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2006 DIGILAW 896 (AP)

CHINCHILADA KRISHNAM RAJU v. VICE CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR GIRIJAN CORPORATION LTD.

2006-07-26

L.NARASIMHA REDDY

body2006
L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J. ( 1 ) THE unsuccessful plaintiff in O. S. No. 233 of 1994, on the file of the learned II Additional Subordinate Judge, Visakhapatnam, is the appellant. ( 2 ) THE appellant was employed as a purchasing agent in the respondent-Corporation on 13. 03. 1959. His service register was opened on 30. 10. 1967. His date of birth was entered as 01. 07. 1934. According to the appellant, in November 1991, he came to know through one of his family friends that his date of birth was entered in the birth register maintained by the Panchayat as 27. 03. 1936. After obtaining a certified extract of the same, he filed a representation, dated 24. 12. 1991, before the respondent, with a request to correct the date of birth in the service register and to permit him to remain in service, till he attains the age of superannuation, on the basis that his date of birth is 27. 03. 1936 and not 01. 07. 191k The trial court dismissed the suit, through its judgment, dated 30. 01. 1993. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant filed A. S. No. 25 of 1993 in the Court of III additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam. The appeal was also dismissed on 22. 04. 1994. Hence, this Second Appeal. ( 3 ) SRI P. Rajasekhar, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that though the Courts below were satisfied that the appellant had proved his date of birth as 27. 03. 1936, they refused to grant relief on a hyper technical ground. He contends that once the proceedings maintained under the statute are placed before the Courts below, they ought to have extended the relief. He further contends that on the strength of the interim orders passed at various stages, the petitioner was permitted to remain in service till 1994, by treating his date of birth as 27. 03. 1936 and that the appellant is entitled to be extended the other consequential reliefs also. He further contends that on the strength of the interim orders passed at various stages, the petitioner was permitted to remain in service till 1994, by treating his date of birth as 27. 03. 1936 and that the appellant is entitled to be extended the other consequential reliefs also. ( 4 ) SRI N. Sreedhar Reddy, the learned counsel for the respondent-Corporation, on the other hand, submits that the date of birth of the appellant was entered in the service register, on the basis of the information contained in the S. S. L. C. Certificate and as long as the same is not modified or amended, there is no basis for the appellant to continue in service beyond that and there does not exist any basis for the appellant to claim the relief. He further submits that mere continuance of the appellant in service, on the strength of the interim orders, does not confer any right upon him to claim other benefits, when the suit and appeal were dismissed. ( 5 ) THE trial Court framed several issues, touching on the controversy, ranging from the correctness of date of birth of the appellant as pleaded in the plaint, to the maintainability of the suit. On behalf of the appellant, p. Ws. 1 to 3 were examined and Exs. A. l to A. 9 were marked. On behalf of the respondent-Corporation, D. W. 1 was examined and Exs. B. 1 to B. 4 were marked. The suit as well as the appeal were dismissed. Had the appellant prayed for a declaration that his date of birth is 27. 03. 1936 and such relief did not have any bearing on his service in the respondent-Corporation, no difficulty, as such, would have arisen. In fact, the trial Court recorded a finding that the extract of the birth register, marked as Ex. A. 1, disclosing the date of birth of the appellant as 27. 03. 1936, is correct, and this finding was upheld by the lower appellate court. When it comes to the question of seeking relief of alteration of entries in the service register, on the strength of Ex. A. 1, totally different connotations arise. The reason is that the date of birth of an employee is entered in the service register, by taking the date of birth entered in the s. S. L. C. Certificate as the basis. A. 1, totally different connotations arise. The reason is that the date of birth of an employee is entered in the service register, by taking the date of birth entered in the s. S. L. C. Certificate as the basis. It is not in dispute that the date of birth of the appellant, as entered in the S. S. L. C. certificate, is 01. 07. 1934 and that the same was entered in the service register, marked as Ex. B. 1. S. S. L. C. Certificate was also marked as Ex. B. 4. ( 6 ) IF the appellant wanted the benefit of the date of birth entered in ex. A. 1 vis-a-vis his service in the respondent, the only course open to him was to seek modification of his date of birth in Ex. B. 4, in accordance with the prescribed procedure. In the event of his date of birth entered in Ex. B. 4 being modified, the alteration of the date of birth in Ex. B. 1 would have been a matter of course. For the reasons best known to him, the appellant did not adopt that course of action. The suit was filed more than three decades after the appellant joined service and more than two decades after the service register was prepared. Viewed from any angle, this Court does not find any basis to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Courts below. ( 7 ) IT is represented that the appellant was continued in service, as though his date of birth is 27. 03. 1936, on the strength of the interim orders passed at different stages. In the ordinary course of things, the appellant was liable to be retired in the year 1992. However, he continued in service till 1994. Since the appellant was paid salary for this period, for the work rendered by him, it cannot be recovered. In case, the service benefits of the appellant were not determined, as yet, they must be finalized immediately, on the basis of the date of birth entered in Ex. B. 1 i. e. 01. 07. 1934. The Second Appeal is dismissed, subject to the above observations. There shall be no order as to costs.