JUDGMENT This regular first appeal is by the defendants in O.S. No. 44 of 1993, on the file of the City Civil Judge, Madikeri, who have suffered the judgment and decree in respect of the suit prayer sought for in the plaint, which reads as under: The plaintiffs therefore pray for a judgment and decree (1) Declaring that Areyada family of the plaintiffs and defendants are jointly entitled to the suit property; (2) Perpetual injunction restraining the defendants 1 to 3 from alienating the suit property or the timber therein to the 4th defendant or any other person; (3) Costs of this suit and other relief or reliefs as this Hon'ble Court deems fit to grant to the plaintiffs in the circumstances of the case. 2. The suit schedule property constituted jamma malai lands as described in the scheduled, comprised in Sy. Nos. 71/1, 54, 61, 69, 65/2, 68/2, 72/1A, 76, 79/B and 28, in all measuring 276.14 acres, situated at Yevakapadi Village, Madikeri Taluk of Kodagu District. 2. The suit schedule property constituted jamma malai lands as described in the scheduled, comprised in Sy. Nos. 71/1, 54, 61, 69, 65/2, 68/2, 72/1A, 76, 79/B and 28, in all measuring 276.14 acres, situated at Yevakapadi Village, Madikeri Taluk of Kodagu District. It is aggrieved by such judgment and decree the present appeal by the defendants in the suit contending that the learned Trial Judge has committed gross error in skirting issues 4 and 5 framed for determination in the suit; that these issues should have been necessarily examined and answered and the suit should have been outright dismissed holding that the plaintiffs had no manner of right or locus to seek the relief as sought in the plaint; that the Trial Court was in error in concluding that the suit schedule property was in the nature of an impartible estate each member of Areyada family having a right in the nature of limited interest in the land in question; that the Trial Court fell into error in holding that the rights were also not alienable apart from being not one capable of partition; that the Trial Court failed to appreciate that the interest in suit schedule land had been partitioned amongst the families of the plaintiff and the defendants long back and that the defendants had been exclusively enjoying the rights in respect of the suit lands to the exclusion of the family members of the plaintiffs branch for the past more than 100 years and therefore the suit ought to: have been dismissed; that the Court below ought to have dismissed the suit for non-joinder of necessary parties namely the Government, as the suit land belongs to the Government and even as admitted by the parties, the only right holders of jamma malai land had in such lands was the right to cultivate cardamom in the land without affecting the nature of the land substantially or in any manner material extent. 3. 3. Brief facts leading to the judgment under appeal as pleaded by the parties are as under: The plaint averments are that the plaintiffs constitute the members of Napoklu Branch of Areyada family, a Coorgi Race in Kodagu District were leading in a representative capacity of the members of the family; that the suit lands had been granted in favour of the great grand ancestors of the plaintiffs and the defendants during the time of Kodagu Raja; that it was a jamma malai grant with no proprietary rights over the land or timber in favour of the grantees known as malaigara; that the plaintiffs and the defendants constitute two branches ofAreyada family viz., the plaintiffs being Napoklu branch having settled in Napoklu village, though it is claimed they' also originated from Yevakapadi, a place in Kakkube Village, two neighbouring villages in Madikeri Taluk in Kodagu District; that the suit property was heritable, but neither partable nor alienable; that Areyada family from which the two branches of the plaintiff and the defendants have emerged are not divided by metes and bounds being Coorgi race; that while such is the position, the defendants without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiffs were attempting to sell timber in the suit property in favour of the fourth defendant and the plaintiffs on coming to know such overt action on the part of the defendants had caused issue of legal notice dated 20-5-1993 (Ex. P. 4), inter alia, indicating to the defendants that the defendants amongst others constitute members of Areyada family; that the family owns wet, bane and jamma malai lands in Napoklu and Yevakapadi Villages; that the family is not divided by metes and bounds, but nevertheless different branches of the family are enjoying wet and dry lands separately according to the convenience; that the jamma malai lands are in joint possession and enjoyment of all the members of the family, but the defendants without the consent and knowledge of the plaintiffs and other members of the family residing at Napoklu Village had made attempts to sell timber and standing on the lands in favour of fourth defendant; that if the defendants should take such illegal action, it would not be binding on the plaintiffs and other members of the family residing at Napoklu Village etc. But in response, the defendants having caused issue of a reply notice where under they admitted that the plaintiffs and the defendants belong to Areyada family, but disputed ownership of any property in Yevakapadi Village by Napoklu branch; that the Napoklu branch of Areyada family did not own any property, either wet or jamma malai in Yevakapadi Village, on the other hand, Yevakapadi branch of Areyada family settled in Yevakapadi Village, own some properties at Napoklu Village; that jamma malai lands were exclusively granted to Yevakapadi branch of Areyada family; that they have been enjoying such lands exclusively within their branch over a century to the exclusion of members of Napoklu branch of Areyada family and therefore the plaintiffs had lost all rights to put forth any right over the jamma malai land and such other reply, gave cause to the plaintiffs to come up with the present suit as the defendants for the first time denied the joint possession and enjoyment of the jamma malai lands by the members of Areyada family and in the circumstances the suit had been filed for the relief referred to above. 4. On issue of notices, the defendants entered appearance and filed written statement. 4. On issue of notices, the defendants entered appearance and filed written statement. The defendants on their part while admitted that, that the plaintiffs and the defendants constitute members of two branches of Areyada family, pleaded that there was no connection left between the two branches with regard to the ancestral properties either of the jamma malai lands or of sagu tenures; that in terms of the arrangements of the year 1873, properties of Areyada family had been shared between the Napoklu branch and the Yevakapadi branch; that the lands in Napoklu Village have been left to the share of plaintiffs except for six acres of wet land, which is admittedly given to the share of Yevakapadi branch of Areyada family and all the lands located at Yevakapadi including the suit schedule lands have been given to the share of the Yevakapadi branch of Areyada family; that ever since the parties had acted as per the arrangements which was reflected in terms of the mahazar drawn by the panchayatdars as per the directions of the then Subedar-cum-II Magistrate of Padianalknad under which the villages of Napoklu and Yevakapadi came; that even thereafter, the parties had continued to act in terms of the arrangement of 1873; that in fact the Yevakapadi branch of Areyada family had all along treated the lands located at Yevakapadi including the jamma malai lands as their exclusive properties and in ownership; that the jamma malai land also had been shared amongst different members of Yevakapadi branch of Areyada family in subsequent partitions inter se amongst the members of the Yevakapadi branch of Areyada family; that one such partition had taken place in the year 1906 under a registered partition deed effected under permission from the then Revenue Commissioner and thereafter several sub-divisions have taken place amongst the members of Yevakapadi branch of Areyada family in respect of the lands located at Yevakapadi including the jamma malai land, which is the subject-matter of the suit; that the two branches namely, Napoklu and Yevakapadi branches have been enjoying their respective shares ever since separately and to the mutual exclusion; that there was no more connection left between the two branches; that the defendants were entitled to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the suit lands and the plaintiffs did not have any right, title or interest over the lands in question either for seeking a declaration of the rights in their favour or for restraining the defendants from dealing with the lands in any manner they deem fit; that the defendants were exclusively paying the assessment of these lands ever since the arrangement and are in exclusive possession thereafter and that the receipt for such payment from the year 1929 onwards was only in the names of the defendants paid by them; that though for the purpose of showing the name of pattedar, the name of eldest member of the Areyada family as it originally constituted is shown, but that by itself will not have any significance for the purpose of either creating any right in favour of the plaintiffs nor did it indicate joint possession of the suit lands by the plaintiffs and the defendants; that the defendants in fact had on an earlier occasion sold timber grown in the suit la.1.d without any objection or opposition from the plaintiffs' side; that they have not asserted any such rights as asserted in the suit nor had they raised any objections to the sale by the defendants; that the defendants had the permission of the forest authorities for sale of such timber on the earlier occasion; that having regard to the fertility of the lands located in Napoklu Village, while 6 acres of wet land is in the share of the defendants' branch, all other lands in Napoklu Village were left to the exclusive share of the defendants branch of Areyada family; that the defendants had been enjoying the suit lands exclusively by even leasing the suit lands by the consent of the forest authorities for cultivation of cardamom on many occasions and on no such occasion, the plaintiffs had raised any objections; that in the earlier litigation between the members of the Napoklu and the Yevakapadi branches of Areyada family and third parties in respect of the properties including the suit lands, the plaintiffs had never joined as parties to such transactions nor had they evinced any interest in such litigation indicating their admission about the property having fallen to the exclusive share of the defendants' branch and that the suit was not tenable for want of necessary parties i.e., the Government, as a defendant, as the suit lands were in the ownership of the Government and therefore prayed for dismissal of the suit with costs. 5. It is in the light of these rival pleadings, the Trial Court had framed the following issues: 1. Do the plaintiffs prove that they and the defendants 1 to 3 belongs to two branches of the same family? 2. Do the plaintiffs prove that the suit schedule properties are jamma malai property granted to ancestors of the plaintiffs 1 to 3 at the time of Kodagu Rajas? 3. Do the plaintiffs prove the grantees of these jamma malai land have no proprietary over the land and timber? 4. Do the plaintiffs prove there was no division between him and the defendants 1 to 3 in the family properties? 5. Do the defendants 1 to 3 prove that there was a division in the year 1973 and it was confirmed in the year 1984 and the suit schedule properties belong to them? 6. Do the plaintiffs prove that the defendants have no manner of right to alienate the suit schedule properties or that timbers thereon? 7. Is (sic) the plaintiffs entitled declaration? 8. Is (sic) the plaintiffs entitled permanent injunction against all the defendants? 9. What order or decree? 6. Parties went to trial on these issues. While on behalf of the plaintiffs, third plaintiff was examined as P.W. 1 and got marked Exs. P. 1 to P. 13 as documentary evidence. On behalf of the defendants, apart from the second defendant having been examined as D.W. 1, four other witnesses namely K Muthanna, K.C. Nanaiah, Kunjiraman and A.P. Ramesh as D.Ws. 2 to 5 respectively, were examined besides marking Exs. D. 1 to D. 39 as documentary evidence. 7. The Trial Judge, after evaluation of the evidence led on behalf of the parties in respect of their respective cases, while rightly held that issue 1 did not arise for consideration, as it had been a common case of the parties that they were two branches of Areyada family and therefore it was not even an issue. Issue 2 was answered in the affirmative, which again, was only partially correct in the sense, the ancestors of the plaintiffs and the defendants were common and it is a common case that the suit lands had been granted to the ancestors of the plaintiffs and the defendants by the Kodagu Rajas in the fourth or fifth generation earlier to the present parties. Issue 3 was answered rightly in the sense that the plaintiffs proved that the grantees of jamma malai lands had no proprietary rights over the lands and the timber, it was virtually a non-issue in the sense, as with regard to the ownership of the land the defendants had conceded they did not have the ownership over the lands, as the same vested in the Government and with regard to timber, though in terms of the grant they have no right, what was pleaded is that with the permission of the forest authorities, some timber had been sold earlier and for effecting such sale of timber, there was no impediment. Issues 4 and 5 have been answered as "does not arise for consideration". Issues 6 and 7 have been answered in favour of the plaintiff which is the same as issue 3. Accordingly, the Trial Judge decreed the suit in terms of the plaint prayer. 8. Submission of Sri Ponnanna and Sri G.S. Bajaj, learned Counsel for the appellants is that the learned Trial Judge fell into error while decreeing the suit inspite of clear admission on the part of the plaintiffs about the division and sharing of the properties not only in the plaint but also in the evidence, and the plaintiffs having tailed to positively prove either the joint enjoyment or joint possession of the suit lands whether at the time of filing of the suit or immediately prior to the suit; that the fact that the defendants did not dispute the two branches originated from out of a common Areyada family and the branching of it into Napoklu branch and Yevakapadi branch did not amount to any admission adverse to the plea of the defendants or in favour of the plaintiffs, but while it was a fact that the two branches were from the ancestors of Areyada family, they had effected sharing of the properties of the Areyada family and in terms of the arrangement and understanding even during the year 1873 and thereafter having enjoyed the property separately, there was no way of the suit having been decreed in favour of the plaintiffs and that the suit should have been dismissed on the failure of the plaintiffs either to plead that there was a joint enjoyment in any positive manner nor the same having been demonstrated by supporting evidence. 9. 9. Learned Counsel for the appellants have also contended that the efforts on the part of the defendants were only to stall the sale of timber which was sought to be cleared for the subsequent cultivation in the wake of failure of cardamom crop and with the permission of the forest authorities and therefore there no cause for restraining the defendants by a decree of injunction. Submission at any rate is that in the absence of any plea or proof of such cause, the suit should have been dismissed; that even in the light of clear legal position that the conduct of the parties about the manner of enjoyment of suit schedule property is a clear indicator of any clear partition or division, as indicated in the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Subramania Reddi v Venkatasubba Reddi (dead) and Others\ the learned Trial Judge committed a grave error in decreeing the suit; that the appeal should be allowed and the impugned judgment and decree set aside and the suit dismissed. 10. Submission of Sri Shankarappa, learned Counsel for the respondents is that the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court is well-sustainable; that in the light of the clear admission on the part of the defendants that the families of the plaintiffs and defendants originated from the Areyada family that they had enjoyed the properties in common and in the absence of further clear proof that the jamma malai land also had been shared by metes and bounds, the Trial Court had no option but to decree the suit and therefore the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 11. 11. Learned Counsel for the respondents has also submitted that the fact even as admitted and even as found on evidence the patta in respect of jamma malai land stood in the name of the eldest brother of Areyada family irrespective of such member being from the Napoklu branch or from the Yevakapadi branch in itself is proof of the fact that the jamma malai lands was in joint enjoyment both by the plaintiffs and the defendants and such enjoyment having been admitted, no further proof is required on the part of the plaintiffs for a declaration as sought for; that what had been sought for is a declaration of joint possession which is reflective of the factual position as it emerges from the revenue records showing the names of Pattadar and therefore also the declaratory relief and consequential restraint order granted by the Court below is well-sustainable and the appeal should be dismissed. 12. It is the submission of learned Counsel for the respondents that even assuming that there was sharing of the other properties by the members of the two branches of the family, the jamma malai lands having not been so shared or separated and even in terms of the record the enjoyment being common with the rights of the members of the family being only to cultivate cardamom in the said lands and such cultivation also having not been carried on for the past several years due to certain disease to cardamom crop, there was no separate or exclusive enjoyment of the lands in question by the appellants-the defendants in the suit and such being the position, the decree passed by the Trial Court is to be sustained. 13. It is also the submission of learned Counsel for the respondents that the character of the land being in the nature of inalienable lands being lands that had been granted by erstwhile Raja of Coorg State and the nature of rights enjoyed being to cultivate without any right to sell or transfer the right in favour of third persons, the jamma malai lands formed part of the impartible estate, particularly, the Areyada family being of Coorgi race. 14. In the light of the rival submissions of learned Counsel for the parties, the point that arises for determination in this appeal are: (a) As to whether the lower Court was justified in decreeing the suit as prayed for? 14. In the light of the rival submissions of learned Counsel for the parties, the point that arises for determination in this appeal are: (a) As to whether the lower Court was justified in decreeing the suit as prayed for? (b) Whether the judgment and decree passed by the lower Court requires to be interfered with and if so to what extent? 15. As noticed above, the prayer in the suit was for declaration that the two branches of the Areyada family comprising the plaintiffs and the defendants in respect of the activity are jointly entitled to the suit property in the nature of jamma malai lands in several survey numbers as indicated in the schedule. The other two prayers are for perpetual injunction and the cost etc., were by way of consequential reliefs. 16. The prayer proceeds on the premise that the suit property is a joint family property of Areyada family and should be declared so, in the sense that, it is not only such a joint family, but it had remained so on the date of filing of the suit. The only plea in support of such prayer as found in the plaint is to be noticed in paragraph 4 of the plaint which reads as under: "The suit property is heritable, but not partible or alienable. Areyada family is not divided by metes and bounds as the family is a Coorgi by race. The defendants have no manner of right to alienate the suit property or the timber from the suit property". 17. The suit property being heritable property is not a matter in dispute as it is the common case of the plaintiffs and the defendants that the future generations of the family have enjoyed the property. But, the dispute arises on the plea of the property being not partible or alienable. According to the defendants, it formed part of the joint family property and had been divided and enjoyed separately where~ the plea of the plaintiffs is that it has continued to be in common enjoyment because it is not a partible one, particularly, having regard to the fact that the family is a Coorgi by race, it is pleaded that it is for this reason that the family is not divided by metes and bounds. The defendants not having any manner of right to alienate the suit property is also not a matter in dispute as both the plaintiffs and the defendants have conceded that the land belonged to the erstwhile Raja of Coorg and now the State and the right that they have enjoyed is only for cultivating cardamom crop alone in the land. 18. The right regarding the sale of timber from the suit property is not to a great extent in dispute, in the sense that, while the plaintiffs asserted there is no such right in respect of the timber, the defendants only pleaded that with the permission of the concerned authorities, they had effected the sale of timber on earlier occasions and if they effect any sale, it is only with the permission of the forest authorities and not otherwise. 19. Submission of learned Counsel for the parties is to the same effect. If so, it is also conceded that the parties whomsoever may be in enjoyment have no manner of right to sell the timber either, unless there is an express permission in this regard by the Competent Authority. If one views the dispute from this angle, it narrows down to a very limited one, in the sense that, as to whether the suit schedule lands formed part of an impartible estate and therefore it had not been divided and should be continued to be joint in law. The other possibility is that if it is not an impartible estate and if it is conceded as part of the joint family property at some point of time, whether it has continued to remain as joint family property in the ownership o( the family notwithstanding that other properties of the joint family property have been admittedly divided, shared and enjoyed separately as admitted by both sides. 20. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the pleas as to what nature of law governs the plaintiffs' and the defendants' family, the law which governed the Areyada family and which continues to govern the two branches of Yevakapadi and Napoklu is conspicuously absent. Except for the plea that the family is a Coorgi by race, there is no other plea. What is the implication of the family being Coorgi by race is not made clear either in the pleadings or in the evidence. Except for the plea that the family is a Coorgi by race, there is no other plea. What is the implication of the family being Coorgi by race is not made clear either in the pleadings or in the evidence. At best, one has to assume that having regard to the plea, the family was governed by the Hindu customary law though not expressly pleaded in the plaint. Thus, if it is assumed that the Areyada family is governed by the Hindu customary law, the concept of impartible estate is not one available in all situations but is peculiar to the particular family in respect of particular property and by custom. If any property of the family was in the nature of an impartible estate, it should be expressly pleaded and should be proved also by cogent evidence. In the absence of a proper plea and supporting material, there is no question of an inference being drawn in favour of the plaintiffs in this regard. 21. The pleadings constitute a very significant and vital part of any suit. In the absence of a proper plea, the suit does not progress any further. A proper plea, one can say in comparison, is like a combat aircraft in the suit. In the absence of a proper plea, the aircraft does not take off at all. The absence of a proper plea will hamper a plaintiff to seek the decree prayed for. However, great be the potential of the aircraft with regard to its speed, maneuverability and the striking capacity, these things can be demonstrated only when the aircraft is airborne and not when it is grounded on the earth. The suit does not take off without a proper plea. The proper plea propels the suit into the sky and with supporting evidence it can achieve the object of guiding the plaintiff towards the relief sought for. 22. Unfortunately in the present case, I find the plea to be woefully lacking for the purpose of the relief sought for i.e., the declaratory relief regarding the joint entitlement of the suit schedule property by the two branches of Areyada family, namely, the Napoklu branch-plaintiffs branch and the Yevakapadi branch-defend ant's branch. In fact, on the other hand, the very description in the plaint itself indicates that there are two branches. The branches are represented separately. In fact, on the other hand, the very description in the plaint itself indicates that there are two branches. The branches are represented separately. It is also the admission of P.W. 1 that apart from the suit schedule property, the families owned several other extents of the properties and they have all been shared and divided and are being enjoyed separately notwithstanding the plea that the Areyada family is not divided by metes and bounds and as the family is a Coorgi by race. 23. On the other hand, it was the express case of the defendants that the properties have been shared between the two branches of the family way back in the year 1873 and the further partitions effected in the year 1906 are only ample proof of such separate possession and enjoyment of the respective shares by the two branches of the family. 24. Though it is submitted by Sri Shankarappa, learned Counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs in the suit that Exhibit D. 2-Mahazar of the year 1873 is not one to which members of plaintiffs' branch are signatories and it is not binding on them, I find such submission at this point of time, not very acceptable as the document only seeks to indicate the manner of division of the existing properties of the family. 25. Though it is also contended that there is no specific mention of malai lands in this mahazar which is shared between the two branches, the fact remains that there was a division between the two branches of the families in the year 1873 and thereafter they have been enjoying their respective sharers. In fact, there is considerable evidence on record to indicate such separate enjoyment and possession by the two branches. 26. The admission of P.W. 1 is also to the same effect that the Areyada family owned wet lands, dry lands etc., and members of the families have been from time to time partitioning the properties and enjoying it separately pursuant to such partition and there is no such dispute about the partition and separate enjoyment by the parties which reads as under: 27. In fact, this witness further admits even in respect of the jamma malai lands, that it was given to the members of the family in the year 1912 by the erstwhile Raja of Coorg State for the purpose of cardamom cultivation; that neither the rights in respect of the ownership of the land nor in respect of forest growth on the land had been given to the grantee; that since their forefathers time, suiting to their convenience, the jamma malai lands was being shared and partitioned separately and separate cardamom cultivation was being carried on and that such Jamma malai lands belonged to the members of the families settled in Napoklu Village and also the members of the family in Avokapadi Village of Kakkube and was in the cultivation of all such members of the two branches of the families. 28. Such admission in the witness-box by P.W. 1 who is the third plaintiff in the suit only goes to show that the joint family properties were being shared from time to time, enjoyed separately; that such separate enjoyment was not objected to or resisted by any other person of the family; that even the jamma malai lands were so shared amongst the members and the cultivation was separate by the members of the two branches of the family; that the cultivation of the jamma malai land was only by the members of the two branches of the family. 29. In the light of such clear admission, what one can infer is that there is a practice of dividing the properties of the family of Areyada; that it has teen shared between the two branches from time to time and even within two branches there has been further divisions and separations; that the identified members of the two branches have been enjoying the land separately; that even the jamma malai lands have not been treated any differently. If such is the admission in the witness-box by the plaintiffs, the very plea that the jamma malai lands was an impartible estate and that it had continued to remain in joint possession and enjoyment is belied. In fact, the plaintiff has utterly failed in either pleading or preparing the ground situation for the purpose of declaratory relief of joint possessory right in the suit schedule lands. 30. In fact, the plaintiff has utterly failed in either pleading or preparing the ground situation for the purpose of declaratory relief of joint possessory right in the suit schedule lands. 30. In the light of the specific plea by the defendants that the jamma malai lands had fallen to their exclusive share and was in the exclusive possession and enjoyment of whatever rights that signified or went with the jamma malai land, it was for the plaintiffs to have proved that the jamma malai lands had not been partitioned, remained in joint possession and enjoyment and at any rate they had never been excluded from such joint enjoyment and the only slender material on which the plaintiffs' case rested was the name of the 'pattadar' and on occasions the elder brother of Napoklu branch of Areyada family also being described as 'pattadar' in respect of jamma malai lands. While this is sought to be taken as supportive of the plea that the suit schedule lands was an impartible estate, the other pleadings and evidence is contrary to the same. The custom that it was an impartible estate is not properly pleaded nor proved. In fact, the evidence is conspicuously absent about any such nature of the property being owned by the family. Except for this, there is nothing else in support of the plaintiffs' case. The burden of proving that a particular piece of property which did not form part of the partition effected amongst the members of the family as it was either an impartible estate or otherwise is heavily upon the person so pleading and unless the plea is proper, precise and supporting evidence is cogent, it is not made good. In the instant case, neither the facts as pleaded nor the evidence that has been let in on behalf of the plaintiffs makes good the version that the jamma malai lands constituted an impartible estate of the joint family and therefore it was not divisible etc. In fact, the presumption is the other way. When all other properties of the family are divided and only one property is claimed to have not been divided amongst the members, the burden is on the party who asserts such version to prove it. In the present case, the plaintiffs failed to prove what extent had fallen to their share and was in their exclusive enjoyment. When all other properties of the family are divided and only one property is claimed to have not been divided amongst the members, the burden is on the party who asserts such version to prove it. In the present case, the plaintiffs failed to prove what extent had fallen to their share and was in their exclusive enjoyment. If that is so, the plaintiffs have miserably failed in proving that the suit schedule land remained in the joint enjoyment and possession of both the branches of Yevakapadi and Napoklu. The consequential declaratory relief necessarily does not follow to declare that the Napoklu branch-the plaintiffs' branch of Areyada family to be jointly entitled to the suit property as the very premise is not made good by the plaintiffs. 31. In the circumstances, the suit as prayed for could not have been decreed. In fact, the decision relied upon by Sri Ponnanna, learned Counsel for the appellants-defendants in the suit in Subramania Reddi's case, supports the version of the appellants and in fact the presumption will be in favour of the defendants to accept their claim that the suit schedule property also formed part of the family properties and it had been so divided etc. 32. The consequential relief of injunction restraining the defendants 1 to 3 from alienating the suit property or timber thereon which has been granted by the Trial Court, though was by way of a relief prayed as a consequential relief, I find that even on the admitted position of the parties, this is a relief which emerges. In fact, neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants claimed that they have right of ownership in respect of the lands. Therefore, there is no question of the defendants effecting sale of the land. It was not even their case that they were trying to sell the land in question. 33. The other relief of restraining the defendants 1 to 3 from effecting sale of timber is also a relief that is sustainable on the admitted position that a grantee of jamma malai land does not get right to the timber growth on the land even in terms of the grant. 33. The other relief of restraining the defendants 1 to 3 from effecting sale of timber is also a relief that is sustainable on the admitted position that a grantee of jamma malai land does not get right to the timber growth on the land even in terms of the grant. If that is so, the consequential injunction appears to be an innocuous relief that has been granted and even on the position of law as has been declared by the Single Bench decision of this Court in the case of Deputy Commissioner of Kodagu and Another v E. Emmanuel Ramapuram1, on which reliance has been placed by the Trial Court, is to the effect that the grantees of jamma malai land have no manner of right either for effecting sale of the land or the timber thereof 34. However, what is submitted by Sri Ponnanna, learned Counsel for the appellants is that the holders of such jamma malai lands may be expressly admitted permitted the competent authorities to effect sale of timber cleared for the purpose of cultivation of cardamom and that will be a permitted thing. 35. It is not necessary to go into this aspect of the matter any further in this appeal, but suffice to clarify that if there is any express permission granted by the Competent Authority for any other act over and above what is permitted under the grant itself, it is open to such party to seek such permission and to carry out such acts but on the basis of the rights that a person gets in respect of jamma malai lands, there is no question of the grantee effecting sale of the land or the timber. In such circumstances, I find that the restraint order in the present case does not require to be disturbed in this appeal at the instance of the appellants. But, that does not come in the way of the appellants from seeking such permission as is permitted in law from such Competent Authorities and to carry out such permitted action in accordance with such permission. 36. In the light of this clarification, this appeal is allowed in part. The judgment and decree insofar as it relates to the declaration that the Areyada family of the plaintiffs and the defendants are jointly entitled to the suit property is set aside. 36. In the light of this clarification, this appeal is allowed in part. The judgment and decree insofar as it relates to the declaration that the Areyada family of the plaintiffs and the defendants are jointly entitled to the suit property is set aside. The suit insofar as this prayer is concerned is dismissed. 37. The suit decreed with regard to the restraint order restraining the defendants from alienating the land or timber therein is left undisturbed. This appeal is allowed to that extent. 38. In the peculiar circumstances, parties to bear their respective costs throughout. Registry to draw decree accordingly.