Judgment 1. Petitioner Ram Singhasan Singh was the Chairman of Bihar Public Service Commission (in short the B.P.S.C), Dr. Shiv Balak Choudhary and Dr. D.N. Sharma were the Members of Bihar Public Service Commission at the relevant time when the occurrence alleged, had taken place. 2. Petitioners are accused in all these cases i.e. Special Case No. 30 of 2005 arising out of Vigilance Case No. 19 of 2005, Special Case No. 17 of 2006 arising out of Vigilance P.S. Case No. 20 of 2006 and Special Case No. 9 of 2006 arising out of Vigilance RS. Case No. 10 of 2006. 3. Cognizance have been taken in these cases against the petitioners under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 477, 201 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code as well as under Sec. 13(2) read with Section 13 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Cognizance has been taken for offence under the Indian Penal Code without any sanction and under Prevention of Corruption Act after obtaining sanction from the Governor of Bihar, which is alleged to be invalid sanction. 4. Since, on similar grounds petitioners have prayed for quashing the order taking cognizance as such all these application have been taken together for disposal. 5. One of the ground for assailing the order taking cognizance is that the Special Judge has taken cognizance for offence under the Penal Code in anticipation of sanction, in violation of bar imposed under Sec. 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code as well as Sec. 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It has been submitted that Sec. 197 of the Code provides protection to public servants from vexatious prosecution Sec. 197(1) and (2) of the Code read as follows :- (1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a Public Servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction. (a) in the case of a person, who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State of the State Government. (2) No Court shall take cognizance of any offence alleged to have been committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the union while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. 6. Sec. 197 deals with the condition requisite for initiation of proceeding against a public servant. In case the conditions mentioned are not fulfilled or absent then no prosecution case be set in motion so far as public servants are concerned. Sec. 197 not only specifies the person to whom the protection is afforded but it also specified the conditions and circumstances in which it shall be available and the effect of it if the conditions are not satisfied. Considering the mandatory character of the protection afforded to a public servant no court shall take cognizance of such offence which have been committed by a public servant in course of discharge our purported exercise of their official duty except with the previous sanction. It has been submitted that the language of Section 197 Cr.P.C. makes it clear that the bar on the exercise of power of the court to take cognizance of any such offence is absolute and complete. The court is precluded from entertaining any complaint or taking notice of it or exercising jurisdiction if it is in respect of a public servant who is an accused of an offence alleged to have been committed during discharge of his official duty. Considering the fact that the allegations which have been made indicates that the petitioners who were Chairman and Member of the BPSC have committed such offence in exercise of their official duty i.e. during selection process of the candidates. There is direct nexus in between the offence alleged and discharge of petitioners duty in their official capacity. Considering the fact that the allegations which have been made indicates that the petitioners who were Chairman and Member of the BPSC have committed such offence in exercise of their official duty i.e. during selection process of the candidates. There is direct nexus in between the offence alleged and discharge of petitioners duty in their official capacity. It is apparent from the order taking cognizance for offence under the Penal Code that it was in anticipation of the sanction. Petitioners counsel have submitted that it has been decided by the Apex Court in several decisions like in the case of P.K. Pradhan Vs. State of Sikkim [2001(6) S.C.C. 705], Abdul Wahab Ansari Vs. State of Bihar and Anr. [2001(1) P.L.J.R. 13] as well as Sankaran Moitra Vs. Sadhna Das and Anr. [ 2006(4) S.C.C. 584 ] that the prosecution of public servant without sanction is barred under the provisions of Sec. 197 Cr.P.C. 7. However the counsel for the Vigilance relying on the dissenting note of one of the Hon ble Judge in 2006(4) S.C.C. 584 (supra) has submitted that in the same decision it has been decided that Primary object of the legislature behind Sec. 197 Cr.P.C. is to protect public officers who have acted in discharge of their duties or purported to act in discharge of such duties. But, it is equally well settled that the act said to have been committed by a public officer must have reasonable connection with the duty sought to be discharged by such public officer and the offence alleged. If the act complained of has no nexus, reasonable connection or relevance to the official act or duty of such public servant and is otherwise illegal, unlawful or in the nature of an offence, he cannot get shelter of Sec. 197 Cr.P.C. In other words, protection afforded by the said section is qualified and conditional. It has also been submitted that no sanction is required at all in the present case since whatever offence the petitioners have committed is not at all part of in their,official duty. It is settled law that the offence alleged to have committed must have something to do, or must be related in some manner, which the discharge of official duty. There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the official duty. It is settled law that the offence alleged to have committed must have something to do, or must be related in some manner, which the discharge of official duty. There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the official duty. A public servant neither acts nor purports to act as a public servant in receiving a bribe, though the job he does in return of the bribe may be such an act. For example a Government Medical Officer does not act or purport to act as a public servant in picking the pocket of a patient whom he is examining, though the examination itself may be such an act. The test may well be whether the public servant, if challenged, can reasonably claim that, what he does, he does by virtue of his office. If the acts complained of, are so integrally connected with the duties attached to the office as to be inseparable from the act, then sanction would be necessary; but if there was no necessary connection between them and the performance of those duties, the official status furnishing only the occasion or opportunity for the acts, then no sanction would be required. Taking bribe cannot as any kind of official duty. 8. Counsel for the vigilance has also placed reliance in the case of State of M.P. Vs. M.P. Gupta [ 2004(2) SCC 349 ] wherein the Hon ble Court in similar facts and circumstances of the case was pleased to hold that Sections 467, 468 and 471 IPC relates to forgery of valuable security, will etc.; forgery for the purpose of cheating and using as genuine a forged document respectively. It is no part of the duty of a public servant while discharging his official duties to commit forgery of the type covered by the aforesaid offences. Want of sanction under Sec. 197 of the Code, is, therefore, no bar. It is not out of place to mention here that all these allegations have been alleged against the petitioners also which will be apparent from the FIR itself. 9. Considering the submissions made by the parties and on perusal of the FIR and the charge-sheet submitted in the vigilance case I find that in the FIR itself it has been alleged that the act were committed by the petitioners in discharge of their official duty. 9. Considering the submissions made by the parties and on perusal of the FIR and the charge-sheet submitted in the vigilance case I find that in the FIR itself it has been alleged that the act were committed by the petitioners in discharge of their official duty. In the charge-sheet also it is mentioned that the charge-sheet is being submitted so far it relates to the offences relating to Indian Penal Code only in anticipation of the sanction by a competent authority as the act alleged making offence have been committed in exercise of official duty. On consideration of these two documents there is no doubt that the requisite sanction which is mandatory for prosecution of the public servant is required in the present case. 10. Another contention of the counsel for the petitioners is that the cognizance of the offence under Prevention of Corruption Act on the basis of invalid sanction has invalidated the entire prosecution and it must be quashed. Their submission is that the Governor is not empowered to accord sanction for prosecution of the Chairman or the Members of the BPSC. Only the President under Article 317 of the Constitution of India can remove the Chairman and Members of the BPSC. Since the petitioners are Chairman and Members they can be prosecuted only after obtaining sanction from the President under Article 317(1) of the Constitution of India. 11. Sec. 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act reads as follows :- (1) No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction. (a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and he is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of that Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of that Government; (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office. 12. 12. Counsel for the petitioners have submitted that the petitioners are Chairman and Members of the Bihar Public Service Commission which is an autonomous body constituted under Article 315 of the Constitution of India. Article 317(1) clearly speaks that only the President can remove the Chairman or Members of the Commission as such for the purposes of sanction their case come under 19(c) of P.C. Act. The Governor of State is not empowered to remove the members and Chairman of the BPSC. Petitioners have placed reliance in order to put force to their submissions on a decision reported in A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 996 [In the matter of Reference under Article 317(1) of the Constitution of India] it has been held that subject to the provisions of clause (3) the Chairman or any other member of a Public Service Commission shall only be removed from his office by order of the President on the ground of misbehaviour after the Supreme Court, on reference being made to it by the President, has, no inquiry held in accord- ance with the procedure prescribed in that behalf under Art. 145 has reported that the Chairman or such other member, as the case may be, ought on any such ground to be removed. 13. It has also been submitted by the counsel for the petitioners that since the sanction is invalid, on the basis of invalid sanction petitioners cannot be prosecuted and entire proceeding depends on the valid sanction accorded by the competent authority. Counsel for the petitioners has relied on a decision reported in [ 2004(7) S.C.C. 763 ] State by Police Inspector Vs. T. Venkatesh Murthy. 14. Counsel appearing for the vigilance on the other hand has submitted that considering the fact there is no direct nexus in between offence alleged and official duty of petitioners as such in the facts and circumstances of the case the sanction was not required but as an abundant precaution the respondents moved the proposal for sanction. The Governor of Bihar who is the appointing authority of the petitioners has accorded the prosecution sanction. Petitioners were appointed by the Governor and engaged with the affairs of the State of Bihar as such in terms of subsection 1 (b) of Sec. 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 the State Government has the power to grant sanction. The Governor of Bihar who is the appointing authority of the petitioners has accorded the prosecution sanction. Petitioners were appointed by the Governor and engaged with the affairs of the State of Bihar as such in terms of subsection 1 (b) of Sec. 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 the State Government has the power to grant sanction. Counsel for the vigilance has tried to distinguish the words employed under Government and engaged in the affairs of the State. It has been submitted that the Chairman and Members might not be employed under the Government but they certainly are employed with the affairs of the State thus in case of such persons 19(1)(b) of P.C. Act will come into play. Petitioners case does not come within Sec. 19(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Sanction is not invalid for prosecution. 15. Admittedly the petitioners were holding a constitutional post, their appointment was made under Article 315 of the Constitution and so far the removal is concerned for that procedure has been provided under Article 317(1) of the Constitution. Article 317(1) of the Constitution insures the indepedence of the Members (including Chairman) of the Public Service Commission and give them protection in the matter of normal duty. In one sense it gives a higher degree of protection to the Member and Chairman of BPSC as far as possible, and provides immunity from all political pressure in the matter of their removal. Any allegations of misbehaviour made against them has to be examined by the Supreme Court. Unlike the allegations made against the Judges of the High Court or the Controller of Auditor General of India and Chief Election Commissioner of India, the Members and Chairman can be removed only when any allegation of misbehaviour made against them is examined by the Supreme Court on merits. In case of proved misbehaviour only they can be removed or prosecuted. The Constitution has provided essential safeguard to the Members or the Chairman of a Public Service Commission as such considering the fact that they can be removed by the President only under Article 317 of the Constitution, the sanction accorded by the Governor cannot be held to be a valid sanction. 16. The Constitution has provided essential safeguard to the Members or the Chairman of a Public Service Commission as such considering the fact that they can be removed by the President only under Article 317 of the Constitution, the sanction accorded by the Governor cannot be held to be a valid sanction. 16. Another contention of the petitioners is that the cognizance of offence under the Indian Penal Code by the Special Judge without any sanction for prosecution of an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act is invalid in view of Sec. 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 17. It has been submitted that during the World War II when it was realised that existing law and Penal Code was not adequate to meet the exigency of the time and imperative need was felt to introduce special legislation with a view to eradicate the event of bribery and corruption criminal Law Amendment Act was enacted. Subsequently the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was enacted. Later on it was amended on two occasions and finally the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was enacted. 18. Sec. 3 of the Act empowers the State Government or the Central Government to appoint Special Judges by notification in the Official Gazette for such area or areas or for such case or group of cases as may be specified in the notification to try following offences, namely:- Section 3(a) any offence punishable under this Act; and (b) any conspiracy to commit or any attempt to commit or any abetment of any of the offences specified in clause (a). (2) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Special Judge under this Act unless he is or has been a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge or an Assistant Sessions Judge under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 19. Sub-section (1) of Sec. 4 provides that only Special Judge shall try offences specified in sub-section (1) of Section 3. Section 4(2) envisages that the offence specified in sub-section (1) of Sec. 3 shall be tried by the Special Judge for the area within which it was committed, or as the case may be, by the Special Judge appointed for the case, or, where there are more Special Judges then one for such area, by such one of them as may be specified in this behalf by the Central Government. 4(3) When trying any case, a Special Judge may also try any offence, other than an offence specified in Sec. 3, with which the accused may, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 be charged at the same trial. 20. It has been submitted that in view of Sec. 3(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act a Special Judge who has been Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge or Assistant Sessions Judge can be appointed as Special Judge and such Special Judge can try the offences punishable under Prevention of Corruption Act and any conspiracy to commit or any attempt to commit or any abetment of such offences. 21. Under Sec. 4(3) when trying any case, a Special Judge may also try any offence, other than an offence specified in Sec. 3(1) of the Act. In the present cate cognizance has been taken for offence under the Penal Code by the Special Judge when there was no sanction accorded by the competent authority to try the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act. So far the offence under the Penal Code is concerned it can be tried by a Sessions Judge only when the cognizance has been taken under Sec. 190 Cr.P.C. a Magistrate and thereafter it is commit to him for trial. The Sessions Judge is not empowered to take cognizance of any offence punishable under the Penal Code as it is specially barred under Section 193 Cr.P.C. which provides:- "Except as otherwise expressly provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court of Session shall take cognizance of any offence as a Court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate under this Code. Counsel for the petitioners in support of her argument has relied on decisions in the case of Moly and Anr.Vs. State of Kerala (2004)4 S.C.C. 584. 22 Counsel for the vigilance has submitted that so far this question is concerned it is now has been well settled in the decision in the case of A.R. Antulay Vs. Counsel for the petitioners in support of her argument has relied on decisions in the case of Moly and Anr.Vs. State of Kerala (2004)4 S.C.C. 584. 22 Counsel for the vigilance has submitted that so far this question is concerned it is now has been well settled in the decision in the case of A.R. Antulay Vs. Ramdas Srinivas Nayak reported in 1984 (2) S.C.C. 500 wherein it has been held that "the Court of Special Judge once created by an independent statute has been brought as a court of original criminal jurisdiction under the High Court because Section 9 confers on the High Court because Section 9 confers on the High Court all the powers conferred by Chapter XXXI and XXXIII Cr.P.C. On a High Court, as if the court of Special Judge or a court of sessions trying case within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court. Therefore, there is no cause "showing the fact that a new criminal court with a name and designation and qualification of the officer eligible to preside over it with the powers specified and particular procedure which must follow has been set up under 1952 Act. The Court has to be treated as a court of original jurisdiction except those specifically excluded. 23. Considering the rival submissions and the decisions I find that there is no substance in this dispute so far cognizance taken under the Penal Code by Special Judge is concerned. Counsel for the petitioners has relied on 2004 (IV) S.C.C. 584. Issues involved in this case was whether special court under S.C.S.T. (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is a Court of Sessions and if so, whether in view of interdict contained in Sec. 193 Cr.P.C. it cannot take cognizance without the case being committed to it. From reading of Sec. 14 of S.C. ST. Act it is clear that Special Court has been empowered for trial of offences under the S.C. S.T. Act and not to take cognizance in the given circumstances the Special Court, which is creation of statute, and a Court of Sessions, in view of interdict of Sec. 193 Cr.P.C. was held not empowered to take cognizance. But, so far Sections 3 and 5 of P.C. Act is concerned Special Judge has been empowered to take cognizance of offences under P.C. Act as well as Penal Code. But, so far Sections 3 and 5 of P.C. Act is concerned Special Judge has been empowered to take cognizance of offences under P.C. Act as well as Penal Code. Sec. 193 Cr.P.C. imposes interdict on all courts of Sessions against taking cognizance of an offence as a Court of original jurisdiction. A Court of Sessions can take cognizance only when it has been committed to it by a Magistrate, or when Code itself expressly provide in clear language to take cognizance or where any other law has provided in express language to take cognizance. 24. Present case comes within the category where under Prevention of Corruption Act, in express language, Special Judge has been empowered to take cognizance of offences under P.C. Act as well as Penal Code, though it is a Court of Sessions. As such for all practical purposes it is an original court and interdict under Sec. 193 Cr.P.C. has no application in the facts and circumstances of present case. Reply to this question is there is A.R. Antulay Vs. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak 1998(H) [sic-1984(2)?] S.C.C. 500 where it has been held that Court of Special Judge under P.C. Act is a court of original jurisdiction and empowered to take cognizance. 25. Another contention of the petitioners counsel is that the sanction is to be taken by the prosecution at the initial stage as the court can try any case only when they have jurisdiction. For taking cognizance jurisdiction is very much essential and that jurisdiction is conferred on such Judge or the prosecution only when sanction is accorded. Reliance has been placed on a decision reported in 2001(1) P.L.J.R. (S.C.)13 (Abdul Wahab Ansari Vs. State of Bihar and Anr). The Apex Court has held that "there is no requirement that an accused should wait for taking the plea of sanction till the charges are framed. Sanction is a prohibition against institution of the proceedings and its applicability must be judged at the earliest stage of the proceeding. In reply to this submission counsel for the vigilance has submitted that the word "sanction" can be decided at any stage, may be at the stage of judgment. Reliance has been placed on the decision in the case of P.K. Pradhan Vs. In reply to this submission counsel for the vigilance has submitted that the word "sanction" can be decided at any stage, may be at the stage of judgment. Reliance has been placed on the decision in the case of P.K. Pradhan Vs. State of Sikkim 2001(6) S.C.C. 704 in which Apex Court has been pleased to held that "An official act can be performed in the discharge of official duty as well as in dereliction of it. For invoking protection under Sec. 197 of the Code, the acts of the accused complained of must be such that the same cannot be separated from the discharge of official duty, but if there was no reasonable connection between them and the performance of those duties, the official status furnished only the occasion or opportunity for the acts, then no sanction would be required if the case as put forward by the prosecution fails or the defence establishes that the act purported to be done is in discharge of duty, the proceeding will have to be dropped. It is well settled that question of sanction under Sec. 197 of the Code can be raised any time after the cognizance; may be immediately after cognizance or framing of charge or even at the time of conclusion of trial and after conviction as well. 26. This is a very debatable question and it has been decided in both ways by the Apex Court. What should the stage of sanction depends on facts of each case. However, the counsel for the petitioners have referred decisions to show that if the question of sanction is raised by the prosecution in that case, the stage does not matter but once question of sanction has been raised by the accused then it should be at the very initial stage. 27. Lastly counsel for the vigilance has stated that in view of Sections 462 and 465 Cr.P.C. as well as Sec. 19(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the cognizance as well as entire criminal proceeding cannot be quashed, altered or modified. 27. Lastly counsel for the vigilance has stated that in view of Sections 462 and 465 Cr.P.C. as well as Sec. 19(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the cognizance as well as entire criminal proceeding cannot be quashed, altered or modified. Section 462 Cr.P.C. deals with the proceedings in wrong place which envisages no finding sanction or order of any criminal court shall be set aside merely on the ground that the enquiry, trial or other proceedings in course of which it was arrived at or passed took place in a wrong sessions division, District, Sub-division or other local area unless it appears such error has in fact occasioned a failure of justice. Similarly sub-sections (3) and 4 of Sec. 19 P.C. Act reads as follows: 19(3) :- Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. (a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a Special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a Court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission, irregularity in, the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has, in fact, been occasioned thereby; (b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice; (c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground and no court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings. (4) In determining under sub-section (3) whether the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, such sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice the court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings. Explanation-Fox the purposes of this section:- (a) error includes competency of the authority to grant sanction; (b) a sanction required for prosecution includes reference to any requirement that the prosecution shall be at the instance of a specified authority or with the sanction of a specified person or any requirement of a similar nature. 28. Explanation-Fox the purposes of this section:- (a) error includes competency of the authority to grant sanction; (b) a sanction required for prosecution includes reference to any requirement that the prosecution shall be at the instance of a specified authority or with the sanction of a specified person or any requirement of a similar nature. 28. It has been submitted that the present case relates to large scale bungling, forgery done in selection by the Chairman, members and staffs of the BPSC, the petitioners taking advantage of their position committed large scale bungling, forgery in the entire selection process. Whatever the petitioners have done cannot at all be posed as a kind of official duty and the proposition of law as discussed are not applicable in the case of the petitioners. In the present case question of law and fact is involved as such simply on account of sanction or invalid sanction entire criminal proceeding cannot be quashed. 29. Reliance has been placed on a decision in the case of State by Police Inspector Vs.T.Venkatesh Murthy 2004(7) S.C.C. 763 . The Apex Court in this decision has held that "A combined reading of sub-sections (3) and (4) of Sec. 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 make the position clear that notwithstanding anything contained in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, no finding, sentence and order passed by a Special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that court a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. 30. I find that the present case has been instituted on the direction of this Court passed in C.W.J.C. No. 7725 of 2005 and the progress in this case is being monitored by a Bench of High Court. Considering the facts of case, presumption of guilt is also there. Considering the serious social impact of such cases, entire criminal proceeding cannot be quashed for some technical irregularity which can be cured. In a similar situation the prosecution was directed to take fresh sanction of competent authority and proceed against the accused, in "State of Goa Vs. Babu Thomas 2006(1) B.B.C.J. (S.C.)7. Considering the serious social impact of such cases, entire criminal proceeding cannot be quashed for some technical irregularity which can be cured. In a similar situation the prosecution was directed to take fresh sanction of competent authority and proceed against the accused, in "State of Goa Vs. Babu Thomas 2006(1) B.B.C.J. (S.C.)7. The direction was "Having regard to allegation levelled against the respondents we permit the competent authority to issue fresh sanction order by an authority competent under Rules and proceed afresh against the respondents from stage taking cognizance of the offence in accordance with law." 31. Another reason for deciding against the petitioner is that they are accused in three cases. It is not the fact that they have been made accused in a solitary case because of some malice or ill motive. Facts indicate that taking advantage of their constitutional position they have adopted all unfair means in selection of the candidates for their personal benefits. The petitioners have virtually defamed institution like a Public Service Commission. The nature of the offence is such that it is going to affect the people at large. Accused of such cases should not be allowed to go scot free on technical grounds ignoring the provision under Sec. 19(3), (4) of the Prevention of Corruption Act specially considering the fact that the prosecution has moved to the President for according sanction in the present case. 32. I find no merit in these three applications. All the three applications are dismissed.