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2006 DIGILAW 836 (RAJ)

Milba Bai v. State of Raj.

2006-03-09

A.K.PUROHIT

body2006
Honble Purohit, M.—The applicants have filed this review petition under Section 229 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (in short "the Act") for reviewing the judgment passed by this Court while sitting in Single Bench dated 18.1.2006, by which reference No.13/97/TA/Sriganganagar (Case ID No.2368/97) State vs. Gangu Bai (Deceased) through legal representatives was accepted. 2. The learned counsel for the applicants has advanced the same arguments which were advanced by him while arguing the reference application. These arguments have already been considered and decided by this Court while deciding the reference. 3. The reference of the State Government was accepted on the ground that the present applicant failed to prove that the disputed land was given to the husband of Gangu Bai, Ratan Singh in lieu of his services as a Village-Servant. On the contrary from the record, it has been proved that the disputed land was recorded as a maufi land of Gurudwara and on such muafi lands of Gurudwara, no khatedari rights accrued to Ratan singh. While deciding the reference, inadvertently while referring the judgment of Honble Rajasthan High Court Ratan Singh vs. State of Rajasthan reported in 1983 WLN (UC), page number was not written. It is page number 1 (one) of that case. 4. While arguing this reference, at initial stage, the counsel of the applicants tried to convince this Court that the Honble High Court in a judgment (supra) reported in 1983 WLN (UC) page 1, has accepted that the khatedari rights to Ratan Singh were given u/S. 193 of the R.T. Act, but when this judgment Ratan Singh vs. State of Raj. 1983 WLN (UC) page 1) was perused vis-a-vis the facts of the present case, then it became crystal clear that the so-called Ratan Singh who was the petitioner in the Rajasthan High Court judgment and Ratan Singh-the husband of Gangu Bai are quite different entity. In the judgment of the reference of 18.1.2006, this Court has in detail examined and mentioned the reasons and facts showing that these two Ratan Singhs are different persons and the counsel for the applicants also ultimately agreed that these two Ratan Singhs are different persons. In the judgment of the reference of 18.1.2006, this Court has in detail examined and mentioned the reasons and facts showing that these two Ratan Singhs are different persons and the counsel for the applicants also ultimately agreed that these two Ratan Singhs are different persons. While deciding the reference, this Court has also considered the judgment of SB Civil Writ Petition No. 287/93 Swarnajeet Singh vs. State, copy of which was submitted before us but the principles laid down in that case are not applicable in the present case because in that case, the khatedari rights were given u/S. 193 of the Act. Whereas in the present case, the land was recorded as a muafi land of Gurudwara and the present applicant filed a suit u/S. 88 of the RT Act before the trial Court for declaration of the khatedari rights and the trial Court decreed the suit on 30.12.80 in violation of the provisions of Rajasthan Tenancy Act as well as the various pronouncements of the Board and the Honble High Court wherein it has been held that on muafi land of Mandir and Gurudwaras, no person can become the khatedari-tenant. 5. Section 16 of the Act expressly prohibits the khatedari rights on the land held for public purpose or work of public utility. In 1984 RRD 1, LB of the Board held that public properties endowed to the idol are entirely for public purpose. Though in judgment of Shiv Ram Chela vs. Mishu reported in 1986 RRD 238 (DB), the division bench of the Board dissented from the LB judgment i.e. 1984 RRD 1 (LB) and again asked for a reference to larger bench and larger bench consisting of five Members was constituted and in the cause of Shiv Ram Chela vs. Mishru, LB (of five Members) relied on 1957 SC 133 and upheld the view taken in 1984 RRD 1 (LB). 6. In compliance of the decree dated 30.12.80, a mutation No. 106 was also sanctioned and a reference was made before this Court to set aside the trial Courts judgment as well as this mutation. This Court while deciding the reference has discussed in detail the reasons for accepting the reference and setting aside the decree dated 30.12.80 in mutation No. 106. 7. The counsel for the applicant wants me to rehear the reference which has already been decided. This Court while deciding the reference has discussed in detail the reasons for accepting the reference and setting aside the decree dated 30.12.80 in mutation No. 106. 7. The counsel for the applicant wants me to rehear the reference which has already been decided. In memo of review petition at page No.2 last lines of para No.1, the applicant himself has reproduced the entries made in Jamabandi of Svt. 2014 in Khana No.5, whereinthe land has been recorded as "ekQh xq:}kjk jru flag oYn jke flag] dkSe jk;fl[k lk- nsg ekQhnkj". On the basis of record also while deciding the reference, this court has held that on the land which is muafi of the Gurudwara, neither the Pujari nor Mahant nor Granthi acquires any right over the land as a khatedar. The disputed land was not allotted to the husband of the applicant in lieu of his services of the village servant. therefore, the provisions of Section 193 of the RT Act are not attracted and no khatedari rights accrued to the husband of Gangu Bai. The learned counsel for the applicant has again and again tried to convince us on the basis of certain documents which have been annexed with the review petition to take a different view from that one which has been taken while deciding the reference but these documents are of no help to the appellants. 8. I have considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the applicants along with the documents which have been annexed with the review petition, and perused the record. 9. first of all, I am not hearing the reference and it is a review petition against the judgment passed by this Court in reference and the scope of review is very limited. Review is permitted only under circumstances of discovery of new and important matter which after exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge or could not have been produced at the time when the order was passed or on account of some mistakes or errors apparent on the face of the record. 10. Review is permitted only under circumstances of discovery of new and important matter which after exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge or could not have been produced at the time when the order was passed or on account of some mistakes or errors apparent on the face of the record. 10. Section 86(3) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 as well as Section 229 of the Act provide that the application for review shall lie on the ground mentioned under Order 47 CPC and the provisions of the said order shall be subject to provisions contained in sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 86 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. It is well settled principle that the mistakes or errors on the face of the record must be in the nature, which does not require any extraneous matter to show its incorrectness. It should be an error so manifest and clear that no court would permit such an error to remain on the record. While hearing the review the court cannot sit over the judgment and hear the case as being heard in the appeal or revision the scope of review has got its limited compass in comparison to the scope available at the time of hearing of appeal or revision. 11. The series of the decisions have crystallized the position that palpable and manifest errors on the face of the record review is permitted. Order 47 Rule 1 CPC provides that the scope of review is very limited and the review of the judgment can be allowed on three grounds; (i) discovery of new and important matters of evidence, i.e., fresh facts which after exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the applicant and could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or the order was made, (ii) some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, (iii) for any other sufficient reasons, which are analogous to the reasons specified above. 12. An error can be said to be apparent on the face of the record only when it may be noticed without going deep in record and trying to find circumstances in which it was given. 12. An error can be said to be apparent on the face of the record only when it may be noticed without going deep in record and trying to find circumstances in which it was given. The court deciding the review petition is also not required to go into correctness or otherwise of the decisions of the lower Court to examine the question of exercise of jurisdiction by those courts, therefore, the scope of present application for reviewing the order pronounced in the appellate Court cannot be wider than that of appeal. 13. The power of review should be exercised in the rarest of the rare cases and it should not be used indiscriminately to avoid justice and when there is no error apparent on the face of the record and the material irregularity the review deserves to be rejected. Subsequent happening is also not a ground for review nor subsequent change of law or decision of the same of the superior court uphold such ground, a subsequent admission of the party in the matter of the litigation cannot be ground for review. 14. The Honble Supreme Court in Smt. Meera Bhanja vs. Smt. Nirmala Kumari Choudhary, AIR 1995 SC 455 has clearly held that the error apparent on the face of the record should be such which should strike immediately looking at the record and would not require any long drawn process of reasoning on points. While considering review, the courts are not supposed to re-appreciate the entire evidence and reverse the findings. In "Ajit Kumar Rath vs. Orissa State, AIR 2000 SC 85 , the Apex Court held that the power is not absolute and is subject to restrictions indicated in Order 47 CPC. A review cannot be claimed or asked for merely for a fresh hearing or correction of an erroneous view taken earlier, i.e., the power of review can be exercised only for correction of a patent error of law or fact which stares in the face without any elaborate argument being needed in establishing it. The expression "any other sufficient reason" used in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC means a reason sufficiently analogous to those specified in the rule. Any other attempt not based on any ground set out in Order 47, would amount to an abuse of the liberty given to the Court under the Act to review its judgment. The expression "any other sufficient reason" used in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC means a reason sufficiently analogous to those specified in the rule. Any other attempt not based on any ground set out in Order 47, would amount to an abuse of the liberty given to the Court under the Act to review its judgment. Similarly, in Nilkanthan Dash vs. Dhruba Charan Sahu, AIR 1999 Orissa 106, the Court has held that when there is a mistake apparent bon the face of the record and the Court is convinced, it would be appropriate for the Court to correct the same, but there is a distinction which may not always be capable of exposition between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by error apparent. The mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is one, which is self evident and does not require a process of reasoning and it is distinct from erroneous decision. Rehearing the matter of detecting an error in the earlier decision and then correcting the same do not fall within the ambit of review jurisdiction. Review jurisdiction cannot be used as appellate jurisdiction in disguise. 15. Honble Supreme Court recently in State of Haryana vs. Mohinder Singh reported in 2003(1) WLC (SC) page 499 considered the scope of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC and held as under:— "Civil Procedure Code, O. 47, R. 1—Scope—Hearing of Review does not mean giving one more chance for rehearing matter already disposed of—High Court in hearing Review as if it was rehearing whole petition overstepped its limits—Order of High Curt set aside and original order restored." 16. As already stated hereinabove, the scope of review is very limited and keeping in view the various legal prepositions referred to above and after going through the judgment of this Court dated 18.1.2006, I do not find that there is any error apparent on the face of the record which requires interference in this review petition. Consequently, the review petition is failed and hereby dismissed. Pronounced in open Court.