S. N. SRIVASTAVA, J. Application in hand is the application filed by Smt. Munawar Rana wife of Shamsher Rana resident of Nai Basti chakrauta Road Saharanpur encapsulating the prayer for recall of judgment delivered on 3-11-2004 by this Court attended with further prayer to implead the applicant in the array of parties. 2. Second appeal arising out of O. S. No. 268 of 1983 Premwati v. Jagdish, was decided by this Court on merits on 3rd November 2003 as stated supra. The applicant claims herself transferee from defendant from whom she purchased property in suit through registered sale deed dated 22-11-1999 during pendency of second appeal. 3. I have heard Sri R. K. Jain, Senior Advocate assisted by Ashish Singh learned Counsel appearing for the applicant and Sri Ashish Kumar Singh learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff appellant. 4. Sri R. K. Jain, began submissions by relying upon case law reported in JT 2004 (2) SC 196, Raj Kumar v. Sardari Lal, and canvassing that the applicant was a transferee from defendant, and that she, albeit the fact, was not arrayed as a party in the suit, was still a person claiming her rights through defendant and by this reckoning, proceeds the argument, she has right to institute application for recall of order by virtue of being affected by the decree. Learned Counsel further canvassed that Satyapal transferor conveyed to transferee that in the second appeal pending before the High Court, an application was moved by plaintiff with the prayer that she did not want to prosecute the aforesaid case as a result of some compromise and it was in that perspective that she purchased the property. In support of her case, the applicant has filed a copy of sale deed dated 22-11-1999 and also Copy of the application allegedly filed by Prem Wati on 3-5-1999 in the Court of Civil Judge in Misc. Case No. 1006 of 1990 and the order dated 9-4-2003 dismissing the suit as withdrawn. Per contra, Sri A. K. Singh contended that the plaintiff was not aware of any sale deed dated 22-11-1999 allegedly executed by Satyapal; that Satyapal was also not competent to transfer the dispute property as Satyapal was only a tenant of disputed property. Case No. 1006 of 1990 and the order dated 9-4-2003 dismissing the suit as withdrawn. Per contra, Sri A. K. Singh contended that the plaintiff was not aware of any sale deed dated 22-11-1999 allegedly executed by Satyapal; that Satyapal was also not competent to transfer the dispute property as Satyapal was only a tenant of disputed property. He further drew attention to the contents of counter-affidavit the text of which is that the husband of applicant and applicant herself had full knowledge of pendency of second appeal and that no application dated 3-5-1999 was ever filed by the plaintiff and that now the applicant is trying to deprive the plaintiff of her legal rights to remain in possession of the property. In support of his case, the learned Counsel filed extracts of assessment register, which vouched for payment of water and house taxes. He further contended that as applicant had full knowledge of pendency of second appeal, on the principles of lis pendens, the applicant is not entitled to get the judgment recalled and application is liable to be dismissed. The learned Counsel referred to para 4 of the rejoinder affidavit which contains admission that Satya Pal had conveyed to her that compromise had taken place between him and the plaintiff and in pursuance of thereof the appellant i. e. Prem Wati had withdrawn her appeal before the High Court. 5. Learned Counsel for the applicant placed reliance on Raj Kumar v. Sadari Lal & Ors. , 2004 (2) JCLR 121 (SC) : JT 2004 (2) SC 196. The quintessence of what has been laid down in this decision is that the doctrine of lis pendens has been statutorily incorporated under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and a defendant cannot, by alienating the property during pendency of litigation, venture into depriving the successful plaintiff of the fruits of decree. The quintessence of what has been laid down in this decision is that the doctrine of lis pendens has been statutorily incorporated under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and a defendant cannot, by alienating the property during pendency of litigation, venture into depriving the successful plaintiff of the fruits of decree. The transfer pendente lite is treated in the eye as a representative-in-interest of judgment debtor and held bound by decree passed against judgment debtor though neither the defendant had chosen to bring the transferee on record by apprising his opponent and the Court of the transfer made by him nor the transferee has chosen to come on record by taking recourse to Order XXII, Rule 10 of the C. P. C. The question which the Apex Court was seized of was that in case transfer took place during pendency of the suit, but the decree passed ex parte in the suit is sought to be set aside not by the defendant on record but by a person who did not come or was not brought on record promptly. The Apex Court relied upon Section 146 of the C. P. C. In a case where ex parte decree was passed against defendant, an application was filed to set aside the ex parte decree by transferee, question was whether such transferee has locus standi to file application for recall of ex parte decree. 6. Coming to the present case, it would appear that the suit itself was decreed on merits by the trial Court on 30-11-1985. The appeal preferred against the said order by the defendant was allowed on merits on 18th October, 1986 by the appellate Court and suit was dismissed on merits. A second appeal filed in this Court was admitted as far back as in the year 1987 on a substantial question of law mentioned as question No. 5 in memo of appeal. It would further transpire from the order sheet that the aforesaid appeal was dismissed for default on 18-4-2001 but on an application filed by the appellant order dated 18-4-2001 was recalled vide order dated 3-8-2001. It would further transpire from the order sheet that the aforesaid appeal was dismissed for default on 18-4-2001 but on an application filed by the appellant order dated 18-4-2001 was recalled vide order dated 3-8-2001. It would further appear that on the date on which sale deed was executed by defendant, the aforesaid appeal was pending and it was being prosecuted by the appellant diligently and Opposite Parties 2 and 3 the transferor of applicant were represented and prosecuted in the second appeal in the High Court. It is nobodys case that the appeal was withdrawn before the date of execution of sale deed dated 22-11-1999. It would further transpire that on the statement of Sri H. N. Sharma, learned Counsel for the appellant the second appeal was permitted to be withdrawn on 7-4-2003 but on restoration application moved by the applicant for recall of order passed by Hon. Mr. Justice B. K. Rathi, dismissing the appeal as withdrawn, notices were issued fixing 25-11-2003. By the order-dated 6-4-2004, this Court passed order directing the office to inform the learned Counsel for Opposite parties. By a detailed order, the restoration application was allowed and order dated 9-4-2003 was recalled by order dated 7-4-2004 and Second appeal was restored to its original number. Thereafter, it would further appear, fresh notices were issued to Opposite parties fixing 17-5-2004 for hearing of the appeal. The office report scribed thereon makes it clear that on 14-5-2004, the notices had not been received back after service and therefore, fresh notices were issued. The notices were again issued but the same were received back unserved and hence registered notices were ordered to be issued on 19-7-2004. The notices were sent to the respective Counsels for the parties namely, Virendra Kumar, S. K. Srivastava, and V. K. Srivastava by the Court vide order dated 23-9-2004 and thereafter the case was heard. The information was again directed to be given to learned Counsel for the opposite parties and the case was listed in Daily cause list. 7. The above facts leave no manner of doubt that all possible steps were taken by the Court to serve the defendants personally though he was represented by the Counsel in the case and the second appeal was heard and decided on merits. The glance through record would further make it clear that applicant had knowledge about pendency of the matter. The above facts leave no manner of doubt that all possible steps were taken by the Court to serve the defendants personally though he was represented by the Counsel in the case and the second appeal was heard and decided on merits. The glance through record would further make it clear that applicant had knowledge about pendency of the matter. Although she has taken the plea that she was informed by the transferor that the matter has been compromised and consequent thereof second appeal has been withdrawn but there is nothing on record to show that she had taken any steps to get these facts verified from the record of second appeal. From the materials on record, there is no indicium on record that the second appeal was compromised. It would rather appear that even after that date the matter was prosecuted rigorously by the plaintiff in the High Court. Coming to case law cited across the bar, having scanned the ratiocination of the decision, I am of the view that the case law relied upon by the learned Counsel for the applicant is not attracted for application to the facts of the present case in as much as in that case immediately after ex parte decree was passed, an application was moved and in this perspective, the Apex Court took aid of Section 146 of the C. P. C. read with Order XXII Rule 10 C. P. C. to lay down the law in the particular facts of the case that case was pending. The present case is not a case of ex parte decree but it would appear that Opposite party was represented in the second appeal. Besides, the name of their Counsel was also published in the Daily Cause list. Out of array of Counsel, only one Counsel claimed that he had no instructions. The other Counsel appearing for the Opposite parties never claimed that Vakalatnama signed in their favour by the respondents 2 and 3 had been withdrawn. As stated supra, all possible steps were taken to serve transferors both by normal processes as well by as registered post. It is also worthy of notice that trial Court as well as appellate Court decided the matter on merits and this Court also dealt with the matter on merits. As stated supra, all possible steps were taken to serve transferors both by normal processes as well by as registered post. It is also worthy of notice that trial Court as well as appellate Court decided the matter on merits and this Court also dealt with the matter on merits. Besides, the learned Counsel for the applicant did not argue the case on merits and did not press into service any point, which might go to show that the finding in judgment is perverse or suffers from any error of law apparent on record. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act being germane to the controversy, is quoted below. "during the pendency in any Court having authority within the limits of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir or established beyond such limits by the Central Government of any suit or proceedings which is not collusive and in which any right to immoveable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the Court and on such terms as it may impose. Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, the pendency of a suit or proceedings shall be deemed to commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint or the institution of the proceeding in a Court of competent jurisdiction, and to continue until the suit or proceeding has been disposed of by a final decree or order, and complete satisfaction or discharge of such decree or order has been obtained or has become unobtainable by reason of the expiration of any period of limitation prescribed for the execution thereof by any taw for the time being in force. " In my considered view, Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is applicable on all fours to the present case. 8. From the materials on record, it transpires that application under Order XLI, Rule 21 C. P. C. read with order XXII Rule 10 C. P. C. was filed on behalf of Smt. Munawar Rana accompanied with an affidavit of one Luqman Ahmad son of Zahoor Ahmad resident of Mohalla Chipiyan Tola District Saharanpur who claims himself to be pairokars on behalf of applicant. It would further appear that he has sworn all paragraphs on personal knowledge. There is nothing on record to exhibit whether Lukman the deponent of the affidavit filed on behalf of Munawar Rana was appointed through general power of attorney or special power of attorney for the purpose of present case or what was the basis for his swearing the allegations made in the affidavit on personal knowledge. In paragraph 7 of the affidavit, it is averred that applicant was bona fide purchaser and was not aware of pendency of any litigation before this Court or before any other forum and further that since the date of purchase she has been in peaceful possession over the property. It is further averred that Premwati on the dint of decree passed on 3-11-2004 is striving hard to dispossess the applicant from the property in dispute. From a perusal of averments contained in paragraph 4 of the affidavit, it is explicit that transferee had full knowledge of pendency of the second appeal. To be precise, In supplementary affidavit, the aforesaid Lukman has reiterated the averments made in affidavit filed in support of application for recall of order, This affidavit was replied to by Smt. Premwati appellant. In paragraph 3 of the counter-affidavit, it has been clearly stated that Munawar Rana was never in possession over the disputed premises and further that she (Premwati) was not aware of sale deed dated 22-11-1999 executed by Satyapal, who it is further averred, was not competent to transfer the dispute premises in favour of Smt. Munawar Rana citing the reason that he was merely a tenant residing in the disputed premises. Paragraph 3 of the affidavit filed by Smt. Premwati may be excerpted below. "that the contents of paragraph No. 6 of the affidavit as they stand are denied and in reply it is submitted that appellant is continuously residing in the disputed premises since the date of her marriage with late Hukam Singh and she is not aware of the purchase of the property by the applicant from Satyapal even otherwise Satyapal was not competent to transfer the property, because he was not the son of late Jagdish, who was the elder brother of the deponents husband and Sri Satyapal was only the tenant in that house. Deponent had also paid house tax of the disputed premises for the period 2005-2006. Deponent had also paid house tax of the disputed premises for the period 2005-2006. Copy of Bill of house tax and receipt are annexed as Annexure C. A. 1" The above averments have been reiterated in paragraph 4 of the counter-affidavit to the supplementary affidavit filed by Luqman wherein appellant has reiterated that Satyapal was not competent to transfer the property because he was not son of late Jagdish Prasad who happened to be the elder brother of deponents husband and Satya Pal was merely a tenant. These averments made in the counter-affidavit as well as in the supplementary affidavit have not been denied in rejoinder affidavit filed by the applicant. In paragraph 3 of the rejoinder affidavit, the only denial by necessary implication is that in the present scenario, it is not open for the appellant to either accept or repudiate that Satyapal was not competent to transfer the disputed premises to the applicant. The fact that Satyapal was not the son of Jagdish Prasad and was simply a tenant has not been repudiated. Similarly, again in paragraph 4 of the counter-affidavit filed in reply to supplementary affidavit of the appellant, the factum that Satyapal was not the son of late Jagdish Prasad and was simply a tenant has not been repudiated. 9. It is apt to notice here that at no stage Smt. Munawar Rana or her husband refuted the averments made in the affidavit of appellant that they made any enquiry from the appellant several times and that the appellant ever informed about pendency of the second appeal. The averments that Smt. Munawar Rana was aware of the present second appeal and also that she (Smt. Munawar Rana) was not in settled peaceful possession as alleged in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the counter-affidavit of appellant filed in reply to the affidavit in support of Application for recall have not been repudiated by Smt. Munawar Rana or her husband, In this connection, the affidavit of Luqman is of no evidentiary value inasmuch as he has not disclosed that he was appointed by the applicant to conduct the case through general power of attorney or special power of attorney. 10. The averments made in the counter about the alleged conversation between the appellant and Munawar Rana do not commend to me for acceptance inasmuch as again it is not disclosed how he came to know of the conversation. 10. The averments made in the counter about the alleged conversation between the appellant and Munawar Rana do not commend to me for acceptance inasmuch as again it is not disclosed how he came to know of the conversation. Further from a perusal of Rejoinder Affidavit filed by Luqman dated 26th October, 2005 filed in reply to counter-affidavit to the affidavit in support of the application under Order XLI, Rule 21 of the C. P. C. it is not clear that the averments made therein are based on personal knowledge or on the basis of record or otherwise and therefore, the rejoinder affidavit aforestated filed on 26-10-2005 commends to me to be rejected on this ground alone. In the entire perspective, the cold fact remains that neither Munawar Rana nor her husband came forward to file affidavit in support of their claims and it is thus perceptible that they did not come up with clean hands. The Court cannot permit any of the parties to lie on the sly and all of a sudden emerge up one fine morning to plead ignorance. On the other hand, as stated supra, Luqman has not divulged how he came to be appointed as pairokars and in the circumstances the affidavit filed by Luqman is liable to be rejected. There is no affidavit in support of application to recall filed by Smt. Munawar Rana or her husband. 11. It is also borne out from the Vakalatnama that when Satya Pal filed Vakalatnama alongwith Jagdish Prasad he did not disclose his parentage and further that the Counsel representing him made a statement across the bar that he had no objection to substitution of Smt. Premwati, appellant as heir of Jagdish Prasad in the second appeal. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of Satya Pal, he never claimed himself to be heir of Jagdish Prasad. These are the circumstances which clearly point to the fact that transferee had Courted trouble for herself and to use a cliche, she purchased litigation for herself despite full knowledge that the second appeal was pending before this Court. As stated supra, it has not been disputed in the rejoinder affidavit that before transfer was made, the purchaser had been made aware by Satyapal that second appeal was pending. As stated supra, it has not been disputed in the rejoinder affidavit that before transfer was made, the purchaser had been made aware by Satyapal that second appeal was pending. It has been admitted in paragraph 4 of the affidavit filed by Luqman in support of application for restoration/recall that Satya Pal had told that suit was filed by Premwati for injunction and the litigation was pending in the High Court in which compromise has been brokered between him and Smt. Premwati. In view of this admitted fact it is clear that transferee had full knowledge about pendency of second appeal but she did not take any steps to ascertain the fact pendency of second appeal before getting execution of sale deed from Satyapal. 12. Yet another facet worthy of notice here is that it is not borne out from the record that name of Satya Pal was ever recorded in the municipal record and on the contrary, the extracts of record of Nagar Palika Parishad Sharanpur filed alongwith counter-affidavit clearly go to show that after the death of Jagdish Prasad name of Smt. Premwati was recorded. It is also significant to note here that this Court while admitting the second appeal also granted injunction by means of an order dated 28-2-89 in favour of plaintiff to the following effect "meanwhile plaintiff appellant shall not be dispossessed from the property in dispute. " This interim order was never vacated by this Court pending second appeal. It is thus amply clear that the applicant, Smt. Munawar Rana is not a bona fide purchaser and she purchased litigation despite knowing well of pendency of litigation in the High Court and the case law relied upon by the plaintiff is not attracted for application to the facts of the present case. 13. In the above conspectus, no ground is made out for recall of order dated 3-11-2004 rendered in Second Appeal aforestated and It is accordingly held that decree is binding on the applicant and the same Is also enforceable in law. 14. As a result of foregoing discussion, the application for recall/review is liable to be dismissed and it is accordingly dismissed. Application dismissed. RAJESH .