JUDGMENT A.B. Pal, J. 1. In the long canvas of undying tax-fee confusion raging over 50 years, with the concept of equivalent quid pro quo taking a backseat in the later judicial thought-process, the present writ petition has provoked similar controversy calling upon this Court to decide the following major questions, namely: (i) Can a consent fee to establish or operate an industry under The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 or The Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 be hiked 15 times at a time, from Rs. 5,000/- to Rs. 75,000/- or from Rs. 500/- to Rs. 25,000/- without showing any correlation between such rise and the services to be rendered to the category from whom the fee is to be exacted; (ii) dehors such correlation whether a fee lapses into a tax in disguise, not permissible under the aforementioned Acts rendering the same unsustainable in law; (iii) Whether the modified rate is also applicable to the industries which obtained such consent before the modified rate was brought into force while renewing or asking to renew the consent from time to time; (iv) whether the power of the Board to grant consent for the period to be specified may be resorted to for the purpose of exacting the consent fee at the modified rate for every renewal of consent. 2. I have heard Mr. S. Deb, learned senior counsel with Mr. B.N. Majumder, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, Mr. T.D. Majumder, learned Additional Govt. Advocate for the State-Respondent and Mr. S. Talapatra, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. B. Banerjee, learned Counsel for the Respondent-Tripura State Pollution Control Board. 3. Before adverting to the above questions, the material facts giving rise to the present controversy may be noticed thus: (i) M/s Sherowali Himghar and Services (P) Ltd., the Petitioner herein, is a registered company, which established a Himghar (Cold Storage) at Chandpur near Khayerpur in West Tripura District of the State of Tripura investing Rs. 2.247 crores. 3. Before adverting to the above questions, the material facts giving rise to the present controversy may be noticed thus: (i) M/s Sherowali Himghar and Services (P) Ltd., the Petitioner herein, is a registered company, which established a Himghar (Cold Storage) at Chandpur near Khayerpur in West Tripura District of the State of Tripura investing Rs. 2.247 crores. On 05.07.2004 the company for the first time applied for consent to establish and operate the Himghar to the Tripura State Pollution Control Board (for short 'Board') and its Executive Engineer, the second and third Respondent herein, as required under Section 25 of The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (for short Water Act') and under Section 21 of The Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 (for short 'Air Act') respectively and the Rules framed under the above two Acts. Upon consideration of the said application, the Respondents aforementioned issued in favour of the Petitioner-company a 'two-in-one (Combined) Certificate' of 'consent to establish and operate' the Himghar under the Water Act and the Air Act. The consent was, however, provisional, valid upto 19.07.2005, for about a year. It was provided in the said certificate that the consent would be renewed subject to fulfillment of the terms and conditions prescribed by the Board for which application seeking renewal would have to be made one month before expiry of the certificate. For obtaining the consent, the company had to deposit an amount of Rs. 5000/- as fees with its application dated 05.07.2004 under Rule 29 of the Tripura State Pollution Control Board (Prevention and Control of Water Pollution) Rules, 1989 (for short 'Water Pollution Rules'), which provides that for industries with fixed capital investment more than Rs. 45 Lakhs but less than Rs. 5 crores, consent fee of Rs. 5000/- has to be paid. Similarly, the company had also to deposit Anr. amount of Rs. 500/- as 'consent to operate fee' alongwith the said application under Rule 8 of the Tripura State Pollution Control Board (Prevention and Control of Air Pollution) Act, 1989 (for short 'Air Pollution Rules'), which provides that industries specified in the schedule to the Air Act having capital investment exceeding 1 crore shall have to deposit Rs. 500/- as consent fee for obtaining 'consent to operate' under Section 21 of the said Act. 500/- as consent fee for obtaining 'consent to operate' under Section 21 of the said Act. (ii) While the Cold Storage (hereinafter referred as 'industry') was functional after obtaining consent under both Water Act and Air Act, the State of Tripura, the first Respondent herein, carried out an amendment to the Water Pollution Rules and the Air Pollution Rules in the year 2005 by notification dated 3rd May, 2005 (Annexures 1 & 2 of the writ petition). By amending Rule 29 of the Water Pollution Rules, 1989, graduated rate of 'consent to establish fee' given in the Table-1 was escalated from Rs. 5,000/- to Rs. 75,000/-, for the category of industries having total investment exceeding Rs. 1 crore but not exceeding Rs. 5 crores to which the Petitioner-company belongs. Similarly, by amending Sub-rule (2) of Rule 8 of the Air Pollution Rules, 1989 a sharp spurt in the rate of 'consent to operate fees' was brought about revising the same from Rs. 500/- to Rs. 25,000/- for the category to which the Petitioner belongs, as given in Table-2 of the said amendment Rules. It is seen that in the Air Pollution Rules a new Table-1 prescribing 'fee to establish' has been introduced for the first time by Sub-rule (2) though Sub-rule (1) which clearly provides for 'fees to operate' only remained unchanged. According to the fees prescribed in 'Table-1' the 'fee to establish' is Rs. 75,000/- for the category to which the Petitioner belongs. However, a respite has been given in Clause (ii) below Table-1 by providing that an Industry applying for 'consent to establish' under both the Act is required to deposit only one 'consent to establish fee'. (iii) Though the said amendments were given prospective effect from 3rd May, 2005, the Petitioner was asked by the Board vide letter dated 13.07.2005 (Annexure-4) to apply for renewal of the consent earlier given which was to expire after 19.07.2005. Before the above communication regarding renewal, the Board issued a memorandum on 18.05.2005 providing certain clarification regarding the operation of the amendments of the Water Pollution Rules and Air Pollution Rules noticed above with regard to the units who applied for obtaining Consent Certificates before 3rd May, 2005, but their applications were pending. The clarification appearing in para 4 and 5 of the memorandum (Annexure-5) reads: 4. The clarification appearing in para 4 and 5 of the memorandum (Annexure-5) reads: 4. A question has now arisen as to whether the revised consent fees structures would be applicable for the units which had applied for obtaining Consent Certificates before May 3, 2005 and the Consent Certificates have not yet been issued by Tripura State Pollution Control Board. The matter was referred to the State Government. The Government is of the view that the revised consent fees structures would be applicable for such units also. 5. All concerned are, therefore, required to deposit the additional amount of Consent Fees to the TSPCB for taking necessary arrangements towards issuance of consent certificates. (iv) The Petitioner-company sustained a confusion from the above clarification whether for seeking renewal of the consent which was given only for a year, it would be required to pay again alongwith the application for renewal a consent fee at the revised rate. For removal of the confusion, the Petitioner addressed the Board a letter for clarification. But without any reference to the clarification sought, the Board addressed a letter dated 06.12.2005 (Annexure-7) to the Company intimating that the consent earlier issued had expired on 19.07.2005 and, therefore, application for fresh consent must be obtained within 31.12.2005 failing which steps would be taken for closure of the industry. As the company did not apply for renewal inspite of the instruction by the Board as seen above, the Board addressed Anr. letter to the Company on 2nd January, 2006 (Annexure-8) to apply for renewal of the 'consent to operate' within seven days failing which closure order of the unit would be issued. Significantly, no instruction in those letters was given by the Board to the Petitioner-company to apply for renewal of the 'consent to establish'. In response, the Petitioner-company on 10.01.2006 made a prayer to the Board (Annexure-9) for extension of time for Anr. 10 days and thereafter on 20th January, 2006 approached this Court by means of the present writ petition challenging the fees escalation brought about by the amendments of the said Rules and calling into question applicability of the modified rate of high consent fee to renewal of consent to be obtained by the Petitioner company who had already obtained consent to establish and operate the industry before 3rd May, 2005 when the amendments impugned came into force. 4. 4. In the above premises, the Petitioner prayed for quashing both the notifications dated 3rd May, 2005 (Annexure-1 & Annexure-2) bringing about the amendments of stiff fee-escalation in the Water Pollution Rules and Air Pollution Rules and setting aside the communications dated 18th May, 2005 containing the clarification regarding applicability of the amendment to pending applications for consent (Annexure-5), communications dated 13.07.2005 (Annexure-4), dated 06.12.2005 (Annexure-7) and dated 02.01.2006 (Annexure-8), whereby direction for renewal felling which threat of closure was communicated. Many pronged attacks to the impugned amendments and the above correspondences have been carefully laid in the writ petition. The first contention of the Petitioner is that the above two Central Acts have not provided anywhere that consent once given thereunder shall be only for a limited duration whereafter one has to apply afresh for renewal of the consent given; Secondly, the amendments of the said Rules escalating the fee from 3rd May, 2005 would show that the Board was not consulted before the amendments were brought about in clear violation of Section64 of the Water Act, which provides in Sub-section (1) as follows: 64. Power of State Government to make rules.-(1) The State Government may, simultaneously with the constitution of the State Board, make rules to carry out the purposes of this Act, in respect of matters not falling within the purview of Section 63: Provided that when the State Board has been constituted, no such rule shall be made, varied, amended or repealed without consulting that Board. Section 54(3) of the AIR Act also contains similar provision. As the amendment notifications impugned do not indicate consultation with the Board, the same are not legally sustainable. Thirdly, the schedule containing the list of industries in the Air Act having been omitted w.e.f. 01.04.1988, Rule 8 of the Air Pollution Rules requiring application with consent fee for operating an industrial plant specified in the schedule to the Act has been rendered otiose; Fourthly, the spurt in the rate of consent fee introduced by the amendments impugned is 15 times the existing rate, which is shockingly arbitrary as it has no correlation with the services to be rendered by the Board. On the ground of reasonableness alone such amendment cannot survive; Fifthly, the clarification given by the State Government regarding applicability of the enhanced consent fees to all applications for consent pending immediately before the amendments has been illegally and arbitrarily sought to be applied to applications for renewals of consent to exact from the existing industries modified consent fee for every renewal. 5. The Respondent Board and its official by filing joint counter-affidavit contended inter alia that the amendments impugned were carried out after a period of more than 16 years and, therefore, the rise in the rate of 'consent to establishment fee' from Rs. 5,000/ - to Rs. 75,000/- and 'consent to operate fee' from Rs. 500/- to Rs. 25,000/- are not unusual and arbitrary if the long span is taken into consideration. Though the amended rules do not ex facie indicate consultation with the Board before the amendments were done, as a matter of fact the proposal for enhancement was initiated to the State Government by the Board itself and, therefore, it cannot be said that there was no consultation by the State with the Board for bringing about the amendment. Strongly relying on Section 31A of the Water Act, the contention advanced is that the Board has been empowered by that provision to issue any directions to any person, officer or authority, who shall be bound to comply with such directions. The Petitioner, therefore, being directed to apply for renewal of the consent earlier granted one month before expiry of the same, is bound to comply. As regards the modified consent fee which has been put under challenge, the contention is that the enhanced fee brought about by way of amendment is strictly in terms of Section 25(4) of the Water Act and Section 21 of the AIR Act, which empowers the Board to specify in the order granting consent conditions of establishment or operation of an industry. One such condition may be to specify the period during which the consent shall remain in force. The most important contention has been made in para-22 of the counter-affidavit which states that as per the clarification given by the State Government in the memorandum dated 18.05.2006 which has been impugned herein, the Petitioner company does not come under the word "concerned" and, therefore, the same is not applicable to the Petitioner company. The most important contention has been made in para-22 of the counter-affidavit which states that as per the clarification given by the State Government in the memorandum dated 18.05.2006 which has been impugned herein, the Petitioner company does not come under the word "concerned" and, therefore, the same is not applicable to the Petitioner company. In the said memorandum of clarification it has been stated that the enhanced rate of consent fees brought about by the amendments dated 03.05.2005 shall also apply to applications pending before such dates meaning thereby that the same shall not apply to the units which has already obtained consent before 03.05.2005. It is contended that the revised rates was endorsed to all the units including the Petitioner only for their information. The final contention is that the writ petition is misconceived as there is a provision in Sub-section (2) of Section 28 of the Water Act and Sub-section (2) of Section31 of the AIR Act to file appeal against any decision of the Board and on that ground alone the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 6. Setting out the rival contentions, as above, the distinction between 'tax' and 'fee' has to be understood clearly before adverting to the contentious issues noticed above. It would be seen from the legal position discussed hereinafter that though there is no generic difference between a tax and a fee in asmuch as both are compulsory exactions, the concept of equivalent quid pro quo as an essential feature of fee distinguishing it from tax continued to dominate judicial thinking for about half a century. As regards distinction between the two, Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel for the Petitioner has painstakingly explained, deriving support from several landmark decisions of the Supreme Court how the concept of equivalent quid pro quo being essential ingredient of a fee came to be gradually metamorphosed into a concept of reasonable correlation' in order to cater to the demand of an ever changing socioeconomic scenario, at the same time maintaining discernible distinction between tax and fee. The Supreme Court in the Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt. reported in 1954 SCR 1005 , held: A tax is compulsory exaction of money by public authority for public purposes enforceable by law and is not payment for services rendered. The Supreme Court in the Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt. reported in 1954 SCR 1005 , held: A tax is compulsory exaction of money by public authority for public purposes enforceable by law and is not payment for services rendered. It is not possible to formulate a definition of fee that can apply to all cases as there are various kinds of fees. But a fee may generally be defined as a charge for a special service rendered to individuals by some governmental agency. The amount of fee levied is supposed to be based on the expenses incurred by the Government in rendering the service, though in many cases such expenses are arbitrarily assessed. The distinction between a tax and a fee lies primarily in the fact that a tax is levied as part of a common burden, while a fee is a payment for a special benefit or privilege. 7. Presence of an element of quid pro quo in a levy qua fee was reiterated by the Apex Court in The Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. and Ors. v. The State of Orissa and Ors. reported in 1961 2 SCR 537 , the relevant part of which is quoted below: Although there can be no generic difference between a tax and a fee since both are compulsory exactions of money by public authorities, there is this distinction between them that whereas a tax is imposed for public purposes and requires no consideration to support it, a fee is levied essentially for services rendered and there must be an element of quid pro quo between the person who pays it and the public authority that imposes it. While a tax invariably goes into the consolidated fund, a fee is earmarked for the specified services in a fund created for the purpose. Whether a cess is one or the other would naturally depend on the facts of each case. If in the guise of a fee, the Legislature imposes a tax, it is for the Court on a scrutiny of the scheme of the levy, to determine its real character. Whether a cess is one or the other would naturally depend on the facts of each case. If in the guise of a fee, the Legislature imposes a tax, it is for the Court on a scrutiny of the scheme of the levy, to determine its real character. The distinction is recognised by the Constitution which while empowering the appropriate Legislatures to levy taxes under the Entries in the three lists refers to their power to levy fees in respect of any such matters, except the fees taken in court, and tests have been laid down by this Court for determining the character of an impugned levy. 8. In Nagar Mahapalika Varanasi v. Durga Das Bhattacharjee and Ors. reported in 1968 3 SCR 374 , the rickshaw owners and drivers challenged validity of the U.P. Municipality bye-laws whereby certain licence fee was imposed. The question was whether after excluding certain items of expenditure the balance of the levy qua fee did constitute sufficient quid pro quo for the services to be rendered. It was held by the Apex Court that the fees mentioned is meant for the purpose of regulation of certain trades and professions, for rendering services and for the maintenance of public safety and convenience of the inhabitants of the municipality, and, it is not contemplated that they should be merged in the public revenues of the municipality or should go for the up-keep of the roads and other matters of general public utility. Therefore, the fees imposed are only fees in the restricted sense of a fee for which a quid pro quo is provided and cannot be considered to be an impost in the nature of tax. 9. The dilemma, however, survived long thereafter and the Supreme Court had the occasion to remove the confusion in The Municipal Council, Madurai v. R. Narayanan and Ors. reported in (1975) 2 SCC 497 . After taking stock of the decision in Liberty Cinema case, reported in AIR 1965 SC 1107 and Salvation Army case reported in (1975) 1 SCC 509 , the Apex Court held: The authority, to justify the levy qua fee, must render some special services to the category from whom the amount is exacted and the total sum so collected must have a reasonable correlation to the cost of such services. Where these dual basic features are absent, one cannot legally claim from the licensee under the label 'fee' It may be noticed that the words "reasonable correlation" continued to survive in the later decisions though the dominant concept of equivalent quid pro quo gradually paled into insignificance. 10. Even in 1993, the distinction between tax and fee continued to be determined by examining the presence of quid pro quo as essential element of fee. In Kishan Lal Lakhmi Chand and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors. reported in 1993 Supp (4) SCC 461, the Apex Court made following observations: The distinction between a tax and a fee lies primarily in the fact that a tax is levied as part of a common burden, while a fee is for payment of a specific benefit or privilege although the special advantage is secondary to the primary purpose of regulation in public interest. If the element of revenue for general purpose of the State predominates the levy becomes a tax. In regard to fee, there is, and must always be, correlation between the fee collected and the service intended to be rendered. In determining whether a levy is a fee, the true test must be whether its primary and essential purpose is to render specific services to a specified area or class; it may be of no consequence that the State may ultimately and indirectly be benefited by it. The power of any legislature to levy a fee is conditioned by the fact that it must be "by and large" a quid pro quo for the services rendered. However, correlationship between the levy and the services rendered/expected is one of general character and not of mathematical exactitude. All that is necessary is that there should be a "reasonable relationship" between the levy of the fee and the services rendered. There is no generic difference between a tax and a fee. Both are compulsory exactions of money by public authorities. Compulsion lies in the fact that payment is enforceable by law against a person in spite of his unwillingness or want of consent. There is no generic difference between a tax and a fee. Both are compulsory exactions of money by public authorities. Compulsion lies in the fact that payment is enforceable by law against a person in spite of his unwillingness or want of consent. A levy in the nature of a fee does not cease to be of that character merely because there is an element of compulsion or coerciveness present in it, nor is it a postulate of a fee that it must have direct relation to the actual service rendered by the authority to each individual nor that each should obtain the benefit of the service. 11. In B.S.E. Brokers' Forum, Bombay and Ors. v. Securities and Exchange Board of India reported in (2001) 3 SCC 482 , it was held that in determining whether a levy is a fee or not emphasis must be on whether its primary and essential purpose is to render specific services to a specified area or class. The relevant part of the observation appearing in para-30 reads as follows: 30. This Court in the case of Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of A.P. has taken the view that the distinction between a tax and a fee lies primarily in the fact that a tax is levied as part of a common burden, while a fee is for payment of specific benefit or privilege although the special advantage is secondary to the primary motive or regulation in public interest. This Court said that in determining whether a levy is a fee or not emphasis must be on whether its primary and essential purpose is to render specific services to a specified area or class. In that process if it is found that the State ultimately stood to benefit indirectly from such levy, the same is of no consequence. It also held that there is no generic difference between a tax and a fee and both are compulsory exactions of money by public authorities. This was on the basis of the fact that the compulsion lies in the fact that the payment is enforceable by law against a person in spite of his unwillingness or want of consent. It also held that there is no generic difference between a tax and a fee and both are compulsory exactions of money by public authorities. This was on the basis of the fact that the compulsion lies in the fact that the payment is enforceable by law against a person in spite of his unwillingness or want of consent. It also held that a levy does not cease to be a fee merely because there is an element of compulsion or coerciveness present in it, nor is it a postulate of a fee that it must have a direct relation to the actual service rendered by the authority to each individual who obtains the benefit of the service. It also held that the element of quid pro quo in the strict sense is not always a sine qua non for a fee, and all that is necessary is that there should be a reasonable relationship between the levy of fee and the services rendered. The judgment also held that the earlier judgment of this Court in Kewal Krishan Puri v. State of Punjab is only an obiter. (Emphasis given) 12. Coming to 2004, the ratio in Shirur Mutt. (supra) was found to be too technical and rigid and was not in tune with the requirement of prevailing social conditions as held by the Apex Court in State of H.P. and Ors. v. Shivalik Agro Poly Products and Ors. reported in (2004) 8 SCC 556 . The changes brought about in the concept relating to the distinction between tax and fee has been compendiously stated in para-15, which reads thus: 15. It will be thus seen that the statement of law made in Shirur Mutt case regarding the attributes of fee has undergone a sea change. The consistent view now is that there is no generic difference between a tax and a fee which are both compulsory exaction of money by public authorities. The correlationship between the levy and the services rendered should be one of general character and not of mathematical exactitude. Further, the board and general correlationship between the totality of the fee on the one hand and the totality of the expenses of the services on the other, will be sufficient to ' justify the levy. The levy will not fail only on. Further, the board and general correlationship between the totality of the fee on the one hand and the totality of the expenses of the services on the other, will be sufficient to ' justify the levy. The levy will not fail only on. the ground that the measure of its distribution on the persons or incidence is disproportionate to the actual services rendered by them. The true test being the comprehensive level of the value of the totality of the services set off against the totality of the receipts. The character of the fee is thus established. The vagaries in its distribution amongst the class do not detract from the concept of a fee as such. (Emphasis given) 13. The majority view in State of W.B. v. Kesoram Industries Ltd. and Ors. reported in (2004) 10 SCC 201 , diluting the concept of quid pro quo, states: It is not necessary that the services rendered from out of the fee collected should be directly in proportion with the amount of fee collected. It is equally not necessary that the services rendered by the fee collected should remain confined to the persons from whom the fee has been collected. Availability of indirect benefit and a general nexus between the persons bearing the burden of levy of fee and the services rendered out of the fee collected is enough to uphold the validity of the fee charged. (Emphasis supplied) 14. It would thus be seen that the recruitment to justify a levy of fee will still be availability of indirect benefit and a general nexus between the persons bearing the burden of levy and the services rendered out of the fee collected. 15. The significant shift in the judicial perception noticed above, came to be further confirmed in Sona Chandi Oal Committee and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2005) 2 SCC 345 in the following lines: The traditional concept of quid pro quo in a fee has undergone considerable transformation. So far as the regulatory fee is concerned, the service to be rendered is not a condition precedent and the same does not lose the character of a fee provided the fee so charged is not excessive. It was not necessary that service to be rendered by the collecting authority should be confined to the contributories alone. So far as the regulatory fee is concerned, the service to be rendered is not a condition precedent and the same does not lose the character of a fee provided the fee so charged is not excessive. It was not necessary that service to be rendered by the collecting authority should be confined to the contributories alone. The levy does not cease to be a fee merely because there is an element of compulsion or coerciveness present in it, nor is it a postulate of a fee that it must have a direct relation to the actual service rendered by the authority to each individual who obtains the benefit of the service. Quid pro quo in the strict sense was not always a sine qua non for a fee. All that is necessary is that there should be a reasonable relationship between the levy of fee and the services rendered not necessary to establish that those who pay the fee must receive direct or special benefit or advantage of the services rendered for which the fee was being paid. It was held that if one who is liable to pay, receives general benefit from the authority levying the fee, the element of service required for collecting the fee is satisfied. (Emphasis given) 16. The 'principle of equivalence', which was diluted in some of the previous decisions came to be re-affirmed by the Apex Court in Jindal Stainless Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Haryana and Ors. reported inAIR 2006 SC 3396. That the fee must be based on the 'principle of equivalence' has been observed in para-39 of the said judgment, which reads as follows: 39. On the other hand, a fee is based on the "principle of equivalence". This principle is the converse of the "principle of ability" to pay. In the case of a fee or compensatory tax, the "principle of equivalence" applies. The basis of a fee or a compensatory tax is the same. The main basis of a fee or a compensatory tax is the quantifiable and measurable benefit. In the case of a tax, even if there is any benefit, the same is incidental to the government action and even if such benefit results from the government action, the same is not measurable. The main basis of a fee or a compensatory tax is the quantifiable and measurable benefit. In the case of a tax, even if there is any benefit, the same is incidental to the government action and even if such benefit results from the government action, the same is not measurable. Under the principle of equivalence, as applicable to a fee or a compensatory tax, there is an indication of a quantifiable data, namely, a benefit which is measurable. 17. From the above decisions focusing on the shift in conception of a fee, the position that has crystalised is that a levy qua fee cannot be dehors reasonable relationship between the levy and the services rendered though equivalent quid pro quo is no longer sine qua non. Such correlation may be indirect but the totality of the fee and the totality of the expenses of the services must have a general correlationship without which the levy will lose characteristic of a fee. Tax and fee thus stand on different footings though they have no generic differences and both are compulsory exactions of money by public authorities. The basic and essential difference lies in the fact that a tax is a common burden which can be levied without any consideration. But a fee is not a common burden and can not be without any consideration. Such consideration need not be equivalent quid pro quo or availability of any direct benefit to the category from whom the levy is exacted. But there must be a general correlationship between the fees and the services rendered showing at least indirect benefit to the category burdened though such indirect benefit need not have equivalence to the totality of the levy. Sans such reasonable correlationship or nexus, a fee would become a tax in disguise. There cannot be any open ended provision empowering any authority to impose fee, as such a provision has potential of being resorted to for arbitrary exercise of powers, an anathema to the rule of law. Neither the Water Act nor the Air Act has any provision for imposing tax. Section 25 of the Water Act and Section 21 of the AIR Act delegates powers to the appropriate Government to prescribe fees by rules for the services to be rendered by the Board to the category from whom the fee has to be exacted. 18. Neither the Water Act nor the Air Act has any provision for imposing tax. Section 25 of the Water Act and Section 21 of the AIR Act delegates powers to the appropriate Government to prescribe fees by rules for the services to be rendered by the Board to the category from whom the fee has to be exacted. 18. In the Rules of 1989, the consent fee for establishment of an industry was only Rs. 5,000/- for the category investing between 1 crore and 5 crores, and the consent fee for operation of such industry was also Rs. 500/-. The same was in force even in 2004 when the Petitioner established the cold storage. In 2005, the said Rules have been amended giving a sudden spurt to the rate of fees from Rs. 5,000/- to Rs. 75,000/- for 'consent to establish' fee and from Rs. 500/- to Rs. 25,000/- for 'consent to operate' fee for such category of industry. The only justification advanced during argument by Mr. S. Talapatra, learned senior counsel to the Respondent-Board is that after a period of 16 years such a hike has to be held reasonable. The Board accordingly, submitted a proposal to the State Government, who accepted the same by amending the Rules impugned. But nothing has been pleaded or advanced as to what material changes, quantitatively or qualitatively, would take place in the services rendered by the Board to this category of industries by way of comparison between those available immediately before the amendments and the proposed ones after the amendments to justify that there is a general correlation between the modified rate and the services intended to be provided though such correlation need not show any equivalence. Dehors any such correlation would inevitably fail to justify such a hike as in that case it would loose the characteristic of a fee and become a tax in disguise. Materials on record are not at all adequate to give any light on the correlation between the modified levy and the services intended to be provided generally or indirectly to the category from whom the same is intended to be exacted. Materials on record are not at all adequate to give any light on the correlation between the modified levy and the services intended to be provided generally or indirectly to the category from whom the same is intended to be exacted. Considering possible financial implications and adverse effect on the State exchequer vis-a-vis services being rendered of which no materials are available on record, an appropriate direction to the Respondents to come out with necessary document showing general correlationship between new rate of fees and the services rendered by way of a comparative statement is called for. 19. Assuming that the consent fee for establishment as well as for operation of an industry under scrutiny has been raised by the amendments impugned on the basis of a reasonable correlation between the modified rate and the services intended to be rendered to the category from whom the same is intended to be exacted, the question that next confronts is whether an industry, such as the Petitioner, which received consent to establish and operate from the Board prior to the amendments in question can be made liable to pay the consent fee again at modified rate every time whenever fresh consent by way of renewal is required to be obtained. Section 25 of the Water Act which is relevant to this question, imposes certain restrictions on new outlets and new discharges. Sub-section (1) of that Section provides: 25. Restrictions on new outlets and new discharges. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, no person shall, without the previous consent of the State Board,- (a) establish or take any steps to establish any industry, operation or process, or any treatment and disposal system or any extension or addition thereto, which is likely to discharge sewage or trade effluent into a stream or well or sewer or on land (such discharge being hereafter in this section referred to as discharge of sewage) or (b) bring into use any new or altered outlet for the discharge of sewage; or (c) begin to make any new discharge of sewage ... It would be seen from Clause (a) that in the above provision, the word "establish" qualifies (i) industry, (ii) operation or process, (iii) any treatment and disposal system, (iv) any extension or addition thereto. It would be seen from Clause (a) that in the above provision, the word "establish" qualifies (i) industry, (ii) operation or process, (iii) any treatment and disposal system, (iv) any extension or addition thereto. In Clause (b) the word "new or altered" and in Clause (c) the word "new" when read with the word "establish" in Clause (a) and the short title "Restrictions on new outlets and new discharges" would make it amply clear that such restrictions of obtaining previous consent of the Board are intended for the new units only, not for existing ones. Rule 29 of the Water Prevention Rules prescribes the procedure of filling application for consent to be made under Section 25 of the Water Act. Essentially, such rule must be consistent with Section 25 of the said Act, as no rule can make any substantive provision contrary to the provision of the Act. Obviously, rule-making power is derived from the Act for the purpose of laying down the procedure essential for implementation of the provisions of the Act. Being a delegated legislation, no statutory rule can make any provision, which is apparently in conflict with any provisions of the Act. Neither it can add or substitute or supplement by way of making a substantive provision. 20. On the anvils of this legal principle regarding subordinate legislation, the provisions contained in Sub-rule (1) of Rule 29 of the Water Prevention Rules calls for closer examination. The said sub-section provides as follows: 29. Application for Consent: (1) Application for obtaining the consent of the Board for bringing into use any new or altered outlet for the discharge of sewage or trade effluent into a stream or well or sewer or on land or to begin to make any new discharge on sewage or trade effluent into a stream or well or sewer or on land under Section 25, or for continuing an existing discharge of sewage or trade effluent into a stream or well or sewer or on land under Section 26 shall be make to the Board in the case of any person other than a local body in Form XIII and in the case of any local body in Form XIII-A which may be obtained from the office of the Board alongwith Annexure on payment of ten rupees and every additional copy of that Annexure may be obtained on payment of five rupees. (Emphasis given) (ii) The application made under Sub-rule (1) for industries and by the local bodies mentioned under column I of the table given below shall be accompanied by the amount of consent fee as specified under column 2 thereof against the corresponding entry of the aforesaid column I: Criteria Consent fees in rupees 1. Industries with fixed capital Rs. 20,000/- investment more than Rs. 5.0 crores (Large Industries). 2. Industries with fixed capital Rs. 5,000/- investment more than Rs. 45.0 lacs but less than Rs. 5.0 crores (Medium Industries). 3. Industries with fixed capital Rs. 100/- investment upto Rs. 45.0 lacs (Small Industries). Class A municipal committees Rs. 2,000/- Class B municipal committees Rs. 5,00/- Class C municipal committees Rs. The words "for continuing an existing discharge of sewage" in Sub-rule (1) obviously refer to Section 26 of the Water Act with intend to cover the persons who were discharging any sewage or trade effluent into a stream or well or sewer or on land before commencing of the said Act, requiring such person to apply for consent on or before a date to be specified by the State Government as specifically provided in that Section. The Petitioner having established the industry only in 2004 does not fall within the mischief of Section 26 and, therefore, the words "for continuing an existing discharge of sewage or trade effluent into a stream or well or sewer or on land under Section 26" do not apply to it. In other words, application for consent under Sub-rule (1) of Rule 29, when read with Section 25 of the Water Act, would definitely appear to be intended for new industry only and the same in no way apply to an industry, which has already obtained consent for a limited period, for the purpose of fresh consent after expiry of the said period. 21. Once it is held that Rule 29 of the Water Prevention Rules is applicable for obtaining consent by the new units or for extension or addition to the disposal system only, the question that next arises whether at the time of renewal of consent the said provision for fresh application can be made applicable. 21. Once it is held that Rule 29 of the Water Prevention Rules is applicable for obtaining consent by the new units or for extension or addition to the disposal system only, the question that next arises whether at the time of renewal of consent the said provision for fresh application can be made applicable. Section 25(4)(a)(iii) of the Water Act provides that the State Board may grant its consent for such period as may be specified in the order, as has been done in the case of the Petitioner herein for a period of one year only. If it can be one year, why it cannot be for a month or even for a day? If a view is taken that such consent may be given for a month or a day the necessary corollary would be that after every month or a day, as may be specified in the order, an industry has to apply for fresh consent. Can it then be said that for every such application for fresh consent, a fresh prayer under Rule 29 is required to be made by the industry alongwith payment of a fee for establishment or operation at the modified rate? Such a view would undoubtedly lead to an absurdity and an element of arbitrariness in such a situation is bound to creep in. 22. That the requirement of consent from Board to establish or operate an industry under Section 25 of the Water Act or Section 21 of the AIR Act is not intended to put unnecessary hurdle in establishment and operation of an industry, can be gathered from Sub-section (7) of Section 25 of the Water Act, which provides as follows: (7) The consent referred to in Sub-section (1) shall, unless given or refused earlier, be deemed to have been given unconditionally on the expiry of a period of four months of the making of an application in this behalf complete in all respects to the State Board. The deeming provision of unconditional consent on the expiry of a period of four months would eloquently confirm that the restrictions contained therein are applicable only for new outlets and new discharges. As a matter of fact, a Pollution Control Board has nothing to do with establishment of an industry which falls in the larger domain of State policy. The deeming provision of unconditional consent on the expiry of a period of four months would eloquently confirm that the restrictions contained therein are applicable only for new outlets and new discharges. As a matter of fact, a Pollution Control Board has nothing to do with establishment of an industry which falls in the larger domain of State policy. What concerns such a Board is to prevent and control pollution of water and air from the new outlets and new discharges of any industry, operation or process. In order to prevent and control pollution, it has been provided in Section 25 of the Water Act that without consent of the Board no person should establish any industry, operation or process or any treatment and disposal system or any extension or addition thereto, which is likely to discharge sewage or trade effluent. Section 21 of the AIR Act has been enacted for same purpose i.e. not only to regulate establishment of an industry per se but to prevent and control air pollution from the operation of an industrial plant which is sought to be established in an air pollution control area. Thus, the main area of activity of a Board constituted under the aforesaid Acts must remain confined to prevent and control water and air pollution by regulating discharge of sewage or trade effluent from new outlets and new discharges under the Water Act and by regulating operation of an industrial plant within the air pollution control area. Establishment of an industry therefore, cannot be isolated from its outlets and discharges which only fall within the purview of the powers and functions of the Board. What has thus emerged from the above provisions is that application for consent under Section 25 of the Water Act and Section 21 of the AIR Act is intended for only new outlets and new discharges of an industry, operation or process, or any industrial plant newly established in the pollution control area and what follows therefrom is that no consent fee for establishment of an industry, operation or process is contemplated at the time of renewal of consent. I may, however, hasten to add that this observation is made on the basis of the legal provisions as they now stand, not intended to put an embargo on making of suitable provision by competent authority imposing renewal fees. I may, however, hasten to add that this observation is made on the basis of the legal provisions as they now stand, not intended to put an embargo on making of suitable provision by competent authority imposing renewal fees. Again, that must be on the basis of reasonable correlation between fees and services and at definite interval. 23. As seen above, the consent may be for such period as may be specified by the Board in its order as provided in Section 25(4)(a)(iii) of the Water Act and Section 21(4) of the AIR Act. Again, Section 33A of the Water Act empowers the Board to issue any directions in writing to any person, officer or authority, who shall be bound to comply with such directions. In the instant case, the Respondent Board granted consent to establish and operate only for a period of one year with a direction to the Petitioner to apply for fresh consent one month before expiry of the period. Such direction is, therefore, binding upon the Petitioner company. There may not be any confusion that the power to grant consent for a period to be specified in the order by the Board is not intended and cannot be construed to have intended for its arbitrary or whimsical application. It has purpose which is to equip the Board with sufficient power for taking necessary action if it is observed during the period of consent that an industry has failed to comply with the requirements of the law or instructions of the Board for regulation and control of water or air pollution. Enormous power has been given to the Board to withdraw or cancel the consent given at any time even before expiry of the limited period of consent and all such powers undoubtedly emanate from the paramount concern of controlling and regulating pollution which is threatening the very existence of the lives on the planet. Enormous power has been given to the Board to withdraw or cancel the consent given at any time even before expiry of the limited period of consent and all such powers undoubtedly emanate from the paramount concern of controlling and regulating pollution which is threatening the very existence of the lives on the planet. At the same time it also has to be borne in mind that all such powers given to the Board should not be construed as an instrument to exact money and augment resources dehors services or subject an industry to unnecessary burden by way of giving consent to establish or operate for a short period, which may be arguably even for a month or a day, and then asking such industry to pay the fees every time application for renewal or extension of the period of consent, is directed to be made. Exaction of fees is not the main object of the aforesaid law, giving powers to impose fees. The power is intended to enable the Board to render certain services which have closer nexus to the control of Water and Air Pollution and the benefits directly or indirectly to be derived by the category from whom such fees is intended to be exacted. 24. Once again I intend to make it clear that the position of law explained above is on the basis of the provisions which now exist. By saying so, I do not intend to mean that the State Government would have no power to provide for periodical exaction of fees by suitable amendments of the laws. But such a provision can be made only subject to the settled legal principles that whether one time or periodical, the fee must have a general correlation with the services to be rendered. Even though the same may not be equivalent or direct, it has to be shown in every such exaction what correlation it has with the services from which the particular category can even indirectly derives some benefit. It is seen in the State rules framed under the above two Acts, there is no express provision for exaction of 'consent fee' at the time of renewal or extension of the period of consent. 25. It is seen in the State rules framed under the above two Acts, there is no express provision for exaction of 'consent fee' at the time of renewal or extension of the period of consent. 25. The controversy regarding 'consent to establish fee' seem to have been set at rest by the contention made in para-22 of the counter-affidavit, which is in response to the contention made in para-13 of the writ petition. In para-13 the writ Petitioner contended that the Board by serving a notice on 18th May, 2005 had drawn its attention to the revised rate of consent fee structure brought about by the amendments impugned w.e.f. 3rd May, 2005, indirectly indicating and pressuring, by not renewing the consent, to deposit consent fee at the modified rate. The reply to that extent is categorical in para-22 of the counter-affidavit staring that the Petitioner does not come under the word "concern" and bence the memorandum dated 18th May, 2005 which clarified that pending applications for consent would fall within the purview of the amended rate of consent fee has no application in case of the Petitioner-company. This contention being significant touching the controversy whether the Petitioner is again required to pay consent fee for extension or renewal of the period of consent is quoted below: 22. That, with reference to Paragraph 13 of the said Writ Petition, it is submitted that the Memorandum dated 18/19.05.2005 was issued from the State Pollution Control Board to the units which had the consent fee at the pre-revised rate which existed prior to 03.05.2005. The revised rate was endorsed to the other units for their information only. In the said Memorandum it has been categorically mentioned that all concerns are required to deposit the additional amount of consent fees to the Tripura State Pollution Control Board for obtaining consent certificate. In the instant case the Petitioner does not come under the word 'concern' and hence is not applicable for the said unit and has been furnished with the said information only for purpose of dissemination. (Emphasis given) 26. This position stands confirmed by the correspondence received by the Petitioner-company from the Board asking it to apply for consent afresh. The said correspondence dated 02.01.2006 (Annexure-8) addressed to the Director of the Petitioner company by the Assistant Environmental Engineer of the Board reads: TRIPURA STATE POLLUTION CONTROLB OARD (A Govt. (Emphasis given) 26. This position stands confirmed by the correspondence received by the Petitioner-company from the Board asking it to apply for consent afresh. The said correspondence dated 02.01.2006 (Annexure-8) addressed to the Director of the Petitioner company by the Assistant Environmental Engineer of the Board reads: TRIPURA STATE POLLUTION CONTROLB OARD (A Govt. of Tripura Organisation) REMINDER No. F. 17(10)TSPCB/W/Cold/(M-Gr)/180902 January 02, 2006 To Sri Nilanjan Datta (Director), M/s. Sherowali Himghar & Services Pvt. Ltd. A.A. Road, Chandpur, Tripura(W). Sir, By our earlier letter No. F. 17 (10)/TSPCB/W/Cold/(M-Gr)/1809, Dated 06.12.2005, you were requested to apply to the Tripura State Pollution Control Board for obtaining Consent to Operate Certificate (Renewal) within 31.12.2005. But your application has not been received till date. You are once again requested to apply to the Board for the same within 7 days of receipt of this letter failing which TSPCB would be duty bound to issue Closure Order against your unit. (Emphasis mine) Yours faithfully, Sd/- 02.01.2006 (Aparajita Das) Assistant Environmental Engineer. 27. It would be seen that the request made in the above letter to the company, is to apply to the Board for obtaining 'consent to operate' certificate (renewal) only. There is no request to apply for obtaining 'consent to establish certificate'. This is also the submission of Mr. Talapatra that no fresh consent to establish the industry is contemplated or required by the Acts or the Rules or the directions of the Board. The said Respondent, however, has offered no clarification. Why then only one combined certificate for 'consent to establish' and 'consent to operate' was issued for a period of one year only and how the said certificate can now be given two different constructions as regards period of its validity? The combined certificate issued on 23.07.2004 conveying provisional consent to establish and to operate reads as follows: TRIPURA STATE POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD, VIGYAN BHAWAN, Pandit Nehru Complex, Gorkhabasti, Kunjaban, Agartala-799 006, Tripura West. No. F. 17(10)/TSPCBAV/Cold/ (M-Gr.)/1809 2129-31 Date: 23/07/2004 CERTIFICATE FOR CONSENT TO ESTABLISH/CONSENT TO OPERATE Under Section 25 / 26 of Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and Under Section 21 of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981. Reference: i) Your Application No. 9119 ii) Our NOC Register S1. No. 3415 dated: 05.07.2004 for : Fresh Consent Total investment: Rs. Reference: i) Your Application No. 9119 ii) Our NOC Register S1. No. 3415 dated: 05.07.2004 for : Fresh Consent Total investment: Rs. 2.247 Crore Storing Capacity: 5000 M.T. With reference to the above application, a provisional Consent to Establish/Consent to Operate Certificate is hereby issued in favour of M/s. Sherowali Himghar & Services (P) Ltd., Sri Nilanjan Datta (Director), Chandpur, Near Khayerpur, Tripura (W) to discharge its industrial and other effluents arising out of their premises into a stream/well/land as per Section 25 /26 of Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and to make emission from the plant/unit as per Section 21 of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 situated at Chandpur, Near Khayerpur, Tripura(W) subject to observance of other codal formalities of the Govt. of India/Govt. of Tripura/District Administration/Agartala Municipal Council/Nagar Panchayats/Health Department/Industries & Commerce Department and subject to observance of the following terms and conditions: i) All connections, joints, fittings etc. in the Unit are to be frequently checked and kept leak proof at all the time. ii) Fire Warning System (Alarm, Siren) is to be installed by the Unit to guard against accidental Pollution/mishap together with fire fighting devices. iii) Public liability, insurance coverage shall have to be provided to the workers of the Unit. iv) And on site emergency management plant shall have to be required. v) A green belt shall have to be developed to the surrounding areas of the Unit. vi) The unit should take necessary measures to combat noise pollution. This Certificate is Valid upto 19.07.2005 after which it should be renewed subject to the fulfillment of the terms and conditions prescribed by the Tripura State Pollution Control Board and application for renewal shall have to be made one month before expiry of this certificate. For and on behalf of Tripura State Pollution Control Board Sd/- 22.07.04 (Manas Mukherjee) Executive Engineer Tripura State Pollution Control Board. To M/s Sherowali Himghar & Services (P) Ltd. Sri Nilanjan Datta (Director) Chandpur, Near Khayerpur, Tripura(W). 28. Though the combined certificate of 'consent to establish' and 'consent to operate' was valid upto 19.07.2005 with direction to apply for renewal one month before expiry of the same, the Respondent Board wants this Court to construe the certificate for 'consent to establish' as a permanent one and the 'consent to operate' valid upto 19.07.2005. 28. Though the combined certificate of 'consent to establish' and 'consent to operate' was valid upto 19.07.2005 with direction to apply for renewal one month before expiry of the same, the Respondent Board wants this Court to construe the certificate for 'consent to establish' as a permanent one and the 'consent to operate' valid upto 19.07.2005. Such a construction, in my considered view is not warranted in the factual and legal situation noticed above. The submission, however, confirms one thing that the Board has nothing to do, as observed earlier, with the establishment of an industry though it has every power to put restrictions on new outlets or new discharges of an industry newly set up. This being the stand of the Board that no fresh consent to establish an industry, operation or process is required, it would be in the fitness of things of the Board to communicate to the Petitioner that the combined certificate issued on 23.07.2004 so far it relates to establishment of the industry of the Petitioner, stands extended and this should be done within a period of 1 (one) month from the date of passing of this judgment and order. 29. Coming to the question of requirement of seeking renewal of 'consent to operate' Mr. Talapatra would argue that the combined certificate deserves the consideration that only 'certificate of consent to operate' would require renewal after 19.07.2005 and the Petitioner is bound under Section 33A of the Water Act to comply with the direction given by the Board to apply for renewal. The confusion which had arisen in the mind of the Petitioner-company is whether while seeking such renewal it has to pay any consent fee at the enhanced rate which was expressed in its letter dated 01.12.2005 (Annexure-6). No categorical reply clarifying the position was attempted by the Board in its reply to the Petitioner by letter dated 06.12.2005 (Annexure-7) and 02.01.2006 (Annexure-8). Significantly, the Respondents even in their counter-affidavit made no express clarification though in paragraph 22 it has been contended that the amendments of the rules modifying the rate of fees have no application in the case of the Petitioner, who obtained consent before coming into force of the said amendments and that the word "concern" employed in the memorandum dated 18th May, 2005 does not intent to cover the Petitioner or similar persons who had already obtained consent before the amendment. 30. It is noticed 'consent to operate' is issued under Section 21 of the AIR Act. Similar provision does not exist in Section 25 of the Water Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the AIR Act provides: 21. Restrictions on use of certain industrial plants. - (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, no person shall, without the previous consent of the State Board, establish or operate any industrial plant in an air pollution control area. 31. It has been seen above that if 'consent to establish' is obtained under the Water Act no fresh 'consent to establish' is required to be obtained under the Air Act, as provided in Clause (ii) of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 8 of the Air Pollution Rules (inserted by First Amendment Rules, 2005) by the notification impugned herein. The said Clause reads: 2(ii) The industries which are applying for obtaining consent to establish certificate both under Water Act and Air Act need not deposit the consent fees for the Tripura State Pollution Control Board (Air Pollution) Rules, 1989 if, the consent fees is deposited for Tripura State Pollution Control Board (Water Pollution Control) Rules, 1989. Section 21 of the AIR Act has not by itself provided any 'consent to operate fees', but delegated the power to the State Government to prescribe the same. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 of the Air Pollution Rules provides for application for 'consent to operate' an industrial plant specified in the Schedule appended to the Air Act situated in an air pollution control area declared as such under Section 19 of the Act. The said Section provides that the State Government may after consultation with the Board by notification in the Official Gazette declare in such manner as may be prescribed any area or areas within the State as air pollution control area or areas for the purposes of the said Act. 32. Mr. Talapatra submits that the entire State has been declared under Section 19 as the air pollution control area and, therefore, any industry to set up within the State requires consent to operate from the State Board. 32. Mr. Talapatra submits that the entire State has been declared under Section 19 as the air pollution control area and, therefore, any industry to set up within the State requires consent to operate from the State Board. A closer examination of the submission in the light of the provision contained in Rule 8 of the Air Pollution Rules would show that it has been specifically provided in that rule that consent of the Board to operate an industrial plant is required only in respect of those industries situated in the air pollution control area which have been specified in the Schedule to the Air Act. It is, therefore not correct that each and every industry to be set up in the State is required to obtain consent of the State Board to operate even though the same has not been specified in the schedule appended to the said Act. 33. Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel for the Petitioner submits that the schedule to the Air Act has been deleted even before the Air Pollution Rules came into force. The deletion was done w.e.f. 01.04.1988 as specifically mentioned in the Air Act. The Air Pollution Rules were framed in 1989. When there is no schedule in the said Act, it is not clear why a reference has been made to the industries specified in the non-existent schedule in respect of which only consent to operate an industry has to be obtained, as clearly provided in Sub-rule (1) of Rule 8. 34. Every rule has to be construed strictly and, it is trite, no court shall attempt to add, amend or vary the same under the guise of interpretation as that would amount to usurpation of legislative powers. When Sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 specifically provides that consent to operate an industrial plant within the air pollution control area has to be obtained from the State Board only in relation to an industry which has been specified in the schedule of the Act, it is not possible for any court to take a view that even though an industry is not so specified it has to obtain consent to operate from the Board. If the intention of the rule makers was to make it obligatory on the part of every industry set up in the State to obtain consent to operate from the State Board, no matter whether such industry is or is not one specified in the schedule appended to the Act, it was a legal necessity for the concerned authority to carry out necessary amendments in Sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 deleting the words "specified in the Scheduled appended to the Act". By not doing so-sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 has been rendered otiose. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 8, which specified the consent fee in graduated rate is in relation to the applications made under Sub-rule (1) and, therefore, a combined reading of the two pro-visions would inevitably show that Sub-rule (1) having become otiose, the fees specified in Sub-rule (2) cannot be given effect to. It is strange to notice that more than 16 years has elapsed after the Air Pollution Rules were framed in 1989 imposing restrictions in relation to certain industries specified in the schedule of the AIR Act, which schedule was deleted in 1988, but no attempt is discernible from the materials on record to set at right this apparent inconsistency. Mr. Talapatra has no explanation to offer to suitably address the inconsistency. What would logically follow from the above is that the levy for consent to operate under Rule 8 cannot be given effect to till it is made clear to what industries situated in the State the requirement of obtaining 'consent to operate' from the State Board would apply. 35. The contention for the Petitioner-company that the Water Act or the Air Act has not authorised the State Government to make rules enabling the State Board to give consent for a limited duration or that the amendments impugned escalating the fee could not be done by the Government without consulting the Board has no substance. Section 25 of the Water Act has provided in Sub-section (4)(a)(iii) that consent will be valid only for such period as may be specified in the orders. Section 21 of the AIR Act has provided in Sub-section (4) that the consent shall be for such period as may be specified in the order. Thus, no necessity was there to make any provision in the rules regarding the duration of the consent and accordingly, the same has not been done. Section 21 of the AIR Act has provided in Sub-section (4) that the consent shall be for such period as may be specified in the order. Thus, no necessity was there to make any provision in the rules regarding the duration of the consent and accordingly, the same has not been done. The Respondent-Board has specifically contended that the proposal to amend the rules for modifying the rate of consent fee was initiated by the Board and the State Government acting upon the same amended the rules. In such a position, it cannot be said that the Board was not consulted by the State Government while amending the rules as required by proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 64 of the Water Act and Sub-section (3) of Section 54 of the AIR Act. The contention of Mr. Talapatra that the writ petition is not maintainable in as much as the Petitioner has filed the same without availing the alternative remedy of appeal, as provided in Section 28 of the Water Act and Section 31of the AIR Act has no substance. Mr. Deb correctly rebuts the same by saying that above provisions contemplates appeal against order of the State Board. It is seen the Petitioner-company by means of this writ petition has put under challenge mainly the amendments to the Water Pollution Rules and the Air Pollution Rules brought about by the State Government whereby the rate of consent fee has been given an unusual and sudden spurt. That apart, appellate authority is to be constituted by the State Government. Such an authority cannot decide question arising out of public law function or question touching the validity of the amendments to the rules impugned. In such a position writ proceeding is undoubtedly maintainable. 36. In the final analysis, upon consideration of the rival stand-points and the legal controversies noticed above, following positions have crystalised: (i) The provision of appeal in the Water Act or the Air Act being contemplated only against order of the State-Board, the present writ proceeding assailing the amendments brought about by the State Government is very much maintainable, more so, the appellate forum contemplated in the Acts cannot decide the question raised herein. (ii) A fee cannot be equated with a tax though there is no generic difference between the two, both being compulsory exactions by public authority. (ii) A fee cannot be equated with a tax though there is no generic difference between the two, both being compulsory exactions by public authority. While imposition of tax is not circumscribed by any consideration, a levy qua fee must have a reasonable correlation with the services to be provided to the category from whom such fee is intended to be exacted. Such a 'reasonable correlation must have 'principle of equivalence' as an element of benefit to the persons burdened with such fees constituting a general correlation between such persons and the services to be rendered, which remains to be sine qua non. Even after watering down, in the later judicial pronouncements, the dominance of the concept of equivalent quid pro quo as an essential feature of a fee, the concept of reasonable and general correlation continues to blow the whistle with the 'principle of equivalence' resurfaced. A fee, dehors such correlation, would lapse into a tax in disguise and consequently cannot survive judicial scrutiny. (iii) The amendments impugned rocketing the 'consent to establish fee' from Rs. 5,000/ - to Rs. 75,000/- and 'consent to operate fee' from Rs. 500/- to Rs. 25,000/- contain no expression to indicate general and reasonable correlation between the raised fee and the services intended to be provided to the category from whom such fee is intended to be exacted. Nothing is discernible from the said amendments or from the facts pleaded in the counter-affidavit, what services exactly are intended to be provided in return to that category to which the Petitioner belongs. As noticed above, consent to establish and operate was provisionally granted in 2004 for a period of one year only against 'consent fee' of Rs. 5,500/- only. No indication is discernible from the above amendments and the pleadings, what additional benefits would be available or services would be provided to that category, directly or indirectly, if they are made liable to pay additional amount at the modified rate. Complete absence of any such reasonable correlation between the levy and services to be provided, would render the impugned amendments invalid. Complete absence of any such reasonable correlation between the levy and services to be provided, would render the impugned amendments invalid. However, considering non-availability of sufficient materials on the question of general and reasonable correlationship between the raised fees and services and possible impact on the State exchequer from such invalidation, it is provided that the State-Respondent, in consultation with the Board would examine the position in the whole hog and make express provisions in relation to the amendments impugned indicating reasonable and general correlation, if any, between the modified rate of fees and the services to be rendered or any direct or indirect benefit to be derived by the category from whom such fee is intended to be exacted. This should be done within a period of 3 (three) months from the date of passing this judgment and order. If the Respondents fail to justify the modified rate of the levy in the above manner then, on the expiry of 3(three) months, the amendments impugned shall stand invalid. (iv) 'Consent to establish fee' under the Water Act is to be paid only for once at the time of making application for the first time under Rule 29 of the Water Pollution Rules read with Section 25 of the Water Act. The Board is competent to issue Certificate of consent for any period as may be specified in the certificate which is in the interest of preventing and regulating pollution. On being satisfied about compliance with the requirements of pollution control, the Board may extend the period of consent and unless specifically directed by the Board no fresh application for renewal is called for. Even though there is no direct or explicit provision for renewal of consent once obtained, the power of the Board to grant consent for any period to be specified in the order under Section 25(4)(a)(iii) of Water Act and 21(4) of the AIR Act or to give any direction under Section 31A of the Water Act would have the necessary implication that the Board may in its discretion direct that fresh application for renewal of consent within such period as it may specify has to be made. (v) The Petitioner-company was given a combined certificate of 'consent to establish' under the Water Act and 'consent to operate' under the Air Act for a period of one year only with a direction to apply for fresh consent one month before expiry of the said period. In view of above legal dispensation such direction has no apparent infirmity. The Board has admitted that no fresh application for renewal of the consent to establish is necessary and, therefore, the question of payment of the consent to establish fee again does not arise. (vi) In view of the legal exposition noticed above, the Petitioner is not required to pay 'consent to operate fee' at the existing or modified rate, every time renewal is sought for. The 'consent to operate fee' under the Air Act can be enforced in respect of an industry located in the State which has been specified in the schedule to the Act. That schedule having been deleted in 1988 before framing of the Air Pollution Rules in 1989, the consent to operate fee cannot be exacted or no 'consent to operate' is at all called for without specifying the industries or modifying the provisions in Rule 8 of the Air Pollution Rules. Though the said rules being later in point of time, reference to a non-existent schedule therein carries no meaning, it is trite that the court shall not amend a law in the guise of interpretation. That apart, by such reference to the schedule which once existed in the Act, the intention of the rule maker not to enforce the provision to all industries in the State is made clear. (vii) The State Government has been delegated under both the Acts to make suitable provisions in the rules requiring renewal of consent at regular interval on payment of fees. But for what has been seen above, any such fee must have reasonable correlation with the services to be rendered, to the category of persons from whom such fee is intended to be exacted. (viii) The memorandum dated 18.05.2005 (Annexure-5) issued by the Board containing clarification of the State Government with regard to deposit of additional fee for all applications pending before the amendments of the rules impugned suffers from no infirmity and, therefore, stands affirmed. The Petitioner-company, however, does not fall within the purview of that memorandum. (viii) The memorandum dated 18.05.2005 (Annexure-5) issued by the Board containing clarification of the State Government with regard to deposit of additional fee for all applications pending before the amendments of the rules impugned suffers from no infirmity and, therefore, stands affirmed. The Petitioner-company, however, does not fall within the purview of that memorandum. Other communication of the Board directing the Petitioner-company to apply for renewal of the 'certificate of consent to operate' being unsustainable in law are hereby set aside and quashed. 37. In view of the discussions and decisions aforementioned, this writ petition is allowed to the extent noted above. 38. No cost. Petition allowed