V. GOPALA GOWDA, J. ( 1 ) THESE two Miscellaneous first Appeals arise out of a common order dated 15-12-2000 passed in arbitration Case No. 40/94. By that order, the court rejected the petition filed by the Arbitrator under Section 14 of the Arbitration Act of 1940 (now repealed) and remitted back the matter to the Arbitrator for redetermination. While the Appellant in the first appeal is aggrieved by the rejection of the petition of the appellant by the Arbitrator, the Appellant in the second appeal is aggrieved by the remand order. ( 2 ) MR. Chandranath Ariga, learned Counsel for the appellant in the first appeal relied upon the decision reported in air 1963 SC 1677 (Smt. Santa Sila Devi VS. Dhirendra Nath Sen)and contended that the finding of the learned Judge of the Civil Court that non-consideration of Issues 14, 15 and 16 by the Arbitrator and passing the Award amounts to "misconduct" under Section 30 of the Arbitration act, is wholly untenable in law. On this ground alone, according to the learned Counsel, the order under challenge is liable to be set aside. The Counsel further relied upon (1992) 4 SCC 217 (Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir) wherein misconduct is explained. Another decision relied upon by the Counsel is (1999) 3 SCC 533 (Kundale and Associates Vs. Konkan Hotels (P) Ltd.)wherein it is held that the award cannot be set aside merely on the ground that it contain no reasons. Therefore, the learned Counsel submitted that the award of the arbitrator should not have been set aside by the Civil Court in the instant case. ( 3 ) LEARNED Counsel Mr. Abhinav. R for the appellant in the second appeal supported the findings recorded by the civil Court at para 8 of the order holding that Issues 14, 15 and 16 goes to the root of the matter and non-considering and answering them amounts to non-consideration of the case. Consequently, the real dispute is not determined and therefore it for the tribunal to set out only its view of what occurred, but also to make it clear that it has considered any alternative version and has rejected it. Even if several reasons lead to the same result, the tribunal should still set them out. Consequently, the real dispute is not determined and therefore it for the tribunal to set out only its view of what occurred, but also to make it clear that it has considered any alternative version and has rejected it. Even if several reasons lead to the same result, the tribunal should still set them out. The tribunal is not expected to recite at great length communications exchanged or submissions made by the parties, nor to analyse the law and the authorities. It is sufficient that the tribunal should explain what its findings are and how it reached its conclusions. " the Counsel repudiated the submissions made by Mr. Ariga and submitted that the Arbitrator on 17-7-1992 held that Issues 14, 15 and 16 would be decided after recording evidence. Having held so, it was his duty to consider the said issues and he should have recorded a finding thereon. The Counsel submits that as rightly pointed-out by the learned Civil Judge, failure to do so amounts to misconduct and therefore the said finding do not warrant interference by this Court. ( 4 ) WITH reference to the rival legal contentions, we consider whether the impugned order of the Civil Court warrant interference. Our answer is in the negative for the following reasons:- i) The reliance placed upon the decision of the supreme Court is inapplicable to the fact situation. It is not the ground that each issue is not separately considered to hold that the award suffers from misconduct under Section 30 of the Act. It is also not the contention or ground urged by the KPTCL either before the Civil court or before this Court. Therefore, the reliance placed upon the decisions is mis-placed. Now, we will consider whether the award can be a non-speaking one. In this regard, learned Counsel for the KPTCL has rightly relied upon the commentary extracted earlier. The said commentary was based upon the decision of Jammu and Kashmir in om Prakash Nargotra Vs. Union of India (1995)2 arb. L. R. 129 (J and K ). In our view, having regard to the power conferred upon the Arbitrator under the Act, he is required to determine the rights of the parties and such determination shall be made by applying his mind to the facts and the evidence on record when the claim is disputed. Union of India (1995)2 arb. L. R. 129 (J and K ). In our view, having regard to the power conferred upon the Arbitrator under the Act, he is required to determine the rights of the parties and such determination shall be made by applying his mind to the facts and the evidence on record when the claim is disputed. This view is clear from section 16 (1) (a) of the repealed Act, which reads as under :- "16. Power to remit award:- (1) The Court may from time to time remit the award or any matter referred to arbitration to the arbitrators or umpire for reconsideration upon such terms as it thinks fit:- (a):- Where the award has left undetermined any of the matters referred to arbitration, or where it determines any matter not referred to arbitration and such matter cannot be separated without affecting the determination of the matters referred; in the above clause, there is a phrase "undetermined or determined". and it has got relevance to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the claimants that the award need not be a speaking award. Determination means, to arrive at a conclusion on the basis of the material placed on record and recording of a finding. This is what, which is stated in the extracted portion as above in this judgment from Markand's laws relating to arbitration and conciliation. Therefore, the reliance placed upon the two decisions by the learned Counsel for the claimant/appellant are not applicable, particularly having regard to the fact that the parties have not agreed to settle the claim but the Arbitrator settled the claim. In such circumstances, non-speaking award cannot be allowed to sustain in law. (ii) A reading of the award of the Arbitrator indicates that neither it is a speaking nor reasoned award. A reasoned award always speaks but the award in question does not speak except allowing the claim. Therefore, we concur with the decision of the Civil Court and rightly it has set aside the award and remanded the matter for fresh consideration. iv) In view of Section 16 of the Act, the submission made by the learned Counsel for the KPTCL that after passing the award, the arbitrator become functus offtcio, cannot be accepted. This position is well-settled in AIR 1962 SC 551 (Rikhabdass Vs. Ballabhdas ). iv) In view of Section 16 of the Act, the submission made by the learned Counsel for the KPTCL that after passing the award, the arbitrator become functus offtcio, cannot be accepted. This position is well-settled in AIR 1962 SC 551 (Rikhabdass Vs. Ballabhdas ). ( 5 ) FOR the reasons stated above, both appeals must fail and the same are dismissed. ( 6 ) WE direct the Arbitrator to resolve the dispute between the parties within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. All the factual and legal contentions are kept open to be considered by the Arbitrator.