Judgment ( 1 ) HEARD learned counsel for the parties. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff-Liquidator,bhopal Co-operative Society Ltd. , pratapnagar, Udaipur filed the suit for eviction against the defendantappellant which was decreed by the trial court by the judgment and decree dated 12. 9. 1977. The appeal against the said judgment and decree was dismissed by the appellate court on 19. 11. 1982. Hence this second appeal. Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff in his plaint alleged that to settle the refugees came after partition, a society named as bhopal Co-operative Society Ltd. , Pratapnagar, Udaipur was constituted. ( 3 ) THE said society got the land from the State Government which includes of uncultivated land also. The land was allotted for establishing a town for these refugees. The society thought it proper that to give some facilities to the members of the town, a poultry-farm, sheep-breeding centre and dairy-farm may be established in the same area. For this purpose, the land measuring 30 bighas was leased out to the defendant and for which the lease deed was executed on 25. 5. 1951. Some objection was raised for letting out the land, therefore, the State government acquired half of the disputed land and only 15 bighas of land remained with the plaintiff and which continued in the tenancy of the defendant. A Liquidator was appointed for the plaintiff-society. He served notice upon the defendant-appellant for eviction from the land in question because of the various reasons and when the defendant did not deliver the possession of the suit property, the present suit was filed for eviction of the defendant-appellant-tenant. ( 4 ) THE defendant submitted written statement and admitted constitution of the Bhopal Co-operative Society Ltd. , Pratapnagar, udaipur but denied that this society was formed to establish the refugees who came from Pakistan. However, he admitted that the defendant took the land from the plaintiff for establishing poultry-farm, sheep-breeding centre and dairy-farm and a lease deed was also executed between the plaintiff-society and the defendant. The defendant, in addition to other pleas, took a plea that the land in question is agricultural land and, therefore, civil court has no jurisdiction to hear the suit. The defendant, in addition to other pleas, took a plea that the land in question is agricultural land and, therefore, civil court has no jurisdiction to hear the suit. It will be worthwhile to mention here that the defendant came with a specific case that 30 bighas of land was let out to him but out of it, 15 bighas was acquired by the State government. He started "industry" on the land in question which according to him is ("industry") so established on the agricultural land and since the State Government acquired 15 bighas of land, therefore, it was not possible for him to run "industry" of poultry-farm, sheepbreeding centre and dairy-farm. The defendant, in his written statement, also admitted that under the condition of lease, he is entitled to grow the crop for the cattle obviously for which he took the lease. The only substantial question of law is to the effect whether the suit was triable by the civil court. This issue was framed because of the reason that in Rajasthan, the suit relating to the agricultural land can be instituted only in revenue courts and not in civil courts which are founded on the right created by the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. The present suit was filed under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act against the tenant by the plaintiff for recovery of possession. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the plaintiff itself admitted that the land in question is agricultural land. Even in lease deed (Ex. 1)the land has been shown specifically as agricultural land. In addition to above, the plaintiffs own witness PW-1 very categorically admitted that the land in question is agricultural land. The learned counsel for the appellant also pointed out that as per condition of the lease itself, the plaintiff is entitled to grow crops and in fact according to the plaintiff itself, the land is being used for growing crops. Therefore, the land is agricultural land and let out for agricultural purpose, therefore, the suit was not maintainable in civil court. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents vehemently submitted that the land is Banjar land and it was given to the plaintiff-respondentsociety for establishing colony. The land was let out so that some additional facilities may be provided to the residents of the colony by establishing poultry-farm, sheep-breeding centre and dairy-farm. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents vehemently submitted that the land is Banjar land and it was given to the plaintiff-respondentsociety for establishing colony. The land was let out so that some additional facilities may be provided to the residents of the colony by establishing poultry-farm, sheep-breeding centre and dairy-farm. The defendant was permitted to grow the crops only for the purpose of feeding of animals of his poultry-farm, dairy-farm and sheep-breeding center and he was not permitted to grow the crops so as to engage himself in the trade of agriculture. Therefore, the main purpose of letting out of the property in question is for any other purpose than the agriculture purpose. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the two courts below recorded finding of fact that the tenancy is not for agriculture purpose and even the land in question is Abadi land and, therefore, this finding of fact is based on evidence, particularly the statement of PW-2 and there is a reference of one Patta issued for the land for Abadi purpose and not for agriculture purpose. The learned counsel for the respondents also submitted that there is limited scope for interference by this court under Section 100,c. P. C. In a matter where there is finding of fact recorded by the two courts below. ( 6 ) I considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. It appears that the defendant took the plea because the land has been shown as agricultural land in lease deed Ex. 1. In the lease deed Ex. 1, word "industry" used for poultry-farm, sheep-breeding center and dairy-farm but it is clear from the lease deed itself that the lessee was permitted to grow crops like, Jawar, barly, methi, corn, muttar, gram and lahasun etc. but only to feed cattle and birds of his dairy, poultry birds and sheep with specific restriction against use of land for agricultural business. Even if it is ignored that for what purpose the land was given to the the plaintiff by the State Government, and even if it is accepted that the land in question is agricultural land even then merely on the basis of this permission to grow crop, the nature of tenancy cannot be considered to mean for agricultural purpose. Even if it is ignored that for what purpose the land was given to the the plaintiff by the State Government, and even if it is accepted that the land in question is agricultural land even then merely on the basis of this permission to grow crop, the nature of tenancy cannot be considered to mean for agricultural purpose. For deciding nature of tenancy, what is relevant is the nature of tenancy and not the nature of the land. Even if an agricultural land is let out for any non-agriculture purpose and it is not permissible in the law governing agricultural tenancy, then consequence may follow and action may be taken against the lessor katedar tenant of the agricultural land as provided under the relevant Act but it will not change the nature of the tenancy. Therefore, crucial issue was whether the premises was let out for agriculture purpose or it was let out for any other purpose. Second question would be, if it was let out for any purpose other than agriculture purpose then whether it was let out for industrial purpose because there is a reference of "industry" in the lease-deed Ex. 1. Because of the use of the words "agricultural" and "industry" in the lease-deed and because of the permission to grow certain crops in terms of the lease-deed, it is sought to be advanced that the lease is for agriculture purpose. To examine this aspect of the matter, it will be necessary to find out the real intention of the parties in letting out the land in question to the defendant. The intention has been made clear in the lease-deed itself, which says as under:-"the lessor hereby demises to the lessee for the purpose of starting poultry, sheep breeding and dairy farms on the plot of 30 bighas of agricultural land. " ( 7 ) THEREFORE, the land was let out for establishing poultry-farm, sheep breeding center and dairy farm, though over an agricultural land. The condition no. viii of the lease-deed is as under:-"that the lessee will grow only fodder crops i. e. Jawar, barly, methi, corn, muttar, gram and lahasun. as are required for the bonafide use of the cattle and will not grow such crops as to make any agricultural profit out of them. "a bare reading of this condition no. The condition no. viii of the lease-deed is as under:-"that the lessee will grow only fodder crops i. e. Jawar, barly, methi, corn, muttar, gram and lahasun. as are required for the bonafide use of the cattle and will not grow such crops as to make any agricultural profit out of them. "a bare reading of this condition no. viii makes it clear that by this lease, the defendant was restrained from growing any crop so as to make profit from agriculture produce. He was bound down to grow only the crops which are required for the bonafide use of the cattle only. Therefore, the purpose is unambiguously clear from the condition of the lease-deed itself that permission to grow limited crops was ancilary to main purpose of establishing poultry, sheep breeding and dairy farming. Agricultural business was specifically prohibited by the condition in the lease-deed itself. Therefore, this lease was not for agricultural purpose. When the terms and conditions in a deed are unambiguous and clear, even the parties cannot supplement the facts and reasons to give a different intention than which comes out from the lease-deed itself. ( 8 ) IT appears that in the lease-deed a condition was also put that the defendant shall develop the Industry within one year from taking possession of the land. The word "industry" has been used not with intention to make the lease for industrial purpose. The intention of the plaintiff to let out the property has been made clear in para no. 2 of the plaint where the plaintiff stated that to give some facilities to the members of the town to be established by the plaintiff-society, it was decided to run a poultry-farm, sheep-breeding center and dairy-farm. The defendant in his written statement particularly in para 5 of the additional pleas unequivocally admitted that the defendant took the land for establishing poultry-farm, sheep-breeding center and dairy-farm and in the last line of para 5 of the written statement stated that it is not possible to run the poultry-farm, sheep-breeding center and dairyfarm because of the obvious reason that half of the land was acquired by the State Government. Therefore, the defendant understood well that the intention to let out the property was not for the agricultural purpose nor for the industrial purpose but it was for the benefit of the members of the town-ship of the plaintiff-society. Therefore, the defendant understood well that the intention to let out the property was not for the agricultural purpose nor for the industrial purpose but it was for the benefit of the members of the town-ship of the plaintiff-society. The expression manufacturing purpose was examined by the Honble Apex Court in the case of Allenbury Engineers (Pvt) Ltd. vs. Shri Ram Krishna Dabnia ( AIR 1973 SC 425 ), wherein Honble the Apex court held that :-"the expression manufacturing purpose in the section means the purpose of making or of fabricating articles or materials by physical labour or skill or by mechanical power vendible or usable as such. There must be a transformation into a different article or material having a distinctive name, character or use, or even fabricating a previously known article by a novel process. Where the manufacture of spare parts was incidental to the main purpose of disposal of vehicles in order to repair or re-condition then, the dominant purpose of the lease would still have to be regarded as storage and re-sale and not as a manufacturing purpose. " ( 9 ) THEREFORE, the dominant purpose in the present lease appears to be establishing a poultry-farm, sheep-breeding center and dairy-farm for the benefit of the members of the locality of the plaintiff-society, may it be by using agricultural land or Abadi land, as the nature of the land in the present facts and the circumstances of the case is irrelevant. At this stage it will be worthwhile to mention here that the plaintiff pleaded that the State Government gave the land to the plaintiff which is uncultivable, for settling the refugees by working out development of the colony and the two courts below held that the land is not agricultural land. For arriving at finding of fact, the courts below relied upon the statement of the plaintiff and considered the fact that the defendant did not produce any evidence to prove that land is agricultural land. I need not to go into this aspect of the matter whether the land is agricultural land or not but it is clear from the evidence available and from the lease-deed Ex. 1 itself that the lease was granted for non-agricultural purpose and non-industrial purpose. In view of the above, the civil court had jurisdiction to hear the suit. I need not to go into this aspect of the matter whether the land is agricultural land or not but it is clear from the evidence available and from the lease-deed Ex. 1 itself that the lease was granted for non-agricultural purpose and non-industrial purpose. In view of the above, the civil court had jurisdiction to hear the suit. Before parting with, I considered the application which was filed by the appellant under section 100 (5), C. P. C. for framing additional substantial questions of law. The substantial question of law was initially framed on 6. 7. 83 and application for framing additional issues was submitted before this Court on 18. 12. 1984, after more than one year. Reply to the application was filed by the respondents on 17. 1. 1985. No order was sought by the appellant on this application since last more than 20 years. However, in the application for framing additional substantial questions of law, the appellant submitted that all the substantial questions of law framed by the appellant arise in the appeal, therefore, they may be framed. After going through application, I do not find that these substantial questions of law arise in the present appeal at all, in the light of the decision given by the two courts below who have decided all the questions of facts and even questions of law after appreciation of the evidence of the parties and after considering the legal position. The appellant only wanted to say that these are substantial questions of law which arise in this appeal but mere raising a plea is not sufficient. It must have some legal foundation so as to constitute it as a substantial question of law and I do not find that substantial question of law raised by the appellant in the memo of appeal and sought to be raised by filing application, are the substantial questions of law. ( 10 ) IN view of the above discussion, there is no merit in this appeal and hence the appeal of the appellant is dismissed. No order as to costs.