JUDGMENT Aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 11-8-1994 in O.S. No.510 of 1991 of the Principal Subordinate Judge. Visakhapatnam, the unsuccessful defendant filed the present appeal and on his death during the pendency of the appeal appellant Nos. 2 and 3 were brought on record as his legal representatives. 2. O.S. No. 510 of 1991 was filed by the respondent herein alleging that the house bearing No.16-6-13. Official Colony, Visakhapatnam belonging to the plaintiff was leased out under an oral agreement to the defendant on a monthly rent of Rs.3,500/-from 12-2-1989 and a notice was issued by the plaintiff on 10-9-1991 terminating the tenancy with effect from 28-9-1991 and a correction 10tice was issued on 18-9-1991 demanding delivery of vacant possession by 12-10-1991. In the absence of any reply from the defendant, the suit was filed for eviction recovery of arrears of rent till termination and recovery of damages for use and occupation thereafter at Rs.1 0,000/- per month as well as the electricity charges paid by the plaintiff. 3. The defendant resisted the suit on various grounds and primarily questioned that the quit notice and the rejoinder were not legal or adequate and do not duly determine the tenancy. A reply was sent accordingly. Hence, the defendant sought for dismissal of the suit. 4. The trial Court framed the following issues for trial: 1. Whether there is valid quit notice terminating the tenancy? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for damages for use and occupation? 3. To what relief? 5. The trial Court examined P.W.1 and D.W.1 and marked Exs.A-1 to A-5 and Exs.B-1 to B-4 during trial. By the impugned judgment, the trial Court also disposed of O.S. No.295 of 1993 filed by the tenant for a permanent injunction against the landlord from interfering with his possession and for a mandatory direction against defendants 2 and 3 therein to restore electricity connection. In O.S. No. 510 of 1991, the trial Court found that quit notices Exs.A-1 and A-3 were validly issued and decreed the suit for eviction with proportionate costs, while directing the determination of the mesne profits from the date of termination of lease i.e. 12-10-1991 till the date of delivery of possession by the tenant on a separate application. The claims of the plaintiff for arrears of rent and electricity charges were dismissed and the defendant was granted two months time for vacating the premises. The claims of the plaintiff for arrears of rent and electricity charges were dismissed and the defendant was granted two months time for vacating the premises. 6. Against the judgment and decree in O.S.No.510 of 1991, the defendant/tenant filed the present appeal primarily questioning the validity of the notice to quit. It was specifically pleaded that the lower Court failed to see and ought to have seen that under Section 110 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the date of commencement (i.e.) 12th has to be excluded and the tenancy lasts up to 12th of the succeeding month of tenancy and as such the tenancy commences from 12-9-1991 and lasts up to 12-10-1991 and does not terminate by 11-10-1991 as determined by the respondent under EX.A-1 read with EX.A-3. ( AIR 1975 SC 1111 ). The challenge to the grant of mesne profits to be determined in a separate enquiry on termination of tenancy, was also consequential to the challenge to validity of termination of the tenancy under the suit quit notice. The defendant/appellant herein also filed transfer Appeal Suit No. 1733 of 2002 against the judgment and decree in O.S.No.295 of 1993 to the extent they went against him. 7. These two appeals were heard and decided by common judgment, dated 26-11-2004, in which it was held that in the light of Dattonpant v. Vithalrao1 and N. Venkatesam v. Jadao Bai2, the quit notice was defective terminating the tenancy with effect from 11-10-1991 calling upon the tenant to deliver possession by 12-1 0-1991, instead of terminating the tenancy with effect from 12-10-1991 calling upon the tenant to deliver possession on 13-10-1991. The judgment under challenge in the Transfer Appeal Suit. No.1733 of 2002 was found to be not susceptible to any interference. Accordingly, this appeal was allowed with costs and the Transfer Appeal Suit No. 1733 of 2002 was dismissed with costs. 8. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff/respondent herein filed review A.S.M.P. No. 338 of 2005 on the ground that Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 as amended by the Transfer of Property (Amendment) Act, 2002 read with the transitory provision in the Amendment Act was not brought to the notice of the Court, which applies to the pending appeal curing any defect in the quit notice. Review A.S.M.P. No. 338 of 2005 was decided by order dated 13-12-2005 allowing the same and setting aside, and recalling the judgment in A.S. No. 1324 of 1994, dated 26-11-2004. The appeal was reopened and for that reason came up for hearing again. It should be noted that the dismissal of Transfer Appeal Suit No. 1733 of 2002 had become final without any further proceedings. 9. Sri V.L.N.G.K. Murthy, learned counsel appearing for the appellants has desired that Section 3 of the Transfer of Property (Amendment) Act, 2002, Central Act No.3 of 2003, should be so construed that the reference to all notices in pursuance of which any suitor proceeding is pending at the commencement of this Act, to which the provisions of Section 106 of the principal Act as amended by Section 2 of the Amendment Act, shall apply, should be understood as meaning to extend such application of the amended provision only to pending suits and no further. The learned counsel argued that the word proceeding cannot embrace within its purview an appeal nor does the word suit cover an appeal from a decision in the suit. The learned counsel further contended that even if an appeal were to be construed as continuation of the suit, still only a notice in pursuance of which any appeal is pending, can be considered to be covered by the amended provision, or in other words, only for an appeal at the instance of landlord basing his claim on such a notice saved by the amended provision, the amended provision may have an application. When the appeal by the tenant is not in pursuance of such notice, the amended provision cannot apply. 10. Sri D.V. Seetharama Murthy, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff submitted with all vehemence that any such strained interpretation of the transitory provision of Section 3 of the Amendment Act is not called for, when the grammatical and literal meaning of the provision is plain and unambiguous. Notices in pursuance of which any suit is pending, have to be construed as all notices in question in any suit or in any appeal which is a continuation of the suit at the instance of either the landlord or the tenant, so as to apply the amended provisions. Notices in pursuance of which any suit is pending, have to be construed as all notices in question in any suit or in any appeal which is a continuation of the suit at the instance of either the landlord or the tenant, so as to apply the amended provisions. As the present appeal was already pending by the date of commencement of the Transfer of Property (Amendment) Act, 2002, the notices under Section 106 in issue in the appeal are governed by the amended provision and notice original provision. The learned counsel also referred to the statement of objects and reasons leading to the introduction and passage of the Legislation amending Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. 11. Before proceeding further, it should be noted that the only question canvassed in this appeal as of now is the validity or otherwise of the notices to quit in issue in the appeal visa-vis the applicability of the Transfer of Property (Amendment) Act, 2002. 12. The point that arises for consideration, therefore, is whether the suit notices to quit are valid to terminate the tenancy in question by virtue of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 as amended? Point: 13. The plaint alleged that the suit schedule house was leased out to the defendant orally on a monthly rent of Rs.3,500/- from February, 1989 and that the building was occupied by the defendant on 12-02-1989. Though it was claimed that the tenancy is from month to month and the rent is payable on the first day of succeeding month, the defendant contended that the tenancy was from 12-02-1989. Though the plaint stated that the plaintiff for the purpose of evidence of this suit is "not" adopting the version of the defendant with regard to the date of commencement of the tenancy, the trial Court on reading the plaint as a whole concluded that the plaintiff accepted the stand of the defendant that the tenancy commenced from 121h of every month and the word not in the plaint in para 3(b) is obviously a typographic mistake. The plaintiff issued Exs.A-1 and A-3 notices dated 10-9-1991 and 18-9-1991 to the defendant to quit and though it was stated in EX.A-1 that the tenancy was terminated with effect from 28-9-1991, it was clarified in EX.A-3 that there was a mistake in the date of tenancy specified in EX.A-1 and that the tenancy was terminated with effect from 11-10-1991. Both the notices were received by the defendant and thus, the plaintiff put the defendant on notice that he terminated the tenancy with effect from 11-10-1991. This factual position is not disputed in the oral evidence and hence, the tenancy was terminated by the plaintiff through Exs.A-1 and A-3 with effect from 11-10-1991. As the tenancy commenced on 12-2-1989, that tenancy should have been terminated with effect from 12-10-1991 and possession should have been demanded to be delivered on 13-10-1991. In the light of the accepted interpretation of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 prior to the amendment, as illustrated by Dattoanpants case (1 supra) and N. Venkatesams case (2 supra), such a notice to quit could not have been considered valid. 14. It is only to remedy such difficulty that the Transfer of Property (Amendment) Act, 2002 was enacted and the statement of objects and reasons for Bill No.77 of 2002 published in Part-II of the Gazette of India Extraordinary referred to the legal position reiterated by the Supreme Court in Mangilal v. Sugan Chand3, that while computing the period of notice, the day on which the notice is served is required to be excluded. Then the 18151 report of the Law Commission of India on amendment to Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 examining the working of this Section was referred to and as suits have been dismis3ed on this lone technicality leading to serving of a fresh notice and filing of a fresh suit which amounts not only to serious injustice but also to multiplicity of litigations despite the fact that the defendant had more time available to him than the prescribed period of notice by the date when the suit is filed to evict him or even by the date of judgment dismissing the suit, it was proposed that the period of notice shall commence from the date of its receipt and the amendment shall apply to the pending suits or proceedings and notices issued before the commencement of the proposed amendment. 15. Accordingly, the Transfer of Property (Amendment) Act, 2002, Central Act NO.3 of 2003, was enacted and by Section 2 thereof, Section 106 of the Principal Act was amended specifically incorporating sub-section (3) under which a notice under sub-section (1) shall not be deemed to be invalid merely because the period mentioned therein falls short of the period specified under that sub-section, where a suit or proceeding is filed after the expiry of the period mentioned in that sub-section. Subsection (3) as amended, undoubtedly makes EX.A-1 notice read with EX.A-3 notice not invalid due to termination of tenancy on 11-10-1991 instead of 12-1 0-1991. 16. The amended Section 106 shall apply according to the transitory provision in Section 3 of the Amendment Act to all notices in pursuance of which any suit or proceeding is pending at the commencement of the Amendment Act. It is true that the suit was disposed of on 11-8-1994 and was not pending by the date of the Amendment Act coming into force. But this appeal by the defendant against the judgment and decree in the suit is undoubtedly pending then and even now. As clarified by Honble Sri Justice V.V.S. Rao in the orders on Review A.S.M.P. No.338 of 2005, dated 13-12-2005, appeal is a continuation of the suit and even if the matter is pending at the appellate stage, the amended provision would apply. The contention to the contrary was negatived. As clarified by Honble Sri Justice V.V.S. Rao in the orders on Review A.S.M.P. No.338 of 2005, dated 13-12-2005, appeal is a continuation of the suit and even if the matter is pending at the appellate stage, the amended provision would apply. The contention to the contrary was negatived. The contention that this appeal is "not in pursuance of" Exs.A-174 and A-3 notices and therefore, the amended provision does not apply, defeats the very purpose and object of the amendment. Even without the aid of the statement of objects and reasons for the Legislation, the plain, unambiguous and grammatical language of Sections 2 and 3 of Amendment Act makes it clear" that the pendency of a lis in which eviction of tenant is sought, in pursuance of a notice to quit, is what all is required for the application of the amended provision, irrespective of whether the pending lis is at the instance of the landlord or the tenant. An appeal by tenant against eviction in pursuance of a notice to quit also arises in pursuance of such notice for adjudication of the validity or otherwise of the same. Such appeal, in effect and substance, becomes pending in pursuance of such notice only and any other construction will result in an absurd situation where the notice would have become valid, if the suit were pending and would have to be considered invalid, if the appeal is pending, though it is a continuation of the suit. While the constitutional and legal validity of the amendment is not in dispute, the transitory provision in Section 3 of the Amendment Act has to, therefore, apply with full force to all notices in pursuance of which any suit or appeal is pending at the commencement of that Act. In that view of the matter, the appeal has to fail. 17. Sri V.L.N.GK Murthy, learned counsel for the appellant desired that in case his contentions are not upheld, the appellants who are running an educational institution in the suit premises may be granted an years time to vacate keeping in view the interests of, the students involved and the difficulty in securing a suitable alternative premises in the locality. 18. Sri D.V. Seetharama Murthy, learned counsel for the respondent opposed the request. 19. The tenancy was terminated by the notice to quit in October, 1991. 18. Sri D.V. Seetharama Murthy, learned counsel for the respondent opposed the request. 19. The tenancy was terminated by the notice to quit in October, 1991. The suit was filed in the same year and could be disposed of only after about three years. The appeal against the same is pending since about 12 years. The defendant/appellants gained almost 15 years since the termination of tenancy without vacating the premises in spite of being liable for the same in law and grant of one more year for them may be too long. For securing the requisite alternative accommodation for running the educational institution grant of three months time may be reasonable and proper. 20. In the result the appea1 is dismissed without costs and the appellants are granted time for three months for vacating the subject premises from the date of this judgment.