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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2006 DIGILAW 865 (MP)

Kamal Kishore v. State of M. P.

2006-07-17

S.C.VYAS

body2006
ORDER 1. This order shall also govern the disposal of MCrC No. 1770/06 (Ranchhod and another v. State of M.P.) as both these applications arise out of the same criminal case. 2. This is the second application filed under section 439 of CrPC for grant of bail in connection with Crime No. I 14/05 registered under section 420,406,465 and 120-B of IPC at Police Station Sardarpur, Dhar against the present applicant and others, on the allegation that the present applicant and other accused persons committed fraud upon the villagers, cheated them and withdrew a huge amount fraudulently from their accounts through the cheques, which were given to them by the Government as compensation of the land acquired by the Government for public purpose. Earlier application was dismissed as not pressed. 3. Learned counsel for the applicant raised two contentions in this application and prayed that applicant be released on bail because he has entered into a compromise with the complainants of the case and the compromise petition has been filed before the trial Court and after that compromise petition, seven complainants were examined by the trial Court and they have turned hostile. Of course the trial Court has rejected the compromise application because offence is not compoundable in terms of S. 320 of the CrPC. Secondly, learned counsel for the applicant submitted that in view of the pronouncement of Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in the matter of Ashok Dhingra v. N. C. T of Delhi [AIR 2000 SC 3537 (1)] and Mehmood Mohammed Sayeed v. State of Maharashtra [ AIR 2002 SC 482 ], as the trial has not been completed even after six months from the date of the arrest of present applicant and looking to the huge amount involved in it and a long list of witnesses, trial Court definitely would take a long time, therefore, to keep the present applicant in custody during trial would be against the interest of justice. Therefore, learned counsel prayed that applicant be released on bail. Learned counsel for the applicant also submitted that as the application of other co-accused persons have been dismissed on merits by others Benches of this Court, therefore, he is not pressing in service any ground touching the merits of the case. 4. Therefore, learned counsel prayed that applicant be released on bail. Learned counsel for the applicant also submitted that as the application of other co-accused persons have been dismissed on merits by others Benches of this Court, therefore, he is not pressing in service any ground touching the merits of the case. 4. Per contra, learned public prosecutor submitted that the ground of delay caused in trial, has also been taken into consideration by another Benches of this Court, while dismissing the bail application of other co-accused persons. Learned public prosecutor submits that the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court cited by learned counsel for the applicant though were not placed before that bench but arguments were advanced, on that basis also and the ground of delay in trial, was considered by other bench while deciding bail application of other co-accused persons and has been found not to be a proper ground for releasing other co-accused on bail, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case. Learned counsel submits that as per the statements given by witnesses before the trial Court, about 1/3 amount of compensation was fraudulently withdrew from bank and retained by the present applicant and other co-accused persons and out of the amount of compensation of Rs.15 lacs, one complainant was paid Rs. 11 lacs and remaining amount of Rs. 4 lacs were distributed between the present applicant, Bank Officers, Patwari and other co-accused persons. Similarly out of the amount of compensation paid by the Government to other complainants lacs of rupees were deducted by the present applicant by cheating and forgery and a wrongful loss has been caused to poor farmers to the tune of Rs. 50 lacs. Statements have been given by the witnesses before the trial Court to prove these facts, and therefore, as the application of other co-accused persons have been dismissed by other benches of this High Court, therefore, judicial discipline requires that the present applicant be also not released on bail merely on the ground of delay caused in trial and over looking to the facts and features of the case. 5. 5. I have gone through the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Dhingra (supra) and Mehmood Mohammad (supra), the facts of those cases have not been discussed in details, and I feel that in the referred cases, some accused persons have been released on bail, looking to the peculiar facts and features of that case and condition of trial Court in a particular State, and, therefore, judgments arc distinguishable on facts. 6. Learned public prosecutor submitted photocopies of the order sheets recorded by the trial Court, which show that the delay in trial has been caused mostly because somehow or other interim applications moved on behalf of the accused persons at different stages and prayers were made to get those application decided by the Court first. Many objections have been raised to create hurdle in the trial by the defence counsel and it appears that such objections arc the main cause for delay in trial, therefore, in the facts and features of the case only because of delay in trial, accused cannot be entitled to be released on bail, particularly when this aspect of the matter has been considered in detail by another bench, in respect of other co-accused has been negatived. This bench also respectfully agree with the view expressed by another bench on the question of delay on the same reasonings. I feel that the present applicant is also not entitled to be released on bail on the ground of delay caused in trial looking to the facts and features of the case. 7. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that another bench dealt with the question of delay caused in trial on the application filed under S. 437 (6) o the CrPC. S. 437 (6) provides that when an offence is triable by Magistrate and the trial could not be concluded within 60 days from the first date of recording of evidence, accused become entitled for bail. S. 437 (6) provides that when an offence is triable by Magistrate and the trial could not be concluded within 60 days from the first date of recording of evidence, accused become entitled for bail. While considering this aspect of the matter, another bench considered the question of delay only with a limited purpose of interpretation of the provisions and giving benefit of those provisions to the present applicant and has negatived that benefit, whereas presently the delay has been argued as per the view expressed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases cited by learned counsel, therefore, the view expressed by another bench should not be taken into consideration, but I do not agree with the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the applicant and feel that when the question of delay has been considered may be in respect of S. 437 (6) of the CrPC or for any other purpose, but it has been opined by this Court that the delay was caused because of the conduct of the accused, and, therefore, they do not become entitled to be released on bail on the ground of delay cause on their own lapses. 8. So far as the question of compromise between present applicant and the complainant are concerned, as three persons have already been examined by the trial Court before filing that so called compromise and they have fully supported the case of the prosecution, therefore, this argument of learned counsel for the applicant has no force. 9. Considering the matter from all angles, the application filed by the present applicant has no merits, and the same is dismissed. 10. Ultimately, learned counsel for the applicant prays that prosecution be given time bound programme to conclude the trial. Learned. Public Prosecutor also agrees that if a direction is given to the trial Court, then trial will be concluded within three months as most of the witnesses have already been examined. The prayer of learned counsel for the applicant appears to be reasonable and is accepted. The trial Court is directed to make every endevour to conclude the trial within a period of three months from next date of hearing. Let a copy of this order be placed in the record of MCrC No. 1770/06.