JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. For setting aside an order passed ex parte in a maintenance proceeding under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short, 'the Code'), whether an application has to be made, under the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 126 of the Code, within three months from the date of the making of the order of maintenance or within three months from the date of the knowledge of such an order is the moot question, which the present revision has raised for determination by this Court. 2. Before I come to the real controversy raised in the present revision, some material facts, which gave rise to the present revision, may be noticed as follows: The opposite party herein made, as second party, an application, under Section125 of the Code, claiming maintenance from the first party, i.e., the Petitioner herein. This application gave rise to Misc. Case No. 180/2001. On 15.11.2001, an order was passed, in the said maintenance proceeding by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate (Sadar), Mangaldoi, directing issuance of notice to the second party. In course of time, the process server submitted a report, dated 24.7.2002. According to this report, notices could not be earlier served personally on the second party for one reason or the other and, eventually, on 24.7.2002, when the process server found the addressee, i.e., the second party, the second party refused to accept the notice on the ground that the name of the mouza, mentioned in the notice, was incorrect. This report also indicated that notices of the proceeding were earlier given twice to the family members of the second party. Following the report, so submitted, the learned SDJM, by order, dated 5.8.2002, treated the notice as served and decided to proceed with the case ex parte against the Petitioner and fixed accordingly 21.8.2002 for ex parte hearing. Upon recording the evidence adduced by the first party, the learned SDJM passed an order, on 21.8.2002, directing the second party to pay maintenance allowance to the first party at the rate of Rs. 400/- per month. As no payment was made by the second party, the learned SDJM, on a petition filed, in this regard, by the first party, passed an order directing issuance of distress warrant against the second party. In execution of the warrant, so issued, the Petitioner was arrested on 20.9.2003. 400/- per month. As no payment was made by the second party, the learned SDJM, on a petition filed, in this regard, by the first party, passed an order directing issuance of distress warrant against the second party. In execution of the warrant, so issued, the Petitioner was arrested on 20.9.2003. The second party, i.e., the Petitioner herein, eventually, filed a petition, on 23.9.2003, praying for setting aside the order, dated 21.8.2002, passed against him ex parte directing him to make payment of maintenance. By order, dated 15.10.2003, the learned SDJM rejected the application made for vacating the ex parte order of maintenance, the ground for rejection being that the Court did not have locus standi to hear the petition. Thus, the petition, seeking to get set aside the ex parte order, was turned down for want of jurisdiction. It is this order, dated 15.10.2003, which stands impugned in the present revision by the second party. 3. The case of the Petitioner, in the present revision, is that all the orders, in the maintenance proceeding, were passed behind his back and that the Petitioner came to know of the order, directing him to pay maintenance, upon his arrest on 20.9.2003 and within three days from the date of the knowledge of the order i.e. on 23.9.2003, the Petitioner filed an application, under Section 126(2) of the Code, for vacating the said ex parte order of maintenance, but the learned SDJM committed serious error of law in rejecting the said application on the ground that the application was time-barred. 4. In the present case, as the application, seeking to get set aside the order of maintenance ex parte, was filed beyond the period of three months from the date of passing of the order of maintenance on 21.8.2002, the question, which falls for determination in the present revision, is as to whether, it is the date of the order or the date of the knowledge of the order, which has to be reckoned as the date of commencement for the purpose of computing the period of limitation for making an application under Section 126(2) to get set aside the order of maintenance passed ex parte. 5. I have heard Mr. T. Islam, learned Counsel for the Petitioner. As none had appeared on behalf of the first party-opposite party, this Court appointed Mr. 5. I have heard Mr. T. Islam, learned Counsel for the Petitioner. As none had appeared on behalf of the first party-opposite party, this Court appointed Mr. B.D. Konwar, learned Counsel, as Amicus Curiae and has heard him accordingly. 6. Presenting the case, on behalf of the Petitioner, Mr. T. Islam, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, has submitted that the learned SDJM seriously erred in taking the view that since the Petitioner's application for setting aside the ex parte order of maintenance was made beyond the period of 30 days from the date of making of the order, the application was not maintainable; whereas, contends Mr. Islam, the period of three months does not mean three months from the date of the making of the order, but three months from the date of knowledge of the order and, in the present case, since the order, directing payment of maintenance, had been made behind the back of the Petitioner, the period of limitation of three months could not have been made to run until the day, when the order stood communicated to the Petitioner or when the Petitioner came to know about the said ex parte order. The impugned order, therefore, submits Mr. Islam needs to be interfered in revision. 7. In support of his above submissions, Mr. Islam refers to, and places reliance on, Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1500 , Meenakshi Ammal v. Samasundra Nadar, AIR 1970 Mad 242 , Hemendra Nath v. Archana, AIR 1971 Cal. 244 , Dhani Ram v. State reported in 1974 Cri. L J. 1234 (All), Joginder Singh v. Balkaran Kaur reported in 1972 Cri. LJ. (P&H) 93 and Zohra Begum @ Aysha Begum v. Mohamed Ghouse Qadeeri and Anr., AIR 1966 A.P. 50 . 8. Appearing as Amicus Curiae, Mr. B.D. Konwarhas on the other hand, submitted that the period of limitation prescribed by any law needs to be interpreted literally unless the context, in a given case, requires otherwise. It is pointed out by Mr. Konwar that the basis for the decisions, which Mr. 8. Appearing as Amicus Curiae, Mr. B.D. Konwarhas on the other hand, submitted that the period of limitation prescribed by any law needs to be interpreted literally unless the context, in a given case, requires otherwise. It is pointed out by Mr. Konwar that the basis for the decisions, which Mr. Islam relies upon to contend that an application to set aside an order passed ex parte for maintenance can be made within three months from the date of the knowledge of the order and not necessarily within three months from the date of making of the order, is the decision of the Supreme Court, in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1500 , wherein the Apex Court has explained as to what the period of limitation for seeking a reference to the District Court against the award of the Collector is. The decision, in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (Supra), is however according to Mr. Konwar, not applicable to a proceeding under Section 125 inasmuch as the decision, in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra), was rendered, while interpreting the provisions of Section 18 of the Limitation Act and this interpretation was based on the scheme of the said Act and is not of universal application irrespective of the scheme of a given statute. The reliance, therefore, placed on the decisions in Meenakshi Ammal (supra), Hemendra Nath (supra), Dhani Ram (supra), Joginder Singh (supra), Zohra Begum (supra) and Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra), for contending that the period of limitation, for the purpose of Section 126(2), shall be reckoned from the date of the making of the order and not from the date of knowledge of the order is, according to Mr. Konwar, incorrect. This apart, points out Mr. Konwar, the Limitation Act, 1963, applies to the special provisions of the limitation period prescribed even under the Code and, hence, a person, against whom an order for maintenance is passed ex parte, will not be prejudiced if he does not come to know about the making of the order within three months from the date of making thereof, for, he may, in such a case, make, points out Mr. Konwar, an application, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, seeking condonation of delay in making the application for setting aside the ex parte order and if he satisfies the Court that he was prevented by good and sufficient cause from making the application within time, the delay, if any, can be condoned by the Court and his application for setting aside the ex parte order can become maintainable. Support for these submissions is sought to be derived by Mr. Konwar from the case of Ghulam Mohd. v. Rasoolan reported in 1991 Cri. LJ. 2937 (J& K) wherein it has been held that the period of limitation is to be reckoned from the date of the order and introducing any other element, such as knowledge, into it would amount to rewriting the terms of the provisions. 9. From the rival submissions noted above, it is transparent that there is divergence of opinion, amongst the High Courts, with regard to the date from which the period of limitation shall be computed for the purpose of making an application to get set aside the order of maintenance passed ex parte and the cleavage of opinion is in favour of computing this period of limitation from the date of the knowledge of the order and not from the date of the making of the order. Let me, therefore, examine the controversy a little minutely and with utmost detachment. 10. While considering the controversy raised in the present revision, what needs to be noted, at the very outset, is that while Section 125 of the Code lays down as to who can be granted maintenance, who can be ordered to pay such maintenance and the circumstances in which an order for maintenance can be made, it is Section 126, which lays down the procedure for making the order of maintenance. Sub-section (2) of Section 126 is extremely relevant for the purpose of correctly appreciating the controversy, which has arisen in the present revision. It is, therefore, necessary that Sub-section (2) of Section 126 is carefully read. Sub-section (2) of Section 126 is extremely relevant for the purpose of correctly appreciating the controversy, which has arisen in the present revision. It is, therefore, necessary that Sub-section (2) of Section 126 is carefully read. For proper appreciation of what Sub-section (2) of Section 126 and the proviso thereto convey, let me reproduce hereinbelow Section 126(2), which run as follows: Section 126(1) Proceedings under Section 125 may be taken against any person in any district- (b) * * * (C) * * * (2) All evidence in such proceedings shall be taken in the presence of the person against whom an order for payment of maintenance is proposed to be made, or, when his personal attendance is dispensed with, in the presence of his pleader and shall be recorded in the manner prescribed for summons cases. Provided that if the Magistrate is satisfied that the person against whom an order for payment of maintenance is proposed to be made is wilfully avoiding service, or willfully neglecting to attend the Court, the Magistrate may proceed to hear and determine the case ex parte and any order so made may be set aside for good cause shown on an application made within three months from the date thereof subject to such terms including terms as to payment of costs to the opposite party as the Magistrate may think just and proper." 11. A careful reading of Sub-section (2) of Section 126 shows that all evidence, in a proceeding under Section 125, shall, ordinarily, be taken in the presence of the person against whom the order for maintenance is proposed to be made or in the presence of such person's counsel if the presence of the party proceeded against has been dispensed with. The restrictions of not recording evidence in the absence of the person against whom the order of maintenance is proposed to be made or in the absence of such person's counsel is subject to an exception and the exception, as the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 126 indicates, is that the Magistrate can proceed to determine ex parte the question of maintenance if the Magistrate is satisfied that the person, against whom an order for payment of maintenance is proposed to be made, is willfully avoiding service or willfully neglecting to attend the Court. If, in a given case, the Magistrate makes the order for maintenance ex parte, such an order may, under the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 126, be set aside for good cause shown on an application made within three months from the date thereof. 12. There are, it may be pointed out, two parts of the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 126. The first part of the proviso empowers the Magistrate to hear and determine the application for maintenance ex parte. In order to enable a Magistrate, under the first proviso, to proceed ex parte, the Magistrate must have reasons to conclude that the person, against whom the order is proposed to be made, is (i) willfully avoiding service or (ii) willfully neglecting to attend the Court. The second part of the proviso enables the Magistrate to set aside the order for maintenance made ex parte. The second part of the proviso, thus, provides a remedy to the party aggrieved of the ex parte order by enabling him to make an application to set aside the ex parte order. The power to set aside the order of maintenance passed ex parte is, however, subject to two restrictions, the restrictions being (i) that the person, proceeded against, must show good cause against the circumstances, whereunder ex parte order was made, and (ii) the application, seeking to get the ex parte order set aside, must be made within three months from the date of the ex parte order. 13. An ex parte order, it may, now, be noted, is passed behind the back of a person, who may have no knowledge about such an order. Such an effect of an ex parte order must be presumed to be within the knowledge or information of the Magistrate. Despite knowing the effect of an ex parte order, when the legislature, in its wisdom, has prescribed three months as the period of limitation from the date of passing of the order, it would not be unreasonable to infer, unless the context needs otherwise, that the period of limitation, so prescribed, is absolute in terms and introducing any other elements, such as knowledge, into such absolute terms would amount to re-writing of the terms of the proviso to Section 126(2). It is with this limitation in mind that the question as to whether the period of limitation shall be reckoned from the date of the order or from the date of the knowledge of the order has to be answered. 14. Bearing in mind what has been indicated above, let me, now, turn to the case of Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra), for, in the entire range of case laws, cited at the bar, in support of reckoning the period of limitation from the date of the knowledge of the order and not the date of the passing of the order, the authority is the decision of the Apex Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra). The question that arose, in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra), was as to whether the period of limitation of six months to make an application for reference to Court should start from the date of the award or from the date of the knowledge of the award if the person interested in the award had no notice of the award on the date on which award was made by the Collector. 15. For appreciating what the Apex Court has observed and held in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra), not only the facts and circumstances of the said case, but even the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act, where-under the decision was rendered by the Apex Court need to be minutely noted and borne in mind. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra), the Appellant's land had been compulsorily acquired for a public purpose by the State of Uttar Pradesh. The Appellant, in terms of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, made his claim for compensation. The proceeding for determining the amount of compensation was started and an award was finally made and filed in the office of the Collector in March, 1951. Though Section 12(2)of the Land Acquisition Act require that the Collector shall give immediate notice of the award to such of the persons interested as are not present personally or represented by their representatives, when the award was made, no notice of the award was issued to the Appellant. Though Section 12(2)of the Land Acquisition Act require that the Collector shall give immediate notice of the award to such of the persons interested as are not present personally or represented by their representatives, when the award was made, no notice of the award was issued to the Appellant. The Appellant, having not been served with the notice, came to know of the award on 30th January, 1953, i.e., almost after two years from the date of the making of the award. The Appellant, then, filed an application, on 24.2.53, under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, to the Collector praying for referring the question of adequacy of compensation to the Court, for, the Appellant considered the amount, awarded to him, as inadequate. Since the Collector was of the view that the application made by the Appellant was beyond the period of limitation prescribed by Section 18(2), the Collector declined to refer the matter. The Appellant, then, filed a writ petition in the High Court, which was allowed. In appeal, the High Court reversed the judgment and, in consequence thereof, the writ petition was dismissed. 16. The Appellant, then, carried the matter to the Supreme Court. Their Lordships, in the Supreme Court, considered the various provisions of the Land Acquisition Act including Sections 12 and 18thereof in order to ascertain the scheme of the Act in relation to the land acquisition proceedings. It was pointed out by their Lordships, in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra), that Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act prescribed two distinct periods of limitation. If a person, who makes an application for compensation was present or represented before the Collector at the time, when the award was made, the application for reference had to be filed within six weeks from the date of the award. In the cases, however, where the applicant was not present or represented before the Collector at the time of making of the award, Section 18(2) provide that such an application for reference shall be made within six weeks from the date of receipt of the notice or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire. The Supreme Court, having considered the legal character of an award, which the Collector in a Land Acquisition proceeding makes, concluded to the effect that the determination of the amount of compensation by the Collector and making of the award is, in law, nothing more than an offer or tender of the compensation to the owner of the property acquisitioned. It was held, in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra), that if the owner accepts the offer, no further proceeding is required to be taken, the amount has to be paid and the proceedings for compensation shall be concluded. If, however, the owner does not accept the offer, Section 18 gives the owner, points out the Supreme Court, statutory right of having the question of adequacy of compensation, determined by the District Court and whatever amount is determined by the Court as compensation would be binding on the owner as well as the Collector. It has been further pointed out, in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra), that where the reference is made or sought for, the amount judicially determined by the Court would be the compensation payable to the owner of the property acquired and on such determination, the acquisition proceeding would stand concluded. It is because of the fact that the nature of the award, made by the Collector, is nothing but a tender or offer made by the Collector, on behalf of the Government, to the owner of the property for his acceptance that the Supreme Court, in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra), pointed out that until the time such a tender or offer is communicated to the party concerned, no question of acceptance of the offer by the offeree (i.e.), the owner of the property) arises and no concluded contract, under the law, can be said to have been arrived at between the parties concerned. It is in the backdrop of conclusions so reached that the Supreme Court, in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra), observed and held as follows: 5. In dealing with this question it is relevant to bear in mind the legal character of the award made by the Collector under Section 12. In a sense it is a decision of the Collector reached by him after holding an enquiry as prescribed by the Act. In dealing with this question it is relevant to bear in mind the legal character of the award made by the Collector under Section 12. In a sense it is a decision of the Collector reached by him after holding an enquiry as prescribed by the Act. It is a decision, inter alia, in respect of the amount of compensation which should be paid to the person interested in the property acquired; but legally the award cannot be treated as a decision; it is in law an offer or tender of the compensation determined by the Collector to the owner of the property under acquisition. If the owner accepts the offer no further proceeding is required to be taken; the amount is paid and compensation proceedings are concluded. If, however, the owner does not accept the offer Section 18 gives him the statutory right of having the question determined by Court, and it is the amount of compensation which the Court may determine that would bind both the owner and the Collector. In that case it is on the amount thus determined judicially that the acquisition proceedings would be concluded. It is because of this nature of the award that the award can be appropriately described as a tender or offer made by the Collector on behalf of the Government to the owner of the property for his acceptance. In Ezra v. The Secretary of State (1903) I.L.R. 30 Cal. 36, 86. It has been held that "the meaning to be attached to the word "award" under Section 11 and its nature and effect must be arrived at not from the mere use of the same expression in both instances but from the examination of the provisions of the law relating to the collector's proceedings culminating in the award. 36, 86. It has been held that "the meaning to be attached to the word "award" under Section 11 and its nature and effect must be arrived at not from the mere use of the same expression in both instances but from the examination of the provisions of the law relating to the collector's proceedings culminating in the award. The considerations to which we have referred satisfy us that the Collector acts in the matter of the enquiry and the valuation of the land only as an agent of the Government and not as a judicial officer, and that consequently, although the Government is bound by his proceedings, the persons interested are not concluded by his finding regarding the value of the land or the compensation to be awarded." Then the High Court has added that such tender once made is binding on the Government and the Government cannot require that the value fixed by its own officer acting on its behalf should be open to question at its own instance before the Civil Court. The said case was taken before the Privy Council in Ezra v. Secretary of State for India (1905) I.L.R. 32 Cal. 605, and their Lordships have expressly approved of the observations made by the High Court to which we have just referred. Therefore, if the award made by the Collector is in law no more than an offer made on behalf of the Government to the owner of the property then the making of the award as properly understood must involve the communication of the offer to the party concerned. That is the normal requirement under the contract law and its applicability to cases of award made under the Act cannot be reasonably excluded. Thus considered the date of the award cannot be determined solely by reference to the time when the award is signed by the Collector or delivered by him in his office; it must involve the consideration of the question as to when it was known to the party concerned either actually or constructively. If that be the true position then the literal and mechanical construction of the words "the date of the award" occurring in the relevant Section would not be appropriate. 17. If that be the true position then the literal and mechanical construction of the words "the date of the award" occurring in the relevant Section would not be appropriate. 17. It is, now, of utmost importance to note is that according to what the Apex Court, in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra), has held, an award, passed by a Collector, is nothing but an offer made on behalf of the government, to the owner of the property and, hence, until the time the offer is communicated to the offeree, i.e., the owner of the property, for the purpose of reaching a concluded contract, there cannot be any deemed acceptance of the offer by the owner of the property, and, consequently, limitation will not start running until the time the person, whose property is acquired, comes to know, actually or constructively, about the award. 18. Besides what have been pointed out above, Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra) assigned yet Anr. reason for coming to the conclusion that unless a person, whose property is acquestioned, acquires knowledge, actual or constructive, of the award, the period of limitation cannot start running against him, the reason being that an award made by a collector is nothing, but an administrative decision taken by the collector in the matter of the valuation of the property sought to be acquired and since such an administrative decision, ultimately, affects the rights of the owner of the property, it is just and fair that such administrative decision be communicated to the party concerned and the period of limitation, for the purpose of seeking a reference to be made to the court against such an administrative decision, be computed from the date of the knowledge, actual or constructive, of such a decision and not from the date of the taking of the decision by the collector. The Supreme Court, therefore, observed that the date of the award must involve consideration of the question as to when the award became known, actually or constructively, to the party concerned. It is in this context that the Supreme Court concluded that the date of the award cannot be mechanically constructed as the date of passing of the award, but must be construed to mean the date on which the award becomes known, actually or constructively, to the person whose property is acquisitioned. It is in this context that the Supreme Court concluded that the date of the award cannot be mechanically constructed as the date of passing of the award, but must be construed to mean the date on which the award becomes known, actually or constructively, to the person whose property is acquisitioned. It is in this light that one has to read the Apex Court's observations made in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra), which run as follows: 6. There is yet Anr. point which leads to the same conclusion. If the award is treated as an administrative decision taken by the Collector in the matter of the valuation of the property sought to be acquired it is clear that the said decision ultimately affects the rights of the owner of the property and in that sense, like all decisions which affect persons, it is essentially fair and just that the said decision should be communicated to the said party. The knowledge of the party affected by such a decision, either actual or constructive, is an essential element which must be satisfied before the decision can be brought into force. Thus considered the making of the award cannot consist merely in the physical act of writing the award or signing it or even filing it in the office of the Collector; it must involve the communication of the said award to the party concerned either actually or constructively.... The knowledge of the party affected by the award, either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fairplay and natural justice the expression "the date of the award" used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words "from the date of the Collector's award" used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way. 7. In this connection it is material to recall the fact that under Section 12(2)it is obligatory on the Collector to give immediate notice of the award to the persons interested as are not present personally or by their representatives when the award is made. This requirement itself postulates the necessity of the communication of the award to the party concerned. In this connection it is material to recall the fact that under Section 12(2)it is obligatory on the Collector to give immediate notice of the award to the persons interested as are not present personally or by their representatives when the award is made. This requirement itself postulates the necessity of the communication of the award to the party concerned. The Legislature recognised that the making of the award under Section 11 followed by its under Section 12(1) would not meet the requirements of justice before bringing the award into force. It thought that the communication of the award to the party concerned was also necessary, and so by the use of the mandatory words an obligation is placed on the Collector to communicate the award immediately to the person concerned. It is significant that the Section requires the Collector to give notice of the award immediately after making it. This provision lends support to the view which we have taken about the construction of the expression "from the date of the Collector's award" in the proviso to Section 18. It is because communication of the order is regarded by the Legislature as necessary that Section 12(2) has imposed an obligation on the Collector and if the relevant clause in the proviso is read in the light of this statutory requirement it tends to show that the literal and mechanical construction of the said clause would be wholly inappropriate. It would indeed be a very curious result that the failure of the Collector to discharge his obligation under Section 12(2) should directly tend to make ineffective the right of the party to make an application under Section 18, and this result could not possibly have been intended by the legislature. 19. I may, at this stage, pause to point out that in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra), the Apex Court approved the decision in Swaminathan v. Lakhsman Chettiar, AIR 1930 Mad 490. In Swaminathan (supra), the provisions relating to limitation, contained under Sections 73(1) and 77(1) of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, were considered. 19. I may, at this stage, pause to point out that in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra), the Apex Court approved the decision in Swaminathan v. Lakhsman Chettiar, AIR 1930 Mad 490. In Swaminathan (supra), the provisions relating to limitation, contained under Sections 73(1) and 77(1) of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, were considered. In substance, Section 73 provides that when a Sub-Registrar refuses to register a document on the ground that the person, by whom the document is purported to have been executed, denies its executions, any person, claiming under such a document, may, within thirty days after making of the order of refusal by the Sub-Registrar, apply to the Registrar to have the document registered. Similarly, under Section77(1), where the Registrar refuses to order a document to be registered, any person claiming under such a document or his representative, assign or agent, may, within thirty days after the making of the order of refusal, institute a suit for a decree directing the document to be registered. 20. It needs to be carefully noted that neither the order of the Sub-Registrar, passed under Section73, refusing to registrar a document nor the order of the Registrar, passed under Section 77, refusing to order a document to be registered is required to be made under the law in the presence of the parties concerned or after giving notice to the party concerned. In such a situation, when Section 73or 77 state that limitation would start running from the date of the order of refusal, the limitation cannot be really made to run from the date, when the order was made, but must be held to run from the date, when the order stood communicated to the party concerned or from the date of the knowledge, actual or constructive, of the party concerned. It is under such a scheme of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, that the time was held, in Swaminathan (supra), not to start running against the person, whose request for registration had been turned down, until the time the order of refusal-be it an order under Section 73 or Section 77-stands communicated to him. It is under such a scheme of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, that the time was held, in Swaminathan (supra), not to start running against the person, whose request for registration had been turned down, until the time the order of refusal-be it an order under Section 73 or Section 77-stands communicated to him. It is in tune with this principle of equity and fair-play that the Madras High Court held, in Swaminathan (supra), that when an order was not made in the presence of the parties or was not passed after notice to them of the date, when the order would be passed, the expression "thirty days after making of the order", occurring in Sections 73 or 77, means within thirty days after the date on which the order stood communicated to the parties affected by the order. This decision, as indicated above, has been approved in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra). 21. The decision, in Annamalai Chetti v. Col. J.G. Cloete ILR 6 Mad 189, is also a decision, which stands approved in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra). It may be carefully noted that in Annamalai Chetti (Supra), the award of the settlement officer was not required to be made in the presence of the parties concerned or after giving notice to the parties of the date, when the order would be passed. Under such a scheme of the Madras Boundary Act, 1860, the Madras High Court, in Annamalai Chettti (supra) held, If there was any decision at all in the sense of the Act, it could no date earlier than the date of the communication of it to the parties; otherwise they might be barred of their right of appeal without any knowledge of the decision having been passed. 22. Thus, same as in Swaminathan (supra), the award of the Settlement Officer, under the scheme of the Madras Boundary Act, 1860, might or might not have become known to the party, who was affected by the award, for, the said enactment did not postulate making of the award in the presence of the parties concerned or making of the award after giving notices to the parties concerned of the date on which the award would be pronounced. It was under such a scheme of the enactment that the Madras High Court held, in Annamalai Chetti (supra), that the limitation, for the purpose of preferring appeal, would not start running until the date of the communication of the award to the party concerned. 23. I may also pause here to point out that the Madras High Court's decision, in Muthia Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, AIR 1951 Mad 204 , is yet Anr. decision, which stands approved in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra). In Muthia Chettiar (Supra), the Madras High Court considered the provisions of Section 33A(2) of the Income Tax Act, which prescribed a period of limitation for filing revision against the order of assessment made by the Income Tax officer. The question, which arose, in Muthia Chettiar (supra), was whether the period of one year would be computed from the date, when the order was sent by the Income Tax officer, or the date, when it was communicated to the Assessee, or the date - if there be any - on which the assessee had the opportunity of coming to know of the order. In Muthia Chettiar (Supra), since the order of assessment passed by the Income Tax officer need not have been passed in the presence of the Assessee or after giving notice to the Assessee of the date on which the order would be made, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court held: "If a person is given a right to resort to a remedy to get rid of an adverse order within a prescribed time, limitation should not be computed from a date earlier than that on which the party aggrieved actually knew the order or had an opportunity of knowing the order and therefore must be presumed to have the knowledge of the order." 24. From what have been pointed out above, it is more than abundantly clear that in all the authorities, namely, Swaminathan (supra), Annamalai Chetti (supra), and Muthia Chettiar (Supra), which the Supreme Court had considered in Raja Harish Chandra Raj (supra), the common feature of the statutes, in question, was that the statutes did perceive of the possibility of making of the order-be it an administrative decision, such as, an award or an order of assessment of income tax-in the absence of the parties or without giving notices to the parties as to when the order would be made or pronounced. Situated in such circumstances that it was held that the limitation would not start running until the order stood communicated to the party affected by the order. Similar has been the scheme under the Land Acquisition Act too, for, even the Land Acquisition Act conceives that an award may be made in the absence of the party concerned. Hence, in these circumstances, limitation cannot be made to run, in such cases, without the order having been communicated to the party affected by the order or without the knowledge, actual or constructive, of such a party. No wonder, therefore, that it is in the context of such a scheme of the Land Acquisition Act that the their Lordship, in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra), observed: If the award is pronounced in the presence of the party whose rights are affected by it can be said to be made when pronounced. If the date for the pronouncement of the award is communicated to the party and it is accordingly pronounced on the date previously announced the award is said to be communicated to the said party even if the said party is not actually present on the date of its pronouncement. Similarly if without notice of the date of its pronouncement an award is pronounced and a party is not present the award can be said to be made when it is communicated to the party later. 25. Similarly if without notice of the date of its pronouncement an award is pronounced and a party is not present the award can be said to be made when it is communicated to the party later. 25. Thus, on a microscopic reading of what has been observed in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra), it becomes abundantly clear that the decision of the Collector, in the Land Acquisition Act, or of the Sub-Registrar under the Registration Act or of the Income Tax Officer, under the Income Tax Act, does not perceive of the decision having been pronounced, as indicated hereinabove, in the presence of the party to be affected by the decision. Such decision, therefore, needs to be communicated in order to use such a decision against the person affected. Inherent into such schemes has to be read the requirement to communicate the order. In fact, the Land Acquisition Act and the Income Tax Act did make provisions for communicating decision to the party, whose interest was to be affected by such order. 26. Coupled with the above, it is also worth noticing that the orders, in none of the decisions, which were considered in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra), was an order passed by a court; rather, the orders were made by administrative authorities. In fact, the award made by the Collector was held to be, as already indicated above, an administrative decision. As against this, the procedure prescribed under Section 126 for passing an order of maintenance is an order to be passed by a court. The provisions of Section 126 make it clear that an ex parte order for maintenance cannot be passed until the time the court is satisfied that either the person, against whom the order is proposed to be made, is willfully avoiding service or is willfully neglecting to attained the court. It is in such circumstances that an ex parte order for maintenance can be made. Thus, the legislature conceives, under Section 126, of not making of the order of maintenance until the time the party affected is informed of the fact that an order of maintenance may be passed against him. It is in such circumstances that an ex parte order for maintenance can be made. Thus, the legislature conceives, under Section 126, of not making of the order of maintenance until the time the party affected is informed of the fact that an order of maintenance may be passed against him. Hence, once the satisfaction is reached by the court that the party, to be affected by the order of maintenance, has the knowledge that such an order, on the application seeking maintenance, may be made and yet when such a person chooses not to appear in the court, the court can make an ex parte order for payment of maintenance. Such an order cannot be held to have not started running until the time the order is communicated to the person against whom the order is made. 27. What emerges from the above discussion is that a proceeding under Section 126 Code of Criminal Procedure is a judicial proceeding and a Magistrate cannot proceed to hear the maintenance proceeding unless he concludes that the party, against whom the order of maintenance is proposed to be obtained, is willfully avoiding service and is willfully neglecting to attend the Court. It is only when such a conclusion is reached that the Magistrate would be able to hear the maintenance proceeding ex parte. In such a case, when the order for maintenance, on conclusion of the hearing, is made, the order need not be formally communicated in order to make the period of limitation of three months run, for, in such a case, the party shall be presumed to know the order from the very day, when the order is pronounced. This impression gets further strengthened from the fact that the Apex Court, while considering the effect of Section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, observed: In this connection it is material to recall the fact that under Section 12(2) it is obligatory on the Collector to give immediate notice of the award to the persons interested as are not present personally or by their representatives when the award is made. This requirement itself postulates the necessity of the communication of the award to the party concerned. The Legislature recognised that the making of the award under Section 11 followed by its filing under Section 12(1) would not meet the requirements of justice before bringing the award into force. This requirement itself postulates the necessity of the communication of the award to the party concerned. The Legislature recognised that the making of the award under Section 11 followed by its filing under Section 12(1) would not meet the requirements of justice before bringing the award into force. It thought that the communication of the award to the party concerned was also necessary, and so by the use of the mandatory words an obligation is placed on the Collector to communicate the award immediately to the person concerned. It is significant that the Section requires the Collector to give notice of the award immediately after making it. This provision lends support to the view which we have taken about the construction of the expression "from the date of the Collector's award" in the proviso to Section 18. It is because communication of the order is regarded by the Legislature as necessary that Section 12(2) has imposed an obligation on the Collector and if the relevant clause in the proviso is read in the light of this statutory requirement it tends to show that the literal and mechanical construction of the said clause would be wholly inappropriate. It would indeed be a very curious result that the failure of the Collector to discharge his obligation under Section 12(2) should directly tend to make ineffective the right of the party to make an application under Section 18, and this result could not possibly have been' intended by the legislature. 28. Situated thus, it is necessary and logical to infer that under Section 126(2), the limitation for the purpose of making an application for setting aside the order of maintenance must be held to run from the date of the order itself. The legislative intendment is crystal clear and the intendment is that a person, who willfully avoids service or willfully neglects to attend the court, must suffer the adverse effect of his such conduct. The legislative intendment is crystal clear and the intendment is that a person, who willfully avoids service or willfully neglects to attend the court, must suffer the adverse effect of his such conduct. If the person, who is affected adversely by such an order, is really innocent and, if, as a matter of fact, he had not willfully avoided service or neglected to attend the court, he can very well make an application, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, informing the court that he was unaware of the pending proceedings and he could not, therefore, make the application to vacate the ex parte order within three months from the date of the making of the order of maintenance. If he can show good and sufficient reasons for condoning the delay in making the application for having the ex parte order set aside, the court shall be duty bound to condone the delay and accept his application. 29. Though it has not been contended, in the present revision, that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, would not apply to an order passed under Sub-section (2) of Section 126 of the Code, apposite it is to point out that unlike Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which had no application to special law, which prescribed any period of limitation, Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, of 1963, clearly provides that the provisions, contained under Sections 4 to 24(inclusive) of the Limitation Act, 1963, shall apply even when the period of limitation has been fixed by any special law or local law unless their application is expressly excluded. Though the Limitation Act, 1963, does not define as to what a special law means, the Apex Court, in Kaushalya Rani v. Gopan Singh, AIR 1964 SC 260 , has held that special law means a law enacted for special cases, in special circumstances in contradiction to the general rules of law laid down as applicable generally to all cases with which the general law deals. 30. 30. While considering the case of Kaushalya Rani (supra), it needs to be noticed that Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, had provided a right of appeal to the State Government against an original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court, and before the Limitation Act of 1963 came into force, the period of limitation for such an appeal was three months under Article 157 of the Limitation Act of 1908, as amended by Act 26 of 1955. Under Article 114, the period of limitation was reduced to 90 days. Sub-section (3) of Section 417 gave a right to a private complainant to move the High Court for special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal, when the same was passed in a case instituted upon a complainant; but such application, under Sub-section (4) of Section 417, had to be filed within 60 days from date of the order of acquittal. There was, and there still remains, no limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963, for such an application. In Kaushalya Rani's case (supra), a question arose whether a special rule of limitation, as was embodied in Section 417 of the code of Criminal procedure, 1898, could be held to be a special law within the meaning of Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963. A Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court answered the question in the affirmative. The matter was carried, in appeal, to the Supreme Court on a certificate granted by the High Court. It was observed by their Lordships that so far as an appeal by the private prosecutor is concerned, the legislature had specially laid down, in Section 417 itself, that "the foundation for such an appeal should be laid within 60 days from the date of the order of acquittal. In that sense, this rule of 60 days bar is a special law that is to say a rule of limitation which is specially provided for in the code itself, which does not ordinarily provide for a period of limitation for appeals or applications. In that sense, this rule of 60 days bar is a special law that is to say a rule of limitation which is specially provided for in the code itself, which does not ordinarily provide for a period of limitation for appeals or applications. It was further observed, in Kaushalya Rani (supra), thus: The whole Code of Criminal Procedure is, indeed, a general law regulating the procedure in criminal trials generally, but it may contain provisions specifying a bar of time for a particular class of cases, which are of a special character. Such a law will be a special law with reference to the law generally governing the subject matter of that kind of relationship. A 'special law', therefore, means a law enacted for special cases, in special circumstances, in contradiction to the general rules of the law laid down as applicable generally to all cases with which the general law deals. In that sense, the Code is a general law regulating the procedure for the trial of criminal cases, generally, but if it lays down any bar of time in respect of special cases, in special circumstances, like those contemplated by Section 417(3) and (4) read together, it will be a special law contained within the general law laying down the general rules of limitation applicable to all cases dealt with by the Act; but there may be instances of Anr. statutes, though not dealing generally with the law of limitation. 31. In the light of what has been laid down in Kaushalya Rani (supra), it logically follows that the restriction of making an application within three months from the date of the order, as envisaged in Section 126(2), is a special law laying down a period of limitation, which is distinguishable from the general law of limitation contained in the Limitation Act, 1963, and Section 5 will apply to an applicable made, under the proviso to Section 126(2), to have an ex parte order of maintenance set aside. Considered thus, it is clear that even if the period of limitation is computed for making an application to have the ex parte order of maintenance set aside as three months from the date of the order of maintenance, the person, against whom the order is made, can, in a given case, satisfy the court that he had no knowledge of the maintenance proceeding and of the order passed therein. In an appropriate case, therefore, it would be, within the powers of the Magistrate, to condone, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay in making an application to have an ex parte order of maintenance set aside even if the application is made, under Section 126(2) of the Code, beyond the period of limitation prescribed therefor, i.e., three months from the date of making of the order of maintenance. 32. While analysing the decision, rendered in Joginder Singh Surumukh Singh (supra), which Mr. Islam relies upon, it is extremely important to note that the majority, while considering the decision rendered in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra), did not take into account the special features of the Land Acquisition Act as pointed out hereinabove. 32. While analysing the decision, rendered in Joginder Singh Surumukh Singh (supra), which Mr. Islam relies upon, it is extremely important to note that the majority, while considering the decision rendered in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra), did not take into account the special features of the Land Acquisition Act as pointed out hereinabove. In view of the fact that the majority, in Joginder Singh Surumukh Singh (supra), while considering the decision in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra), did not explain as to how an award given by a Collector under the Land Acquisition Act can be equated with an order of maintenance passed under Section 126 Code of Criminal Procedure and, secondly, when the majority, in Joginder Singh Surumukh Singh (supra), while considering the observations made by the Apex Court, in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra), to the effect that when the rights of a party are adversely affected by an order, limitation cannot start running against such an order unless the party affected by the order has acquired knowledge, actual or constructive, of the order, appear to have, if I may, with great respect point out, overlooked the fact that an award, as described by the Apex Court, in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra), is an administrative decision, the Land Acquisition Act dose perceive of making of the award without the knowledge of all the persons, who may be affected by such an award, and that the Land Acquisition Act itself provided for communicating the award to the person or persons concerned and, hence, it was, in the context of such noticeable features of the Land Acquisition Act, that the period of limitation was held, in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra), not to run until the time the award stands communicated, actually or constructively, to the person concerned. As the decision in Juginder Singh Surumukh Singh (supra) appears to have been rendered without noticing the said glaring noticeable features of the Land Acquisition Act and the observations of their Lordships in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra), I, with utmost humility, find impossible to agree to what the Court, in Juginder Singh Surumukh Singh (supra), has laid down. 33. 33. It is of immense importance to note and, if I may say, emphasise that the question, raised in the present revision, needs to be decided in the light of the scheme of the provisions of Section 126, for, it is trite that the words in a statute are to be given its ordinary meaning unless the context demands otherwise. In fact, in Kaliyappan v. State of Kerala and Ors., AIR 1989 SC 239 , the Apex Court, while interpreting Section 11A of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1984, has not applied the law laid down, in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra), for the purpose of computing the period of limitation prescribed for making an application requesting the Collector to refer the question relating to the valuation of the land, acquired under the Act, to the civil court. In this regard, observations, made in Kaliyappan (supra), are quite revealing, for, the Apex Court observed: 5....An extended or a different meaning assigned to the words 'the date of the award' by this Court in Raja Harish Chandra case (1962) 1 SCR 676 , AIR 1961 SC 1500 cannot be applied in this case since such an extended or different meaning is neither warranted by equity nor will it advance the object of the statute. Similarly under the provision to Section 11-A of the Act, the Collector is empowered to make an award within two years from the date of commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 irrespective of the date on which the notice of award is served on the person concerned. We do not find any analogy between Section 11-A and Section 18 of the Act insofar as the above question is concerned. The High Court was, therefore, right in rejecting the above contention of the Petitioner. 34. From the above observations made in Kaliyappan (supra), it becomes abundantly clear that interpretation of a particular provision of a given statute cannot be extended to even a similar statute if the context and setting of the provisions are different. The reason for such an approach, while interpreting a statute or a decision of a court, is that a statute must be read as a whole, for, the words, used in a statute, have to be understood in the context of the scheme of the statute concerned. The reason for such an approach, while interpreting a statute or a decision of a court, is that a statute must be read as a whole, for, the words, used in a statute, have to be understood in the context of the scheme of the statute concerned. See R. v. Henn (1980) 2 All ER 166 In fact, it is trite that unless the statutes are in pari materia, the words used in one statute cannot be applied to Anr. statute, for, two statutes may have different schemes and different context in which the same words appear in the two statutes. However, as Lord Mansfield observed, in R. v. Loxdale (1758) 97 ER 394 : Where there different statutes in part materia though made at different times, or even expired, and not referring to each other, they shall be taken and construed together, as one system and as explanatory of each other. 35. In United Society v. Eagle Bank (1829) 7 CCC 457, the American Court explained the meaning of the words pari materia thus: The meaning of the phrase pari materia has been explained in an American case in the following words: Statutes are in pari materia which relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things. The word par must not be confounded with the word similes. It is used in opposition to it-intimating not likeness merely but identity. It is a phrase applicable to public statutes or general laws made at different times and in reference to the same subject. It needs to be remembered that when two pieces of legislation are of differing scopes, it cannot be said that they are in pari materia. (see State of Punjab v. Okara Grain Buyers Syndicate Ltd., Okara, AIR 1964 SC 669 . Thus, and the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, and the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, were not held to be statutes in pari materia as these two statutes do not relate to the same person or thing or to the same class of persons or things, (see Shah & Company v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1967 SC 1877 36. I may also point out that in Kumar Padma Prasad v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 1213 , the Supreme Court, while interpreting the term 'judicial office', occurring in Article217(2)(a) of the Constitution of India, held that the expression 'judicial office' means an office, which is a part of the judicial service as defined under Article 236(b) of the Constitution of India and that in order to qualify for appointment as a Judge of the High Court under Article 217(2)(a), a person must hold a 'judicial office', which must be a part of the judicial service of the State. This interpretation of the expression judicial office is different from what the 'judicial office' was explained in Statesman (Private) Ltd. v. H.R. Deb, AIR 1968 SC 1495 . 37. In fact, while dealing with the case of HR Deb (supra), the Apex Court, in Kumar Padma Prasad (supra), observed thus: 24. In Statesman (Private) Ltd. v. H. R. Deb (1968)3 SCR 614 , AIR 1968 SC 1495 the question before this Court was whether a Sub-Deputy Collector vested with the powers of a first class magistrate was a judicial officer in terms of Section 7(3)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The said Section provides that a person shall not be qualified for appointment as the presiding officer of a labour court unless he has held any judicial office in India for not less than 7 years. H. R. Deb was holding office of the Sub-Deputy Collector and was vested with magisterial powers which he enjoyed for about nineteen years. He was appointed presiding officer of a labour court. His appointment was challenged on the ground that he had not held judicial office for 7 years prior to his appointment. Hidayatullah, C. J. who spoke for the Court held that since a magistrate exercises judicial functions he holds a judicial office. Whether his duties are partly judicial and party other does not in any way detract from the position that while acting as a magistrate he is a judicial officer. On these findings the appointment of H.R. Deb as a labour officer was upheld. While holding so, the learned Chief Justice observed as under: (SCR p. 621) Nor does the argument that magistrates will claim to be appointed Judges of the High Court need detain us. On these findings the appointment of H.R. Deb as a labour officer was upheld. While holding so, the learned Chief Justice observed as under: (SCR p. 621) Nor does the argument that magistrates will claim to be appointed Judges of the High Court need detain us. The Scheme of Chapter V of Part VI of the Constitution has its own effect on the meaning of the expressions 'judicial office' and 'judicial service'. In any case the use of the same expression in any other enactment not in pari materia can have no bearing upon the Industrial Disputes Act and vice versa. In the Constitution these words must bear the meaning which the context dictates and in that connection the history of appointment of Judges cannot be overlooked. 38. Moreover, while considering the question as to whether the period of limitation of three months, as embodied in Section 126(2), shall be reckoned from the date of the order or from the date of the knowledge of the order, what is of paramount importance to note is that the periods of limitation are, by their very nature, arbitrary to some extent and may result in hardship; but in construing such provisions, equitable considerations have no place and strict grammatical meaning of the words is the safest guide. The Judicial Committee, in Nagendra Nath and Anr. v. Suresh Chandra Dey and Ors., AIR 1932 PC 165, made, in no uncertain words, clear, when it, speaking through Sir Dinshah Mulla, observed thus: ...The fixation of periods of limitation must always be to some extent arbitrary, and may frequently result in hardship. But in construing such provisions equitable considerations are out of place, and the strict grammatical meaning of the words is, their Lordships think, the only safe guide. 39. In General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Coporation Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, AIR 1941 PC 6 too, the Judicial Committee, while emphasizing that the limitation ought to receive such construction as the language in its plain meaning imports, observed and held as follows: ...As was well stated by Mr. Mitra in his Tagore Law Lectures, Edn. 6 (1932) Vol. 1 P. 256 : A law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly or unjustly in particular cases, but where such law has been adopted by the state....it must if unambiguous be applied with stringency. Mitra in his Tagore Law Lectures, Edn. 6 (1932) Vol. 1 P. 256 : A law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly or unjustly in particular cases, but where such law has been adopted by the state....it must if unambiguous be applied with stringency. The rule must be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party. The Judge cannot on equitable grounds enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognized by it. Very little reflection is necessary to show that great harship may occasionally be caused by statutes of limitation in cases of poverty, distress and ignorance of rights; yet the statutory rules must be enforced according to their ordinary meaning in these and in other like cases. 40. From the observations made above in Janmahomed Abdul Rahim (supra), it becomes clear that the law with regard to the period of limitation has to be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning howsoever harsh the same may sound. 41. The Apex Court followed the above principle governing the interpretation of limitation, when, it, in R.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and Anr. reported in (1997) 7 SCC 556 , held: 6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. 42. Municipal Board, Puskar v. State Transport Authority, Rajas than AIR 1965 SC 458 is also an authority for the proposition that equitable considerations have no place in interpreting the provisions of limitation. In Municipal Board, Puskar (supra), a Constitution Bench held that the words "date of the order" should not be read as "from the date of the knowledge of the order" in the absence of clear indication to that effect. The decision, in Municipal Board, Puskar (supra) clearly shows that unless an enactment gives an indication otherwise, the date of the order would mean the date of making of the order and would not necessarily mean the date of the knowledge of the order. The decision, in Municipal Board, Puskar (supra) clearly shows that unless an enactment gives an indication otherwise, the date of the order would mean the date of making of the order and would not necessarily mean the date of the knowledge of the order. To put it differently, it is in a given case possible to interpret the date of the order as the date of the making of the order and it is not necessary that in each and every case, the date of the order shall be read and construed as the date of the knowledge of the order. 43. I must, however, hastern to point out that while it is true that in each and every case, it is not necessary to read the date of the order as the date of the knowledge of the order, the fact remains that when in a given case [as already indicated above while discussion the decisions in Swaminathan (supra), Annamalai Chetti (supra) and Muthia Chettiar (supra) ], When a statute does not require making of an order in the presence of the parties concerned or after giving notice to the parties concerned as to when the order would be made or pronounced, the period of limitation cannot be made to run without the party, affected by such an order, has the knowledge, actual or constructive, of the order. It is in this context that in Madan Lal v. State of U.P., AIR 1975 SC 2085 , the Apex Court, having considered its decision in Municipal Board, Puskar (supra), observed and held thus: The Act, we are concerned with, does not state what would happen if the Forest Settlement Officer made an order under Section 11, without notice to the parties and in their absence. In such a case, if the aggrieved party came to know of the order after the expiry of the time prescribed for presenting an appeal from the order, would the remedy be lost for no fault of his? It would be absurd to think so. In such a case, if the aggrieved party came to know of the order after the expiry of the time prescribed for presenting an appeal from the order, would the remedy be lost for no fault of his? It would be absurd to think so. It is a fundamental principle of justice that a party whose rights are affected by an order must have notice of it....though the Forest Settlement Officer, adjudicating on the claims under the Act, is not a court, yet the principle, which is really a principle of fair play and is applicable to all tribunals performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions must also apply to him. 44. Thus, what is of paramount importance to note, in the case of Mandnlal (supra), as also the case of Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra), is that the orders, in question, were not orders passed in a judicial proceeding nor the orders were necessary to be passed in the presence of the parties concerned. Hence, when the enactment itself envisages passing of an order affecting the rights of the parties in the absence of the parties concerned, the date of the order has been interpreted to be the date of the knowledge of the order. It is, in this context, that we have to understand the Apex Court's observations, in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra) and Madanlal (supra). 45. Further-more, while considering the question as to whether the period of 30 days, spoken of in Sub-section (2) of Section 126, shall run from the date of the making of the order or from the date of the knowledge of the order, it is pertinent to note that under Article 123 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation to have set aside a decree passed ex parte or to re-hear an appeal decreed or heard ex parte is 30 days from 'the date of the decree or where the summons or notice was not duly served, when the applicant had knowledge of the decree'. Thus, the legislature made it clear, in Article 123, that when an ex parte is passed or an appeal is heard or decreed ex parte, the party affected may prefer an application within 30 days from the date of the decree; but when the notice was not duly served, the appeal can be preferred within 30 days from the date of the knowledge of the decree. Had the legislature intended that in respect of an ex parte order of maintenance, the period of 30 days, as envisaged in Section 126(2), should be made to run from the date of the order or from the date of the knowledge of the order if the notice has not been duly served, nothing could have stopped the legislature in incorporating, in Sub-section (2) of Section 126of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, itself, that the period of 30 days shall be counted from the date of the ex parte order, where the party against whom the order of maintenance is passed, had been served with the notice and that when notice was not so served, then, the period of limitation shall be 30 days from the date of the knowledge of the order. 46. It may be carefully noted that the Limitation Act, 1963, came into force on 1st January, 1964; whereas the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, has come into force on lar April, 1974. This shows that the legislature could have made, under Sub-section (2) of Section 126, the date of knowledge of the order as the date of commencement for computing the period of 30 days, whenever the notice is not duly served on the party against whom the ex parte order of maintenance is made; but the legislature chose not to do so. When there is no indication given by Sub-section (2) of Section 126that the period of 30 days shall be computed from the date of the knowledge of the order and when, in the face of the fact that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, are applicable to an application made to have set aside an ex parte order of maintenance, it will not be appropriate, on the part of the courts, to defeat the legislative intendment by construing the period of 30 days from the date of the order as the date of the knowledge of the order, particularly, when an ex parte order cannot be passed directing maintenance unless the Magistrate is satisfied that the person, against whom the order is proposed to be made, is avoiding service or neglecting to attend the Court. 47. Let us, for a moment, assume a suit in which a civil court fixes a date for hearing. One of the persons, who was a party to such a suit and who had been avoiding service of summons was not present at the time, when the hearing took place and the judgment was pronounced. Can the party, who had avoided service or who had avoided attending the court, claim that the period of limitation shall be made to run from the date of the knowledge of the judgment? Such a plea will not be acceptable, for, having avoided the service of notice or having willfully neglected to attend the Court, the party affected cannot claim that the judgment was pronounced behind his back. No wonder, therefore, that Article 124 of the Limitation Act, 1963, lays down 30 days as the period of limitation from the date of the decree or order for the purpose of the review. No wonder, therefore, that Article 124 of the Limitation Act, 1963, lays down 30 days as the period of limitation from the date of the decree or order for the purpose of the review. Considered thus, it is clear that a review application has to be made within 30 days from the date of the decree or order and if there is a delay in making an application for review on account of the fact that the review applicant had no knowledge of the judgment or the decree, his remedy lies in making the application under Section 5of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay in making the application for review; but absence of knowledge, in such a case, cannot make the Court read the expression "date of the decree or the order", appearing in Article 124, as the date of the knowledge of the decree or order. 48. What crystallizes from the above discussions is this: An award made by a Collector, under the Land Acquisition Act, is nothing but an offer in law made, on behalf of the Government, to the person, whose property is acquired and unless, therefore, the award is communicated to such a person, period of limitation cannot be made to run, for, without the award having been communicated, owner of the property cannot be held to have accepted the award. An award under the Land Acquisition Act is nothing, but an administrative decision taken by the Collector as regards the valuation of the property sought to be acquired and since such an administrative decision affects the valuable rights of the owner of the property, fairness and justice demands that the limitation be not made to run until the time the administrative decision, such as, an award, has been communicated to the affected party or until the party concerned acquires knowledge, actual or constructive, of the award. The Land Acquisition Act itself conceives of making of an award in the absence of a person interested in the property is concerned and that is why Section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act makes it obligatory for the Collector to communicate the award to a person, who is not present or represented by his agent at the time, when the award is made. The decisions, which received approval of the Apex Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra), namely, Swaminathan (supra), Annamalai Chetti (supra), Muthia Chettiar (supra) and Madanlal (supra) are all cases, which arose out of enactments, which did not make it obligatory that the orders be made in the presence of the party concerned nor the statutes, in question, necessitated of giving of notice, in advance, to the parties interested, in the order, as to when the order would be pronounced. It is in the context of such schemes of the Statutes that the Courts held that the limitation cannot be made to run without the order having been communicated to the party affected or without the person affected by such an order having acquired knowledge, actual or constructive, of the order. As against such a setting of the statutes, which were considered in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra), Section 126(2) of the Code makes it obligatory that the application for maintenance be heard and decided in the presence and hearing of the parties concerned and that this requirement can be dispensed with only when the party, against whom the order is proposed to be made, avoids service or neglects to attend the court. Thus, when a person, under such a scheme of a statute, avoids service or neglects to attend the court, he cannot complain of prejudice, when an order of maintenance is made ex parte. When the two statutes are not pari materia, their schemes and context are different, they may not be similarly interpreted. Two different, statutes having two different schemes, may not, in a given context, command same interpretation. 49. Bearing in mind the two prominent reasons, which the Apex Court has assigned, in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra), for making the period of limitation run not from the date of the making of the award, but from the date of the knowledge of the award, when I revert to the proviso to Section126(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, what becomes transparent is that an order, directing payment of maintenance, even when passed ex parte, cannot be regard as an offer and, hence, question of acceptance thereof by the party against whom the order is made does not arise at all. Thus, the legal character of an order directing payment of maintenance is entirely different from the legal character of an award made by a Collector. There can be no analogy between the duties of a Collector in making an award and the function of a Magistrate, who decides, in exercise of powers under Sub-section (2) of Section 126, a maintenance proceeding and passes an ex parte order of maintenance. The Code embodies a set of rules for effecting service on the parties and when the service is effected in accordance with the procedure prescribed therefor, it would be deemed to be a valid service and the application for maintenance, as contemplated under Section 126(2), can proceed ex parte in the absence of the person on whom service of notice or summons is treated as served. The rules of natural justice and fair play or equitable considerations cannot be invoked in such cases to defeat the legislative intendment, for, the party, having avoided service of notice or having neglected to attend the court, cannot turn back and complain that the order be treated not to have come into force as against him without the order having been communicated to him. The party, proceeded against, cannot, in such a case, be made beneficiary of his own wrongful act and the party, who has been granted maintenance, cannot be made to suffer. Moreover, in a case, where the order of maintenance is passed ex parte, the party, having avoided service or having neglected to attend the court, must be deemed to have knowledge, though constructive, of the order passed in the maintenance proceeding. No wonder, therefore, that the Code does not require, contrary to what Section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act perceives, communication of the order of maintenance to the party against whom the ex parte order of maintenance is made. 50. No wonder, therefore, that the Code does not require, contrary to what Section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act perceives, communication of the order of maintenance to the party against whom the ex parte order of maintenance is made. 50. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, it is abundantly clear that in the present case, when the application made by the review Petitioner seeking to get set aside the ex parte order of maintenance had not been made within a period of 30 days from the date of making of the order and when the said application had not been supported by any application made under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking condonation of delay, one can have no escape from the conclusion that the application made by the Petitioner to have the ex parte order of maintenance set aside was not maintainable in law. Hence, refusal by the learned Court below to entertain the petition cannot be interfered with in revision. The Petitioner is, however, given the liberty to make appropriate applications in the learned Court below to have the ex parte order of maintenance set aside in terms of the provisions of law contained in that behalf and in the light of the observations made in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment. 51. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, this revision fails and the impugned order is not interfered with. 52. Send back the LCRs. Revision Petition dismissed