Honble, DIXIT, M.— This is a second appeal against the order of the learned Revenue Appellate Authority in which Appeal No. 90/99 which was passed in the appeal titled Shail Bhargava vs. Brijrani in a matter of rejecting a civil suit 181/93 as barred by law. The matter came up for admission. With the consent of both the parties, the matter is being heard finally and a decision on merits is being given. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the late husband of the appellant, Prem Mohan Bhargava had instituted a suit 181/93 under Sections 88 and 188 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act which was held as barred on account of the fact that the same Prem Mohan Bhargava had instituted a previous suit 71/81 under Sections 88 and 183 against the defendants who are broadly the same as in the 1993 suit and in respect of the same land and a cause of action which is the subject matter of adjudication here and the suit 71/81 was dismissed under Order 9 Rule 8 of the CPC in default and the order remained final. A subsequent suit 181/93, the Courts have seemingly held (1) to have been barred on account of the operation of Order 9 Rule 9 of the C.P.C. 3. The exclamation mark has been put by this Court because that only an inference can be drawn with regard to the bar being under Order 9 Rule 9 as both the Courts below have not expressly held it to be so under the said provision. In fact, the impugned order is a classic case of error apparent on the face of record as the issue that has been decided pertains to Order 9 Rule 8. The very issue that has been framed is interesting. The issue reads as follows: ``Whether the previous suit 71/81 (1/81) Prem Mohan vs. Niranjan Lal was based on the same cause of action which was dismissed in default on account of non-presence and non-prosecution and the decision therein was final. Therefore, the present suit is barred by Order 9 Rule 8 and Order 2 Rule 2. 4. The issue reads as follows: ``Whether the previous suit 71/81 (1/81) Prem Mohan vs. Niranjan Lal was based on the same cause of action which was dismissed in default on account of non-presence and non-prosecution and the decision therein was final. Therefore, the present suit is barred by Order 9 Rule 8 and Order 2 Rule 2. 4. Now, Order 9 Rule 8 reads as under: Procedure where defendant only appears.- Where are defendant appears and the plaintiff does not appear which the suit is called on for hearing, the Court shall make an order that the suit be dismissed, unless the defendant admits the claim, or part thereof, in which case the Court shall pass a decree against the defendant upon such admission, and, where part only of the claim has been admitted, shall dismissthe suit so far as it relates to the remainder. The bare reading of the provision discloses no bar. However, we can only presume that the Court meant Order 9 Rule 9, which reads as under: Decree against plaintiff by default bars fresh suit - (1) Where a suit is wholly or partly dismissed under rule 8, the plaintiff shall be precluded from bringing a fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action. But he may apply for an order to set the dismissal aside, and if he satisfies the Court that there was sufficient cause for his non appearance when the suit was called on for hearing, the Court shall make an order setting aside the dismissal upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit. (2) No order shall be made under this rule unless notice of the application has been served on the opposite party. 5. We can only presume that this is the only meaning that can be adduced to the impugned order which otherwise would result in a manifest absurdity. The bar contained in Order 9 Rule 9 is in respect of the same cause of action. A cause of action is a bundle of facts, which is deduced after reading the integral facts in the entire plaint. However, it would be beneficial to look at the record of submissions of the two sides first. 6. The bar contained in Order 9 Rule 9 is in respect of the same cause of action. A cause of action is a bundle of facts, which is deduced after reading the integral facts in the entire plaint. However, it would be beneficial to look at the record of submissions of the two sides first. 6. The counsel for the petitioner submits that the first suit was instituted by the husband and the father of the appellants, Prem Mohan Bhargava, against his mother Jaya Devi and Kamla Bhargava, Pushpa Bhargava and Vijay Bhargava on account of the fact that he was not being accepted as the only Khatedar of the land under dispute; whereas the present suit is brought against the same defendants, but on account of the fact that the defendants were claiming to be the owners of that property on account of an alleged Will of the grandfather of the appellants, Shrigopal. Thus the cause of action in the second suit was different in which the status of the defendants was as the heirs on the basis of the Will. The Will was not in existence at the time of the first suit and the suit was not based on the Will; and the relief asked for in both the suits was also different. In spite of this, both the subordinate Courts have committed an error of law in treating the subsequent suit barred on account of the operation of Order 2 Rule 2, and Order 9 Rule 9 of the C.P.C. He also submits that cause of action is a bundle of facts and some similarity between two causes of action does not mean that they are the same. The following Judgments were cited in support of the contention: 1. Birla Cement Works and Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan (2001 (4) WLC (Raj.) 500). (on Order 2 Rule 2 CPC). 2. Union of India vs. Pramod Gupta (2005) 12 SCC 1). (on S. 11 CPC Res Judicata). 3. Union of India vs. H.K. Dhruv. (2005) 10 SCC 218 ) (on Or. 2 R. 2) 7. Countering the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner appellant, the learned counsel for the respondents submits that Order 9 Rule 9 completely precludes the plaintiff from filing a subsequent suit on the same cause of action. 3. Union of India vs. H.K. Dhruv. (2005) 10 SCC 218 ) (on Or. 2 R. 2) 7. Countering the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner appellant, the learned counsel for the respondents submits that Order 9 Rule 9 completely precludes the plaintiff from filing a subsequent suit on the same cause of action. It was pleaded that mere camouflage of a different cause of action was liable to be detected by the Court and the two causes of action needed to be different not merely in technical sense, but in substance as well. AIR 1965 SC 295 ; Suraj Rattan Thirani and Ors. vs. Azamabad Tea Co. Ltd. (Head not b and c) was cited in support of this contention. It was also pleaded that this ratio has also been followed in AIR 1980 SC 1655 ; M/s. Parasram Harmand Rao vs. M/s. Shanti Prasad Narinder Kumar Jain. The learned counsel pleaded further that a suit dismissed in default and not restored on application also attracted the ratio of the Larger Bench Judgment of the Hon. Rajasthan High Court as reported in RRT 2002(2) page 1272 in the case of Hanuman Singh and Ors. vs. Board of Revenue and Ors. In addition, AIR 2005 Patna 166 and 1996 RRD 198 were also cited. All these cases except the first one relate to a situation where the cause of action is the same. The counsel also pleaded that the bar of Res Judicata would also apply. Although this is not the finding either by the trial Court or by the first appellate Court, the point was permitted to be raised, being a law point. 8. The authorities cited by the learned counsel for the appellant pertain to Order 2 Rule 2 and Section 11. Res Judicata is not the issue in the trial Court or the appellate Court. However, it would be dealt with at the appropriate time within the course of this Judgment. We, therefore, have to perforce look elsewhere. 9. The authorities cited by the learned counsel for the respondents do pertain to Order 9 Rule 9, but the situation in all the authorities is such that the cause of action is found established as the same. We, therefore, have to perforce look elsewhere. 9. The authorities cited by the learned counsel for the respondents do pertain to Order 9 Rule 9, but the situation in all the authorities is such that the cause of action is found established as the same. In Suraj Rattan Thirani, the case is one of a person claiming under the original plaintiff suing on the same cause of action and the issue for determination is whether a person claiming under the original plaintiff can sue on the same cause of action. This is not the case here. In the present case, however, what we have to determine is whether under the facts and circumstances of the case, the cause of action can be said to be the same. We, therefore, find ourselves forced again to look elsewhere. 10. The crux of the matter, as is clear from the contentions is the cause of action. It is admitted by both the parties that the subject matter and the parties are the same in both the suits. Thus it boils down to the cause of action; whether it is substantially the same. It is also admitted that the relief asked for in the two suits is different. Whereas the first suit was for declaration and ejectment; the second one is for declaration and permanent injunction. 11. We are not heldped by the impugned order and the order of the trial Court. We have already noted that even the issue has been framed in respect of Order 9 rule 8 instead of Order 9 rule 9. Not merely that, both the courts have passed laconic and non-speaking orders without analyzing the facts and the law. ``Cause of Action, it has been held by the Hon. Supreme Court in its Judgment Duleep Singh vs. Mehar Singh Rathore (2004) 7 SCC 650 ) while examining the applicability of Or. 2 R. 2 in a similar situation that: ``Or. 2. r. 2 - Condition for applicability - ar of subsequent suit for the relief which had been omitted in the previous suit in respect of the same cause of action- Where plea regarding such bar raised, held, court has to ascertain whether cause of action of the previous and subsequent suits was identical- But in the absence of proof of identity of cause of action and pleadings, such plea cannot be permitted to be raised. 12. 12. The cause of action is the bone of contention in the present appeal. It has been pleaded that both the grounds and the relief sought are materially different. It has also been countered that the difference is only a cloak, and in the garb of a technical difference the same cause of action is sought to be adjudicated, as was the one in the suit, which had been dismissed. 13. Let us now look at how the Apex Court looks at the term ``cause of action. In the case of Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. vs. Union of India (2004) 6 SCC 254 ) the term has been amplified. It would be worth our while to quote from the same: ``Cause of action implies a right to sue. The material facts, which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove, constitute the cause of action. Cause of Action is not defined in any statute. It has, however, been judicially interpreted inter alia to mean every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Negatively put, it would mean that everything, which if not proved, gives the defendant as immediate right to judgment, would be part of cause of action. Its importance is beyond any doubt. For every action, there has to be a cause of action, if not, the plaint or the writ petition, as the case may be, shall be rejected summarily. The entire bundle of facts pleaded need not constitute a cause of action as what is necessary to be proved before the petitioner can obtain a decree is the material facts. The expression material facts are also known as integral facts. All necessary facts must form an integral part of the cause of action. 14. Thus we need to examine the integral facts to see whether they are identical. It has been pleaded that the grounds are dissimilar. It is not in dispute that the in the subsequent suit, the plaintiff has challenged the rights on the grounds that they flowed out of a Will and the Will was not a subject matter of the first suit. It is also not in dispute that the reliefs claimed are different. It has been pleaded that the grounds are dissimilar. It is not in dispute that the in the subsequent suit, the plaintiff has challenged the rights on the grounds that they flowed out of a Will and the Will was not a subject matter of the first suit. It is also not in dispute that the reliefs claimed are different. The first suit is under Section 88 and 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 for declaration and ejection and the subsequent suit is under Section 88 and 188 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act,1955 for declaration and permanent injunction. Ejection and permanent injunction are as far removed from each other as the source of the stream from its ultimate confluence. Ejection is sought when the petitioner does not have possession and is seeking removal of an encroacher. In seeking permanent injunction, the petitioner is making a prayer to the court to ward off the encroacher. It is not the case of the first appellate Court to question the basis of the ground as that is the province of the trial Court and that is not a basis on which the suit can be held barred. The first appellate Court has used the fact of change in the status of the plaintiff against him by stating ``how the plaintiff came into possession has not been made clear. This cannot be aground for applying the bar of ``cause of action estoppel as contained in Order 9 rule 9. Both the Grounds and the Relief constitute integral facts of a plaint. These integral facts are manifestly dissimilar as discussed above. Thus on facts, the cause of action is dissimilar. Of course, the veil must be lifted to see whether the same cause of action is not hiding behind the veil of the technically dissimilar cause of action. However, this exercise also does not reveal anything other than the fact that the grounds and the relief are indeed dissimilar. The result of this exercise, therefore, is that we are able to conclude that the ratio of the AIR 1965 SC 295 , Suraj Ratan Thirani case (supra) is clearly distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of the present case. The result of this exercise, therefore, is that we are able to conclude that the ratio of the AIR 1965 SC 295 , Suraj Ratan Thirani case (supra) is clearly distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of the present case. All other cases cited by the learned counsel for the respondents are, in any case not applicable as they are all dealing with situations where there is no doubt in the fact of cause of action being same whereas in the present case, we have already seen that both the Grounds as well as the relief sought is different. The Larger Bench Judgment of the Hon. Rajasthan High Court in the case of Hanuman Singh (supra) pertains to withdrawal of writ petition without liberty to file a freshwrit petition and is, therefore, clearly distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of the present case. 15. At this point, we could have been helped in our endeavor to go behind the mere words and try to have a peek at the reality if the two subordinate courts had taken the pain to write something about it. Instead, what we have are platitudes. It does not suffice for a court to merely make a bland statement that the causes of actions are the same. The court is duty bound to examine the available pleadings, link up with any available evidence and then come to a reasoned conclusion. Both the courts have failed in doing that. Instead, we have the piquant situation where the trial Court has framed an issue which suffers from an apparent error on the face of record as pointed out earlier and the first appellate Court has made a statement that ``it is not clear how the plaintiffs have come into possession. What the first appellate Court needed to remember was that this was precisely what the trial Court was supposed to find out. Its worry on this account is a testimony to the fact of the Grounds and Reliefs being different. This practically wraps up the argument that the two ``causes of action are as different from each other as chalk from cheese. 16. Once it is established that the two causes of action are different, the applicability of Order 2 Rule 2 disappears completely. This practically wraps up the argument that the two ``causes of action are as different from each other as chalk from cheese. 16. Once it is established that the two causes of action are different, the applicability of Order 2 Rule 2 disappears completely. Similar is the situation with Order 9 Rule 9, as in both the provisions, the bar rests on the fact of cause of action being same, which in turn requires to be proved on the basis of pleadings, grounds and relief. What remains to be seen are whether the penumbral sweep of res judicata as defined in Sec. 11 CPC has any impact in the facts and circumstances of the case. 17. In the case of Mysore State Electricity Board vs. Bangalore Woolen, Cotton and Silk Mills Ltd. ( AIR 1963 SC 1128 ), a 5- Judge Constitution Bench of the Hon. Apex Court has laid down the law that ``Matter and not reasons operate res judicata. The Honble Court has gone on to told that ``It is indeed true that what becomes res judicata is the `matter which is actually decided and not the reason which leads the Court to decide the `matter. In other words, unless there is a decision on merits, there can be no res judicata. Res judicata, as is settled law, is a rule of law unlike estoppel, which is a rule evidence. It has been more explicitly stated in a recent Judgment of the Honble Supreme Court Arm Group Enterprises Ltd. vs. Waldorf Restaurant (2003) 6 SC 423) - that if the merits of the rights and claims of the parties are not decided, the plea of res judicata is not available. In another case State of Maharashtra vs. National Construction Co. (1996) 1 SCC 735 ), the Honble Supreme Court has held that ``dismissal of the former suit on technical ground of non-joinder of the party without adjudication on merits on the matter in issue would not operate as res judicata so as to bar a subsequent suit. In a more recent Judgment of the Hon. Supreme Court in the case of Haryana State Coop. In a more recent Judgment of the Hon. Supreme Court in the case of Haryana State Coop. Land Development Bank vs. Neelam, (2005) 5 SCC 91 ), the Hon. Apex Court has held that where a writ petition was withdrawn without permission of court to file fresh petition, the bar of res judicata would not operate as the matter was not adjudicated on mertis. Thus the law is established that res judicata would not operate where the matter has not been decided on merits. 18. However, we need not tarry long nor need drift yonder. The Hon. Rajasthan High Court is to our aid. In an almost identical case of Fakir Mohammed vs. Ajaj Ali (2004(4) WLC (Raj.) 506) the Hon. Rajasthan High Court has held that when the Ground is different, the cause of action also becomes different and neither Order 9 rule 9 nor res judicata can operate. The head note `B of the case reads thus: ``B: Civil Procedure Code, Sec. 11, Order 9 Rules 8, 9 - Scope - Earlier eviction suit dismissed in default - Application for restoration dismissed- Earlier suit basedon the bona fide requirement of one of sons of landlord - Subsequent suit on ground of requirement of appropriate premises since three out of five sons of landlord were married and lived in rented house - Cause of action in two suits being different, Order 9 Rule 9 not attracted- Earlier suit have not been decided on merits, bar of Sec. 11 also not attracted - Second suit not barred. 19. The similarity between the Fakir Mohammed case (supra) and the case under appeal could not be starker. It has already been established on facts that the cause of action in the two is different. The impugned order of the Revenue Appellate Authority is, therefore, set aside. The appeal is allowed and the matter is remanded back to the trial Court for deciding the suit on merits after framing the substantive issues. 20. No costs. Pronounced in the open Court.