JUDGMENT T. Nandakumar, J. 1. This writ appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 19.11.2004 passed in W.P.(C) No. 4146 of 2000 and W.P.(C) No. 5199 of 2002 wherein and whereunder the learned Single Judge set aside the penalty imposed upon the writ Petitioner, IC-42417 F Major TK Chatterjee (Tapash Kumar Chatterjee) (at present the Lt. Col) by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Eastern Command by confirming the findings of the Court Martial proceedings to the extent of: (a) to forfeit three years past service for the purpose of promotion, and (b) to be severely reprimanded. 2. The precise facts basing on which the Respondent/writ Petitioner filed W.P.(C) No. 5199 of 2002 assailing the Summery Court Martial convened against the Respondent/writ Petitioner for an offence under Army Act, i.e. Section 69 "Committing a civil offence that is to say abetment of the offence of transporting liquor, specified in Section 7(a)(i) of the Mizoram Liquor Total Prohibition Act, 1995, contrary to Section 8(1) of the said Act" and the order of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Eastern Command dated 22.9.2000 imposing the sentence to the Respondent/writ Petitioner to the extent of forfeit three years past service for the purpose of promotion and severely reprimanded by confirming the findings of the Summary Court Martial are that the Respondent-army authority had convened the Summary Court Martial proceedings against the Respondent-writ Petitioner basing on the fact that during April 1999 the Respondent-writ Petitioner, Major TK Chatterjee was performing the duty of Office Commanding No. 4, Detachment, ISG Eastern Command located at Mizoram. On 10.8.1999, NK Pushpender Singh contacted the Respondent over writ Petitioner the telephone, by that time the Respondent was at Kolkata by availing casual leave and the Respondent-writ Petitioner ordered NK Pushpender Singh to come to Masimpur along with NK Naresh Kumar Yadav and also to bring Rs. 12,850/- (Rupees twelve thousand eight hundred and fifty) only which the Respondent-writ Petitioner had left with him before proceeding on leave. Accordingly, on 12.8.1999, NK Pushpender Singh and NK Naresh Kumar Yadav met the Respondent-writ Petitioner at Masimpur. Movement order for NK Pushpender Singh and NK Naresh Kumar Yadav for proceeding in the Maruti Gypsy bearing Regn. No. ML-01-2094 to Masimpur was signed by Nb Sub Mahender Singh. At Masimpur, Respondent-writ Petitioner also handed over a sum of Rs. Accordingly, on 12.8.1999, NK Pushpender Singh and NK Naresh Kumar Yadav met the Respondent-writ Petitioner at Masimpur. Movement order for NK Pushpender Singh and NK Naresh Kumar Yadav for proceeding in the Maruti Gypsy bearing Regn. No. ML-01-2094 to Masimpur was signed by Nb Sub Mahender Singh. At Masimpur, Respondent-writ Petitioner also handed over a sum of Rs. 10,000/- only in the presence of Nk Naresh Kumar Yadav in a room of the Station Officers' Mess, Masimpur. For the whole amount of money, i.e. Rs. 10,000/- + Rs. 12,850/-, Nk Pushpender Singh and Nk Naresh Kumar Yadav had purchased different brands of Indian Made Foreign Liquor (for short 'IMFL') from different sources at Masimpur. 3. It is also the further case of the Respondent-army authority that for transportation of the said liquor, i.e. IMFL, to Mizoram, the Respondent writ Petitioner also signed a letter of authority in favour of Nk Pushpender Singh and Nk Naresh Kumar Yadav without mentioning the quantity of liquors for unit purpose and not for sale. On 15.8.1999, Nk Pushpender Singh and Nk Naresh Kumar Yadav loaded their belongings and entire quantity of liquor in the Mamti Gypsy bearing registration No. ML-0-2094 and proceeded towards Aizwal. En route, at 12.45 hours when their vehicle i.e. Maruty Gypsy, reached Vairengte Excise Check Post, Mizoram, it was stopped by Sub-Inspector, Zonuthara. On inquiry made by Sub-Inspector Zonuthara as to why the said IMFL were transporting in the Gypsy, Nk Pushpender Singh showed the said letter of authority said to have been signed by the Respondent writ Petitioner. Sub-Inspector Zonuthara seized the said liquor by preparing seizure memo dated 15.8.1999 and also arrested Nk Pushpender Singh and Naresh Yadav. After preparing the seizure memo and arrest memo, Sub-Inspector Zonuthara prepared the seizure and arrest reports on separate papers and forwarded those reports to the Officer-in-Charge Excise Station Vairangte on the same day. 4. On receipt of the said seizure and arrest reports prepared by Sub-Inspector Zonuthara, the Officer-in-Charge Excise Station Vairangte registered a case being FIR No. Ex-VRT-106/99 dated 15.8.1999 under Section 8(1)/24 of Mizoram Liquor Total Prohibition Act, 1995. 4. On receipt of the said seizure and arrest reports prepared by Sub-Inspector Zonuthara, the Officer-in-Charge Excise Station Vairangte registered a case being FIR No. Ex-VRT-106/99 dated 15.8.1999 under Section 8(1)/24 of Mizoram Liquor Total Prohibition Act, 1995. The letter of authority for transporting those liquors said to have been signed by the Respondent-writ Petitioner shown to the Sub-Inspector, Zonuthara at the time of seizing those liquors on 15.8.1999, was not seized by the said Sub-Inspector, Zonuthara nor it was mentioned in the said reports submitted by him to the Officer-in-Charge, Excise Station, Vairangte. For easy reference, Section 7 and Section 8(1) of the Mizoram Liquor Total Prohibition Act, 1995 are quoted hereunder: 7. Prohibition of manufacture, traffic in and consumption etc. of liquors. No person shall- (a) (i) transport, import, export, or possess liquor; (ii) sell or buy liquor; (iii) manufacture liquor; (iv) use or keep for use any material, utensil, implement or apparatus whatsoever for manufacture of liquor; and (v) construct any distrillery or brewery; (b) consume liquor except on a prescription of a registered medical practitioner, or on a permit granted under the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder; as the case may be. 8. Punishment for contravention of Section 7. (1) Whoever contravenes the provisions of Clause (a) of Section 7 of this Act shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years but not less than three months and also with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees but not less than one thousand rupees; Provided that a person, who is under 21 years of age and against whom no previous conviction is proved, may be awarded a sentence of less than three months and a fine less than one thousand rupees for reasons to be recorded in the judgment that in consideration of the age, character and antecedents of the person concerned, a lesser sentence is justified. 5. The power of seizure and arrest in public places are mentioned in Section 51 of the said Act which reads as follows: 51. Power of seizure and arrest in public places. 5. The power of seizure and arrest in public places are mentioned in Section 51 of the said Act which reads as follows: 51. Power of seizure and arrest in public places. Any Officer of Excise and police Departments referred to in Sub-section (1) of Section 50 of this Act may without warrant- (a) Seize, in any public place or in transit any liquor, material, utensil, implement or apparatus in respect of which he has reasons to believe that an offence punishable under this Act or the rules made hereunder, has been committed, and alongwith it, any document or other article which may furnish evidence of the commission of the offence, and (b) detain, search and arrest any person whom he has reason to believe to have committed an offence under this Act. 6. Under Section 57 of the said Act, any officer making an arrest or seizure under the Act shall, within 24 hours, make a full report of all particulars of such arrest or seizure to his immediate official superior and produce the arrested person before the magistrate. For easy reference, Section 57 of the said Act is quoted hereunder: 57. Report of arrest and seizure. Any Officer making an arrest or seizure under this Act shall, within twenty-four hours of such seizure and arrest make a full report of all the particulars of such arrest or seizure to his immediate official superior, and produce the arrested person before a magistrate. The time taken for the journey from the place of seizure or arrest to the Court shall not, however, be counted. 7. For the said incidence, a Court of Inquiry was conducted from 20.8.1999 to 28.8.1999 and the same was forwarded to Headquarter, 3rd Crops and thereafter from 10.11.1999 to 19.11.1999 summary of evidence was recorded. The time taken for the journey from the place of seizure or arrest to the Court shall not, however, be counted. 7. For the said incidence, a Court of Inquiry was conducted from 20.8.1999 to 28.8.1999 and the same was forwarded to Headquarter, 3rd Crops and thereafter from 10.11.1999 to 19.11.1999 summary of evidence was recorded. Ultimately, a Summary Court Martial Proceeding was convened for the charges which read as follows: CHARGE SHEET The accused, IC-42417 F Major TK Chatterjee, of No. 4 Detachment, Internal Security Group, Eastern Command attached to 57 Mountain Division Signal Regiment, is charged with- ARMY ACT SECTION 69 Committing a Civil Offence, That is to say, Abetment of the offence or transporting Liquor, Specified in Section 7(a)(i) of the Mizoram Liquor Total Prohibition Act, 1995, contrary to Section 8(1) of the said act, in consequence of which abetment such offence was committed, is that he, at field on or about 12 Aug 99, conspired with No. 3990593P NK. Pushpender Singh of his unit to illegally transport liquor from Masimpur to Aizawl in the unit vehicle, in consequence of which 224 bottles of liquor as under, were illegally transported: (a) Old Monk Rum (750 ml) - 72 Bottles (b) Contessa Rum (750 ml) - 36 Bottles (c) Bagpiper Whisky (750 ml) - 67 Bottles (d) Old Tarem Whisky (750 ml) - 05 Bottles (e) Contessa Rum (750 ml) - 12 Bottles (f) Brandy Honey Bee (750 ml) - 01 Bottles (g) Golden Chariot Whisky - 01 Bottles (h) Solan No. 1 Whisky (750 ml) - 02 Bottles (i) Comrade Rum (750 ml) - 16 Bottles (j) Black Knight Whisky (750 ml) - 12 Bottles Total = 224 Bottles Place : Fields Sd/- (A.K. Kochhar) Date : 21 Apr. 2000 officiating commanding officer. 8. In the Summary Court Martial Proceeding, prosecution witnesses, namely: (1) P.W.-1 No. 3990593P Nk Puspender Singh (co-accused) (2) P.W.-2 No. 1099673L Nk Naresh Kumar Yadav (Co- accused) (3) P.W.-3 JC-810314W Nb Sub Mahender Singh (4) P.W.-4 No. 2984914P Hv Chuni Lal; (5) P.W.-5 No. 044 Sub-Inspector Zonunthara; (6) P.W.-6N0. 170 Inspector C. Lalhmingliana and (7) Court Witness SS-37494M Lt, Ashish Awasthi. were examined. 9. The Summary Court Martial Proceeding was concluded on 4.9.2000 and found guilty of the offence and awarded punishment to the Respondent-writ Petitioner for: (a) Cashiering; (b) Rigorous imprisonment for three months and (c) A fine of Rs. 170 Inspector C. Lalhmingliana and (7) Court Witness SS-37494M Lt, Ashish Awasthi. were examined. 9. The Summary Court Martial Proceeding was concluded on 4.9.2000 and found guilty of the offence and awarded punishment to the Respondent-writ Petitioner for: (a) Cashiering; (b) Rigorous imprisonment for three months and (c) A fine of Rs. 5000.00 Subsequently, on 22.9.2000, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief confirmed the findings of the Court Martial but commuted the sentence to the extent of (a) forfeiture of three years past service for the purpose of promotion and (b) severely reprimanded. 10. By filing the writ petition, W.P.(C) No. 5199 of 2002, the Respondent-writ Petitioner challenged the said award and sentence on the inter alia ground that procedural safeguards available to the Respondent-writ Petitioner under the relevant provisions of the Mizoram Liquor Total Prohibition Act, 1995 and Code of Criminal Procedures, 1973 and also the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 were completely ignored in the summary Court martial proceedings convened against the Respondent-writ Petitioner. 11. The learned Sr. counsel submitted that the alleged seizure memo dated 15.8.1999 which was exhibited as "U" in the Summary Court Martial Proceeding was prepared in complete violation of the provisions of the Section 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedures inasmuch as there was no signature of the independent witnesses on the seizure memo and also the said report submitted by the Sub-Inspector, Zonunthara for the seizure of the liquors was in clear violation of the procedures for submission of the report prescribed in Sections 51 and 57 of the Mizoram Liquor Total Prohibition Act, 1995 inasmuch as the alleged letter of authority said to have been signed by the Respondent-writ Petitioner authorizing Nk Puspender Singh was not mentioned in the said report to the Officer-in-charge, Excise Station, Vairengte. It is the requirement of Sections 51 and 57 of the said Act that the Excise Officer making the seizure of the liquor without warrant in any public place or in the transit in respect of which he has reasons to belief that an offence punishable under the said Act or the rules made thereunder has been committed he has to submit a report along with any document or other articles which may furnish evidence of the commission of the offence. The said very letter of authorization said to have been signed by the Respondent-writ Petitioner which was exhibited as 'N' in the Summary Court Martial Proceeding is the only material which would connect the Respondent writ Petitioner in the transportation of the seized liquors by the Nk Puspender Singh and Nk Naresh Kumar Yadav was to be sent to the Officer-in-Charge, Excise Station, Vairengte, in case the letter of authority exhibited "N" was really produced by Nk Puspender Singh and Nk Naresh Kumar Yadav before the Sub-Inspector, Zonunthara alleging that they transported the seized liquors on the basis of the letter of authority exhibited 'N' The procedural safeguards in preparation of the report of arrest and seizure prescribed in Sections 51 and 57 of the said Act and Section 100 of Code of Criminal Procedure available to the accused were not followed by the Sub-Inspector, Zonunthara, Vairengte Excise Station while seizing the liquors and preparing the report of seizure inasmuch as it is the bounden duty of the Sub-Inspector, Zonunthara to make a full report of all the particulars of such arrest and seizure to his immediate superior officer. Admittedly, in the present case, while preparing the said report and seizure memo regarding the seizure of the liquor from Nk Puspender Singh and Nk Naresh Kumar Yadav, Sub-Inspector, Zonunthara did not mention the said letter of authority exhibited 'N' said to have been signed by the Respondent-writ Petitioner. 12. It is the admitted case of both the parties the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act are applicable in the Summary Court Martial Proceeding convened against the Respondent-writ Petitioner. The Summary Court Martial Proceeding made its findings basing on the exculpatory statements of the co-accused Nk Puspender Singh (P.W.-1) and Nk Naresh Kumar Yadav (P.W.-2) which were not corroborated by independent witnesses. This Court is not considering the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence in making the findings by the Summary Court Martial Proceeding in a writ proceeding, but this Court is simply considering as to whether the safe guards provided for the Respondent-writ Petitioner under the Mizoram Liquor Total Prohibition Act, 1995, Code of Criminal Procedures, 1973 and the Indian Evidence Act had been complied with or not by the Summary Court Martial. The learned Sr. The learned Sr. counsel in support of his contention had referred to the decision of the Apex Court in Jnendra Nath Ghose v. State of West Bengal : AIR 1959 SC 1199 . The Apex Court in that case held that there should be corroboration in the material particulars of the statements made by the approver and also that the approver are reliable witnesses. The learned Sr. counsel also relied on the decisions of the Apex Court in Bhiva Doulu Patil v. State of Maharastra : AIR 1963 SC 599 . 13. P.W.-5, Sub-Inspector, Zonunthara and P.W.-6, Inspector, Lalhmingliana, Officer-in-Charge, Excise Station, Vairengte in their statements could not explain the reasons under which they did not fulfill the requirements of the provisions of Section 51 and Section 57 of the Mizoram Liquor Total Prohibition Act so far as the said alleged letter of authority exhibited 'N' in the Summary Court Martial Proceeding is concerned. It is also not known as to why the letter of authority exhibited 'N' was produced only in the Summary Court Martial Proceeding. For the sake of repetition, had the letter of authority marked exhibit 'N' been produced by Nk Puspender Singh (P.W.-1) and Nk Naresh Kumar Yadav (P.W.-2) before the P.W.-5 (Sub-Inspector, Zonunthara, Excise Station, Vairengte) at the time of seizing the liquor on 15.8.1999 at Vairengte, Excise Check Post, the P.W.- 5, Sub-Inspector, Zonunthara would have mentioned about the letter of authority exhibited 'N' in the seizure memo and his report to his superior Officer in compliance with the procedure prescribed in Section 51 and Section 57 of the Mizoram Liquor Total Prohibition Act, 1995. Without looking into the procedural safe guards provided in Section 51 and Section 57 of the Mizoram Liquor Total Prohibition Act, 1995, the Summary Court Martial Proceeding taken the alleged letter of authority exhibited 'N' said to have been signed by the Respondent-writ Petitioner into evidence and made its findings basing on the said letter of authority. Even if the letter of authority exhibited 'N' is accepted at its facial value, it will not implicate the Respondent-writ Petitioner for the civil offence of abetment to commission of the offence for transportation of seized liquor by the P.W.-1, Nk Pushpender Singh (co-accused) and P.W.-2, Nk Naresh Kumar Yadav (co-accused). Even if the letter of authority exhibited 'N' is accepted at its facial value, it will not implicate the Respondent-writ Petitioner for the civil offence of abetment to commission of the offence for transportation of seized liquor by the P.W.-1, Nk Pushpender Singh (co-accused) and P.W.-2, Nk Naresh Kumar Yadav (co-accused). The letter of authority exhibited 'N' reads as follows: CERTIFICATE No. 3990593P Nk Pushpender Singh of No. 4 Det East Comd IS Gp C/o 613 Tpt. Coy ASC (Jeep) C/o 99 APO is hereby authorized to carry the liquor for unit purpose, not to be sale in other person. He is a army person. T K Chatterjee Maj OC 14. The Apex Court in Lt. Col Prithi Pal Singh Bedi v. Union of India and batch : (1982) 3 SCC 140 through Justice Desai (as then he was) observed that "A marked difference in the procedure for trial of an offence by the criminal Court and the Court martial is apt to generate dissatisfaction arising out of this differential treatment. Even though it is pointed out that the procedure of trial by Court martial is almost analogous to the procedure of trial in the ordinary criminal Courts". The relevant portion of the para-44 of SCC page 178 of the judgment in Lt. Col. Prithi Pal Singh Bedi (Supra) reads as follows: 44. * * * In the larger interest of national security and military discipline Parliament in its wisdom may restrict or abrogate such rights in their application to the Armed Forces but this process should not be carried so far as to create a class of citizens not entitled to the benefits of the liberal spirit of the Constitution. Persons subject to Army Act are citizens of this ancient land having a feeling of belonging to the civilized community governed by the liberty oriented constitution. Personal liberty makes for the worth of human being and is a cherished and prized right. Deprivation thereof must be preceded by an enquiry ensuring fair, just and reasonable procedure and trial by a judge of unquestioned integrity and wholly unbiased. A marked difference in the procedure for trial of an offence by the criminal Court and the Court martial is apt to generate dissatisfaction arising out of this differential treatment. Deprivation thereof must be preceded by an enquiry ensuring fair, just and reasonable procedure and trial by a judge of unquestioned integrity and wholly unbiased. A marked difference in the procedure for trial of an offence by the criminal Court and the Court martial is apt to generate dissatisfaction arising out of this differential treatment. Even though it is pointed out that the procedure of trial by Court martial is almost analogous to the procedure of trial in the ordinary criminal Courts, we must recall what Justice William O'Douglas observed: "[T]hat civil trial is held in an atmosphere conducive to the protection of individual rights while a military trial is marked by the age-old manifest destiny of retributive justice. Very expression 'Court martial' generally strikes terror in the heart of the person to be tried by it. And somehow or the other the trial is looked upon with disfavour" ["Tough Test for Military Justice", Time Magazine, pp.42 and 43] In Reid v. Covert 1 L Ed 2d 1148 : 354 US 1 (1957) Justice Black observed at page 1174 as under: Courts martial are typically ad hoc bodies appointed by a military officer from among his subordinates. They have always been subject to varying degrees of "command influence". In essence, these tribunals are simply executive tribunals whose personnel are in the executive chain of command. Frequently, the members of the Court martial must look to the appointing officer for promotions, advantageous assignments and efficiency ratings - in short, for their future progress in the service. Conceding to military personnel that high degree of honesty and sense of Justice which nearly all of them undoubtedly have, the members of a Court martial, in the nature of things, do not and cannot have the independence of jurors drawn from the general public or of civilian judges. 15. Conceding to military personnel that high degree of honesty and sense of Justice which nearly all of them undoubtedly have, the members of a Court martial, in the nature of things, do not and cannot have the independence of jurors drawn from the general public or of civilian judges. 15. The Apex Court is of the view in Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India : AIR 1987 SC 2386 that "Procedural safe guards should be commensurate with the swept of the powers, the wider the power the greater the needs for the restraint in its exercise and correspondingly, more liberal the construction of the procedural safeguard envisaged by the statute." The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India (1990) 4 SCC 549 held that the High Court in a writ proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has the power of judicial review in respect of proceeding of the Court martial. The circumstances under which the High Court can exercise its power of judicial review in writ proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in respect of the proceedings of the Court martial according to ratio laid down by the Apex Court in S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India (supra) are in para 42 of SCC at page 615 which reads as follows: 42. Before referring to the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules it may be mentioned that the Constitution contains special provisions in regard to members of the Armed Forces. Article 33 empowers Parliament to make law determining the extent to which any of the rights conferred by part III shall, in their application to the members of the Armed Forces be restricted or abrogated so as to ensure the proper discharge of their duties and the maintenance of discipline amongst them. By Clause (2) of Article 136 the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution has been excluded in relation to any judgment, determination, sentence or order passed or made by any Court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces. Similarly Clause (4) of Article 227 denies to the High Courts the power of superintendence over any Court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces. Similarly Clause (4) of Article 227 denies to the High Courts the power of superintendence over any Court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces. This Court under Article 32 and the High Courts under Article 220 have, however, the power of judicial review in respect of proceedings of Courts martial and the proceedings subsequent thereto and can grant appropriate relief if the said proceedings have resulted in denial of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution or if the said proceedings suffer from a jurisdictional error or any error of law apparent on the face of the record. 16. The learned Sr. Counsel in order to substantiate the case of the Respondent-writ Petitioner had placed heavy reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court in Union of India and Ors. v. L.D. Balam Singh : (2002) 9 SCC 73. The facts spell out in Union of India and Ors. v. L.D. Balam Singh (supra) who was serving in the Indian Army was resided with his family in a government accommodation, on search of his residence conducted by the Army Officers/Officials allegedly opium being 4.99 Kg was recovered from his family quarter. Balam Singh was tried by the general Court Martial under Section 69 of the Army Act for the offence punishable under Section 18of the NDPS Act and after trial he was convicted and sentenced by the General Court Martial. Mr. Balam Singh filed the writ petition challenging the said findings and sentence of the General Court Martial on the main thrust that formalities and procedural safeguards provided under the provisions of NDPS Act were not followed. In consequence thereof, findings and sentence of the General Court Martial is vitiated. Paras-15 and 16 of the SCC in Union of India and Ors. v. L.D. Balam Singh (supra) read as follows: 15. Turning attention on the procedural aspect, be it noticed that Section 18is an offence which cannot but be ascribed to be civil in nature in terms of the provisions of the Army Act if Section 18 is to be taken recourse to then and in that event the provisions of the statute come into play in their entirety rather than piecemeal. The charge leveled against the Respondent is not one of misdeeds or wrong full conduct in terms of the provisions of the Army Act but under the NDPS Act. In the event, we clarify, a particular statute is taken recourse to, question of trial under another statute without taking recourse to the statutory safeguards would be void and the entire trial would stand vitiated unless, of course, there are existing specified provisions therefore in the particular statute. Needless to record that there were two other civilian accused who were tried by the Court at Patiala but were acquitted of the offence for non compliance with the mandatory requirements of the NDPS Act. Once the petition was put on trial for an offence under the NDPS Act, the General Court Martial and the Army Authorities cannot reasonably be heard to state that though the Petitioner would be tried for an offence under Section 18 of the NDPS Act, yet the procedural safeguards as contained in the statutory provision would not be applicable to him being a member of the armed forces. The Act applies in its entirety irrespective of the jurisdiction of the General Court Martial or other Courts an since the Army Authorities did not take into consideration the procedural safeguards as are embodied under the statute, the question of offering any credence of the submissions of the Union of India in support of the appeal does not and cannot arise. There is no material on record to show that the authorities who conducted the search and seizure at the house of the Respondent herein have in fact done so in due compliance with Section 42 of the statute, which admittedly stands fatal for the prosecution as noticed above - as a matter of fact, two of the civilians stand acquitted therefor. 16. Lastly, it has been contended by the Respondent that the charge-sheet is not only vague, but devoid of all material particulars and does not even fulfill the requirements of the Army Rules and the entire proceedings in any event stand vitiated. We are, however, not expressing any opinion thereon, neither the same is required for the purposes of disposal of this matter. Suffice it to record, however, that the same has some substance. 17. To the contra, Mr. We are, however, not expressing any opinion thereon, neither the same is required for the purposes of disposal of this matter. Suffice it to record, however, that the same has some substance. 17. To the contra, Mr. B. Sarma, learned CGSC appearing for the Appellant strenuously submitted that this Court while exercising its powers of judicial review in a writ petition in respect of the proceedings of the Court Martial cannot look into the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence basing on which the Court Martial made its findings. In support of his contention, the learned CGSC placed the decision of the Apex Court in (1) Union of India and Ors. v. Major A. Hussain (IC-14827) : (1998) 1 SCC 537 ; (2) Union of India and Ors. v. R.K. Sharma: AIR 2001 SC 3053 . We are not disputing the proposition of law put up by the learned CGSC that this Court while exercising its power of judicial review in a writ proceeding against the Court Martial Proceeding and its findings is not functioning as an appellate authority of the Court Martial Proceeding, nor re appreciating the evidence, i.e. the statement of the witnesses recorded by the Court Martial Proceeding and documents relied upon by the Court Martial in coming to its findings. And also this Court is not considering as to whether there is sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence for coming to the finding in the Court Martial Proceeding, but only concerned with this Court is as to whether the procedural safeguards provided under the relevant provisions of law or/statute and also the relevant provisions of law had been taken into consideration and followed by the Court Martial in its proceeding in coming to their findings. 18. Having regards to the above discussions, we are of the considered view that the findings of the Summary Court Martial Proceedings convened against the Respondent-writ Petitioner is vitiated inasmuch as the Court Martial had completely lost sight of the denial of the procedural safeguards provided in Mizoram Liquor Total Prohibition Act, 1995 and Code of Criminal Procedures to the Respondent-writ Petitioner and also the provisions of Indian evidence Act in coming to its findings against the Respondent writ Petitioner. We are also of the considered view that the Appellant also failed to make out materials/law points compelling us to interfere with the conclusion of the learned Single Judge in its judgment and order dated 19.11.2004 that the penalty imposed upon the Respondent-writ Petitioner on the basis of the Summary Court Martial convened against the writ Petitioner are liable to be quashed. Writ Appeal is devoid of merit, accordingly dismissed. 19. Parties are to bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed