Judgment 1. Heard. 2. The petitioner states that F.I.R. was instituted being Keoti PS. Case No. 62 of 1989 in respect of a dacoity under Sec.395 I.PC. Later on 30.5.1989 a Petromax and umbrella were recovered from his house for which Keoti PS. Case No. 63/1989 was instituted against the petitioner under Sec. 414 I.PC. The recovered articles were not in the list of the earlier PS. Case being articles taken away in course of dacoity. However, the informant of the first case subsequently identified the said articles and, accordingly, the petitioner through supplementary charge-sheet was charge-sheeted in the first case solely on the basis of recovery. In the second case i.e. Keoti PS. Case No. 63 of 1989 he was charge-sheeted under Sec. 414 I.PC. for having in his possession stolen articles known to be stolen. The latter case was tried and after examination of six prosecution witnesses none of whom supported the prosecution, the petitioner was acquitted and thereby held that he had any stolen article knowing them to be stolen articles. 3. It may be mentioned that the prosecution witnesses in this case are the same who have been named as a witness in the first case. The petitioner submits that once he has been acquitted on the charge of having in possession of articles known to be stolen then merely for recovery of those articles he cannot be proceeded against in the earlier case being Keoti RS. Case No. 62 of 1989 in respect of a dacoity. It is specifically asserted that apart from recovery there is nothing in the first case to connect him with the crime as per supplementary charge-sheet itself. It is, thus, submitted that once the issue whether those articles were stolen or not and whether they were stolen articles to the knowledge of the petitioner had been decided by a Court of competent jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner and the petitioner not having been found guilty this fact cannot be ignored so far as the first case is concerned and if this fact cannot be ignored then there is nothing against the petitioner to be tried so far as the earlie case is concerned. In my view, the submission is to be accepted.
In my view, the submission is to be accepted. If the facts that the petitioner was found in possession of the articles known to him to be stolen as a fact which is not correct and has been so held in the trial of the second case then it is to be assumed for all purposes including in subsequent trial that he was not in possession of those articles and that he did not know that they were stolen. Therefore, it has to be assumed that he has no connection with those articles even those articles were part of dacoity in first case. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision in the case of Pritam Singh vs. State of Punjab reported in A.I.R. 1956 Supreme Court 415. Under similar circumstances a person was charged for causing death by use of firearm. He was separately charged with having the said firearm without licence. Thus, there were two trials against the petitioner of that case; one in respect of causing death by firearm and second for illegal possession of firearm. In the latter case he was tried and acquitted holding that he was not in illegal possession of firearm. When his trial for murder was taken up it was pleaded on his behalf that he could not be charged with murder by firearm because another court of competent jurisdiction had come to the finding otherwise. His plea was not accepted upto the High Court and then the matter reached the Apex Court. The Apex Court after examining the said judgment and evidence held that the principle of res judicata are equally applicable to criminal proceedings. It is a key to an issue estoppel whether the findings arrived at by a competent Court would bind all other Courts in all other subsequent proceedings and in that view of the matter the Apex Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction. 5. In the present case once the petitioner has been acquitted for being in possession of stolen articles knowing to be stolen then no other charge in respect of those articles connecting him to an offence under Sec.395 I.P.C. can be continued. At this stage, I may mention that there is no allegation that the petitioner was found participating in dacoity. may mention here that the petitioner was not put on T.I. Parade in the first case.
At this stage, I may mention that there is no allegation that the petitioner was found participating in dacoity. may mention here that the petitioner was not put on T.I. Parade in the first case. He was not charge-sheeted originally. It was only as a consequence of recovery of those articles and subsequent identification by the informant that he has been charge-sheeted in the supplementary charge-sheet. These are the only materials against the petitioner. I may also mention that the witnesses in the two cases i.e. Keoti RS. Case No. 62/1989 and Keoti RS. Case No. 63/1989 were common. 6. Applying the principle as laid down in the decision of the Apex Court above, I have no hesitation to hold that further proceedings in so far as petitioner is concerned in the first case would be clearly an abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore, the prosecution of the petitioner in Keoti RS. Case No. 62 of 1989 is hereby quashed. The proceedings against others may proceed.