ORDER : 1. Seeking to have the proceedings in Cr. No. 188 of 2004 of Samarlakota Police Station, East Godavari District quashed, the State Bank of India, Central office, Mumbai represented by its Chairman and the State Bank of India, Samarlakota branch represented by its Manager, (Accused 1 and 2 in Cr. No. 188 of 2004), have filed Criminal Petition No. 5480 of 2004. 2. Seeking to have the same proceedings in Cr. No. 188 of 2004 of Samarlakota police Station, East Godavari District quashed, Sri G. Rama Krishna Rao, Branch Manager, State Bank of India, Draksharamam branch, East Godavari District and Sri H. Maitesh, Chief Manager (CR), State Bank of India, Balanagar branch, Hyderabad, (Accused No. 3 and 4 in Cr. No. 188 of 2004), have filed Crl.P. No. 1333 of 2005. Since the proceedings in Cr. No. 188 of 2004 of Samarlakota police station are sought to be quashed in both the criminal petitions, they were heard together and are now being disposed of by a common order. The complaint filed, against Accused Nos. 1 to 4 in Cr. No. 188 of 2004, is for offences under Sections 409, 467, 471 and 511 IPC. 3. The allegations, in the complaint filed in Cr. No. 188 of 2004, are that the 2nd respondent-complainant's father Sri M. Satyanarayanamurthy, owned 1.92 Acres of house site at Samarlakota and a building situated thereon. He mortgaged this property with State Bank of India, Samarlakota branch, by deposit of title deeds, as security for a loan granted in favour of M/s. Pragathi Enterprises, Samarlakota, a registered firm of which the respondent-complainant was the Managing partner and his relatives, the other partners. Late Sri Malreddy Satyanarayana Murthy, who stood as guarantor and had also deposited certain other title deeds with the Samarlakota branch of State Bank of India, as security for the loan granted to M/s Pragathi Enterprises, agreed to sell the land and building at Samarlakota to State Bank of India, Samarlakota branch towards discharge of the loan. While negotiations for the sale concluded on 27-9-1985 itself the Samarlakota branch unduly delayed obtaining the registered sale deed till 28-6-1988. While rent of Rs. 2,000/- per month was being paid prior to 27-9-1985, it was subsequently enhanced to Rs. 7,800/- per month. While negotiations for the sale concluded on 27-9-1985 itself the Samarlakota branch unduly delayed obtaining the registered sale deed till 28-6-1988. While rent of Rs. 2,000/- per month was being paid prior to 27-9-1985, it was subsequently enhanced to Rs. 7,800/- per month. The undue delay, on the part of State Bank of India, Samarlakota branch, in obtaining the registered sale deed, while keeping the documents of title of the property with them under equitable mortgage, resulted in O.S. No. 189 of 1991 being filed, by late Sri Malreddy Satyanarayana Murthy and his sons against the accused, before the II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada for recovery of Rs. 3,76,025-32 ps towards damages. Consequent to the sale of the building and its appurtenant site, by registered sale deed dated 28-6-1988, the balance amount outstanding, on the loan repayable by M/s Pragathi Enterprises to State Bank of India, Samarlakota branch, stood fully discharged and since the property sold was only a part of the mortgaged properties, owned by late Sri M.S.N. Murthy and his sons including the complainant, they requested the bank to record redemption of the equitable mortgage and to return the documents of title which were deposited at the time of obtaining the loan. They also requested that the certificate of release of security, with regards the remaining property, be issued. Even during negotiations, of the sale of the building, State Bank of India had agreed to release the security over the remaining property, to deliver the documents pledged with them and the recitals in this regard were reflected in the sale deed dated 28-6-1988. Despite repeated requests, the original documents were not returned and, on the other hand, the Samarlakota Branch of State Bank of India collected more amounts from M/s. Pragathi Enterprises than what was actually due from them. This resulted in O.S. No. 165 of 1991 being filed, by Sri M. Satyanarayana Murthy, before the II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada for recovery of Rs. 5,87,328.70 ps. 4. The undue delay, in returning the original documents and the letter of release of security, necessitated a registered notice dated 03-12-1997 being sent to the General Manager, SBI local head office, Koti, Hyderabad seeking his intervention in the matter. Despite receipt of the said notice no action was taken. 5,87,328.70 ps. 4. The undue delay, in returning the original documents and the letter of release of security, necessitated a registered notice dated 03-12-1997 being sent to the General Manager, SBI local head office, Koti, Hyderabad seeking his intervention in the matter. Despite receipt of the said notice no action was taken. The complainant and his father, vide letter dated 06-05-1997, requested the State Bank of India, Samarlakota branch atleast to furnish certified copies of the original documents, and the letter of release, to enable them to obtain much needed loans for their business from other banks. Registered notice dated 01-01-1998 was sent to the Chief Manager, S.B.I. Samarlakota (A-2) and the Chairman, State Bank of India, Mumbai (A-1) wherein the list of documents deposited by way of equitable mortgage was mentioned with a request that these documents be returned. Lack of response from them, resulted in late Sri M.S.N. Murthy filing a suit in O.S. No. 720 of 1998 on the file of the Additional Junior Civil Judge, Kakinada which was later transferred and numbered as O.S. No. 223 of 1998 on the file of II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada to be tried along with O.S. No. 165 of 1991 and O.S. No. 189 of 1991. A reply notice was sent by the State Bank of India on 20-6-1998 informing the complainant that, since these documents were deposited with the State Bank of India towards equitable mortgage and it was mentioned in the sale deed dated 28-06-1988 that the vendors would deliver the documents as vouchers to the said sale deed, there was no question of delivering the documents which formed part of the voucher documents. 5. The State Bank of India, Samarlakota Branch (A-2), filed a written statement, in O.S. No. 223 of 1998, on 13-01-1999 wherein they stated that the documents were given to them as vouchers to the sale deed dated 28-06-1988 and that they could not be returned. The complainant and his family members constituted another registered firm under the name and style of M/s Sri Ravi Chandra Transport, Samarlakota and issued registered notice dated 17-05-1999 to State Bank of India, Mumbai (A-1) and State Bank of India, Samarlakota (A-2) informing them that the complainant could not fulfil their contract with M/s. Panyam Cements and Minerals, Hyderabad and that they had suffered loss to the tune of Rs. 54,00,000/-, as a result of failure on the part of State Bank of India to return the documents held by them. In reply thereto, State Bank of India got issued a notice wherein they admitted that they were in custody of the documents as vouchers to the sale deed dated 28-06-1988. The complainant's father died on 28-08-2000 leaving behind him the complainant and his brothers as his legal heirs. 6. During his lifetime, Sri M.S.N. Murthy, had filed O.S. No. 302 of 1997, before the I Additional Junior Civil Judge, Kakinada against Samarlakota Municipality, wherein summons were issued to State Bank of India, Samarlakota branch, to cause production of the aforesaid documents in Court. Accused No. 4 filed memo, dated 22-02-2001, in the said suit stating that the documents which were sought to be summoned had, in fact, been delivered to Sri M.S.N. Murthy on 14-07-1997 itself and that the bank was not in possession of these documents. Along with the memo a Photostat acknowledgment containing the signature of late Sri M.S.N. Murthy was enclosed. This forged document was brought into existence in order to defraud and defeat the just claims of the complainant and his father. The memo filed under the signature of A-4 was false and fraudulent. On 08-08-2001, Accused No. 3, as the Chief Manager of State Bank of India, Samarlakota, filed an affidavit in I.A. No. 558 of 2001 in O.S. No. 223 of 1998 under his signature stating that when he sat with his advocate for getting ready with the arguments to be adduced on 10-8-2001 in the above suit, and while consulting the files, he found that on 14-07-1995 Sri M.S.N. Murthy had received all the documents in question under his signature in a proforma supplied by the Bank. Accused No. 3 sought an amendment to the written statement, already filed in the suit, to the effect that the original documents, which were the subject matter of the suit, had already been returned to Sri M.S.N. Murthy and that he had signed a memo acknowledging receipt of the documents of title from State Bank of India, Samarlakota. This version, in the affidavit filed in I.A. No. 558 of 2001, was diametrically opposite to the version in the written statement. The original of the said acknowledgment memo, purported to have been signed by late Sri M.S.N. Murthy, was filed into Court on 11-08-2001. This version, in the affidavit filed in I.A. No. 558 of 2001, was diametrically opposite to the version in the written statement. The original of the said acknowledgment memo, purported to have been signed by late Sri M.S.N. Murthy, was filed into Court on 11-08-2001. The complainant filed a counter denying the genuineness of the acknowledgment memo dated 14-07-1997 and the truth of the allegations in the affidavit filed by A-3. The II Additional Subordinate Judge, Kakinada recorded a finding that the amendment to the written statement was sought for by manipulating the alleged receipt dated 14-07-1995 to weave out a story to get over the liability for damages and that State Bank of India was not entitled for amendment of the written statement at that stage. The amendment petition, in I.A. No. 558 of 2001, was dismissed on merits by order dated 23-08-2001. No appeal or revision was preferred by State Bank of India against the said order. The acknowledgment in the printed proforma dated 14-07-1995, purported to have been signed by Sri M.S.N. Murthy, is a forged and false document to the knowledge of the accused and it was not signed by late Sri M.S.N. Murthy. By 14-07-1995, Sri M.S.N. Murthy, was bedridden and was not in a position to move out. In addition, relations between officers of State Bank of India Samarlakota branch and late Sri M.S.N. Murthy was badly strained. Even for a naked eye the signature of Sri M.S.N. Murthy, on the alleged acknowledgment, did not tally with his admitted signature in the plaint in O.S. No. 223 of 1998, in the vakalats filed therein and in the minutes of the meeting held on 10-02-1987 at State Bank of India, Visakhapatnam, which were all available with the bank itself. Accused 1 to 4 manipulated the forged and false acknowledgment dated 14-07-1995, purported to have been signed by Sri M.S.N. Murthy, and pressed the same into service with a view to harass the complainant and his family members, the L.Rs. of late Sri M.S.N. Murthy. The suit in O.S. No. 189 of 1991 was decreed in favour of the complainant and his family members for a sum of Rs. 3,76,025.32 ps with subsequent interest and costs. The suit in O.S. No. 165 of 1991 was decreed with costs for a sum of Rs. of late Sri M.S.N. Murthy. The suit in O.S. No. 189 of 1991 was decreed in favour of the complainant and his family members for a sum of Rs. 3,76,025.32 ps with subsequent interest and costs. The suit in O.S. No. 165 of 1991 was decreed with costs for a sum of Rs. 5,87,328.72 ps with subsequent interest, and the suit in O.S. No. 223 of 1998 was also decreed with costs and the State Bank of India, Samarlakota branch was directed to return the documents deposited with them within one month, and also to furnish Photostat copies of the documents of title deposited at the time of equitable mortgage certifying them as true copies, along with the release certificate of the mortgaged property, except the property purchased by the bank under the sale deed dated 28-06-1988. All the three suits were decreed by judgment dated 30-10-2001. In their written statement, filed in O.S. No. 9 of 2001 before the III Additional District Judge, Kakinada, State of Bank of India, Samarlakota branch, maintained the stand that the documents in question were available with them and that they had the right to retain those documents as they were given as vouchers and that no condition was stipulated therein for supplying Photostat copies. State Bank of India preferred appeals before this Court, against the common judgment dated 30-10-2001. It sought for interim stay of execution of the decree in O.S. No. 165 of 1991 and this Court, by order dated 15-04-2002, granted stay of execution, which was subsequently made absolute, by order dated 10-12-2003 on the condition that the appellants i.e., State Bank of India, Mumbai (A-1), State Bank of India Samarlakota (A-2) deposited half the decretal amount along with costs and interest within a period of six weeks from that date and, on such deposit, the complainant and others were at liberty to withdraw the entire amount without furnishing any security. CMP. No. 7099 of 2003, filed by State Bank of India, Samarlakota branch seeking a direction that the complainant and others furnish security for withdrawal of the amounts, was disposed of, by order dated 21-3-2003, holding that, in view of the fact that the original title deeds of the mortgaged property was still in the custody of the bank, no further security need be given. Accused 1 and 2 contended that the title deeds of the property were not in their custody, that the certified copies of the title deeds were alone in their custody and that the original title deeds were in the custody of the II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada and therefore the order dated 21-03-2003 required modification. This Court held that mortgage, by deposit of title deeds, was made without actually obtaining the original deeds which amounted to an irregularity. The Chairman, State Bank of India, Mumbai was directed to be present in Court on 25-08-2003 and explain as to whether any action was initiated or contemplated against the officers responsible for such irregular transactions. This Court observed that, in view of the fact that the lapse on the part of the State Bank of India was occasioned by virtue of either in efficient or deliberate mischief on the part of the officers concerned, and in view of the fact that the appellant bank was dealing with public money, it was appropriate to suspend the order dated 21-03-2003. On 22-08-2003 the Chief General Manager, State Bank of India, filed an affidavit before this Court admitting that the original documents in question were lying in deposit with State Bank of India, Samarlakota branch and that necessary action had been initiated against the officers who had misrepresented the facts of the case before the lower Court as also before this Court. The presence of the Chairman, State Bank of India, on 25-08-2003 was requested to be dispensed with. This Court, by order dated 25-08-2003, observed that the original title deeds of the property, on the strength of which loan was advanced, were available with the State Bank of India, Samarlakota branch in view of the affidavit filed by the Chief General Manager, State Bank of India, Hyderabad that necessary disciplinary action would be taken against the officers responsible for making inaccurate statements, misleading the Court and wasting its time, the earlier order dated 21-03-2003 would continue. Consequent thereto the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada, issued a cheque fork Rs. 4,89,306/- on 24-04-2004 without the complainant furnishing any security. Consequent thereto the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada, issued a cheque fork Rs. 4,89,306/- on 24-04-2004 without the complainant furnishing any security. The episode before this Court was positive proof as to how the accused conjointly played fraud, against the complainant and his family members, by pressing into service a false and forged acknowledgment memo purported to have been signed by the father of the complainant and also by making false statements before the lower Court and before this Court with a view to harass and intimidate them with ulterior motives. A-3 and A-4 worked as officer and Chief Manager of State Bank of India, Samarlakota, during the relevant time when the offence was committed on different occasions and they were the officers responsible for the commission of the offence. A-1 and A-2 had connived and colluded with A-3 and A-4 in the commission of offence, by supporting the acts of A-3 and A-4, at every stage. A-1 and A-2, despite their promise before this Court to take appropriate disciplinary action against the officers responsible for the entire episode, had not taken any action against them and thus A-1 to A-4 had conjointly committed offences under Sections 409, 467 and 471 IPC and had rendered themselves liable for punishment. The complainant waited in vain for A-1 and A-2 to take disciplinary action against A-3 and A-4 and such other officials responsible as promised before this Court and as such the complaint, in Cr. No. 188 of 2004, was filed. 7. Sri N. Narender Reddy, learned Counsel for the petitioners, would submit that the documents retained by the bank are link documents/vouchers for the sale deed dated 28-06-1988 whereby the building, and appurtenant land, at Samarlakota was sold by the respondent-complainant and others to the Bank. Learned Counsel would submit that, as a result of officers being periodically transferred and records being shifted from one section of the bank to another, officials of the bank had committed a mistake in informing that the documents had been returned, when in fact the documents had been retained as vouchers, (link documents), to the sale deed dated 25-06-1988. Learned Counsel would submit that the bona fide mistake of officers of the bank at Samarlakota cannot be equated to an offence of criminal breach of trust, forgery of valuable security or using as genuine forged documents. Learned Counsel would submit that the bona fide mistake of officers of the bank at Samarlakota cannot be equated to an offence of criminal breach of trust, forgery of valuable security or using as genuine forged documents. Learned Counsel would submit that the document signed by Sri M.S.N. Murty, is not a forged document and that the complaint was filed only to harass the bank officers for their bona fide act in refusing to part with the link documents. Learned Counsel would rely on State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : AIR 1992 SC 604 and Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Md. Sharaful Haque, 2004 (1) Decisions Today (SC) 1017, in support of his submission that the complaint as filed is liable to be quashed, since the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety as true, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused of their having committed the offences of which they are charged, since the allegations in the complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person could ever reach the just conclusion for proceeding against the accused and since the criminal proceedings instituted is manifestly attended with mala fides, with the ulterior motive of wrecking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite them due to personal grudge since the bank had refused to return the document retained by it as vouchers, (link documents), for the registered sale deed. Learned Counsel would submit that Accused No. 1 and 2 are public institutions and such baseless allegations cannot be made against them, that the 1st accused, a statutory body and a separate legal entity, cannot be charged of offences under Sections 409, 467 and 471 IPC and that similar is the case of the 2nd accused, the Samarlakota branch of State Bank of India. Learned Counsel would submit that the Chairman of the Bank, sitting at Mumbai, cannot, in any event, be said to have knowledge of what transpired at the-Samarlakota branch in East Godavari District of Andhra Pradesh. Similarly the present Branch Manager could not also be said to have committed the offence and as such the complaint against A-1 and A-2 were liable to be quashed. Similarly the present Branch Manager could not also be said to have committed the offence and as such the complaint against A-1 and A-2 were liable to be quashed. Even with regards A-3, learned Counsel would submit that he was the subsequent officer and, merely by filing an I.A. seeking amendment of the written statement, he cannot be said to have committed the offence of which he was charged. In so far as A-4 is concerned, learned Counsel would submit that the 4th accused did not commit any offence, since the memo was filed on the basis of the records and the allegation that the said memo is forged is without any basis. 8. Sri T. Bal Reddy, learned Senior Counsel, on the other hand, would submit that the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot be invoked to stifle investigation into serious offences. Learned Senior Counsel would submit that the allegations in the complaint disclose that the accused therein had committed the offences of which they are charged. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the accused had been repeatedly harassing the complainant and his family members and had resorted to these unsavoury incidents only to deny the complainant return of the documents which he was legally entitled to. Learned Senior Counsel would submit that it is not for this Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to examine the truth or otherwise of the allegations in the complaint more so when these matters have not even been investigated into. Learned Senior Counsel would place reliance on M.V. Javali v. Mahajan Borewell and Co., 1997 SC (Crl.) 1239 and State Bank of Punjab v. Subhash Kumar, (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 324. Learned Senior Counsel would submit that criminal proceedings can be instituted even against a statutory body and the only limitation is that, on their conviction, only a fine can be imposed on them for the offences of which they are found guilty. 9. Before examining the rival contentions, it is necessary to take note of the relevant provisions of the Penal Code, 1860. Section 409, 463, 464, 467 and 471 IPC read thus: 409. 9. Before examining the rival contentions, it is necessary to take note of the relevant provisions of the Penal Code, 1860. Section 409, 463, 464, 467 and 471 IPC read thus: 409. Criminal breach of trust by public servant, or by banker, merchant or agent:— Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property in his capacity of a public servant or in the way of his business as a banker, merchant, factor, broker, attorney or agent, commits criminal breach of trust in respect of that property, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extent to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. 463 Forgery:— Whoever makes any false document or part of a document with intent to cause damage or injury, to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery. 464 Making a false document:— A person is said to make a false document or false electronic record. 464 Making a false document:— A person is said to make a false document or false electronic record. Firstly- Who dishonestly or fraudulently (a) makes, signs, seal executes a document or part of a document; (b) makes or transmits any electronic record or part of any electronic record; (c) affixes any digital signature on any electronic record; (d) makes any mark denoting the execution of a document or part of document, electronic record or digital signature was made, signed, sealed, executed, transmitted or affixed by or by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed executed or affixed; or Secondly- Who, without lawful authority, dishonestly or fraudulently by cancellation, or otherwise, alters a document or an electronic record in any material part thereof, after it has been made, executed or affixed with digital signature either by himself or by any other person, whether such person be living or dead at the time of such alteration; or Thirdly- Who dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, seal, execute or alter a document or an electronic record or to affix his digital signature on any electronic record knowing that such person by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication cannot, or that by reason of deception practiced upon him, he does not know he contents of the document or electronic record or the nature of the alterations. Explanation 1-A man's signature of his own name may amount to forgery. Explanation 2- The making of a false document in the name of a fictitious person, intending it to be believed that the document was made by a real person, or in the name of a deceased person, intending it to be believed that the document was made by the person in his lifetime, may amount to forgery. Explanation 3- For the purposes of this section, the expression “affixing digital signature” shall have the meaning assigned to it in clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Information Technology Act, 2000. 467. Explanation 3- For the purposes of this section, the expression “affixing digital signature” shall have the meaning assigned to it in clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Information Technology Act, 2000. 467. Forgery of valuable security, will, etc.:— Whoever forges a document which purports to be a valuable security, or a will, or an authority to adopt a son, or which purports to give authority to any person to make or transfer any valuable security, or to receive the principal, interest, or dividends thereon, or to receive or deliver any money, movable property, or valuable security, or any document purporting to be an acquittance or receipt acknowledging the payment of money, or an acquittance or receipt for the delivery of any movable property or valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extent to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. 471. Using as genuine a forged document:— Whoever fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine any document; which he knows or has reason to believe to be a forged document or electronic record, shall be punished in the same manner as if he had forged such document or electronic record. 10. The State Bank of India Act, 1955 is an Act to constitute the State Bank of India, to transfer to it the undertaking of the Imperial Bank of India and to provide for other matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Section 3 thereof relates to establishment of the State Bank and reads thus: Establishment of the State Bank:— 1. A Bank to be called the State Bank of India shall be constituted to carry on the business of banking and other business in accordance with the provisions of this Act and for the purpose of taking over the undertaking of the Imperial Bank. 2. The Reserve Bank, together with such other persons as may from time to time become shareholders in the State Bank in accordance with the provisions of this Act, so long as they are shareholders in the State Bank, constitute a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal under the name of the State Bank of India, and shall sue and be sued in that name. 3. 3. The State Bank shall have power to acquire and hold property, whether movable or immovable, for the purposes for which it is constituted and to dispose of the same. 11. It is clear therefrom that the State Bank of India is a body corporate with perpetual succession. 12. Chapter V relates to management and Section 16 thereunder relates to offices, branches and agencies. Section 16 reads thus: 16. Offices, branches and agencies:— 1. Unless otherwise provided by the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, the central office of the State Bank shall be at Bombay. 2. The State Bank shall have local head officers in Bombay, Calcutta and Madras and at such other places; in India as the Central Government, in consultation with the Central Board, may determine. 3. The State Bank shall maintain as its branches or agencies all branches or agencies of the Imperial Bank which were in existence immediately before the appointed day, and no such branch may be closed without the previous approval of the Reserve Bank. 4. The State Bank may establish branches or agencies at any place in or outside India in addition to the branches or agencies referred to in sub-section (3). 5. Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (4), the State Bank shall establish not less than four hundred branches in addition to the branches referred to in sub-section(3) within five years of the appointed day or such extended period as the Central Government may specify in this behalf and the places where such additional branches are to be established shall be determined in accordance with any such programme as may be drawn up by the Central Government from time to time in consultation with the Reserve Bank and the State Bank, and no branch so established shall be closed without the previous approval of the Reserve Bank. 13. Under Clause 4 of Section 16, the State Bank of India is empowered to establish branches at any place in India. Section 27 relates to the powers and remuneration of chairman and under sub-section (1) thereof, the chairman shall preside at all meetings of the Central Board and, subject to such general or special directions as the Central Board may give, exercise all such powers and do all such acts and things as may be exercised or done by the State Bank. Chapter VI relates to business of the State Bank and under Section 32, the State Bank, whenever so required by the Reserve Bank shall act as the agent of the Reserve Bank at all places in India where it has a branch, and where there is no branch of the banking department of the Reserve Bank. Under Section 33, the State Bank may carry on and transact the business of banking as defined in clause (b) of Section 5 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and may engage in one or more of the other forms, of business specified in sub-section (1) of Section 6 of that Act. Section 34 relates to business which the State Bank may not transact and under Section 35 the State Bank is empowered to acquire the business of other banks. 14. Since both the State Bank of India (a body corporate) and its Samarlakota branch are arraigned as A-1 and A-2, on a specific query from the Court as to which of the offences, of which the accused are charged, specifically relate to Accused No. 1 and 2, Sri T. Bal Reddy, learned Senior Counsel, would submit that in so far as A-1 and A-2 are concerned, they are specifically charged of the offence of criminal breach of trust under Section 409 of the Penal Code, 1860. While conceding that A-1 and A-2, even if found guilty of the offence under Section 409 IPC, are not liable to be imposed the punishment of imprisonment, learned Senior Counsel would submit that since it was open for the learned Magistrate to impose a fine, the mere fact that the State Bank of India and it Samarlakota Branch are not individuals, and are a body corporate and its branch, would not absolve them of an offence under Section 409 IPC. 15. In this context, it is necessary to take note of the allegations made against A-1 and A-2 in the complaint. A-1 to A-4 are alleged to have manipulated the forged and false acknowledgment dated 14-07-1995, purported to have been signed by Sri M.S.N. Murthy, and to have pressed the said acknowledgment into service with a view to harass the complainant and his family members. A-1 and A-2 are alleged to have connived and colluded with A-3 and A-4 in the commission of the offence by supporting their acts at every stage. A-1 and A-2 are alleged to have connived and colluded with A-3 and A-4 in the commission of the offence by supporting their acts at every stage. A-1 and A-2, despite their promise to this Court that they would take disciplinary action against the officers responsible for the entire episode, had not taken any action against them and thus A-1 to A-4 had conjointly committed the offences under Section 409, 467 and 471 IPC. 16. In M.V. Javali (3 supra), the Supreme Court held that the mandatory sentence of imprisonment and fine under Section 276-B of the Income Tax Act could only be imposed on persons who, at the time when the offence was committed, were in charge of and were responsible to the company for conduct of its business and any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company with whose consent or connivance or because of neglect attributable to whom the offence had been committed. In the case of companies fine alone could be imposed as punishment and not imprisonment. 17. Amenability, of a body corporate, to criminal prosecution also came up for consideration in Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2005) 4 SCC 530 : 2005 (2) ALT (Crl.) 296 (SC) : 2005 (4) SCJ 645 wherein the Supreme Court observed:— “……Inasmuch as all criminal and quasi-criminal offences are creatures of statute, the amenability of the corporation to prosecution necessarily depends upon the terminology employed in the statute. In the case of strict liability, the terminology employed by the legislature is such as to reveal an intent that gilt shall not be predicated upon the automatic breach of the statute but on the establishment of the actus reus, subject to the defence of due diligence. The law is primarily based on the terms of the statutes. In the case of absolute liability where the legislature by the clearest intendment establishes an offence where liability arises instantly upon the breach of the statutory prohibition, no particular state of mind is a prerequisite to guilt. Corporations and individual persons stand on the same footing in the face of such a statutory offence. It is a case of automatic primary responsibility. It is only in a case requiring mens rea, a question arises whether a corporation could be attributed with requisite mens rea to prove the guilt. Corporations and individual persons stand on the same footing in the face of such a statutory offence. It is a case of automatic primary responsibility. It is only in a case requiring mens rea, a question arises whether a corporation could be attributed with requisite mens rea to prove the guilt. But as we are not concerned with this question in these proceedings, we do not express any opinion on that issue……” (emphasis supplied) 18. The earlier judgment in M.V. Javali (3 supra) considered in Standard Chartered Bank (5 supra), and on the question as to whether, in a case requiring mens rea, a corporation could be attributed with the requisite mens rea to prove the guilt, the Supreme Court did not express any opinion. In the case on hand, the offences of which the accused are charged are under Sections 409, 467 and 471 IPC. Section 467 which relates to forgery of valuable security, Section 409, which relates to criminal breach of trust by a banker, and Section 471, which relates to using as genuine a forged document, are all offences requiring mens rea. 19. Section 405 IPC which defines “criminal breach of trust” speaks of a person being in any manner entrusted with property. It does not contemplate the creation of a trust with all the technicalities of the law of trust. It contemplates the creation of a relationship whereby the owner of property makes it over to another person to be retained by him until a certain contingency arises or to be disposed of by him on the happening of a certain event. The person who transfers possession of the property to the second party still remains the legal owner of the property and the person in whose favour possession is so transferred has only the custody of the property to be kept or disposed of by him for the benefit of the other party, the person so put in possession only obtaining a special interest by way of a claim for money advanced or spent upon the safe keeping of the thing or such other incidental expenses as may have been incurred by him. Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay, 1956 SCR 483 . 20. Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay, 1956 SCR 483 . 20. The essential ingredient of an offence of criminal breach of trust under Section 405 is that the accused, being in any manner entrusted with property or with dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he had made touching the discharge of such trust. Sardar Singh v. State of Haryana, (1977) 1 SCC 463 : AIR 1977 SC 1766 . Section 405 contemplates something being done with respect to the property which would indicate either misappropriation or conversion or its use or disposal in violation of the contract, express or implied. Mohammad Sulaiman v. Md. Ayub, AIR 1965 SC 1319 . 21. The offence of criminal breach of trust, like the offence of criminal misappropriation, is characterized by an act of fraudulent appropriation of property. There is not originally wrongful taking as in the case of theft but the offence consists in wrongful appropriation of property, consequent upon a possession which is lawful. The offence is distinguishable from criminal misappropriation because the subject of it is not the property which by some casual act or otherwise, but without criminal means, comes into the offender's possession, but the property which is entrusted to the offender by the owner or by other lawful authority and which the offender holds subject to some duty or obligation to apply it according to the trust. 22. The word ‘dishonesty’ is defined in Section 24 of the Penal Code, 1860 to be whoever does anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another person, is said to do that thing ‘dishonestly’. FRAUDULENTLY has been defined in the Penal Code, 1860 in Section 25 as follows: “a person is said to do a thing fraudulently if he does that thing with intent to defraud but not otherwise”. Wrongful gain includes wrongful retention and wrongful loss includes being kept out of the property as well as being wrongfully deprived of property. The essential ingredient of criminal breach of trust is whether the accused was actuated by dishonest intention or not. Wrongful gain includes wrongful retention and wrongful loss includes being kept out of the property as well as being wrongfully deprived of property. The essential ingredient of criminal breach of trust is whether the accused was actuated by dishonest intention or not. As the question of intention is not a matter of direct proof Courts have, from time to time, laid down certain broad tests which would generally afford useful guidance in deciding whether, in a particular case, the accused had or did not have mens rea for the crime. Krishan Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1959 SC 1390 . 23. To constitute an offence of criminal breach of trust, there must be an entrustment, there must be misappropriation or conversion to one's own use, or use in violation of a legal direction or of any legal contract and the misappropriation or conversion or disposal must be with a dishonest intention. The section is relatable to property in a positive part and a negative part. The positive part deals with criminal misappropriation or conversion of the property and the negative part consists of dishonestly using or disposing of the property in violation of any direction and of law or any contract touching the discharge of trust. 24. The term “entrustment” is not necessarily a term of law. It may have different implications in different contexts. In its most general signification all it imports is the handing over possession for some purpose which may not imply the conferring of any proprietary right at all. When a person misappropriate to his own use the property that does not belong to him, the misappropriation is dishonest even though there was an intention to restore it at some future point of time. The principal ingredient of the offence being dishonest misappropriation or conversion which may not ordinarily be a matter of direct proof, entrustment of property and failure in breach of an obligation to account for the property entrusted if established, may, in the light of other circumstances, justifiably lead to an inference of dishonest misappropriation or conversion. Ram Narayan Popli v. CBI, (2003) 3 SCC 641 . 25. The ingredients of the offence of criminal breach of trust are: (1) Entrusting any person with property, or with any dominion over property. Ram Narayan Popli v. CBI, (2003) 3 SCC 641 . 25. The ingredients of the offence of criminal breach of trust are: (1) Entrusting any person with property, or with any dominion over property. (2) The person entrusted (a) dishonestly misappropriating or converting to his own use that property; or (b) dishonestly using or disposing of that property or willfully suffering any other person so as to do in violation— (i) of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged; or (ii) of any legal contract made touching the discharge of trust. 26. The basic requirement to bring home the accusations under Section 405 are the requirements to prove conjointly (1) entrustment, (2) whether the accused was actuated by dishonest intention or not, and (3) whether the accused misappropriated it or converted it to his own use to the detriment of the persons who entrusted it. As the question of intention is not a matter of direct proof, certain broad tests are envisaged which would generally afford useful guidance in deciding whether in a particular case the accused had mens rea for the crime. Janeshwar Das Aggarwal v. State of U.P., (1981) 3 SCC 10 : AIR 1981 SC 1646 ; Anwar Chand Sab Nanadikar v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 10 SCC 521 ; Kailash Kumar Sanwatia v. State of Bihar, (2003) 7 SCC 399 : 2003 (2) ALT (Crl.) 378 (SC). 27. Ever case of criminal breach of trust is also a case of civil liability. (Jaswanti Rai Manilal (6 supra). The same set of facts may give rise both to a civil liability and a criminal prosecution. The question to be seen is whether it was a case of mere breach of contract or a case of criminal breach of trust. In every case of criminal breach of trust a breach of contract is implicit. The determinant factor in judging whether a case is one of criminal breach of trust or a breach of contract is whether the person proceeded against had acted dishonestly. The main distinction between civil liability on the one hand and criminal breach of trust on the other lies in the existence of dishonest intention, that is to say, the mental act of fraudulent misappropriation in the latter case and the absence of the same in the former. The main distinction between civil liability on the one hand and criminal breach of trust on the other lies in the existence of dishonest intention, that is to say, the mental act of fraudulent misappropriation in the latter case and the absence of the same in the former. This is the essential ingredient of the offence of criminal breach of trust. Gopiram v. The State, 1954 Crl.L.J. 448. If there is no mens rea, or if the other essential ingredients of an offence are lacking, the same facts may not sustain a criminal prosecution, though a civil action may lie. Jaswantrai Manilal (6 supra), Halimuddin Ahmad v. Ashoka Cement Ltd., 1976 Crl.L.J. 449. 28. Section 467 relates to forgery of documents such as valuable securities and of other documents mentioned therein. The offence is complete as soon as there was forgery with a particular intent. Section 471 deals with using as genuine a forged document. Under Section 467 read with Section 471 IPC, it has to be shown that an accused either knew or had reason to believe that the document was forged. Section 463 defines forgery and Section 464 deals with making a false statement. In order to constitute forgery, the first essential ingredient is that the accused should have made a false document. The false document must be made with an intent to cause damage or injury to the public or to any class of public or to any community. The expression “intent to defraud” implies conduct coupled with an intention to deceive or thereby to cause injury. In other words, defraud involves two concepts, namely, the deceit and injury to the person deceived, that is infringement of some legal right possessed by him but not necessarily deprivation of property. The term “forger” in the I.P.C. is used in its ordinary and popular acceptation. 29. The definition of the offence of forgery declares the offence to be completed when a false document or false part of a document is made with a specified intention. The questions are (i) is the document false, (ii) is it made by the accused, and (iii) is it made with an intent to defraud. In order to constitute an offence of forgery the documents must be made dishonestly or fraudulently. Fraudulent does not imply the deprivation of property or an element of injury. The questions are (i) is the document false, (ii) is it made by the accused, and (iii) is it made with an intent to defraud. In order to constitute an offence of forgery the documents must be made dishonestly or fraudulently. Fraudulent does not imply the deprivation of property or an element of injury. In order to be fraudulent, there must be some advantage on the one side with a corresponding loss on the other. Every forgery postulates a false document either in whole or in part, however small. 30. The intent to commit forgery involves an intent to cause injury. A person makes a false document who dishonestly or fraudulent signs with an intent or causes to believe that the document was signed by a person whom he knows it was not signed. A false description makes a document a forgery when it is found that the accused by giving such false description intended to make out or wanted it to be believed that it was not he that was executing the document but another person. Ram Narayan Popli (10 supra). 31. On a plain reading of the complaint filed in Cr. No. 188 of 2004 it is clear that the complainant has already instituted civil action against the accused for breach of contract and on a decree being passed in this favour, in O.S. No. 223 of 1998 dated 30-10-2001, the Bank has carried the matter in appeal to this Court. The fact that the Bank is in possession of the documents, which the complainant claims should be returned to them, is not in dispute. The dispute is whether or not the Bank is entitled to retain the documents as vouchers/link documents to the sale deed executed in its favour. If retention of the documents is merely in breach of the agreement then only a civil action would lie. It is only if the accused had retained possession of these documents, would the ingredients of a criminal breach of Trust, under Section 409 IPC, be said to have been attracted. 32. As noted above, amongst the essential ingredients of an offence of criminal breach of trust is the accused being actuated by a dishonest intention. If there is no mens rea, the person cannot be said to have committed the offence of criminal breach of trust. 32. As noted above, amongst the essential ingredients of an offence of criminal breach of trust is the accused being actuated by a dishonest intention. If there is no mens rea, the person cannot be said to have committed the offence of criminal breach of trust. Similarly, in order to constitute forgery under Section 467, it is essential that the accused should have made a false document with the intent to cause damage or injury to the public or to any class of public or to any person. The expression “intention to defraud” in Section 463 I.P.C. implies the conduct coupled with the intention to deceive or thereby cause injury. The essential ingredient of an offence of forgery is when a false document is made with an intention to defraud. Since Section 467 relates to forgery of a document which purports to give a valuable security, the essential ingredient thereof is an intention to defraud and an intention to cause injury. Similarly, under Section 471, the essential ingredient is the use of a forged document as genuine with a fraudulent and dishonest intention. Thus, for all the allegations of which the petitioners herein are charged under Sections 409, 467 and 471 IPC, the essential ingredient is a dishonest or fraudulent intention. Can a body corporate be said to be actuated by a dishonest or fraudulent intention? The civil liability of a breach of contract apart, it is difficult to accept the submission that a body corporate can also be said to be actuated with fraudulent and dishonest intention. A body corporate acts through its Directors, Officers and employees. It does not have a mind of its own. A fraudulent or dishonest intention involves a frame of mind, a thought process which a body corporate, by itself, is incapable of as such the question of it acting with a fraudulent or dishonest intention does not arise. It is also to be borne in mind that the 1st accused is a body corporate constituted under Section 3 of the State Bank of India Act, an Act of the Parliament. Can a public financial institution such as the State Bank of India and its Branches, as distinct from its officers, be said to be actuated with dishonest or fraudulent intention? The answer has necessarily to be in the negative. 33. Can a public financial institution such as the State Bank of India and its Branches, as distinct from its officers, be said to be actuated with dishonest or fraudulent intention? The answer has necessarily to be in the negative. 33. In this context it is useful to refer to Bhajan Lal (1 supra), wherein the Supreme Court laid down certain illustrative tests to serve as a useful guide in exercising the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. “………In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. 1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Sec. 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. 5. 4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provisions in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice………” (emphasis supplied) 34. The allegations in the complaint that the State Bank of India and its branch at Samarlakota (Accused 1 and 2), had committed offence under Section 409, 467 and 471 I.P.C. are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against them. The allegations in the complaint that the State Bank of India and its branch at Samarlakota (Accused 1 and 2), had committed offence under Section 409, 467 and 471 I.P.C. are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against them. Since a body corporate and its branch, more particular a public financial institution constituted by an Act of Parliament, cannot be said to be actuated with a dishonest or fraudulent intention or to have the mens rea for the crime, the uncontroverted allegations in the complaint, even if read as a whole and accepted as true, would not attract the ingredients of the offence of which they are charged. Since one of the tests prescribed in Bhajan Lal (1 supra), for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is satisfied, the complaint in Cr. No. 188 of 2004, in so far as Accused 1 and 2 are concerned, is accordingly quashed. 35. The distinction between a body corporate and its officers on the question of mens rea or dishonest or fraudulent intent cannot be lost sight of While the former cannot be said to be actuated with fraudulent or dishonest intent or to have mens area for the crime, no such presumption can be drawn in the case of the latter. 36. In so far as the petitioners in Criminal Petition No. 1333 of 2005 are concerned the allegations against A-4, in Crime No. 188 of 2004, is that he filed a memo dt. 22-2-2001 in O.S. No. 302 of 1997 on the file of the I Additional Junior Civil Judge, Kakinada stating that the documents which were sought to be summoned had, in fact, been delivered to Sri M.S.N. Murthy on 14-7-1995 itself and that the Bank was not in possession of the documents. Along with the memo, a photostat copy of the acknowledgment, containing the signature of late Sri M.S.N. Murthy, was enclosed. It is alleged, in the complaint in Crime No. 188 of 2004, that the acknowledgement was a forged document brought into existence in order to defraud and defeat the just claims of the complainant and his father, that the memo filed under the signature of A-4 was false and fraudulent. It is alleged, in the complaint in Crime No. 188 of 2004, that the acknowledgement was a forged document brought into existence in order to defraud and defeat the just claims of the complainant and his father, that the memo filed under the signature of A-4 was false and fraudulent. It cannot be said that, on a reading of the complaint as a whole and accepting the uncontroverted allegations made therein as true, no case has been made out against the 4th accused of his having committed an offence under Sections 467 and 471 I.P.C. 37. As observed by the Supreme Court in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. (2 supra):— “……In exercise of the powers Court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of Court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the Court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, ( AIR 1960 SC 866 ) this Court summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings. (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with the last case, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. In dealing with the last case, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death……. ………As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, moreso when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. (See: Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdary, ( (1992) 4 SCC 305 ), and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar, ( AIR 1964 SC 1 ). Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. (See: Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdary, ( (1992) 4 SCC 305 ), and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar, ( AIR 1964 SC 1 ). It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be susitainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In a proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that even there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fide of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceedings…………” (emphasis supplied) 38. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceedings…………” (emphasis supplied) 38. In Subhash Kumar (4 supra), the Supreme Court held that the High Court could not act as an investigating agency at the stage when the F.I.R. was under investigation or enter into the factual arena while quashing the complaint under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It is not for the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to weigh the evidence or to examine the truth or otherwise of the allegations in the complaint. 39. It is not for this Court to minutely examine each and every sentence of the complaint or carry out a microscopic examination as to whether the allegations made therein over each and every ingredient of the offence of which the accused are charged. In Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi, (1999) 3 SCC 259 : 1999 (1) ALT (Crl.) 301 (SC), the Supreme Court observed:— “…It is not necessary that a complainant should verbatim reproduce in the body of his complaint all the ingredients of the offence he is alleging. Nor is it necessary that the complainant should state in so many words that the intention of the accused was dishonest or fraudulent. Splitting up of the definition into different components of the offence to make a meticulous scrutiny, whether all the ingredients have been precisely spelled out in the complaint, is not the need at this stage. If factual foundation for the offence has been laid in the complaint the court should not hasten to quash criminal proceedings during investigation stage merely on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated with details. For quashing an FIR (a step which is permitted only in extremely rare cases) the information in the complaint must be so bereft of even the basis facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1 supra) this Court laid down the premise on which the FIR can be quashed in rare cases. The following observations made in the aforesaid decisions are a sound reminder: (SCC p. 379, para 103) “103. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1 supra) this Court laid down the premise on which the FIR can be quashed in rare cases. The following observations made in the aforesaid decisions are a sound reminder: (SCC p. 379, para 103) “103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice………. ………The High Court seems to have adopted a strictly hypertechnical approach and sieved the complaint through a cullendar of finest gauzes for testing the ingredients under Section 415 IPC. Such an endeavour may be justified during trial, but certainly not during the stage of investigation. At any rate, it is too premature a stage for the High Court to step in and stall the investigation by declaring that it is a commercial transaction simpliciter wherein no semblance of criminal offence is involved……” (emphasis supplied) 40. Needless to state that the truth or otherwise of the allegations in the complaint are all matters of evidence for the trial Court to examine and it is not for this Court to weigh the evidence in proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. If the uncontroverted allegations in the complaint are read as a whole, and are accepted true, it cannot be said that no case has been made out against the 4th accused of his having committed the offence of which he is charged. No interference is therefore called for in proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. more so, when the complaint has, as yet, not been investigated into. Criminal Petition No. 1333 of 2005, in so far as A-4 is concerned, is accordingly dismissed. 41. The allegations in the complaint in Cr. No interference is therefore called for in proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. more so, when the complaint has, as yet, not been investigated into. Criminal Petition No. 1333 of 2005, in so far as A-4 is concerned, is accordingly dismissed. 41. The allegations in the complaint in Cr. No. 188 of 2004, against A-3, are that, as the Chief Manager of State Bank of India, Samarlakota, he filed an affidavit in I.A. No. 558 of 2001 in O.S. 223 of 1998 under his signature stating that when he sat with his advocate for getting ready with the arguments to be adduced on 10-8-2001 in the above suit and while consulting the files, he found that on 14-7-1995 Sri M.S.N. Murthy had received all the documents in question under his signature in a proforma supplied by the Bank. A-3 sought amendment, of the written statement already filed in the suit, to the effect that the original documents which were the subject matter of the suit had already been returned to Sri M.S.N. Murthy and that he had signed a memo acknowledging receipt of the documents of title from State Bank of India, Samarlakota. It is alleged that the original of said acknowledgement memo, purported to have been signed by Sri M.S.N. Murthy, was filed into Court on 11-8-2001. As is clear from the complaint itself, even prior thereto, A-4 had filed a Memo on 22-2-2001, in O.S. No. 302/97, before the I Addl. Junior Civil Judge, Kakinada enclosing a Photostat copy of the very same acknowledgment dated 14-07-1995, under his signature, which is alleged to be false and fraudulent. The allegation against A-3 is that he filed an affidavit subsequently on 8-8-2001 in I.A. 558 of 2001 in O.S. 223 of 1998 referring to the said memo and that he filed the original acknowledgement memo into court on 11-8-2001. 42. Sri T. Bal Reddy, learned Senior Counsel, would contend that while A-3 is not accused of forgery he is accused of an offence under Section 471 I.P.C. for using as genuine of a forged document. 42. Sri T. Bal Reddy, learned Senior Counsel, would contend that while A-3 is not accused of forgery he is accused of an offence under Section 471 I.P.C. for using as genuine of a forged document. As a specific allegation has been made in the complaint that A-3 had filed an affidavit in I.A. 558 of 2001 on 8-8-2001, relying on the alleged forged acknowledgment dated 14-7-1995, and had filed the original copy of the acknowledgment memo into court on 11-8-2001, it cannot be said that, even if the uncontroverted allegations in the complaint are read as a whole and accepted as true, the ingredients of Section 471 I.P.C. are not attracted. 43. It is no doubt true that summoning an accused, in a criminal case, is a serious matter and criminal law cannot be set in motion as a matter of course. The accused can approach this Court, under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to have the proceedings quashed when the complaint does not make out any case against him and he is still required to undergo the agony of a criminal trial, for the provisions of Section 482 of the Code are devised to advance justice and not to frustrate it. Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749 . 44. While exercising powers under the section, the Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised ex debito justitae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has the power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of these powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar, (2006) 4 SCC 359 . 45. Under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of process of court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But the expressions “abuse of the process of law” or “to secure the ends of justice” do not confer unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court and the alleged abuse of the process of law or the ends of justice can only be secured in accordance with law including procedural law and not otherwise. Further, inherent powers are in the nature of extraordinary powers to be used sparingly for achieving the object mentioned in Section 482 of the Code. Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of A.P., (1999) 6 SCC 146 . 46. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code is the exception and not the rule. Inherent jurisdiction under the Section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the Section itself. While judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression, or needless harassment, at the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa, (2002) 3 SCC 89 ; State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522 : 2004 (2) ALT (Crl.) 288 (SC) 47. State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa, (2002) 3 SCC 89 ; State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522 : 2004 (2) ALT (Crl.) 288 (SC) 47. Cases which require interference, under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are few and far between. The most common cases where inherent jurisdiction is generally exercised is where criminal proceedings are required to be quashed because they are initiated illegally, vexatiously or without jurisdiction. The inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. must be exercised only in the rarest of rare cases, State v. Navjot Sandhu, (2003) 6 SCC 641 ; State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla, (1996) 8 SCC 164 , M. Narayandas v. State of Karnataka (2003) 11 SCC 251 , Mohd. Malek Mondal v. Pranjal Bardalai (2005) 10 SCC 608 , for such a power does not confer arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana, (1977) 4 SCC 451 . I see no reason to stifle investigation into Crime No. 188 of 2004 in so far as A-3 and A-4 are concerned, as it cannot be said that the uncontroverted allegations in the complaint, if accepted as true, do not make out a case of A-3 and A-4 having committed the offences of which they are charged. As a result, Criminal Petition No. 5480 of 2004 is allowed and the proceedings in Crime No. 188 of 2004 of Samarlakota Police Station, East Godavari District, in so far as A-1 and A-2 are concerned, is accordingly quashed. 48. Criminal Petition No. 1333 of 2005 of 2005 filed by A-3 and A-4 in Cr. No. 188 of 2004, is however dismissed.