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2006 DIGILAW 890 (PNJ)

Food Corporation of India v. Shri Shiva Parshad

2006-03-02

M.M.KUMAR

body2006
JUDGMENT M.M. KUMAR, J. 1. This judgment shall dispose of three contempt petitions bearing C.O.C.P. Nos. 1630 of 2004, 1374 of 2004 and 145 of 2005 as questions of facts and x x x x law are same in these petitions. However, facts are taken from C.O.C.P. No. 1630 of 2004. 2. This petition filed by the Class-IV Employees Union of. He Food Corporation of India complains violation of the directions issued by this Court on 21.7.1998 in L.P.A. No. 742 of 1993 (P-1) and further directions issued by another Division Bench of this Court on 22.8.2002, while disposing of C.W.P. Nos. 4695, 4694, 6705, 5848 of 1999 and 14123 of 2000 (P-2) respectively. Another decision which has been made the basis of contempt petition is the order dated 3.1.2004 passed by still another Division :Bench rendered in C.W.P. No. 15484 of 2003 (P- 4). The petitioners have attached copies of the order dated 5.11.2004, dismissing the Review Application No. 207 of 2004 in C.W.P. No. 15484 of 2003 by the Division Bench, which had decided C.W.P. No. 15484 of 2003 (P-6). 3. According to the petitioner the net result of the directions issued by various Division Benches of this Court is that the Food Corporation of India (FCI) has been restrained from employing contract labour either by direct method or by indirect method through the contractor. It has been alleged that the FCI has adopted a novel method of employing contract labour by deputing Special Police Officers (SPOs) and Home Guards, which is claimed to be another form of contract labour. It has been claimed that the members of the petitioner Union were required to be employed by the respondent on regular basis rather than engaging the services of SPOs/Home Guards. On the aforementioned basis it is claimed that the orders dated 21.7.1998, 22.8.2002 and 23.1.2004, passed by various Division Benches of this Court have been violated. 4. In reply to notice to show cause the stand taken is that the petitioners were entitled to the benefit of sub para 6 of para 121 of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of National Steel Authority of India v. National Water Front Workers Union, JT 2001 (7) SC 268. 4. In reply to notice to show cause the stand taken is that the petitioners were entitled to the benefit of sub para 6 of para 121 of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of National Steel Authority of India v. National Water Front Workers Union, JT 2001 (7) SC 268. According to the aforementioned para if a contract was found to be genuine and x x x x a notification under Section 10(1) of the Contract Labour Regulation Act in respect of the concerned establishment has been issued by the appropriate Government, prohibiting employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work of any establishment and where in such process, operation or other work of the establishment the principal employer intends to employ regular workman then he was required to give preference to the erstwhile contract labour, if otherwise found suitable and, if necessary, by relaxing the condition as to maximum age appropriately taking into consideration the age of the workers at the time of their initial appointments by the contractor and also relaxing the condition as to academic qualifications other than Technical qualifications. It has further been asserted that the FCI has not been employing/recruiting regular workman and it is not under obligation to grant the benefit of sub-para 6 of para 121 of the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in National & Steel Authority of India’s case (supra). The aforementioned position becomes more apparent from a perusal of para 6 of the written statement wherein it has been mentioned that the deployment of SPOs/Punjab Home Guards is gradually decreasing over the years. In the table produced in para 6, various figures have been provided. 5. Mr. Vikas Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, placing reliance on various documents attached with the replication, seeks to argue that the payment by the respondent is made to the District Commandant, which include element of service charges. According to the learned counsel all these facts are discernible from Annexures P-13 to P-18, which have been placed on record along with replication filed through C.M. No. 14087-CII of 2005. It has accordingly been urged that this Court must come to the conclusion that the form of employment has been changed and in fact hiring the services of SPOs/Punjab Home Guards is indirect contract labour. 6. Mr. It has accordingly been urged that this Court must come to the conclusion that the form of employment has been changed and in fact hiring the services of SPOs/Punjab Home Guards is indirect contract labour. 6. Mr. C.R. Dahiya, learned counsel for the respondent has pointed out that there is no violation of any of the directions because there was no prohibition by any of the three orders passed by this Court to employ Home Guards/SPOs. He has further pointed out that according to the stand taken by respondent in para Nos. 5, 6 and 7 of the reply, no regular employment has yet been made and, therefore, the benefit of sub-para 6 of para 121 of the judgment in Steel Authority of India’s case (supra) cannot be availed by the petitioner. 7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length, I am of the considered view that it is not possible for the Contempt Court to punish the respondent for flouting the orders of this Court in such like cases because there is no finding in either of the three judgments of this Court that the respondents were not competent to hire the services of government employees like SPOs/Home Guards. There is no finding that such method of deployment of SPOs/Home Guards would amount to contract labour: In the absence of any positive finding against such a method it is not possible for a Contempt Court to conclude that the Food Corporation of India is engaging SPOs/Home Guards as contract labour. Therefore, the remedy of petitioner would obviously lie elsewhere. The petitioner has to agitate the matter before a Court of competent jurisdiction to secure findings on the aforementioned question. Therefore, I do not find that there is any case made out for concluding that the respondent has flouted the orders passed by this Court. 8. Dismissed. 9. Rule discharged.