1. By this application under article 226 of the Constitution the petitioners had challenged the validity of rule 6Cc) of the Nagaland Taxation Service Rules, 1976 ('the Rules') as regards age restriction and also the order dated 23.6.2006, appointing respondent No. 4 to the post of Inspector of Taxes and has also sought for a relief in the nature of a direction to the extent that the UDAs in the Directorate have no right to be considered for appointment by promotion to any post falling under the above said Rules and that the Head Assistants ('the HA') alone are entitled to be considered for appointment to the post of Inspector of Taxes. Petitioner No. 1 before this court is the Nagaland Taxation District Ministerial Staff Association as claiming to be a registered Society, registered under the Societies Act, 1860. Petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 are the officers holding the post HA in the District. Respondents 1, 2 and 3 are State authorities. Respondent No. 4 is an Inspector of Taxes appointed vide impugned order dated 23.6.2000. Respondent Nos. 5 to 9 are persons holding the post of UDA in the office of Commissioner of Taxes. 2. It is the case of the petitioners that rule 6(c) is discriminatory and the same is violative of articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution on the short ground that the same provision prescribed to the extent that a person belonging to the Ministerial Staff who have crossed the age of 45 years on first day of January in which the selection is made shall not be considered for appointment. It is also the case of the petitioner that order dated 23.6.2000, by which respondent No. 4 was promoted, suffers from legal infirmities on the ground that the case of petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 have not been considered as their cases have not even been forwarded to the DPC for consideration on the grounds disclosed in the minutes of the DPC and in particular on the ground that petitioner No. 2 is found over aged. 2 and 3 have not been considered as their cases have not even been forwarded to the DPC for consideration on the grounds disclosed in the minutes of the DPC and in particular on the ground that petitioner No. 2 is found over aged. Referring to the scheme of pay as contained in ROP Rules, 1993 and ROP Rules, 1999, it is also stated that the HAs enjoy scale of pay at the level higher than the UDA in the Directorate and contention has been raised that the Has have not been fairly treated for the purpose of promotion as the unequal have been treated as equals. Stating that the pay of HAs is higher than the scale of pay of Inspector of Taxes (Junior), it is also contended that the HAs should be considered for promotion to the post of Inspector of Taxes (Senior). Mentioning that the UDAs have a promotional avenues in the Directorate as in the nature of promotion to the post of Senior Accountant/Superintendent/Registrar, the entire 25% reserved for promotion from Ministerial Staff should be made available to the Has if not 25% reservation should be increased to 75%. It is also mentioned that respondent No. 4 is junior to petitioners 2 and 3 and he is not the senior most except for the reason that the case of the petitioner No. 2 could not be forwarded for consideration by DPC on the ground that he is over aged and petitioner No. 3 had produced false certificate. An additional affidavit was filed on behalf of the petitioners. In the said additional affidavit mention has been made to a notification dated 11-2-02, which provides, inter alia, that the post of District and Sub-Divisional HAs other than those in the office of the Deputy Commissioner, who have completed 10 years of continuous service as on 1.1.2001 be upgraded to higher scale of pay and categorized as Class II Gazetted. Reference also has been made to letter dated 2.11.2002 from the office of Commissioner of Taxes addressed to petitioners 2 and 3 and another informing them to withdraw the case for further necessary action of upgrading the post. An affidavit on behalf of respondent No. 4 has also been filed. Reference also has been made to letter dated 2.11.2002 from the office of Commissioner of Taxes addressed to petitioners 2 and 3 and another informing them to withdraw the case for further necessary action of upgrading the post. An affidavit on behalf of respondent No. 4 has also been filed. Except the reason for promoting respondent No. 4 on the basis of the recommendation of DPC and the reason for not considering the cases of the petitioners 2 and 3 for the reasons disclosed in the said minutes of the DPC, no particular materials have been placed to counter the basis for challenging rule 6(c) of the Rules. An affidavit on behalf of respondents 1, 2 and 3 has also been filed. In the said affidavit apart from explaining the basis of making appointment of respondent No. 4 and explaining the position of UDA in the Directorate vis-a-vis HA and also making general submissions,, no particular materials had been placed as to show that rule 6(c) of the Rules have a basis or is connected with any particular object. On the other hand, while submitting that the challenge made by the petitioners against the Service Rules are not tenable, it is also stated that necessary and reasonable amendments are on the process. 3. As regard the validity of rule 6(c) of the Rules as regard age restriction, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondents have not at all placed any materials as to explain the basis of the same. According to him, a person holding the post of HA reached such position after putting in many years of service and it would invariably be the case that they would be reaching that position at the age of about 45 years. In this view of the matter, putting an age bar of 45 years as stipulated in rule 6(c), such provision would have the effect of excluding the serving HAs from being considered for promotion to the post of Inspector of Taxes or it would make the chance of promotion to the post of Inspector of Taxes illusionary. In this view of the matter, putting an age bar of 45 years as stipulated in rule 6(c), such provision would have the effect of excluding the serving HAs from being considered for promotion to the post of Inspector of Taxes or it would make the chance of promotion to the post of Inspector of Taxes illusionary. In support of his contention to the extent that rule 6(c) is liable to be struck down as violative of articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court as laid down in AIR 1986 SC 1035 (Indravadan H. Shah v. State of Gujarat and Anr., (1994) 2 SCO 411 (Shakuntala Sharma v. High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla and Anr,) and AIR 1985 SC 306 (Debranjan Ray and Ors. v. Comptroller and Auditor General of India and Ors.), He has also placed reliance on the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court as reported in 2001 (3) SCT (Shiv Dayal Dabra v. State of Haryana). On the point raised with respect to validity of order dated 23.6.2000, the learned counsel submits that the same order would suffer from legal infirmities as the same is based on the recommendation of the DPC based on the reading of rule 6(c). Learned counsel further submits that in any case, the same cannot stand the scrutiny of law on the ground that the Department had not at all placed the case of the petitioners 2 and 3 for consideration before the DPC. The counsel also points out that the petitioner No. 3 was never informed of the allegation that he had produced false certificate and in any case no order has been rendered by the authority with respect to the same allegation and as such the action of the respondents in not forwarding the case of the petitioners is based on extraneous consideration. Therefore, the counsel submits that the recommendation of the DPC is vitiated for reason of violation of the Rules of natural justice. As regard the point raised to the extent that the UDAs in the Directorate are not entitled to be considered for promotion in terms of rule 6(c) and that only HAs are entitled to be considered for promotion, the learned counsel has not made a serious submissions in support of the proposition. As regard the point raised to the extent that the UDAs in the Directorate are not entitled to be considered for promotion in terms of rule 6(c) and that only HAs are entitled to be considered for promotion, the learned counsel has not made a serious submissions in support of the proposition. Learned counsel has also submitted that the petitioners 2 and 3 and another are entitled to be considered for the benefit as provided in Notification dated 11.2.2002 and they have been wrongly denied. He also submits that withdrawing the case as in the present case cannot be made a condition for releasing the benefit of Notification dated 11.2.2002 and in any case they ought to have been given an option as they are also pursuing their rights in the court of law. 4. Although response has been filed by respondent No. 4 through an Advocate, no such counsel has ever appeared before the court during the entire proceedings from the time of the rule issued on 5.4.2001 till the hearing of this matter on 4.9.2006 and 5.9.2006. Mr. I. Jamir, learned Addl. Advocate General submits that the order dated 23.6.2000 does not suffer from any legal infirmities as the same is based on the recommendation of the DPC and the Rules in question was in operation. He however, submits that the Rules is of 1976 and exercise is being taken to review the provisions on different aspects of the schemes of the Rules. However, till such exercise is made, he submits that this Court has to uphold the action of the authorities based on the provisions of the Rules, 5. In considering the submissions of the learned counsel on the validity of rule 6(c) of the Rules, I am prompted to refer to the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel. In the case of lndravadan H. Shah (supra), the Apex Court had examined the Gujarat Judicial Service Recruitment Rules and in particular rule 6(4)(i) and, rule 6(4)(iii)(a) the validity, of which had been challenged. In the said Rules, age restriction has been imposed for appointment to the post of Assistant Judge by promotion amongst the members holding the post of Civil Judges (Junior Division) and Civil Judges (Senior Division). In the said Rules, age restriction has been imposed for appointment to the post of Assistant Judge by promotion amongst the members holding the post of Civil Judges (Junior Division) and Civil Judges (Senior Division). There is however, no age restriction for further appointment to the post of a District Judge by promotion amongst the members of the Junior Division of the State Judicial Service who had served as Assistant Judges. Finding that there is no rational or any .reasonableness for introduction of the age bar in regard to appointment by promotion to the post of Assistant Judge, the Apex Court held that the above said Rules is arbitrary and it violates the salutary principles of equality and want of arbitrariness in the matter of public employment as guaranteed under articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution,, The, Apex Court also held that the Rules under challenge are irrational arbitrary and unreasonable, inasmuch as, there, is no, nexus to the object sought to be achieved by introducing the age restriction in regard to the appointment of Assistant Judge by promotion amongst members holding the post of Civil Judges (Junior Division) and those in the cadre of Civil Judges (Senior Division), whose names have been entered into select list. In the case of Shakuntala Sharma (supra) the Apex Court had examined the validity of rule 10 of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh Recruitment (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1992, which provides for appointment to the post of Superintendent amongst Graduate Deputy Superintendent/Revisors with minimum 3 (three) years of service in a ratio of 4:1 failing which, for promotion from amongst Senior Assistants/lYanslators with minimum 6 years of service as such in the same ratio. The facts involved in the case was that the Appellant was appointed as Revisor and for want of vacancy the respondent was not appointed to the post of Deputy Superintendent from the line and later respondent came to be appointed to the post of Superintendent on the ground of possessing 6 (six) years of service in the grade of Senior Assistant, which is equivalent to the post of translators, a grade immediately below the post of Revisor. The Apex Court, finding that the basic weakness in rule 10 that it places two unequal sets of posts at par with each other and prescribes the qualifying service for the higher post as well, had held that the said Rules 10 is iniquitous and indefensibly unjust and that it violates article 14 of the Constitution since it treats unequals as equals and what is more, gives unwarranted advantage to the incumbents of the lower post over the incumbents of the higher post. Accordingly, the Apex Court struck down the said Rules and directed the High Court to frame an equitable Rules for promotion to the post of Superintendent. In the case of Shiv Dayal Dabra (supra) the Punjab and Haryana High Court had examined rule 5(2) of the Haryana Excise and Taxation Department (Group B) Service Rules, 1988, the Rule of which prescribe the age of 54 years for promotion to Assistant Excise and Taxation Officer from Assistant and Senior Scale Stenographer. No such age bar has been placed in respect of Recruitments from three other sources for appointment to the post. Referring to the decision of the Apex Court as laid down in the case of Indravadan H. Shah (supra) and applying to the principle laid down by the Apex Court to the facts of the case, the Punjab and Haryana High Court had found that? the impugned Rules which prescribe the age of 54 years for promotion to Assistant Excise and Taxation Officer from Assistant and Senior Scale Stenographer is arbitrary and illegal and that there is no object to be achieved by fixing such an age limit. The said High Court further held that rule 5(2) in question is discriminatory and arbitrary and should have, thus, no force of law. In the case of Debranjan Ray (supra) the Apex Court had examined the scheme for promoting a separate avenue for promotion on temporary basis only for Upper Division Clerk and Selection Clerk who have put in 20 years of service and exhausted all chances of appearing in Subordinate Accounts Service Examination or had become ineligible to appear at it. On the facts of the case the Apex Court held that the classification so made for the purpose of the scheme is reasonable. 6. On the facts of the case the Apex Court held that the classification so made for the purpose of the scheme is reasonable. 6. As contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, no materials have been placed on behalf of the respondents and in particular the respondent authorities have to explain the basis for introducing the age restriction as in rule 6(c) of the Rules. The learned counsel also submits that at the age of 45 years one is at his prime age. He also submits that in any view of the matter, the retirement age having been already raised, the age restriction that has been put in rule 6(c) ought to have been reviewed. The issue of promotion is to be examined by the DPC on consideration of many factors and not based on the age alone. As contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, having regard to the span of time that is taken for reaching the post of HA, the age restriction incorporated in rule 6(c) may make the promotion prospect of HAs illusionary and it may make impossible for the HAs to get an opportunity to be considered for promotion in accordance with the Rules. It is also contended that the HAs have the advantage of being exposed to the nature of work connected with taxation matters and by virtue of the long service are otherwise considered suitable to be inducted into the Nagaland Taxation Service Rules. Having considered that no materials have been placed by the State authorities to explain the object of introducing the age restriction and applying the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Indrauadan H. Shah (supra) and Shakuntala Sharma (supra) and also taking the benefit the instruction from the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shiv Dayal Dabra (supra), an irresistible conclusion may be drawn that rule 6(c) as regard age restriction is also liable to be struck down as arbitrary, discriminatory and unreasonable and as suffering from the vice of articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Accordingly, I have no hesitation to hold that the petitioner has made out a case for issue of writ of Mandamus as to direct that the age restriction provided in rule 6(c) of the Rules be struck down as void. Accordingly, I have no hesitation to hold that the petitioner has made out a case for issue of writ of Mandamus as to direct that the age restriction provided in rule 6(c) of the Rules be struck down as void. As regard the promotion dated 23.6.2000, even if the same is not disturbed at this stage, the petitioners 2 and 3 being ranked senior to respondent No. 4 are entitled to be considered for promotion. At this stage, it is already placed on record that petitioner No. 2 is already released from service on voluntary retirement and as such the question of considering her case does not arise at this stage. The case of petitioner No. 3 was not forwarded for consideration by DPC on the ground that he had produced false certificate. The fact that his case was not forwarded even for consideration by DPC is not disputed. No materials also has been placed by the respondents that it is a proven case that the petitioner No. 3 has been informed of any misconduct and to be disqualified on that ground for being considered for promotion. In my view, petitioner No, 3 has legitimate ground to be aggrieved for not being considered by the DPC. Therefore, the action of the respondents in not forwarding his case for consideration by the DPC is also liable to be held arbitrary and such action also suffers from legal infirmities of being vitiated by application of the Rules of natural justice. Accordingly, I am inclined to hold that the respondent authorities should re-consider the case of petitioner No. 3 unless he is penalized by following the Rules of natural justice. As regard the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner with respect to the part of the relief to the extent that only HAs have the right to be considered for promotion to the post of Inspector of Taxes and that the UDAs in the Directorate are not to be treated as equal to that of HAs in view of the Government OM dated 25.6.1987 and that they are also entitled to be considered for promotion to the post of Senior Inspector on the consideration of the pay scale of HAs, it may be observed that the petitioner has not otherwise challenged the validity of the entire provisions of rule 6(b), rule 6(c) and rule 2(f) of the Rules. No particular scheme has been drawn up by the authorities for the purpose of providing promotional avenues for HA as a separate class. Therefore, the decision of the Apex Court referred to in the case of Debranjan Ray (supra), in my view, does not lend any support to the case of the petitioners. On consideration of the facts of the case presented in the case and upon hearing the submissions of the counsel, I am not inclined to hold that the petitioners are entitled to get any relief from this court in respect of the points raised, as above. Although it has not been raised in the writ petition but it has also been brought on record during the pendency of the hearing of the case that Government had issued Notification dated 11.2.2002 by which notification the Government had decided to upgrade the post of District Divisional HA in respect of HAs who have completed 10 years of continuous service as on 1.1.2002 to that of HA Class-II Gazetted in the scale of Rs. 6,000-9,750 p.m. and the same post be designated as HA Senior. It is stated that the HAs who have rendered more than 10 years of service have been denied of the said benefit. It is also placed on record that by letter dated 2.11.2002 petitioners 2 and 3 and another have been informed and they are directed to withdraw the court's case for further necessary action for upgradation of HA. In my considered view, pendency of the court's case cannot be a ground for refusing the benefit and withdrawal of the court's case cannot a condition for denying the benefit. The action of the authorities contained in the said letter dated 2.11.2002 has not been challenged in the writ petition. It is also not placed on record if the petitioners have submitted any representation to the authorities in this regard. Accordingly, I am not inclined to examine the validity of the same by way of recording a specific finding on the subject except to observe to the extent that the filing of the present writ petition cannot constitute a basis for not giving the benefit of the Notification dated 11.2.2002. The application is accordingly disposed of as indicated above. There shall be no order as to costs.