Judgment : Ms. PRABHA SRIDEVAN, J. The malady of illegal constructions coming up in brazen violation of all statutory provisions pained the Supreme Court into observing that: “The experience has been that despite notices which are issued for demolition, wherever excess construction or illegal construction has taken place, no demolition in effect is carried out and the wrongdoers continue to take benefit of their wrongful action by occupying and utilizing the excess areas so constructed. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the municipal authorities all over India are unwilling or unable or incapable of stopping illegal construction and/or demolishing the same. Because no effective action is taken in this regard, the number of violations of the building plans and the building bye-laws and encroachments are increasing in the country, the wrongdoers being emboldened by the fact that the law will not catch up with them. A suggestion has been mooted that whenever any such illegal construction comes to notice, at first an opportunity should be granted to the wrongdoer to carry out the rectification and demolish the excess construction and in the event of his failing to do so, the illegal construction should automatically, and by operation of law, vest in the State free from all encumbrances and without the State having to pay any compensation in respect thereof. It is only if such a law is passed, which some wrongdoers may consider as draconian, that perhaps the malaise may be contained.” Vide Supreme Court Monitoring Committee v. Mussoorie Dehradun Development Authority Vide Supreme Court Monitoring Committee v. Mussoorie Dehradun Development Authority Vide Supreme Court Monitoring Committee v. Mussoorie Dehradun Development Authority AIR 2002 SC 2876 : 2003 (10) SCC 445 . The building that is the subject matter of these proceedings is a five-storied illegality. 2. The petitioner in W.P. Nos. 8901 of 2004 and 26478 of 2004 is one and the same. The respondent in the former is the Commissioner, Corporation of Chennai and in the latter, the respondents are the State Government and the Member Secretary, Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority. 3. 2. The petitioner in W.P. Nos. 8901 of 2004 and 26478 of 2004 is one and the same. The respondent in the former is the Commissioner, Corporation of Chennai and in the latter, the respondents are the State Government and the Member Secretary, Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority. 3. In Writ Petition No. 8901 of 2004, the petitioners case is that the vacant land in formerly R.S. No. 1277/12 and now R.S. No. 1277/13 belonging to the Corporation of Chennai, on which he has put up the superstructure bearing Door Nos.326 and 327, Walltax Road, was leased out in perpetuity about 173 years back. In or about the year 1930, there was a superstructure consisting of a ground floor and the first floor. The ownership of the leasehold rights of the land and the superstructure thereon has exchanged several hands and now, it belongs to the petitioner. According to the petitioner, one Ramdayal Prasad originally purchased the leasehold right interest in the land along with the ownership of the building from one Janakiammal. The said Janakiammal informed the Corporation by her letter dated 19.3.1945 that she had alienated the leasehold interest in the property and on that basis, there was mutation of names in the records and registers of the Corporation. Ramdayal Prasad bequeathed the leasehold rights of the property along with the building thereon to his son Ravishankar by a registered Will. In O.P. No. 487 of 1986, probate of the said Will was granted. This was also duly informed to the Corporation and his name was recorded in the place of Ramdayal Sharma. Thereafter, the aforesaid Ravishankar, by a registered sale deed dated 28.10.1992, sold his entire rights in the superstructure and the land to the petitioner. This sale was also informed to the Corporation and the entries in the records have been changed. The building has been assessed to property tax and the same has been paid without default. In the year 2000, when the petitioner remitted the lease amount of rupees one lakh, it was received as payment towards damages and a claim was made for a further sum of Rs. 4,01,200/-calculated upto the year 2000. This was also paid by the petitioner. In the year 2000, when the petitioner remitted the lease amount of rupees one lakh, it was received as payment towards damages and a claim was made for a further sum of Rs. 4,01,200/-calculated upto the year 2000. This was also paid by the petitioner. When the petitioner applied by way of abundant caution, to the respondent for execution of a lease deed in his favour, he was informed by the impugned letter dated 8.11.2003 that the leasehold rights cannot be transferred and moreover, since the land is required for public purpose, his request stands rejected. As against that letter, W.P. No. 8901 of 2004 has been filed seeking to quash the letter, and for a direction to renew the lease, and also for an injunction restraining interference with the petitioners possession and for other reliefs. 4. In Writ Petition No. 26748 of 2004, the averments relating to the devolution of interest in the property to the petitioner are almost identical as in the previous writ petition. Further, it is submitted that when the Government of Tamil Nadu introduced the regularization scheme, the petitioner applied for regularization of the construction of ground plus four floors, on payment of rupees one lakh. The C.M.D.A, rejected this application stating that since the land belonged to the Corporation, as per Rule 3(3) of the Buildings Regularization Scheme as amended upto 24.4.2002, all applications for regularization made by any person who does not have any right over the land or the building shall be summarily rejected. It is alleged that there was total non-application of mind and no opportunity was given to the petitioner to produce the documents to show his title. Therefore, he preferred an appeal to the Government. This appeal was dismissed and as against the dismissal of the said appeal, W.P. No. 26748 of 2004 has been filed. 5. Pending W.P. No. 8901 of 2004, the petitioner prayed for a direction to renew the lease granted in favour of the petitioner. Interim direction was granted in W.P.M.P. No. 10410 of 2004. Against that interim order, Writ Appeal No. 1829 of 2004 has been filed. W.P.M.P. No. 31010 of 2004 was filed to restrain the respondents from demolishing the superstructure. The interim injunction granted in this petition was made absolute. As against that order, Writ Appeal No. 1369 of 2005 has been filed. 6. Against that interim order, Writ Appeal No. 1829 of 2004 has been filed. W.P.M.P. No. 31010 of 2004 was filed to restrain the respondents from demolishing the superstructure. The interim injunction granted in this petition was made absolute. As against that order, Writ Appeal No. 1369 of 2005 has been filed. 6. By consent, the writ appeals and the writ petitions are taken up for disposal. 7. According to Mr. S. Prabhakaran, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner, a lease deed was executed in favour of the petitioners predecessor-in-interest on 14.4.1945 with regard to Door No. 327 and subsequently, on 20.8.1951, there was a registered lease deed executed with the Corporation of Chennai in favour of Ramdayal Prasad and thereafter, the petitioners predecessorsin-interest have continued to be a tenant holding over and the petitioner is entitled to the same rights. The Corporation has received the rents without any demur and now, they cannot be heard to say that they have not agreed to the continuance of the petitioner in the premises as a lessee. It is further contended by the learned counsel that the stand taken by the Corporation that the road has to be widened for a public purpose is nothing but a ruse to demolish the superstructure put up by the petitioner and the petitioner is being singled out for such treatment, when there are other constructions on the same road, in respect of which no such action has been taken. Learned counsel would submit that if his prayer for regularization is granted, then, there can be no objection to the Corporation to renew the lease in their favour. The C.M.D.A. had erred in rejecting the regularization scheme in respect of the petitioners property and if an opportunity is given to the petitioner to produce the documents dated 14.4.1945 and 20.8.1951, the petitioner will demonstrate that he has a right in the land and therefore, entitled to the benefit of the regularization scheme. However, it is admitted by the learned counsel that no sanction or permission was obtained before the five-storied construction was put up by the petitioner. However, it is admitted by the learned counsel that no sanction or permission was obtained before the five-storied construction was put up by the petitioner. Learned counsel also submitted that in Resolution No. 432 of 2000, the Corporation had resolved to lease out the properties to the parties who are now in possession of lands belonging to the Corporation in order to avoid any loss of revenue and therefore, the petitioner submitted that the benefit of this Resolution should be granted to the petitioner. Learned counsel also pointed out to a letter addressed to another person on the same road, in which it is stated that as per the said Resolution, if persons who are in enjoyment of the land paid the entire arrears of the lease amount to the Corporation, then the land will be allotted to the same person who is in enjoyment of the same. 8. Mr. A.L. Somayaji, learned Additional Advocate-General appearing for the Corporation of Chennai and the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority would submit that the petitioner is an encroacher and not a lessee under the Corporation, The construction is totally unauthorized. The amount calculated and received by the Corporation as dues from the petitioner is not in recognition of his right as a lessee, but towards damages for illegal use and occupation of the land. The levy of property tax and mutation of names in the records will not confer any right on the petitioner in respect of the said property. If the C.M.D.A. is directed to regularize the unauthorized construction, it would amount to rewarding a person who has flouted the statutory rules and is an encroacher. The learned Additional Advocate-General also submitted that even the documents now produced by the petitioner cannot be relied on, since in those documents, there are references to certain other documents, ostensibly relating to the property in question, but which really have nothing to do with the property. Therefore, false recitals have been introduced in those sale deeds to lend credence to the claim of title by the petitioner. According to the learned Additional Advocate-General, such a person is not entitled to any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, false recitals have been introduced in those sale deeds to lend credence to the claim of title by the petitioner. According to the learned Additional Advocate-General, such a person is not entitled to any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It was further submitted that the resolution referred to by the petitioner has been subsequently withdrawn, and referred to the letter dated 18.8.1981 addressed by the Superintending Engineer, Highways Department to the Revenue Officer, Corporation not to renew the lease of private parties and to a subsequent communication dated 9.3.2006, where the officials of the Corporation have been again instructed to take back the land from the lessees and hand them over to the City Roads Division Department for widening of the road. 9. The various documents referred to by the petitioner must necessarily be looked into for deciding whether the petitioner has any semblance of a right to claim the relief sought for. 10. On 12.3.1944, one Janakiammal has addressed a letter to the Corporation of Chennai stating that she has sold the superstructure to one Ramdayal Prasad and requesting the Corporation to treat him as a tenant in respect of the said land (“belonging to you and which is under lease to me”). On 14.4.1945, the Corporation has addressed a letter to Ramdayal Prasad stating that the lease will be transferred subject to the following conditions: “i) Half yearly rent calculated at Rs. 23-9-2 per ground per mensem shall be paid on or before the 10th day of each half-year for which it relates, ii) The land shall be used as a bamboo or timber depot. iii) It shall not be sub-let. iv) It shall not be built upon without the previous sanction of the Commissioner. v) It shall be vacated on a 15 day notice in writing.” The extent covered by this document is about 2250 sq.ft. in Old No. 130, New No. 327. iii) It shall not be sub-let. iv) It shall not be built upon without the previous sanction of the Commissioner. v) It shall be vacated on a 15 day notice in writing.” The extent covered by this document is about 2250 sq.ft. in Old No. 130, New No. 327. On 20.8.1951, a registered lease deed has been executed by the Corporation in favour of Ramdayal Prasad for a period of one year from 1.4.1951 subject to the following conditions: “i) Not to make or permit to be made any erections on the demised premises or any destruction of or alteration in or additions to any building or construction on the demised premises without the previous consent in writing of the Commissioner for the time being of the Lessor first had and obtained. ii) Not to assign, underlet, or part with the possession of the demised premises or any part thereof without first obtaining the written consent of the Commissioner. iii) It shall be lawful for the Lessor in case the said premises or any part thereof shall be required for some public purpose.” 11. On 6.2.1947, one Kannaiah Prasad is said to have purchased the superstructure and leasehold rights in respect of Door No. 129, Walltax Road, which is present Door No.326. By a partition deed dated 3.5.1973 amongst Kannaiah Prasad, Ramdayal Prasad and Munilal Prasad, the superstructure with leasehold right in Door No. 129, present Door No. 326 is allotted to Kannaiah Prasad. The superstructure that was existing in 1947, as seen from the tax receipt is a “tiled bamboo depot”. On 10.6.1976, the Corporation had issued a letter to Kannaiah Prasad rejecting his request for renewal of lease. On 16.1.1983, the Will, under which the vendor of the petitioner claims his title, was executed. On 28.10.1992, the petitioner had purchased the property. From the recitals in this document, it is seen that the lease dated 20.8,1951 (Door No. 327) in respect of an extent of 2250 sq. ft. was transferred to Ramdayal Prasad, the father of the vendor in Document No. 19 of 1951 in the Office of the Sub Registrar of West Madras. The xerox copy of this document has been produced and it is seen therefrom that Document No. 19 of 1951 has nothing to do with this property and relates to a property in De’Mellos Road, Vepery Division. The xerox copy of this document has been produced and it is seen therefrom that Document No. 19 of 1951 has nothing to do with this property and relates to a property in De’Mellos Road, Vepery Division. Intriguingly, though in the earliest document which is claimed to be the parent document, the extent mentioned is 2250 sq. ft., in the sale deed executed in favour of the petitioner, the extent which is allegedly transferred to the petitioner has been increased to 4329 sq.ft., for which there is no explanation. Therefore, even the alleged devolution of title in favour of the petitioner has missing links. 12. Though the petitioner has sworn to an affidavit that the property was leased out in perpetuity 173 years ago, he has not been able to produce any document bearing out his case. Therefore, his grievance that the C.M.D.A. has not given him an opportunity to produce the documents which are in his possession is without any strength. In the order passed in the appeal filed by the petitioner to the Government, it is seen that the matter had been examined in detail, and that the copies of the parent documents and the lease deeds were not produced and the Government concluded that when the petitioner was unable to prove his rights in respect of the land, the request for regularization cannot be granted. 13. The crucial recitals in the letter dated 14.4.1945 and in the lease deed dated 28.5.1951 which have been extracted above show clearly that the superstructure shall remain as a bamboo or a timber depot; there can be no sub-lease, assignment or parting with possession without the written consent of the Corporation; no construction can be put upon without the previous sanction of the Commissioner; and that there shall be no destruction, alteration or addition to the construction on the demised premises without previous consent. Each one of these conditions has been violated by the petitioner. The aforesaid documents, on which the petitioner rests his case, also show that the petitioners predecessor-in-title had agreed to vacate the premises on receipt of 15 days’ notice and had also agreed that the lessor, namely the Corporation of Chennai would be entitled to resume the land or any part thereof when it is required for a public purpose. The aforesaid documents, on which the petitioner rests his case, also show that the petitioners predecessor-in-title had agreed to vacate the premises on receipt of 15 days’ notice and had also agreed that the lessor, namely the Corporation of Chennai would be entitled to resume the land or any part thereof when it is required for a public purpose. The direction given by the Highways Department to the Corporation dated 18.8.1981 and the communication dated 9.3.2006 referred to earlier show that the road needs to be widened and therefore, the land has to be resumed from the parties in possession. Therefore, assuming without granting that the petitioner derived any right under the aforesaid documents, it shall not continue anymore since it is clear that the land is required for a public purpose, viz. widening of the road. That apart, the documents themselves restrict the right given to the lessees thereunder to one year only and that time has expired long ago. Therefore, the petitioner can claim no right under these documents. The fact that the property taxes haw been received from the petitioner and amounts received towards illegal use and damages will not, by themselves, confer any right on the petitioner to continue in the premises. 14. Admittedly, the petitioner has put up ground plus four floors on the property in question without any sanctioned plan from the authorities. While we appreciate the vigilance with which the Corporation has taken action after 2002, we are unable to comprehend how the authorities failed to see that a building of this proportion was being put up in front of their eyes without any permission. In this connection, we would like to refer to the following words of the Supreme Court in Pratibha Cooperative Housing Society Ltd v. State of Maharashtra Pratibha Co-operative Housing Society Ltd v. State of Maharashtra Pratibha Co-operative Housing Society Ltd v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1991 SC 1453 : 1991 (3) SCC 341 : "“Before parting with the case, we would like to observe that this case should be a pointer to all the builders that making of unauthorized constructions never pays and is against the interest of the society at large. The rules, regulations and by-laws are made by the Corporations or development authorities taking in view the larger public interest of the society and it is the bounden duty of the citizens to obey and follow such rules which are made for their own benefits.”" In similar circumstances where a nursery school was constructed in a certain park in complete violation of the Delhi Development Act, 1957, the Supreme Court made the following observations in Dr. G.N. Khajuria v. Delhi Development Authority Dr. G.N. Khajuria v. Delhi Development Authority Dr. G.N. Khajuria v. Delhi Development Authority AIR 1996 SC 253 : 1995 (5) SCC 762 . "“…… A feeling is gathering ground that where unauthorized constructions are demolished on the force of the order of Courts, the illegality is not take care of fully inasmuch as the officer of the statutory body who had allowed the unauthorized construction to be made or make illegal allotments go scot-free. This should, not, however, have happened for two reasons. First, it is the illegal action/order of the officer which lies at the root of the unlawful act of the citizen concerned, because of which the officer is more to be blamed than the recipient of the illegal benefit. It is thus imperative, according to us, that while undoing the mischief which would require the demolition of the unauthorized construction, the delinquent officer has also to be punished in accordance with law. This, however, seldom happens. Secondly, to take care of the injustice completely, the officer who had misused his power has also to be properly punished. Otherwise, what happens is that the officer, who made the hay when the sun shined, retains the hay, which tempts others to do the same. This really gives fillip to the commission of tainted acts, whereas the aim should be opposite.” Recently, in Chairman, Madras Metropolitan Development Authority v. S. Radhakrishnan Chairman, Madras Metropolitan Development Authority v. S. Radhakrishnan Chairman, Madras Metropolitan Development Authority v. S. Radhakrishnan (2006) 1 MLJ 181 , the claims of encroachers that the notices issued under Section 56 of the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1972 beyond three years of completion of the offending constructions were barred by limitation, were rejected. It was held thus: ”It is thus seen that while clear and imperative prohibitions are contained in the provisions of the Act regarding erection and construction of buildings in contravention thereof, there is no provision which provides for or could be construed as given an enabling provision, tending to legalize any unauthorized construction by mere lapse of time. True it is that Section 56(1) of the Act prescribes three years time to issue notice against an unauthorized development. The object of the Act is for planned development and therefore, the interpretation which upholds any such scheme should be followed. Heydens principles is now well recognised in interpreting any enactment. It lays down that the Courts must see (a) what was before the making of the Act (b) what was the mischief or defect for which the law did not provide. (c) what is the remedy that the Act has provided and (d) what is the reason of the remedy. It states that the Courts must adopt the construction which suppresses the mischief and advances the remedy. The remedy that the Act has provided is for smooth and planned development of the areas brought under the Act through the development schemes. …………………………………. Of late, the tendency of raising unlawful construction and unauthorized encroachment is increasing in almost all metropolitan cities and such activities are required to be dealt with by firm hands. Such unlawful constructions are against public interest and hazardous to the safety of occupiers and residents of multi-storied buildings. In a recent decision of the Apex Court in Friends Colony Development Committee v. State of Orissa and others Friends Colony Development Committee v. State of Orissa and others Friends Colony Development Committee v. State of Orissa and others 2004 (8) SCC 733 , Lahoti, C.J., speaking for the Bench, observed as under: In all developed and developing countries, there is emphasis on planned development of cities which is sought to be achieved by zoning, planning and regulating building construction activity. Such planning, though highly complex, is a matter based on scientific research, study and experience leading to rationalization of laws by way of legislative enactments and rules and regulations framed thereunder. Zoning and planning do result in hardship to individual property owners as their freedom to use their property in the way they like is subjected to regulation and control. Such planning, though highly complex, is a matter based on scientific research, study and experience leading to rationalization of laws by way of legislative enactments and rules and regulations framed thereunder. Zoning and planning do result in hardship to individual property owners as their freedom to use their property in the way they like is subjected to regulation and control. The private owners are to some extent prevented from making the most profitable use of their property. But for this reason alone the controlling regulations cannot be termed as arbitrary or unreasonable. The private interest stands subordinate to the public good. It can be stated in a way that power to plan development of city and to regulate the building activity therein flows from the police-power of the State. The exercise of such Governmental power is justified on account of it being reasonably necessary for the public health, safety, morals or general welfare and ecological considerations; though an unnecessary or unreasonable intermeddling with the private ownership of the property may not be justified.”" 15. When the petitioner has scant respect for law, we do not think he is entitled to invoke Article 226 of the Constitution for a direction to the Corporation to renew the lease. No right inheres in the petitioner to make such a demand. It is also relevant to note that the petitioner filed a civil suit in O.S. No. 2986 of 2002 for the relief of permanent injunction restraining the respondent from demolishing the suit property. The interim injunction sought for by him and which was granted and on 10.6.2002 was made absolute till the Government disposed of the petition filed by him under Section 44 of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act and his petition regarding the renewal of lease is disposed of by the Corporation. The petitioners request for renewal of lease has already been rejected and the Government has also dismissed his appeal filed against the order passed by C.M.D.A. The suit filed by the petitioner has also been dismissed for default, as seen from the counter filed by the Corporation in W.P.M.P. No. 31010 of 2004. 16. The petitioner has no right to remain in the land owned by the Corporation. The land is required by the Corporation to widen the road. The petitioner has not produced any document to show his entitlement. 16. The petitioner has no right to remain in the land owned by the Corporation. The land is required by the Corporation to widen the road. The petitioner has not produced any document to show his entitlement. The superstructure has been put up without obtaining any permission. The petitioners application for regularization has been rejected. The averments sworn to by the petitioner in his affidavit are without truth. We are not persuaded by the plea made on behalf of the petitioner that there are other constructions similarly situated like the building belonging to the petitioner on the same road, against which no action has been taken. That cannot be a ground to permit the illegal construction of the petitioner to remain. We are sure, if there are any such offending constructions, the Corporation will initiate action in accordance with law. The Corporation has, in fact, produced before us, copies of the notices issued to lessees of such properties. 17. For all these reasons, the writ appeals are allowed and the writ petitions are dismissed. Consequently, W.A.M.P. No. 2512 of 2005, W.A.M.P. No. 3422 of 2004, W.P.M.P. Nos.10410, 10411, 32564 and 32565 of 2004 are closed.