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2006 DIGILAW 858 (GAU)

Pravabati Ghosh v. Gautam Das

2006-09-12

I.A.ANSARI

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JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. Satish Chandra Ghosh (since deceased) made an application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act ('the MV Act') seeking an award for compensation for the injuries sustained by him in a motor vehicular accident, the injuries being, inter alia, multiple fracture of his right leg. The said injured died, on 18.12.2000, the death having, however, not been caused due to the injuries sustained by the said deceased in the accident aforementioned. On his death, the present petitioners, as legal representatives of the said deceased, sought for being substituted in place of the said deceased as claimants. On the ground that in the case of personal injury, no right to sue survives, the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, West Tripura, Agartala, passed an order, on 5.7.2001, rejecting the prayer made by the present petitioner for substitution. It is this order, which stands impugned in the present revision made under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 2. I have heard Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, and Mr. T.K. Dey, learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1. I have also heard Mr. S. Kar Bhowmik, learned Counsel, appearing for the respondent No. 2, and Mr. P. Gautam, learned Counsel, appearing for the respondent No. 3. 3. The question raised in the present revision is very significant, the question being thus : Having presented an application under Section 166 or Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ('the MV Act'), claiming compensation not only for the personal injuries sustained by him in an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle in a public placed, but also for compensation towards expenses incurred for treatment, loss of income, etc., if a claimant dies during the pendency of the claim proceeding, whether his legal representatives can be substituted and brought on record and whether such legal representatives can continue with the proceedings if the claimant's death was not caused in consequence of the injuries sustained by him but for some other cause? 4. My quest for an answer to the above question brings me, first, to the provisions of Section 166 of the MV Act, which is reproduced hereinbelow: 166. Application for compensation. 4. My quest for an answer to the above question brings me, first, to the provisions of Section 166 of the MV Act, which is reproduced hereinbelow: 166. Application for compensation. - (1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in Sub-section (1) of Section 165 may be made: (a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or (b) by the owner of the property; or (c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or (d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be: Provided that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined, shall be impleaded as respondents to the application. (2) Every application under Sub-section (1) shall be made, at the option of the claimant either to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred, or to the Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or carries on business or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides, and shall be in such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed: Provided that where no claim for compensation under Section 140is made in such application, the application shall contain a separate statement to that effect immediately before the signature of the applicant. (4) The Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under Sub-section (6) of Section 158 as an application for compensation under this Act. 5. (4) The Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under Sub-section (6) of Section 158 as an application for compensation under this Act. 5. From a careful analysis of the provisions contained in Section 166, it clearly transpires that while an application making claim for compensation, in respect of an accident involving the death of a person arising out of the use of a motor vehicle, can be made by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased persons or by their authorized agents, an application claiming compensation in respect of bodily injury caused to a person in an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle can be made either by a person, who has sustained injury or by such person's duly authorized agent. It. clearly follows from the provisions contained in Section 166 that if a person, who suffers bodily injury in a motor vehicular accident, chooses not to make any claim for compensation during his life-time, Section 166 does not recognize the rights of the legal representatives of such a person to institute proceedings claiming compensation if the injured dies without having instituted a proceeding for compensation in a Claims Tribunal constituted under Section 165 of the MV Act. 6. Bearing in mind what has been indicated above let me, now, turn to Section 306 of the Succession Act, 1925. This section reads as follows: 306. Demands and rights of action of, or against deceased survive to and against executor or administrator. -All demands whatsoever and all rights to prosecute or defend any action or special proceeding existing in favour of or against a person at the time of his decease, survive to and against his executors or administrators; except causes of action for defamation, assault, as defined in the Indian Penal Code, or other personal injuries not causing the death of the party; and except also cases whereafter the death of the party, the relief sought could not be enjoyed or granting it would be nugatory. 7. A careful reading of the provisions of Section 306 shows that the right to sue, ordinarily, survives to and against every person except when the cause of action is, inter alia, for defamation, assault-or other personal injuries not causing death of the party. 7. A careful reading of the provisions of Section 306 shows that the right to sue, ordinarily, survives to and against every person except when the cause of action is, inter alia, for defamation, assault-or other personal injuries not causing death of the party. What also follows from a careful reading of Section 306 is that though in a claim application, the claimant may seek reliefs of not only compensation for the injuries sustained by him. but also for the expenses incurred for his treatment, loss of income, future expenses to be incurred, etc., the fact remains that all these reliefs would be available to such a claimant provided that the claimant is found entitled to receive compensation for the personal injuries sustained by him. Hence, when a claimant's claim for compensation arises out of personal injury sustained by him, the right to sue does not survive in favour of his legal representatives, if the injured-claimant dies not because of the injuries sustained by him, but for some order reason. A reference may, in this regard, be made to Melepurath Sankunni Ezuthassan v. Thekittil Geopalankutty Nair (1986) 1 SCC 118 : AIR 1986 SC 411 . In Melepurath Sankunni (supra), the Supreme Court, on considering Section 306 of the Succession Act, 1925, held that action personal is mortur-cum-persona (a personal action dies with the person) applies if the plaintiff dies during the pendency of the suit; but if the plaintiff dies, after the suit is decreed, the right to sue survives, for, in such a case, the cause of action has merged in the decree and the decretal dues forms part of the estate left behind by the deceased. This, in turn, will mean that when a suit for personal injury is decreed, the legal representatives can put such a decree to execution and may, if an appeal is pending against such a decree, be substituted, for, the right to sue or be sued survives if the suit already stands decreed in favour of the injured before the injured, died. In Melepurath Sankunni (supra), it has also been made clear that Section 306 of the Succession Act speaks of an action and not of an appeal, the effect being that if the plaintiff dies without the suit having been decreed, the legal representatives cannot be substituted. In Melepurath Sankunni (supra), it has also been made clear that Section 306 of the Succession Act speaks of an action and not of an appeal, the effect being that if the plaintiff dies without the suit having been decreed, the legal representatives cannot be substituted. Clearly, therefore, when such a suit foils and the plaintiff or the claimant has preferred an appeal, the right to sue does not survive, for, the suit abates on the death of such a plaintiff or claimant. Explaining this position of law, the Supreme Court, in Melepurath Sankunni (supra), observed, 6. ...Section 306 speaks of an action and not of an appeal. Reading Section306 along with Rules 1 and 11 of Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, it is, however, clear that a cause of action for defamation does not survive the death of the appellant. 7. Where a suit for defamation is dismissed and the plaintiff has filed an appeal, what the appellant-plaintiff is seeking to enforce in the appeal is his right to sue for damages for defamation and as this right does hot survive his death, his legal representative has no right to be brought on the record of the appeal in his place and stead if the appellant dies during the pendency of the appeal. The position, however, is different where a suit for defamation has resulted in a decree in favour of the plaintiff because in such a case the cause of action has merged in the. decree and the decretal debt forms part of his estate and the appeal from the decree by the defendant becomes a question of benefit or detriment to the estate of the plaintiff-respondent which his legal representative is entitled to uphold and defend and is, therefore entitled to be substituted in place of the deceased respondent-plaintiff. 8. Section 306 further speaks only of executors and administrators but on principle the same position must necessary prevail in the case of other legal representatives, for such legal representatives cannot in law be in better or worse position than executors and administrators and what applies to executors and administrators will apply to other legal representatives also. 9. The position, therefore, is that had the appellant died during the pendency of his suit, the suit would have abated. 9. The position, therefore, is that had the appellant died during the pendency of his suit, the suit would have abated. Had he died during the pendency of the appeal filed by him in the district court, the appeal would have equally abated because his suit had been dismissed by the trial court. Had he, however, died during the pendency of the second appeal filed by the respondent in the High Court, the appeal would not have abated because he had succeeded in the first appeal and his suit had been decreed. As, however, the High Court allowed the second appeal and dismissed the suit, the present appeal by special leave must abate because what the appellant was seeking in this appeal was to enforce his right to sue for damages for defamation. This right did not survive his death and accordingly the appeal abated automatically on his death and his legal representatives acquired no right in law to be brought on the record in his place and stead. 8. What logically follows from the observations made above, in Melepurath Sankunni (supra), is that when an injured sues or makes an application to a Claims Tribunal seeking compensation, the right to sue does not survive if, during the life-time of the injured, proceedings do not culminate into an award in his favour. If the claim for compensation results into an award in favour of an injured and an appeal is preferred by the person, who is directed to pay compensation awarded to such an injured, the appeal against such an award would not abate and the legal representatives of such an injured can be substituted, for, the award, rendered in favour of such an injured-claimant, forms part of the estate left behind by the deceased. If, however, the claim for compensation is not awarded by the Claims Tribunal and the injured-claimant, having preferred appeal, dies during the pendency of the appeal, the right to sue will not survive in favour of his representatives, for, in such an appeal, what the legal representatives of such a claimant would be doing is to ask for compensation and the right to ask for compensation to be awarded does not survive if the claimant dies before the claim for compensation is awarded or decreed in his favour, the cause of death not being the injuries sustained by the deceased claimant. 9. 9. In M. Veerappa v. Evelyn Sequeria and Ors. (1988) 1 SCC 556 , the suit filed by the plaintiff against an advocate claiming compensation was held to have abated by the trial court on the ground that the plaintiff had died during the pendency of the suit. On appeal, the first appellate court reversed the order of dismissal against which the defendant successfully appealed and the cross-objection filed by the heirs of the deceased plaintiff was dismissed. In the backdrop of these facts, their Lordships of the Supreme Court has held that if the suit is based on tort, the suit abates if the plaintiff dies during the pendency of the suit; but if the suit stands decreed before the plaintiff dies, it becomes a debt to which the heirs succeed. Their Lordships have also held that if the suit is based on tort, the right to sue abates; but if the suit is based on contract, it survives and when a suit is based partly on tort and partly on contract, the suit abates to the extent that it relates to tortious liability, but the right to sue still survive so far as the contractual liability is concerned. 10. In M. Veerappa (supra), the Apex Court, taking note of the law laid down in Melepurath Sahkunni (supra), observed, thus: 10. The maxim 'actio personalis-cum-moritur persona' has been applied not only to those cases where a plaintiff dies during the pendency of a suit filed by him for damages for personal injuries sustained by him but also to cases where a plaintiff dies during the pendency of an appeal to the appellate court, be it the first appellate court or the second appellate court against the dismissal of the suit by the trial court and/or the first appellate court as the case may be. This is on the footing that by reason of the dismissal of the suit by the trial court or the first appellate court as the case may be, the plaintiff stands relegated to his original position before the trial court. Vide the decisions in Punjab Singh v. Ramautar Singh (1919)4 Pat. LJ 676 : AIR 1920. Pat. 841; Irulappa v. Madhciva AIR 1951 Mad. 733 ; Maniramlala v. Mt. Chattibai ILR 1938 Nag. 280 : AIR 1937 Nag. 216; Baboolal v. Ramlal AIR 1952 Nag. Vide the decisions in Punjab Singh v. Ramautar Singh (1919)4 Pat. LJ 676 : AIR 1920. Pat. 841; Irulappa v. Madhciva AIR 1951 Mad. 733 ; Maniramlala v. Mt. Chattibai ILR 1938 Nag. 280 : AIR 1937 Nag. 216; Baboolal v. Ramlal AIR 1952 Nag. 408 and Melepurath Sankunni Ezhuthassan v. Thekittil Geopalankutty AIR 1986 SC 411 : (1986) 1 SCC 118 . In Palaniappa Chettiar v. Rajah of Ramnad ILR 49 Mad. 208 and Motilal v. Harnarayan AIR 1923 Bom. 408 : 25 Bom. LR 435 : ILR 47 Bom. 716, it was held that a suit or an action which has abated cannot be continued thereafter even for the limited purpose of recovering the costs suffered by the injured party. The maxim of actio personalis cum moritur persona Has been held inapplicable only in those cases where the injury caused to the deceased person has tangibly affected his estate or has caused an accretion to he estate of the wrong-doer vide Rustomji Dorabji v. W.H. Nurse ILR 44 Mad. 357 and Ratanlal v. Baboolal AIR 1960 MP 200 as well as in those cases where a suit for damages for defamation, assault or other personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff had resulted in a decree in favour of the plaintiff because in such a case the cause of action becomes merged in the decree and the decretal debt forms part of the plaintiff's estate and the appeal from the decree by the defendant becomes a question of benefit or detriment to the estate of the plaintiff which his legal representatives are entitled to uphold and defend (vide Gopal v. Ramchandra ILR 26 Bom. 597 and Mclepurath Sankunni v. Thekittil AIR 1986 SC 411 : (1986) 1 SCC 118 . 11. What further follows from the observations made in M. Veerappa (supra) is that a suit for personal injury cannot survive even for the limited purpose of recovering the cost suffered by the injured. In other words, even for the limited purpose of recovering the expenses incurred by the injured-claimant for his treatment, the right to sue will not survive in favour of such an injured-claimant's legal representatives if the injured-claimant dies without any decree or award having been rendered in his favour entitling him to receive such an amount. 12. In other words, even for the limited purpose of recovering the expenses incurred by the injured-claimant for his treatment, the right to sue will not survive in favour of such an injured-claimant's legal representatives if the injured-claimant dies without any decree or award having been rendered in his favour entitling him to receive such an amount. 12. In the face of the authoritative pronouncements in Melepurath Sankunni (supra) and M. Veerappa (supra), there can be no escape from the conclusion that in the present case, since the said deceased had made the claim for compensation for personal injuries sustained by him and the claim proceeding did not end in an award in his favour granting him compensation, the right to sue did not survive, in favour of the legal representatives of the said claimant, even for. the limited purpose of recovering the expenses for the treatment, which the injured-claimant might have incurred. Considered thus, it is abundantly clear that the impugned order, whereby the learned Tribunal has rejected the present petitioners' prayer for substitution, is in conformity with the provisions of law as indicated in Melepurath Sankunni (supra) and M. Veerappa (supra). 13. Let me, now, refer to some of the decisions, which have dealt with similar question. In Joti Ram and Ors. v. Chaman Lal and Other AIR 1985 P&H 2 , a Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana had the occasion to consider a case, where a claimant's application for compensation for personal injuries Had several heads of compensation, namely, pain and sufferings, medical expenses, special diet, expenses required for regaining of health and loss of earnings. The Division Bench, in Joti Ram (supra), however, held that so far as the claim for compensation for pain and sufferings was concerned, the same was not permissible to grant; but the claim for damages, which affect the estate of the deceased, such as, expenses for treatment, loss of income, etc., are concerned, the right to sue would survive in favour of the legal representatives of such a deceased. Whale considering the decision in Joti Ram (supra), what is of immense importance to note is that this decision did not have the benefit of the authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Melepurath Sankunni (supra) and/or in M. Veerappa (supra). Whale considering the decision in Joti Ram (supra), what is of immense importance to note is that this decision did not have the benefit of the authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Melepurath Sankunni (supra) and/or in M. Veerappa (supra). I have already, pointed cut above that in a suit based on tort, such as, a suit or action for compensation for bodily injuries and/or expenses of the proceeding the right to sue will not survive inasmuch no decree or award stands granted, in such a suit or action, in favour of the deceased, for, it is only on granting of a decree or award, in such a case, that the decree for compensation - be it for pain and suffering or for expenses incurred for treatment or loss of income, - will affect the estate of the deceased claimant by causing accretion to his estate. 14. In Joti Ram (supra), the court referred to Hazari v. Neki (dead) AIR 1968 SC 1205 , as an authority for the proposition that right of pre-emption survives in favour of the deceased-plaintiff. While considering the case of Hazari (supra), what needs to be noted is that when a claim for compensation is in respect of damage caused to a property or loss of a property, the right to sue is not taken away by Section 306 of the Succession Act. This apart, even Section 166 of the MV Act, clearly shows that as far as the compensation for damage to property is concerned, it does not fall within personal injury and cause of action in such a case would survive. 15. The Division Bench, in Joti Ram (supra), also referred to Girijanandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain Choudhary AIR 1967 SC 1124 , in support of its conclusion that the right to sue in respect of expenses incurred by an injured claimant and/or loss of his income, etc., arising out of personal injuries, would survive in favour of the legal representatives of such a claimant. While considering the case of Girijanandini Devi (supra), it is pertinent to note that a specific conclusion reached by the Apex Court, in Girijanandini Devi (supra), is that "a claim for rendition of account is not a personal claim. It is not extinguished because the party who claims an account, the party who is, called upon to accounts dies. While considering the case of Girijanandini Devi (supra), it is pertinent to note that a specific conclusion reached by the Apex Court, in Girijanandini Devi (supra), is that "a claim for rendition of account is not a personal claim. It is not extinguished because the party who claims an account, the party who is, called upon to accounts dies. The maxim 'actio personalis moritur cum persona' a personal action dies with the person has a limited application. It operates in a limited class of actions ex-delicto such as actions for damages for defamation, assault or other personal injuries not causing the death of the party, and in other actions where after the death of the party the relief granted could not be enjoyed or granting it would be nugatory. An action for account is not an action for damages ex delicto and does not fall within the enumerated classes. Nor is it such that the relief claimed being personal could not be enjoyed after death, or granting it would be nugatory. Death of the person liable to render an account for the property received by him does not, therefore, affect the liability of his estate." 16. A claim for rendition of account, it maybe borne in mind, is, basically, a claim for property and such a claim does not fall within the meaning of personal injury and such a claim is not barred under Section 306. When a person, in addition to making claim for compensation, for bodily injury, makes a claim for compensation for damage to his vehicle or for damage to his property by a motor vehicular accident, Section 306 would bar claim for compensation for bodily injury; but it shall have no bearing on the claim for compensation so far as damage to vehicle or property is concerned; but when the claim for compensation is for personal injury and also for loss of income, expenses incurred for treatment, etc., the right to recover expenses for treatment or loss of income is inextricably connected with the right to recover compensation for personal injury. It is only on proof of personal injury caused to the claimant that reliefs flowing therefrom, such as, compensation for pain and sufferings, expenses for treatment or loss of income, etc., would become available to the claimant. It is only on proof of personal injury caused to the claimant that reliefs flowing therefrom, such as, compensation for pain and sufferings, expenses for treatment or loss of income, etc., would become available to the claimant. Hence, when such a claimant dies and when the right to sue for bodily injury, in such a case, does not survive, the right to recover the expenses for treatment and/or loss of income, etc., can also not survive independent of the claim for compensation for personal injury, for, dehors the personal injury, claim for compensation for expenses of treatment or loss of income, etc., cannot survive. To enable such a claim to survive in favour of the legal representative, the claim has to end either in an award or decree within the life-time of the claimant, for, on granting of an award or decree, the award or the decree, as the case may be, will become a part of the estate of the deceased. 17. The case of S. Muniyappa v. H.L. Narasimhaiah and Ors. AIR 1984 Kant. 63 (DB) is yet another case, which involved similar question. In this case, a scooter rider was knocked down by a car on a road in Bangalore and the scooter rider sustained bodily injuries. He claimed compensation for a sum of rupees one lakh alleging that the accident had occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the car by its driver. The Claims Tribunal, having found the driver of the car guilty of causing the accident by his rash and negligent driving, awarded Rs. 15,430.03 as compensation to the claimant for the personal injuries sustained by him. Dissatisfied with the award, so given, the claimant preferred an appeal; but during the pendency of the appeal, the claimant died. However, the death of the claimant was not in consequence of the bodily injuries sustained by him in the accident. The question, which arose in the appeal, was whether the claimant-appellant's claim for enhancement of compensation for the personal injuries sustained by him due to the negligent driving of the car by its driver survived, on the claimant-appellant's death, to his legal representatives. The question, which arose in the appeal, was whether the claimant-appellant's claim for enhancement of compensation for the personal injuries sustained by him due to the negligent driving of the car by its driver survived, on the claimant-appellant's death, to his legal representatives. By referring to Section 306 of the Succession Act, the Court held, in S. Muniyappa (supra), that Section306 makes it clear that a suit for damages for personal injuries not causing death of a party would not survive and the cause of action abates with the death of the person injured. While so holding, the court observed as under: 20. Thus as the law stands in India, it is obvious that a suit for personal injury does not survive the death of the injured. An appeal stands on much the same footing as an original suit. So, when an appeal is filed against a decree dismissing a suit for malicious prosecution, but the tort feasor dies during the pendency of the appeal, the appeal abates, Maniram v. Chalti BaiAIR 1937 Nag. 216. Where a decree is passed for damages against the tort feasor and he filed an appeal but dies during its pendency, the appeal or the suit will not abate, vide Paramen v. Sundarrajja ILR (1902) Mad 4991; Haridas v. Jaganath Das ILR (1940) Nag. 63; Gopal v. Ramchandra ILR (1902) 26 Bom. 597. Where an appeal is filed by the tort feasor and cross-objections are filed by the plaintiff and the appellant dies then, though the appeal does not abate, the cross-objections would abate, for if the plaintiff had appealed the same could have abated. 21. Thus, it is clear that the appeal filed by the victim for enhancement of compensation does not survive the death of the injured, as the law stands in India today. Therefore, the appeal, without more, has to be dismissed. The decree that is already passed by the trial court in favour of the injured enures to the benefit of legal heirs as representing the estate of the deceased and they would be entitled to defend it in case that is challenged by the other side by filing an appeal, for the legal heirs have the right to defend the estate of the deceased. But the appeal in this case would not survive, for the appeal was instituted by the injured-claimant himself for enhancement of compensation and the right dies with him. The legal position stated as above by the Division Bench of this Court has since been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the decisions of the Supreme Court in Melepurath's case and M. Veerappa's case it becomes obvious that such legal position has stood affirmed by the Supreme Court even though there is no specific reference made to the Division Bench decision of this Court in that regard. 18. Priviska Rozario v. Ford Foundation AIR 1969 Cal. 394 is a case, wherein a person, having been made a claim for compensation, under Section 110A(1)(a) of the MV Act, for personal injuries had died during the pendency of the claim proceeding, the death being a result of the personal injuries sustained by him. In dealing with the said case, the court, in Priviska Rozario (supra), held that the claim for personal injuries could be prosecuted on the death of the claimant by his legal representatives if such death had occurred as a result of the injuries sustained by the claimant provided that such a claim does not come in conflict with a claim made by the legal representatives under Clause (b) of Section 110A(1) due to the death of the claimant occurring as a result of the injuries sustained by him in a motor vehicular accident. Whiled considering this decision, it is important to note that when a person, having sustained personal injuries in a motor vehicular accident, dies, a claim for compensation can, now, be made under Section 166(1)(c) by his legal representatives or under Section 166(d) of the MV Act, by their authorized agent. Hence, when such an injured person, having instituted a claim for compensation, dies, because of the injuries sustained by him, there is no reason why his legal representatives cannot continue with such an application, for, such an application does not come in conflict with the legal representatives' right to receive compensation for the death. In short, while the legal representatives of such an injured-deceased can maintain the same application or they may institute a proceeding afresh claiming compensation for the death of the deceased provided, as already indicated hereinbefore, that the death is caused as a result of the injuries sustained by such a person. 19. In short, while the legal representatives of such an injured-deceased can maintain the same application or they may institute a proceeding afresh claiming compensation for the death of the deceased provided, as already indicated hereinbefore, that the death is caused as a result of the injuries sustained by such a person. 19. CP Kandaswamy v. Mariappa AIR 1974 Mad. 178 is a case, where the claimant not only sustained bodily injury, but his bicycle too was damaged. The injured made a claim for compensation not only for the personal injuries sustained by him, but also for the damage caused to his property, i.e., his bicycle. When the question arose as to whether the right to sue in favour of the legal representatives would survive or not in such a case, the court held that though the compensation for personal injuries has abated, claim for compensation for damage to the bi-cycle, which the claimant was riding, still survived. This decision clearly reveals that when the claim for compensation is not only for the personal injuries caused to the claimant, but also for damage caused to his property, the right to sue will not survive so far as the claim arising out of the personal injury is concerned, but the right to receive compensation for damage caused to the property still survives. Such a case stands on an entirely different footing than the case, where claim for compensation for loss of income, etc., is dependant upon, and arise out of, bodily injuries sustained by the claimant as in the case at hand. 20. I may, now, point out that in Kannamma v. Deputy General Manager (1991) ACC 421 (Kant), a Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court had the occasion to deal with the question, which has been raised in the present revision, and, having considered all the relevant authorities on this subject, the court summarized the position of law as follows: 10. I may, now, point out that in Kannamma v. Deputy General Manager (1991) ACC 421 (Kant), a Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court had the occasion to deal with the question, which has been raised in the present revision, and, having considered all the relevant authorities on this subject, the court summarized the position of law as follows: 10. What emerges from the above consideration of the question relating to a claim by a person for compensation for personal (bodily) injuries sustained in a motor accident on suck person's death not caused due to such injuries, surviving to such person's legal representatives, may now be summarized: (1) The Common law Rule 'actio personalis moritur cum persona' as embodied in Section 306 of the Succession Act since applies to India, a claim by a person for compensation for personal injuries caused in a motor accident does not, on that person's death not being the consequence of such injuries, survive to his/her legal representatives; (2) Cause of action for personal injuries being founded on tort (motor accident caused by the tort-feasor) injured person's claims for damages under Heads recognized by Common Law and not by Statute, based on such tort and not independently of it, cannot, on such person's death, survive for prosecution by his/her executors or administrators (or legal representatives) since Section 306 of the Succession Act, in express terms, declares that the cause of action in favour of a person for personal injuries (tort) does not survive on such person's death to his/her executors or legal representatives; (3) A claim by a person for compensation for personal injuries, be it pending before the Claims Tribunal, be it in pending in the first Appellate Court or be it pending in the second Appellate Court, does not survive, on such person's death not caused as a consequence of personal injuries, to his legal representatives; (4) A claim of a person for compensation for personal injuries if has resulted in award of the Claims Tribunal or decree of the Appellate Court, survives to his legal representatives on its death even if such death is not the consequence of personal injuries sustained by him and hence, if such award or decree is disputed in the first Appellate Court or the second Appellate Court, the same could be resisted by the legal representatives of the claimant; (5) *** *** *** (6) *** *** *** (7) *** *** *** 12. In the result, the Full Bench answers the question referred for its decision by the Division Bench, thus: (i) A claim petition presented under Section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, by the person sustaining bodily injuries in a motor accident, claiming compensation for personal injuries as also for compensation towards expenses, loss of income, etc., (loss to estate) cannot, on such person's death occurring not as a result of consequence of bodily injuries sustained from a motor accident, be prosecuted by his/her legal representatives; but (ii) A claim petition presented under Section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, by the person sustaining bodily injuries in a motor accident, claiming compensation for personal injuries as also for compensation towards expenses, loss of income, etc., (loss to estate) can, on such person's death occurring as a result of consequence of bodily injuries sustained in the motor accident, be prosecuted by his/her legal representatives only in so far as the claim for compensation in that claim petition relates to loss of estate of the deceased person due to bodily injuries sustained in the motor accident. 21. For the reasons, which I have already indicated above, I respectfully agree with the propositions of law, which have been laid down in Kannamma (supra). 22. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, what clearly emerges is that when a person, who sustains injury in a motor vehicular accident, makes an application, under Section 166or 163A of the MV Act, claiming compensation for personal injuries sustained by him and also seeks compensation towards the expenses for treatment, loss of income, etc., right to sue will not survive in favour of his or her legal representatives even for the limited purpose of recovering the cost of the proceeding if such person's death occurs not as a result of the bodily injuries sustained by him, but for some other cause. However, if such a person, having instituted such a claim proceeding for compensation, dies as a result of the bodily injuries sustained by him, right to sue will survive in favour of his legal representatives. 23. However, if such a person, having instituted such a claim proceeding for compensation, dies as a result of the bodily injuries sustained by him, right to sue will survive in favour of his legal representatives. 23. In the backdrop of the position of law as discussed above, when I turn to the factual matrix of the present case, I notice that in the case at hand, the predecessor-in-interest of the present petitioners had instituted the claim proceeding seeking compensation for the personal injuries, lost of income, etc; but in view of the fact that his death was not as a result of the injuries sustained by him, the right to sue does not survive in favour of his legal representatives, i.e., the present petitioners. Viewed, thus, it is clear, if I may reiterate, that the impugned order passed by the learned Tribunal is in accordance with law and calls for no interference by this Court. 24. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this revision fails and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed. 25. No order as to costs. 26. Send back the LCR. Petition dismissed.