JUDGMENT A.B. Pal, J. 1. Same transfer order being under challenge on same of similar grounds by the two Petitioners, the above two will petitions filed by them are proposed for disposal by this common judgment. 2. In W.P. (C) No. 329 of 2005 the Petitioner Shri Jogendra Debbarma was initially appointed on 24.10.1985 as Kokbarak Teacher by the Director of School Education, Govt. of Tripura, the fourth Respondent herein and posted at Kamlaibari Primary School under the Inspector of Schools, Amarpur, South Tripura District. On 31.1.1989, after more than three years, he was transferred to Ratanpur Jumia Colony J. B. School under the Inspector of Schools, Khowai by an order of the Inspector of Schools under the Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council (for short 'District Council') followed by Anr. transfer on 1.4.1999, after a period of ten years, to Sera Chandra Para J.B. School by an order of the Principal Officer (Education) under the District Council. On 29.11.2000 he was again transferred to Radhanagar J.B. School and then on 12.8.2005 to Kablaiha R.P. J.B. School under the Inspector of Schools, Gandacherra by the same authority, i.e. the Principal Officer (Education) of the District Council. This last transfer order, which was after about five years of his stay at Radhanagar J.B. School, came to be impugned by means of this writ petition. 3. In W.P. (C) No. 312 of 2005 the Petitioner Sumendra Debbarma was similarly appointed as Kokbarak Teacher on 26.12.1985 by the Director of School Education and posted at Paschim Potacherra J.B. School (Raishya Bari) under the Inspector of Schools, Gandacherra. By order dated 23.8.1991 after a period of more than 5 years he was transferred to Sumantapara J. B. School under the Inspector of Schools, Teliamura followed by Anr. transfer on 14.2.2000, after a period of more than 8 years to Minok Bari J. B. School under Inspector of Schools, Teliamura. Thereafter, on 4.6.2001, within a period of one year from the earlier transfer order he was again transferred from Minokbari J. B. School to Kuchia Para J. B. School under Inspector of Schools, Tulashikok. On 12.8.2005 came the last transfer order from Kuchia Para J. B. School to Jogendra R.P. J. B. School, which came to be impugned by means by the present writ petition. This impugned transfer order was issued after more than four years of his stay in Kuchia Para J. B. School. On 12.8.2005 came the last transfer order from Kuchia Para J. B. School to Jogendra R.P. J. B. School, which came to be impugned by means by the present writ petition. This impugned transfer order was issued after more than four years of his stay in Kuchia Para J. B. School. 4. In both the cases the two Petitioners have been transferred by same transfer order dated 12.8.2005, which is under challenge on the common grounds that having been appointed by the Director of School Education, Govt. of Tripura they are not liable to be transferred by the Principal Officer (Education) of the District Council. It has also been contended that the District Council was constituted after their appointment and, therefore, while placing their services at the disposal of the District Council, it was incumbent upon the State Government to obtain their consent as required by FR 110 (a) of the Fundamental Rules applicable to the State of Tripura. Both the Petitioners claim that they are active supporters and office bearers of the Tripura Tribal Employees Association, which is a rival organization against the party in power in the District Council. According to them, political consideration, not the public interest was behind their transfer, which is apparent from frequency in their transfers making the impugned order mala fide. The other contention is that the proforma-Respondents, who are longer stayee, were not transferred which fact again eloquently indicates arbitrariness on the part of the Respondent concerned. On these grounds they have prayed for setting aside and quashing the impugned transfer order. 5. Opposing the prayers, District Council contended, inter alia, that there was absolutely no element of mala fide, discrimination or arbitrariness in the impugned order of transfer, which was actuated by public interest. In both the cases it would appear that transfer order impugned was passed after a long period and, therefore, allegation of frequency with ulterior motive falls flat. Contending that one of the service conditions embodied in the letter of appointment was that the appointee would be liable to serve in an any part of the State and following that condition the authority is competent to transfer the employees or the Petitioners whenever situation so demands and uniformity in the duration in effecting such transfer is never a sine qua non. Dismissing the allegation that the transfer order impugned was issued with mala fide intention, the strong contention advanced is that it is not enough to plead mala fide, it is also at the same time a firm and inescapable duty of the Petitioners to prove the same by placing materials in support thereof. Regarding the contention that the Principal Officer (Education) of the District Council is not competent to transfer the Petitioners who were initially appointed by the Director of School Education, Govt. of Tripura, the statement per contra is that FR 110 (a) was modified on 7th October, 1986 providing that the provision regarding consent or will of the employee concerned while transferring them to foreign service shall not apply in case of the State Govt. servants transferred to the District Council. The said provision reads as under: F.R. 110 (a) No government servant namely be transferred to foreign service against his will provided that this sub rule shall not apply to the transfer of a government servant to the service of: (1) A body, incorporated or not, which is wholly or substantially owned or controlled by the Government and (ii) The Tribal Autonomous district Council. (b) A transfer to foreign service in or not side India transfer to service of an Indian State may be sanctioned by the State Government. 6. The public interest, which was behind the impugned transfer order has been explained by the Respondents stating that in many schools in the District Council area there was only one Kokbarak Teacher which created serious difficulty whenever the said teacher was absent on leave or otherwise. In order to overcome this situation the said Respondents transferred the Petitioners from the schools where there were more than one Kokbarak teachers. The Respondents have controverted the claim that the formula of longer stayee should go first should be followed while effecting any order of transfer submitting that no straight jacket formula could ever the evolved in favour of such a formula as that would render the entire process of transfer without any application of mind. On all such premises the Respondents have prayed for dismissing the writ petitions at the very threshold. 7. I have heard Mr. A.C. Bhowmik, learned Counsel for the Petitioners and Mr. T.D. Majumder, learned Counsel for the Respondents. 8. The submission of Mr. On all such premises the Respondents have prayed for dismissing the writ petitions at the very threshold. 7. I have heard Mr. A.C. Bhowmik, learned Counsel for the Petitioners and Mr. T.D. Majumder, learned Counsel for the Respondents. 8. The submission of Mr. Bhowmik that the Principal officer (Education) of the District Council is not competent to pass the order of transfer impugned herein has no merit when considered in the light of the notification dated 23.5.1986 by the Govt. of Tripura whereby the Governor of Tripura was pleased to transfer to the District Council 1036 Primary and Junior Basic Schools with their assets, land, structures and appurtenances situated within the local limits of District Council. By the said notification the services of all the Headmasters, Assistant Teachers and non-teaching staff of whatever designation posted to and working in those schools were in the public interest placed at the disposal of the District Council. The list of schools appearing in the Annexure to the said notification included all the schools where the Petitioners were initially posted and subsequently transferred. 9. Mr. Majumder, learned Counsel for the Respondents has correctly pointed out that after the initial posting by the Director of School Education all the subsequent orders of transfer were issued by the Principal Officer (Education) of the District Council and never before the Petitioners raised any objection to such transfer orders presumably because those were favourable to them. By not putting under challenge the notification dated 25.3.1986 placing the services of the Petitioners at the disposal of the District Council and the subsequent orders of their transfer before the impugned one, the Petitioners have no locus standi to call into question the last transfer order only because the same came to be not convenient for them. It has been noticed that though earlier transfer orders were after a shorter duration the Petitioners did not challenge the same. They have not explained how the transfer order impugned, which is apparently after quite a long period can be said to have been visited by the vice of frequency to show ulterior motive behind the same. 10. Mr. Bhowmik has placed reliance on several decisions in support of his contention that transfer order should not be on political ground and that mala fide could become evident if transfer order is without touching the longest stayee. 11. 10. Mr. Bhowmik has placed reliance on several decisions in support of his contention that transfer order should not be on political ground and that mala fide could become evident if transfer order is without touching the longest stayee. 11. In Suresh Chandra Sharma v. Chairman, UPSEB and Ors. reported AIR 2005 SC 1133 the Apex Court considering the fact that transfers of the employees were likely to be made in a couple of months issued certain directions so that no Minister nor a Govt. officer should interfere with the transfer/posting of the officers in the Corporation. In the case on hand, the Petitioners were transferred from their existing places of posting after a considerable period within the District Council to ensure that the pupils in the schools having one Kokbarak teacher did not suffer dislocation in the school administration did not take place when single teacher happened to be absent on leave or otherwise. 12. On the question of deputation which cannot be without the consent of the person so deputed, the decision relied on is in State of Punjab and Ors. v. Inder Singh and Ors. reported in (1997) 8 SCC 372 . There is no quarrel on the issue that in normal circumstances a deputation must be on the consent of the employee concerned, but the facts in issue before this Court can be easily distinguish from Inder Singh (supra) for the reason that in terms of the provision contained in the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution the School administration at Primary level in the District Council had to be entrusted to the District Council as a corollary of which the properties and the employees had also to be placed at the disposal of the said Council, which was done as back as in 1986 and the same was never objected to by the Petitioners during this long period. All the transfer orders thereafter issued by the Principal Officer (Education) of the District Council were never called into question. Only when the latest transfer order, which has been impugned herein, issued after a considerable period came to be inconvenient the Petitioners chose to challenge the same by approaching this Court which apparently does not appear to be a bona fide exercise of the right to seek justice. 13. Only when the latest transfer order, which has been impugned herein, issued after a considerable period came to be inconvenient the Petitioners chose to challenge the same by approaching this Court which apparently does not appear to be a bona fide exercise of the right to seek justice. 13. This Court in Tana Kaya Tara v. State of Arunachal Pradesh reported in 2005 (3) GUT 76 has rendered the decision on the question of mala fide in the facts and circumstances of that case alone. Needless to say that the allegation of mala fide has to be strictly proved by materials relevant to the fact giving rise to such allegation and standard of such proof is bound to vary from case to case. In the above case, this Court has not and cannot laid by down any ratio of universal application of the concept of mala fide. 14. In State of Punjab v. V.K. Khanna reported in AIR 2001 SC 343 the Apex Court observed in para 25 as follows: The expression 'mala fide' has a definite significance in the legal phraseology and the same cannot possibly emanate out of fanciful imagination or even apprehensions but there must be existing definite evidence of bias and actions which cannot be attributed to be otherwise bona fide. 15. Similarly, in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in AIR 1974 SC 555 the Apex Court observed as follows: The burden of establishing mala fide is very heavy on the person who alleges it. The allegations of mala fides are often more easily made than proved, and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high order of credibility. 16. In the case in hand the allegation has been made against the Principal Officer (Education) of the District Council, a high official of the District Council that the transfer order impugned was issued mala fide without elaborating the attending facts, if any, to give rise to the presumption that the said officer had acted with bias. In the absence of any pleading in support of the contention of mala fide the allegation cannot be accepted and consequently, the decisions cited cannot be applied. 17. In the absence of any pleading in support of the contention of mala fide the allegation cannot be accepted and consequently, the decisions cited cannot be applied. 17. It is no longer res integra that transfer is an incident of service and it can be challenged only on the ground of mala fide or violation of any specific rules or policies prevailing at the relevant time. As seen above, the Principal officer (Education) of the District Council was competent to issue the transfer order impugned and no fact has been pleaded to show any mala fide on his part. 18. For the reasons aforementioned, these writ petitions have no merit and the same are accordingly dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own cost. Petition dismissed