 again held that "Sec. 13(1) of the Act of 1954 has been deleted" by Notification dated 22.4.1991 and consequently Sec. 13-A(1) of the Act of 1954 has become ineffective from the date of its insertion and there is no justification in recovering the compound fee provided u/S. 13-A of the Act of 1954. 29. On the basis of forgoing discussions and after going through the relevant provisions of Secs. 13, 13-A and also after perusing the Notifica-tion dated 22.4.1991 it is crystal clear that by issuing the Notification dated 22.4.1991 the applicability of Sec. 13(1) was not "deleted" but it was "excluded" from the colony area of Indira Gandhi Canal, Bhakra and Gang Canal projects with prospective effect and not with retrospective effect. 30. The Board of Revenue in Pritam Singh case reported in 2002 RRD page 654 considered two Notifications dated 22.4.1991 and 24.1.1990 and held that on account of withdrawal of the provisions for eviction and penalties provided u/S. 13(1) of the Act of 1954 the State Government by these notifications has "deleted" Sec. 13(1) of the Act and held that there was no justification in the eviction order. We have considered the judgment of Honble High Court in writ petition filed against the judgment in Pritam Singhs case decided by the Board and the Honble High Court though upheld the judgment of the Board of Revenue but by observing that the liability of compounding fee (As provided u/S. 13-A) has already been filfilled by Pritam Singh, therefore, there was no justification in resumption of tenancy and eviction. The Honble High Court has not at all upheld the findings given by the learned Member to the effect that Sec. 13(1) of the Act of 1954 has been deleted. We are of the view that the finding of learned Single Member of the Board in Pritam Singhs case holding that Sec. 13(1) of the Act of 1954 has been deleted is incorrect finding based on misreading of the Notification dated 22.4.1991 and its effect on applicability of Sec. 13(1). 31. Notification dated 22.4.1991 is in Hindi and as reproduced above it provides that for the areas mentioned in this notification applicability of Sec. 13(1) is excluded and in Hindi word used is ^^ÁorZu ls vioftZr** . The legal Glossary issued by the Department of Land & Justice, Government of India in 1988 provides English translation of word ^^viotZu** as "exclusion" and ^^vioftZr djuk** as "excluded", whereas in Pritam Singhs case the word ^^vioftZr** has wrongly been understood to have meaning of deleted. The primary rule to all the general principle of interpretation is liberal construction. It is first and most elementary rule of construction that the words and phrases used in the legislation should be given their ordinary meaning and also phrases and sentences should be construed according to rules of grammar and nothing to be modified, altered or qualified the language which constitutes contents. It must be construed in ordinary natural manner of the words and sentences. The safer and more correct course of dealing with the question of construction is to take the words themselves arrive a possible on their meaning without in the first instance, reference to cases. The object of the interpretation is always to discover the intention of the legislature but such intention should be deduced from the language used the statute itself. Where the language used in the statute is plain and admits of but one meaning, the prescribed interpretation can hardly be said to arise. The object of the interpretation is always to discover the intention of the legislature but such intention should be deduced from the language used the statute itself. Where the language used in the statute is plain and admits of but one meaning, the prescribed interpretation can hardly be said to arise. "The decision in this case" said Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest in a revenue case, "Calls for a full and fair application of particular statutory language to particular facts as found. The desirability or the undersirability of one conclusion as compared with another cannot furnish a guide in reaching a decision." Shop and Store Developments Ltd. vs. I.R.C. (1967) 1 A.C. 472 per Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest at P. 493. Where by the use of clear and unequivocal language capable of only one meaning, anything is enacted by the legislature, it must be enforced however harsh or absurd or contrary to the common sense the result may be. The words are not to be construed contrary to their meaning, the duty of the Court as to expound the law as it stands, and to "leave the remedy (if one be resolved upon) to others. 32. In the case in our hands, in the Notification dated 22.4.1991 the word used is vioftZr which means excluded this word cannot be construed to mean delete on applying above principle this word cannot be considered to mean delete. 33. The general principle of interpretations provides that liberal construction of any word and phrase has to be interpreted as liberal construction an when the language used by the Legislature in a Act and also in the notification is plain then no other meaning to the word can be assigned. In this case there is no scope of applying the maxim UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT there cannot be two interpretations and meaning of the word vioftZr because this notification was issued only with the purpose that the provisions of Sec. 13(1) which apply to whole colony area requiring sanction of the State Government before sale, mortgage, exchange, gift to be excluded in a particular area mention in the notification and no where this notification either intend to delete the provision of Sec. 13-A of the Act of 1954 from the statute book nor it says that this notification will have retrospective effect. Otherwise also it is well-established principle of legislation that the provisions of an Act cannot be deleted by way of a simple notification by the State Government. If any provision in the Act requires to be deleted then it can be done only by way of amendment in the Act, whereas in the present case it was simply a notification by which the applicability of Sec. 13(1) of the Act of 1954 was excluded from the area mentioned in the notification and this was done certainly with the prospective effect and not with retrospective effect because the period provided u/S. 13-A of the Act of 1954 for applying to get validation of such transactions which were without sanction required u/S. 13(1) is prior to the issuing of this Notification dated 22.4.1991 Sec. 13-A of the Act of 1954 will be applicable and those transactions can only become valid on depositing the compounding fee and penalty required u/S. 13-A o the Act of 1954, whereas any transaction which is subsequent to the Notification dated 22.4.1991 in area mentioned in the notification the requirement of sanction of the State Government prior to such sale is not at all necessary and on those transactions u/S. 13-A of the Act of 1954 there is no requirement of paying compounding fee or penalty. 34. We have perused the judgment of Gurmel Singh vs. State of Rajasthan passed by the Division Bench of this Court and reported in 2004(2) RBJ page 477. In this judgment learned members of the Board have followed the principle laid down in 2002 RRD 92 and 654 Pritam Singh vs. State of Rajasthan. As we have already discussed and observed that the judgment of Single Member of the Board in Pritam Singhs case holding that Sec. 13(1) of the Act of 1954 has been deleted from the statute is not a correct conclusion because simple reading of Sec. 13(1) of the Act of 1954 and the Notification dated 22.4.1991 makes it clear that by way of Notification dated 22.4.1991 Sec. 13(1) of the Act of 1954 has not been deleted, the only effect the notification is that from the area mentioned in the notification the applicability of Sec. 13(1) of the Act of 1954 has been excluded from the date of issuing of notification. The Division Bench of the Board in Gurmel Singhs case has also referred the principle laid down by Honble High Court in 2002 RRD page 92 which provides that if any provision of the Act is deleted then it means that provision was never existed in the statute. Consequently the Division Bench of the Board has gone to the extent of holding that Sec. 13-A (1) of the Act of 1954 will also ineffective on account of such deletion of Sec. 13(1) of the Act of 1954. In our view the Division Bench of this Court has also misunderstood and has erred in giving finding that on account of Notification dated 22.4.1991 the provision of Sec. 13(1) has been deleted and this judgment of Division Bench is passed on presuming that Sec. 13(1) of the Act of 1954 has deleted which is wrong presumption, as we have observed and discussed above. Therefore, the judgment of the Division Bench is Gurmel Singh case does not lay down the correct law and cannot be a precedent, because any judgment which is in ignorance of law or expressly against the provisions of law is a judgment per in curium and a such cannot be a precedent to be followed. Learned members of the Division Bench decided Gurmel Singhs case on wrong assumption that by the Notification dated 22.4.1991 Sec. 13(1) was "deleted" whereas in fact by Notification dated 22.4.1991 the application of Sec. 13(1) of the Act of 1954 was "excluded" from the areas mentioned in the notification. 35. Series of judgment of Honble Supreme Court and Honble High Court, the principle of law regarding precedent, doctrine of merger and judgment per in curium has been considered which are reproduced as under: (i) AIR SC 1971/2313 : India Electric Words vs. Jamesn Mantosh (P) the Supreme Court of India held as under: "Precedents — Requirement of public interest should be considered in disturbing a question of law, which has held field for long time. "Though on the plain language of Sec. 14(1) of the Limitation Act, I would have had no hesitation in holding that the plaintiff cannot avail himself of the benefit of that provision, as a misconceived suit, such as the one he filed earlier claiming future mesne profits in a money suit cannot be said to be a claim which the Court was unable to entertain from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature yet in view of the decision of the Judicial Committee in Mst. Rance Surno Moyee vs. Shooshee Mokhee Burmonia, (1867-69) 12 Moo Ind App 244 which decision has been followed in the later decisions of the Judicial Committee as well as in several decisions of High Court, I am of the opinion that it is not in public interest to disturb a question of law which has held the field for a long time. The decision of the Judicial Committee referred to earlier held that a claim which is satisfied, an expression held t include even getting of a decree on a claim, if reopened because of the decree of the appellate Court or otherwise, a new cause of action accrues to the plaintiff on the date the earlier satisfaction is taken away. Applying that rule to the facts of the present case a new cause of action must be deemed to have accrued to the appellant in respect of the mesne profits under dispute once the decree of the trial was set aside by the High Court. For this reason I agree with the order proposed. (ii) AIR 1980 Karnataka 92 Full Bench Govindnaik G. Kalaghatigi, Petitioner vs. West Patent Press Co. Ltd. and another and considered law of precedence held as under : "Precedents — Two conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court — One given by larger Bench should be followed - (1974) I Kant IJ 344 (FB), Overruled. "If two decisions of the Supreme Court on a question of law cannot be reconciled and one of them is by a Larger Bench while the other is by a smaller Bench, the decision of the Larger Bench, whether it is earlier or later in point of time, should be followed by High Courts and other Courts. "If two decisions of the Supreme Court on a question of law cannot be reconciled and one of them is by a Larger Bench while the other is by a smaller Bench, the decision of the Larger Bench, whether it is earlier or later in point of time, should be followed by High Courts and other Courts. However, if both such Benches of the Supreme Court consist of equal number of Judges, the later of the two decisions should be followed by High Courts and other Courts." (iii) AIR 1976 Supreme Court 2433 : Union of India vs. Another, K.S. Subramaniam held as under: "Precedents — Duty of High Court to follow opinions expressed by Large Benches of Supreme Court. The proper course for a High Court is to try to find out and follow the opinions expressed by Larger Benches of the Supreme Court in preference to those expressed by small benches of the Court. That is the practice followed by the Supreme Court itself. The practice has now crystallized into a rule of law declared by the Supreme Court. That is the practice followed by the Supreme Court itself. The practice has now crystallized into a rule of law declared by the Supreme Court. If however, the High Court is of opinion that the views expressed by Larger Benches of the Supreme Court are not applicable to the facts of the case it say so giving reasons supporting its point of view." (iv) RRD 1978 page 1 State of Rajasthan vs. Gangaram & others held as under: "Precedents — Decision, given per incuriam in ignorance of terms of Statute — Effect — subordinate Court, bound to follow interpretation of law, made by High Court — Where decision of High Court given per incuriam overlooking specific provisions of Statute, it will not be binding to that extent since High Court cannot over ride intention of leg." (v) RLR 2000(1) Madan Lal Jat vs. State of Rajasthan & anothers held as under: "(a) Precedents : Reference to Larger Bench — When not competent Single Judge made reference to Larger Bench for reconsideration of judgment given by Full Bench (of three judges) in Dharampal Singhs case (2000(3) RLR 728) in view of Supreme Court judgment in Commissioner of Police vs. Dhaval Singh (1999) 1 SCC 246 ) — Held, reference made by Single Judge is not competent — Judgment delivered by Full Bench of High Court does not require any reconsideration on a reference being made by a Single Judge who is bound by the judgment of Full Bench — Reference can be made to Larger Bench for examining correctness of a judgment only by a Bench consisting of same number of Judges who delivered such judgment (Reference to Larger Bench - When not competent)". (vi) RLW 1996(2) Rajasthan page 210 : Dinesh Chandra Sharma vs. State of Rajasthan held as under: "Constitution of India, Art. 226, Precedent — Single Bench is bound by the decision of other Single Bench, otherwise to refer matter to Division Bench — Single Bench is bound by the decision of Division Bench — In case of two contrary views of the Division Bench, the later view will be followed provided earlier view was considered in the later decision — If the earlier decision was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench, the earlier Division Bench decision would not lost its binding force — Held — The petitioner is not entitle for any relief on the basis of the Division Bench decision — Writ petition dismissed." (vii) AIR 1967 All. 180 (V54 C 56) Premchandra and another vs. Dy. Director of Consolidation, Bara Banki and others held as under: "E) Civil P.C. 1908), Precedents — Same High Court — Division Bench — Single Judge cannot refuse to be bound by a Divisional Bench decision of the same High Court on the ground that an argument or provision was not noticed by the Bench." "Per M.C. Desai C.J.: No Court deals with every single argument advanced before it, regardless of merits, in its judgment. Certain arguments are left unnoticed on the ground that there is no force at all in them. A decision of a Bench on a certain question binds a Single Judge of the same High Court when he has to answer that question and he cannot refuse to be bound on the ground that a certain argument or a certain provision was not noticed by the Bench. A decision of a Bench on a certain question binds a Single Judge of the same High Court when he has to answer that question and he cannot refuse to be bound on the ground that a certain argument or a certain provision was not noticed by the Bench. If the Bench found that the provision was irrelevant a Single Judge cannot override that finding of the Bench and hold that there was force or relevancy and then refuse to be bound by it." (viii) 1987 RRD page 584 Shravan Singh vs. State of Rajasthan held as under: "(a) Rajasthan Land Revenue Act 9 & 11 — Constitution of India, Article 141 — Precedents — A Bench of Board can over rule decision of an earlier co-ordinate Bench on ground that earlier judgment did not take into account certain provisions of law if provisions ignored are so vital that judgment of earlier co-ordinate Bench can be said to per incuriam." (b) Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 9 & 11 — Constitution of India, Article 141 — Precedents — If earlier judgment was per incuriam it will not be a valid precedent to be followed — In any other case subordinate Courts will be free to choose between two conflicting decisions of Board given by co-ordinate Benches. (ix) AIR 1981 All. 300 Gopal Krishna vs. V. Addl. District Judge, Kanpur held as under: "(a) Constitution of India, Article 141— Precedents — Conflict between two decisions of Supreme Court given by Judges of equal strength — Decision of latter Bench is binding — Doctrine of per incuriam — Applicability — (Precedents - Doctrine of per incuriam). Para 19 "The Supreme Court has dealt with the binding nature of its pronouncements in a number of decisions it is not necessary to refer to those cases. In a case where a High Court finds any conflict between views expressed by larger and smaller Benches of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court said that proper course for such a High Court is to follow the opinion expressed by smaller Benches of the Court (See State of U.P. vs. Ram Chandra AIR 1976 SC 2547 )". (x) AIR 1974 SC (Pr. (x) AIR 1974 SC (Pr. I) Gojer Brothers vs. Ratan Lal held as under: "Where the decree of the trial Court is carried in appeal and the appellate Court dispose of the appeal after a contested hearing, the decree to be executed is the decree of the appellate Court and not of the trial Court. The reason for this rule is that in such cases the decree of the trial Court is merged in the decree of the appellate Court." (xi) In AIR 1986 SC 1780 Patna vs. Balakrishna IOC vs. State of Rajasthan & others it is held: "Constitution of India, Arts. 136 and 226 dismissal of special leave petition by Supreme Court by non-speaking order — No bar to trial of same issues in High Court u/A. 226. Decision of Patna High Court, reversed. The dismissal of a special leave petition in limine by a non-speaking order does not justify any interference that by necessary implication and contentions raised in the special leave petition on the merits of the case have been rejected by the Supreme Court. Neither on the principle of res judicata nor on any principle of public policy analogous thereto, would the order of the Supreme Court dismissing the special leave petition operate to bar the trial of identical issues in a separate proceeding namely, the writ proceeding before the High Court merely on the basis of an uncertain assumption that the issues must have been decided by the Supreme Court at least by implication. Decision of Patna High Court reversed. 36. In Shravan Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, 1987 RRD 584, it was held that it earlier judgment did not take into account certain provisions of law and if provisions are ignored are so vital that judgment can be said to be per in curium. 37. In the case of Gurmel Singh also, the express provisions contained in the Notification dated 22.4.1991 has been misunderstood to have effect of deletion of Sec. 13(1) which is incorrect because the notification only exclude the applicability of Sec. 13(1) and not delete the application of Sec. 13(1). 38. On the basis of foregoing discussions, on the questions referred to us, our opinion is that: (i) The effect of Government Notification dated 22.4.1991 (F 4(27) Govt. 38. On the basis of foregoing discussions, on the questions referred to us, our opinion is that: (i) The effect of Government Notification dated 22.4.1991 (F 4(27) Govt. Colonisation/84 on applicability of Sec. 13(1) is that the State Government by issuing above notification has excluded the area of Indira Gandhi Canal, Bhakra & Gang Nahar projects from applicability of Sec. 13(1) of Rajasthan Colonisation Act from the date of its issuance, and the tenants in that areas are not required to obtained previous consent in writing of the State Government or Collector as required in Sec. 13(1) of the Act of 1954 for the areas Indira Gandhi Canal, Bhakra and Gang Nahar Projects. Thus, this Notification dated 22.4.1991 has prospective effect. The effect of Government Notification dated 22.4.1991 on Secs. 13-A and 13-A(i)(A) of the Act of 1954 is that Notification dated 22.4.1991 having prospective effect, therefore, any transfer of the land which is prior to 22.4.1991, and such transfer is without consent required u/S. 13(1) of the Act of 1954, the provisions of Sec. 13-A or 13-A(i) of the Act of 1954 will be applicable to them. The date and time mentioned in provisions of Sec. 13-A and 13-A(i) of the Act of 1954 has been extended by the State Government time to time. (ii) The Division Bench judgment of this Court in Gurmel Singh in 2004(ii) RBJ 277 does not lay down the correct law and is a judgment per in curium and not precedent to be followed. The permission/written consent of the State or Collector is required for the transfer of land in case when the land is transferred prior to 22.4.1991 without permission/written consent the transfer will be invalid and transferee has been given opportunity to get such transfers regularised by way of compounding the case u/Ss. 13-A and 13-A(i) of the Act of 1954 and the time provided under these sections may be extended by the State Government time to time. 39. Hence, these references be sent to the Learned Single Member with above referred opinion of the Larger Bench.