JUDGMENT R.K. Merathia, J. 1. The petitioner has prayed for quashing the Industrial Award dated 26.5.1995 (Annexure 1) passed by respondent No. 2 in Reference Nos. 109 of 1991 and 131 of 1991 directing to treat the case of respondents No. 4 to 11 under Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short "the Act") and to offer re-employment within two months from the award becoming enforceable and to re-employ those who offer them for re-employment, without back wages, and subject to their physical fitness, failing which, pay them monthly salary as compensation every month. 2. On 29 th October, 1991, the following dispute was referred for adjudication which gave rise to Reference Case No. 109 of 1991: Whether the action of the management of State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur in terminating the services of the under mentioned workmen with effect from the date shown against their name, is legal and justified? If not, to what relief the workmen are entitled to? Sl. No. Name of the workmen Date of termination 1. Shri Girdhar Gopal 01.02.1979 2. Shri Manindra Kumar Gupta 22.11.1981 3. Shri Vinod Kumar Singh 24.07.1982 4. Shri Rajiv Ranjan 23.08.1984 5. Miss. Tapoti Sarkar 23.12.1982 6. Shri Raghubansh Kumar Singh 23.07.1980 7. Shri Amit Sinha 24.09.1982 8. Shri Girdhar Gopal Tiwari 10.05.1984 On 12 th November, 1991, the following dispute was referred which gave rise to Reference No. 131 of 1991: Whether the action of the management of State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur in terminating the services of the undermentioned workmen with effect from the date shown against their name, is legal and justified? If not, to what relief the workmen are entitled to? Sl. No. Name of the workmen Date of termination 1. Shri Bishwajit Das 23.3.1987 2. Shri Ashok Kumar Das 06.07.1980 3. Shri Gokul Kishore Roy Chowdhary 31.12.1981 4. Shri Man Mohan Krishna Verma 15.2.1984 5. Shri Shakti Kant Dubey 14.11.1981 6. Shri Ashraf Ziyauddin 28.07.1983 Both the references were decided analogously by the impugned order. 3. In Reference No. 109 of 1991, three persons, namely, Shri Girdhar Gopal, Shri Manindra Kumar Gupta and Shri Rajiv Ranjan did not appear. Shri Gokul Kishore Roy Chowdhary 31.12.1981 4. Shri Man Mohan Krishna Verma 15.2.1984 5. Shri Shakti Kant Dubey 14.11.1981 6. Shri Ashraf Ziyauddin 28.07.1983 Both the references were decided analogously by the impugned order. 3. In Reference No. 109 of 1991, three persons, namely, Shri Girdhar Gopal, Shri Manindra Kumar Gupta and Shri Rajiv Ranjan did not appear. Similarly, in Reference No. 131 of 1991, Shri Bishwajit Das, Shri Gokul Kishore Roy Chowdhary and Shri Man Mohan Krishna Verma did not appear and, therefore, the said references were confined to the remaining eight persons who are respondents No. 4 to 11 in this writ petition. 4. After hearing the parties and going through the records, I am satisfied that the impugned award is illegal, perverse and without jurisdiction for the following reasons. 5. Admittedly, respondents No. 4 to 11 worked for 80-90 days in the years 1980-1984 with clear stipulation that the engagement will cease on expiry of the terms. The recruitments in Bank are done only through the Banking Service Recruitment Board but the Branch Managers were authorised to engage persons temporarily as per the needs. But in view of the policy decision of the management, all such engagement ceased after expiry of the stipulated period. However, on 6.7.1987 and subsequently also, notices were published petitioner- Bank, offering employments to all, including the ex-employees (Annexure 3 series) but the tribunal wrongly ignored the said notices saying they were afterthoughts. Respondents No. 4 to 11 alleged that after their termination, the petitioner Bank took other persons in employment which was specifically denied by the petitioner. Thus the onus was on respondents No. 4 to 11 to prove such fact. But nothing was brought on record by them to show that the alleged fresh employments were for the same category or posts, or that one temporary hand was replaced by other, or that it was not through the normal procedure prescribed for recruitment by the Recruitment Board. Even then the tribunal held in general terms that fresh appointments were made after termination of respondents No. 4 to 11. Such finding is thus wholly perverse. Reliance on Ext. W-4 [(1991) 1 PLJR 567] was wholly misplaced, inasmuch as the said writ petition was filed against refusal to make reference in which on prima facie satisfaction, the High Court directed for referring the matter for adjudication. Such finding is thus wholly perverse. Reliance on Ext. W-4 [(1991) 1 PLJR 567] was wholly misplaced, inasmuch as the said writ petition was filed against refusal to make reference in which on prima facie satisfaction, the High Court directed for referring the matter for adjudication. On one hand the tribunal observed that such award may jeopardise the chance of many candidates who may be more deserving and willing to complete for such jobs through open competition conducted by the Recruitment Board but on the other hand, it took hyper technical view in passing the award. 6. In the case of State Bank of Bikaner and Taipur v. Om Prakash Sharma (2006) 5 SCC 1231, it is held that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court emanate from the order of reference. In the present case, the reference was whether the termination was legal and justified or not. But the tribunal traveled much beyond the reference to find out purported non-compliance of Sections 25-G, 25-H of the Act and Rules 77 and 78. Thus the award suffers from jurisdictional error also. In the said case, it has also been held that at best, non-compliance of the Rules may attract penalty under Rule 79, but it could not be a ground for passing the award. 7. Similar awards were pronounced by different tribunals in respect to different branches of the petitioner. Some of such awards were challenged by the petitioner in Allahabad High Court which are annexed by the petitioner in reply to the supplementary counter affidavit. I fully agree and adopt the following findings of the Allahabad High Court which were rendered in almost similar circumstances: As already noticed above, it is not disputed that the contract of engagement specified the date of cessation of employment and that the employment would not continue after the mentioned period. Thus, there was an agreement contrary to the principles of last come first go as contemplated in Section 25-G. A feeble attempt was made by Mr. Agarwal, learned Counsel for the respondent that the agreement should be express. However, I am not impressed by this argument. Giving a plain meaning of the word, agreement and contrary, it would take within its sweep even implied agreement. I am supported in my view by a decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court rendered in Kashmira Singh v. Haryana Electricity Board and Ors. However, I am not impressed by this argument. Giving a plain meaning of the word, agreement and contrary, it would take within its sweep even implied agreement. I am supported in my view by a decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court rendered in Kashmira Singh v. Haryana Electricity Board and Ors. 1976 Labour & Industrial Cases p. 348 where the agreement stipulated that the services could be terminated by giving one month notice, the court held that such an agreement amounted to an agreement to the contrary as envisaged in Section 25-G. The application of Section 25-G can also be examined by another angle. It is not disputed that regular appointment is to be made by the Recruitment Board and in case the bank is permitted to make such temporary arrangement de-hors those rules, such back door appointments would violate the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. It has time and again been said that back door appointment do not help the cause of the workmen at large. ... ... Section 25-H mandates that if the employer proposes to take new hands, he would have to give preference to the retrenched employees who offers himself for re-employment. Though the written statement of the employee contained a statement that fresh hands were taken in, which was specifically denied by the employer, no specific details of such employment of fresh hands was brought on record. Some witnesses examined on behalf of management did say that fresh hands were taken in but the workman has failed to place on record any material or evidence that such fresh employment was for the same category or post or that it was not through the normal procedure prescribed i.e. through the Recruitment Board. In absence of such evidence, the tribunal was not justified in giving a mechanical finding that Section 25-H of the Act was violated. The tribunal has knot noted, even in a cursory manner, or found as a matter of fact, that fresh hands were taken in on the same post or category and that one temporary hand was replacing another. In my view Section 25-H would apply when all the aforesaid ingredients are present. The third submission of learned Counsel for the petitioner also carries weight. In my view Section 25-H would apply when all the aforesaid ingredients are present. The third submission of learned Counsel for the petitioner also carries weight. It is trite to say that Section 25-F does not control Section 25-H but it is also correct to say that Section 25-H merely gives a preference in fresh appointment but does not ipso facto a right for re- employment. 8. The High Court was of the view that even though the award was contrary to the provisions of law but in view of the fact that the concerned persons were working for more than 15 years on the strength of the stay order, the High Court allowed them to continue. 9. Learned Counsel for respondents No. 4 to 11 submitted that few persons have been given appointment/reinstatement after the order of the Allahabad High Court and the Supreme Court. The petitioner has replied to this by saying that they were confirmed/absorbed as per the orders of the Court. Thus this ground is also of no help to respondents No. 4 to 11. In the present case, the services of respondents No. 4 to 11 came to an end as far back as in the year 1980-84 after working for 80-90 days on temporary basis. However, on 6.5.1997, this Court directed to comply with the requirements of Section 17-B of the Act. 10. On the whole, it is not possible to uphold the award which is hereby set aside. The writ petition is allowed. However, there will be no order as to costs.