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2006 DIGILAW 907 (GAU)

H. M. Caire v. Union of India

2006-09-25

AMITAVA ROY

body2006
JUDGMENT Amitava Roy, J. 1. The Petitioner seeks the intervention of this Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction in the probe launched by the Central Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter for short as the 'CBI') and the clearance there for, granted by the Ministry of Human Resources Development, Govt. of India. He contends that the process lacks the approval of the Central Government within the meaning of Section 6A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). By order dated 04.08.2005 passed in the interim, the investigation undertaken by the CBI has been kept in abeyance. 2. I have heard Mr. G.K. Bhattacharjee, Senior Advocate assisted by Ms. P. Barman, Advocate for the Petitioner, Mr. Hasibur Rahman, learned Assistant Solicitor General, Government of India for Respondents No. 1 to 4 and Mr. D.K. Das, learned Standing counsel, CBI for Respondent No. 5. 3. A summary of the pleaded facts is essential to appreciate the rival submissions. The Petitioner, who belongs to the Indian Administrative Service of 1978 batch and allotted to the Assam Cadre, is presently holding the post of Principal Secretary to the Government of India, Department of Public Enterprise. From 1998 to 2004, he was posted as the Commissioner, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan New Delhi. According to him, the Sangathan is an organization set up by the Ministry of Education, Union of India and is registered as a Society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, but is basically a wing of the Ministry of Human Resources Development (hereinafter for short also referred to as the 'HRD'). He has pleaded that while he was under training at the Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi, in the month of January 2005, he came across an article in the issue dated 16.01.2005 of the Magazine India Today under the caption "Schools of Scandal", disclosing that following an internal audit in the affairs of the Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan by the HRD, large scale financial irregularities having been detected an enquiry into the same was to be conducted; by the CBI. He, therefore, addressed a letter dated 10.05.2005 to the Ministry of HRD, offering his comments on the alleged irregularities as detailed in the said article. He, therefore, addressed a letter dated 10.05.2005 to the Ministry of HRD, offering his comments on the alleged irregularities as detailed in the said article. In the meantime, he had received a letter on 09.05.2005 from the Joint Secretary, HRD on the same subject inter alia, to the effect that no reply had been received from him to the memorandum dated 07.02.2005, recording the alleged irregularities, which had been earlier forwarded to him. Thereby, he was asked to submit his reply by 20.05.2005. In response thereto, the Petitioner on 18.05.2005 addressed a letter to the Joint Secretary, Government of India, HRD, intimating the latter that the memorandum dated 07.02.2005, had not been received by him. He requested that a copy thereof, be forwarded to him and also prayed for extension of time for submission of his comments. A copy of the said office memorandum was forwarded to the Petitioner on 19.05.2005, to which he submitted his reply on 27.05.2005 to the Secretary, Govt. of India Education Department. He came to learn thereafter that before seeking the above explanation, the Secretary, Ministry of HRD, had in the meantime, referred the matter to the CBI for investigation in the first week of April, 2005. Having come to learn further that the approval for such investigation had been granted by the Secretary, HRD on 15.05.2005 under Section 6A of the Act, he endeavoured to collect a copy thereof, but could not do so. The Petitioner has contended that the post of Commissioner Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan, is equivalent to that of a Joint Secretary, Govt. of India and that his cadre controlling authority is the Ministry of Personal, Public Grievances and Pensions (Department of Personal and Training) (hereinafter referred to as the 'Ministry of Personal etc. DOPT') and that he had been placed under the administrative control of the HRD during his stint under the Sangathan. He, therefore maintained that the approval under Section 6A of the Act, was required to be accorded by the Ministry of Personal etc. and not by the Ministry of HRD. Having been appointed by the President of India to the Indian Administrative Service, according to the Petitioner, Central Government within the meaning of Section 6A of the Act, connotes (cannot) be the President of India through the Ministry of Personnel etc. and not by the Ministry of HRD. Having been appointed by the President of India to the Indian Administrative Service, according to the Petitioner, Central Government within the meaning of Section 6A of the Act, connotes (cannot) be the President of India through the Ministry of Personnel etc. The purported approval has been assailed to be without any legal authority besides being prompted by extraneous considerations frustrating the underlying purpose of protecting officers against arbitrary and vindictive action by the Government, as ingrained in the above provision of the Act. It has been further contended that the imputations contend in the memorandum dated 07.02.2005, even if, accepted in their entirety, do not disclose any offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1998 or the Indian Penal Code. Further, the grant of such approval before the expiry of the time granted to him for submission of his replies to the accusations smacks of mala fide besides being violative of the principles of natural justice and fairness in action. 4. In their written response, the Respondents No 1 to 4, while, contending that the Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan functions under the Ministry of Human Resources Development, Department of Secondary and Higher Education, have pleaded that in terms of the memorandum of association of the Sangathan three sub committees of Board of Governors namely, (i) Finance Committee, (ii) Works Committee and (iii) Academic Advisory Committee, are in office. During the period between 07.09.2001 and 09.10.2004, the Board of Governors did not assemble and the sole responsibility lay on the Petitioner, who then was functioning as the Chief Executive of the Sangathan. It was thus his responsibility to examine the legality of the actions and decisions to be taken and the procedures to be adopted before placing any proposal before the Board of Governors or in absence thereof, the Chairman of the Sangathan. While, denying that the matter was referred to the CBI for investigation with the approval of the Secretary, Department of Secondary and Higher Education, the answering Respondents have maintained that the approval of the in-charge i.e. Minister for HRD, had been obtained and was ratified by the Department of Personal etc. It was clarified that the Department of personal and Training, Ministry of Personal, Public Grievances etc. It was clarified that the Department of personal and Training, Ministry of Personal, Public Grievances etc. was officially consulted by the Ministry of HRD and that only thereafter the Ministry for HRD accorded the approval as required under Section 6A of the Act. According to the answering Respondents, the investigation has been ordered only after financial irregularities and procedural lapses were prima facie detected following a detailed inquiry conducted by the office of Chief Controller Accounts. The Respondent No. 5, CBI, in its counter has disclosed that it received of a written complaint dated 07.02.2005 from the Joint Secretary to the Govt. of India, Ministry of HRD, Department of Secondary Education, alleging that the Petitioner, while posted as Commissioner, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan, New Delhi, had allotted land worth nearly Rs. 62 crores on 30 years lease, free of cost to various builders for construction of swimming pool, gymnasium on a building operative transfer basis by flouting the relevant rules and requirements, which disclosed a prima facie case for inquiry by it. Accordingly, the Ministry of HRD was requested to grant permission to proceed with the inquiry as required under Section 6A of the Act and on such permission being accorded by its (Ministry of HRD) letter dated 19.05.2005, preliminary inquiry vide No. PE 11 (A)/2005-DLI/AEB, was registered on 06.06.2005 in the CBIASB Branch, New Delhi, which is in progress. The answering Respondent has dismissed the plea of want of approval by the appropriate authority contending that the necessary permission had been granted by the Ministry of HRD with the consent of the competent authority. 5. Mr. Bhattacharjee, has urged that the approval within the meaning of Section 6A of the Act, in the instant case, not having been accorded by the Department of Personal etc. the investigation initiated by the CBI, is wholly incompetent and is liable to be adjudged null and void. According to the learned Senior counsel, the Petitioner being a member of the Indian Administrative Service (hereinafter for short as the 'IAS'), appointed by the President of India and being removable from service by the said authority through the Department of Personal etc. mere consultation with the said department, is not a sufficient compliance of the mandatory prescription of Section 6A of the Act. Drawing an analogy from Section 19 of the Prevention of the Corruption Act, 1998 (hereinafter referred to as the PC 'Act'), Mr. mere consultation with the said department, is not a sufficient compliance of the mandatory prescription of Section 6A of the Act. Drawing an analogy from Section 19 of the Prevention of the Corruption Act, 1998 (hereinafter referred to as the PC 'Act'), Mr. Bhattacharjee has emphatically asserted that the underlying objective thereof, being akin to that of Section 6A of the Act, nothing short of an approval by the authority competent to remove the Petitioner can empower the CBI to validity investigate into any imputation against an officer contemplated under the above provision of the Act. The end objective of the constraint discernible in Section 6A of the Act being to protect the officers specified therein, from the ignominy of vexatious, scandalous and malicious investigations, a rigorous adherence to the mandate thereof, is imperative and, therefore, prior approval for such investigation by the authority competent to appoint and remove the officer concerned is an essential precondition for the legitimacy thereof. In support of this contention in particular, Mr. Bhattacharjee invited the attention of this Court to the single directive figuring in Vineet Narayan v. Union of India and Anr. (1998) 1 SCC 226 . The learned Senior counsel for the Petitioner further urged that the charges levelled against the Petitioner, are unfounded and that he is sought to be harassed and persecuted with the change of government in power. To buttress his arguments, he relied on the decisions of Apex Court in AIR 1981 SC 20 The State of Rajasthan v. Dr. A.K. Datta (1984) 2 SCC 183 R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay (2003) 9 SCC 504 P.A. Mohandas v. State of Kerala. 6. The learned Assistant Solicitor General in his endeavour to sustain the impugned decision referred to the letter dated 12.05.2005 of the Department of Personnel etc. available in the records to urge that the Ministry of HRD was the appropriate authority to grant approval for investigation by the CBI into the charges levelled against the Petitioner. He however, contended that the records would reveal the reason for consultation by the Ministry of HRD with the Department of Personal Training etc. in the matter. Mr. Rahman, in all, maintained that the approval as required under Section 6A of the Act, had been validity obtained and that the Petitioner's grouse to the contrary, is untenable in law and on facts. Mr. in the matter. Mr. Rahman, in all, maintained that the approval as required under Section 6A of the Act, had been validity obtained and that the Petitioner's grouse to the contrary, is untenable in law and on facts. Mr. Das, while, endorsing the above, argued that the analogy of sanction for prosecution either under the PC Act or the Criminal Procedure Code in the contextual facts, is wholly misplaced. The approval comprehended in Section 6A of the Act, being only for the purpose of permitting investigation thereunder, the rigour of sanction under the above two legislations, cannot be imported into it. As Section 6A does not enjoin that the authority for such approval has to be the one competent to remove the officer concerned, such a prescription cannot be inferred and, therefore, the Petitioner's assertion to the said effect is ex facie flawed. According to Mr. Das, as the Petitioner at all material times to which the charges appertain, was under the administrative control of the Ministry of HRD, it validity granted the approval with due consultation with Department of Personnel etc. and therefore, the petition being misconceived is liable to be dismissed. Mr. Das, sought to rely on the decisions of the Apex Court in AIR 1962 SC 1573 R.R. Chari v. State of Uttar Pradesh and AIR 1996 SC 1910 State Through Anti-Corruption Bureau, Govt. of Maharashtra, Bombay v. Krishanchand Khushalchand Jagtiani) to reinforce his contentions. 7. Before adverting to the rival submissions for the evaluation thereof, it would be appropriate to have a brief survey of the authorities cited at the Bar. The validity of the sanction granted under Section 197 Code of Criminal Procedure for his prosecution was questioned by the Appellant in R.R. Chari (supra). At the relevant time, he was a permanent employee in a gazetted post under the Govt. of Assam, but his services had been lent to the Govt. of India, whereafter, he was appointed as the Deputy Director of Metals in the Munitions Production Department at Calcutta. Subsequent thereto, he became the Deputy Iron & Steel Controller, Kanpur Circle, a post he held during the period covered by the charges levelled against him, leading to his prosecution under various sections of Indian Penal Code and the Defence of India Regulations, 1939. Subsequent thereto, he became the Deputy Iron & Steel Controller, Kanpur Circle, a post he held during the period covered by the charges levelled against him, leading to his prosecution under various sections of Indian Penal Code and the Defence of India Regulations, 1939. After the period relevant for the charges, the Appellant had proceeded on leave and did not return to service either with the Govt. of India or the State Government. The Central Government, however, extended his leave and also placed him under suspension. It also accorded sanction for his prosecution. Though, at the initial stages of the trial, he took a preliminary objection urging invalidity of the sanction, the same was overruled and he was convicted. Negating a similar plea before it, the Apex Court observed that the basis of the assailment i.e. the assumption that at the time of sanction, the Appellant had ceased to be in the employment of the Govt. of India and had reverted to the State service, lacked factual support. It noticed the absence of any order of reversion by the Central Government repatriating him to his parent service and, therefore, held that at all relevant times, he continued to be in the employment of the former. Responding to the contention that the Appellant being a permanent employee in connection with the affairs of the State of Assam, his service, though, lent to the Govt. of India, the Governor of Assam, was the only authority to accord valid sanction for his prosecution under Section 197 of the Code, the Apex Court ruled that the office of employment at the relevant time, would be decisive to identify the authority competent to accord sanction. Observing that the Appellant at the relevant point of time had been employed in connection with the affairs of the Central Govt., the sanction for his prosecution was held to be valid. This decision understandably, has been pressed into service by the learned Counsel for the CBI to offset the argument that being in the substantive employment under the Department of Personnel etc., approval under Section 6A of the Act, sanction could not have been granted by the Ministry of HRD, which had borrowed his services for the period involved. 8. In State through Anti-Corruption Bureau, Govt. 8. In State through Anti-Corruption Bureau, Govt. of Maharashtra, Bombay (supra), the sanction for the prosecution of the Respondent and another employee of the Municipal Corporation, Greater Bombay, under Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter also referred to as the 'PC act') and Sections 161 & 65 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as the 'IPC') granted by the Municipal Commissioner of the aforementioned Corporation, was impugned to be incompetent and invalid being without the previous approval of the Standing Committee thereof. The Apex Court recalled its observations in K. Veeraswami v. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 655, that Section 6 of the PC Act, warranted a liberal construction so much so that the expression "authority competent to remove" used in section 6(1)(c) thereof, ought to be construed to mean also an authority without whose order or affirmation the public servant could not be removed. This observation was in the context of the plea raised therein, that a Judge of High Court can be removed only by an order of the President of India passed after an address by each House supported by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two thirds of the members of that House present and voting and presented to the President in the same session for such removal. It held that the motion passed by each House of Parliament with the special procedure prescribed under Article 124(4) would not have the consequence of removing the Judge from the office unless followed by an order of the President and, therefore, the latter could be considered as the authority to grant sanction for the prosecution of a Judge. It concluded in the contextual facts that by the same analogy the sanction accorded by the Commissioner without the previous approval of the standing committee was valid. It held the view that the object of Section6(1)(c) of the PC Act, or Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure though, being to insulate a public servant from unnecessary harassment resulting from institution of vexatious and frivolous criminal complaint against him, such a protection is neither absolute nor unqualified. 9. It held the view that the object of Section6(1)(c) of the PC Act, or Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure though, being to insulate a public servant from unnecessary harassment resulting from institution of vexatious and frivolous criminal complaint against him, such a protection is neither absolute nor unqualified. 9. The Respondent in The State of Rajasthan v. A.K. Datta (supra), who was employed as Officer-in-charge Desert and Gangetic Plains Zoological Survey of India, Jodhpur, faced a criminal charge, which after being investigated by the Special Police Establishment, Jaipur, resulted in a charge sheet against him. He was subsequent thereto, convicted under Section 5(1)(c) read with Section 5(2) of the PC Act 1947 and Section 471 of the IPC. Sanction for his prosecution was granted by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. In his appeal, the jurisdictional High Court held that the Ministry of Home Affairs was not the competent authority to accord sanction. Having regard to the Govt. of India (Allocation of Business) Rules 1961 as amended, the High Court held that prior to the amendment in 1965, the competent authority under the said Rules to provide sanction for offences investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment, was the Department of Personal (Karmik Vibhag), Cabinet Secretariat, where such sanction was required to be extended by the Central Government. The High Court noticed that the Zoological Survey of India functions under the Department of Science and Technology, allocated in the Ministry of Education and Social Welfare and, therefore, determined that in absence of any sanction for prosecution either by the Ministry of Education or the Department of Personnel (Karmik Vibhag), the trial Court had no jurisdiction take cognizance of the offences alleged against the Respondent. The sanction though, endeavoured to be saved by the State by falling back on the office memorandum dated 06.10.1948, where under the Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India on receipt of the relevant papers from the Inspector General of Police, Delhi, Special Police Establishment, was competent to issue the requisite sanction for prosecution, the same did not find favour with the Apex Court in absence of any material on record to indicate the subsistence of the said memorandum in the face of the aforementioned Rules in force since in 1961. The decision of the High Court was left un-interfered. 10. In PA. The decision of the High Court was left un-interfered. 10. In PA. Mohandas (supra), the Apex Court quashed the proceeding instituted against the Appellant under the PC Act, sustaining the plea of lack of sanction by the competent authority noticing that the Secretary (Vigilance), who accorded the same, had been so authorized only on and from 23.04.1994. The sanction having been granted before that date, it was determined to be incompetent and unauthorized. The Governor of Maharashtra as the facts in R.S. Nayak (supra), reveal on 28.07.1982, had granted sanction under Section 6 of the PC Act to prosecute the Respondent on the charges set out therein. On a compliant thereafter, being filed, the learned trial Court sustained the plea of the accused that though, in the meantime, he had ceased to be the Chief Minister of the State on the date of taking cognizance of the office, he was a sitting Member of the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly and being a public servant within the meaning of Section 21 IPC, no prosecution lay against him in absence of a sanction by the authority competent to remove him from his said office i.e. the Assembly. The Apex Court referring to the underlying object of the protection envisaged in Section 6 of the PC Act, observed that the terminus a quo for a valid sanction was the time when the Court was called upon to take cognizance of the offence and, therefore, if, when the offence was alleged to have been committed, the accused was a public servant but had ceased to be so at the time of the Courts cognizance thereof, no sanction was necessary. Elucidating that as a public servant becomes one on occupying the office with the power attached thereto, it held that a corrupt conduct is directly attributable to and flows from such power. The offence requiring sanction to be taken cognizance of, would be committed by the public servant by misusing or abusing the power of the office and, therefore, the authority competent to remove him from such office would be entitled to grant sanction. The offence requiring sanction to be taken cognizance of, would be committed by the public servant by misusing or abusing the power of the office and, therefore, the authority competent to remove him from such office would be entitled to grant sanction. The Apex Court, therefore, in categorical terms concluded that the sanction to prosecute can be granted by an authority competent to remove the public servant from the office, which he had misused or abused because that authority alone would be able to know, whether there had been a misuse or abuse of the office by the public servant and not some rank outsider. The Apex Court was of the opinion that the Legislature therefore, conferred power on the authority competent to remove the public servant from the office to grant sanction for the obvious reason that it would alone be able, when facts and evidence are placed before it to judge whether a serious offence had been committed or the prosecution would be either frivolous or speculative. It would be the said authority who would be in a best position to know about the power and the nature of functions dischargeable by the public servant and the manner in which the same had been abused or misused therefor. In that context, the Apex Court ruled that on a true construction of Section 6 of the PC Act, it was implicit that sanction of that competent authority alone would be necessary, which was competent to remove the public servant from the office, which he had allegedly misused or abused for corrupt motive and for which a prosecution was to be launched against him. The above observations have to be construed in the factual context of the case, in which the Respondents raised the plea of want of sanction of the Maharashtra State Assembly of which he at the relevant time was a Member, though, had in the meantime, ceased to be the Chief Minister of the State, his contention being that though the charges related to the period when he was the Chief Minister, he being a public servant as the MLA of the State, sanction of the State Assembly was a necessary precondition for his prosecution. 11. 11. The Apex Court, while responding to the complaint of the failure of the investigating agencies like, CBI and the Revenue Authorities in performing their duties and legal obligations to probe into issue relating about the "seizure" of Jain Diaries allegedly on the interference of the repositories of power in Vineet Narain (supra), was seized with the question of validity or otherwise of the Single Directive issued by the Government requiring prior sanction of the designated authority to initiate investigation by CBI against the officers of the Govt. and the public sector undertakings, nationalized bank above a certain level. The Single Directive was a consolidated set of instructions issued to the CBI by various Ministers/Departments laying down modalities for initiating an inquiry or registering a case against certain categories of Civil Servant. Directive No. 4/7 (3), which is relevant for the instant proceeding, is extracted hereinbelow for immediate reference: 4.7 (3)(i) In regard to any person who is or has been a decision-making level officer (Joint Secretary or equivalent or above in the Central Government or such officers as are or have been on deputation to a Public Sector Undertaking; officers of the Reserve Bank of India of the level equivalent to Joint Secretary or above in the Central Government, Executive Directors and above of the SEBI and Chairman & Managing Director and Executive Directors and such of the bank officers who are one level below the Board of Nationalized Banks), there should be prior sanction of the Secretary of the Ministry/Department concerned before SPE takes up any enquiry (PE or RC), including ordering search in respect of them. Without such sanction, no enquiry shall be initiated by the SPE. It was contended before the Apex Court that the purpose of the said directive was to protect the decision making level officers from the ignominy of malicious and vexatious investigations, so much so, to relieve them of the anxiety from the likelihood of harassment in taking honest decisions. The directive, however, was extendable only to the official acts. The question posed before the Apex Court was whether, the Single Directive was sustainable in the face of the provisions of the Act. The directive, however, was extendable only to the official acts. The question posed before the Apex Court was whether, the Single Directive was sustainable in the face of the provisions of the Act. It was held that though, under that statute, the overall administration of CBI vested in the Central Government, which by virtue of Section 3 signified the power to specify the offence or class of offences to be investigated by it, the same could not be construed to include within it, the control of the initiation and the actual process of investigation. The Apex Court ruled that once the CBI was empowered to investigate an offence as specified under Section 3, the process of investigation, including its initiation was to be governed by the statutory provisions providing for the initiation and the manner of investigation and was not envisioned within the sweep of "Superintendence" in Section4(1) of the Act. To put it differently, it was held that the word "Superintendence" in Section 4(1)could not be interpreted to permit supervision of actual investigation of the offence by the CBI contrary to the manner provided by the provisions of the Act. It held that once the jurisdiction was conferred on the CBI to investigate an offence by virtue of a notification under Section 3 of the Act, the powers of investigation were governed by the statutory provisions and they could not be estopped or curtailed by any executive instruction issued under Section 4(1) thereof. In the absence of any statutory requirement for prior permission or sanction for investigation, the same could not be prescribed as a condition precedent or initiation of the investigation once the jurisdiction was conferred on the CBI to investigate the offence by virtue of a notification under Section 3 of the Act, it held. The Apex Court noticed the absence of any provision in the Act predicating the requirement of previous sanction for investigation under PC Act or the Act. The Single Directive in view of the above determination, was therefore, held to be invalid. In essence, the Apex Court declined to sustain the Single Directive, as the same was incompatible with the scheme of the Act besides being repugnant to the statutory provisions governing the process of investigation including the initiation thereof, in absence of any enabling provision to that effect in the Legislation. 12. In essence, the Apex Court declined to sustain the Single Directive, as the same was incompatible with the scheme of the Act besides being repugnant to the statutory provisions governing the process of investigation including the initiation thereof, in absence of any enabling provision to that effect in the Legislation. 12. The Parliament enacted the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 (hereinafter also referred to as the 'Commission Act'), principally to confer a statutory status on the Central Vigilance Commission already set up by the Central Government by resolution of 1964, as an anti corruption measure. The resolution inter alia, provided that the Commission in the exercise of its powers and function would not be subordinate to any Ministry or Department, though, attached to the Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India and was endowed with the same degree of independence and autonomy, as the Union Public Service Commission. Following the recommendations of the Independent Review Committee set up by the Central Government and the decision of the Apex Court in Vineet Narain (supra), the Central Government Vigilance Commission Ordinance 1998, was promulgated and eventually the Commission Act came into existence. The Preamble of the legislation states it to be an enactment to provide for the Constitution of Central Vigilance Commission to inquire or cause inquires to be conducted into offences alleged to have been committed under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 by certain categories of public servants of the Central Government, Corporations established by or under a Central Act, Government Companies, Societies and Local Authorities owned or controlled by the Central Government and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Section 3 outlines the composition of the Central Vigilance Commission (hereinafter also referred to as the 'Commission'). Section 8 delineates its functions and powers, which inter alia are to exercise superintendence over the functioning of the Delhi Special Police Establishment in so far, as it is relates to investigation of offences committed amongst others under the Prevention of Corruption Act and to give directions to the Delhi Special Police Establishment for the purposes of discharging responsibilities entrusted to it under Section 4(1) of the Act. The commission has also been entrusted with the function of reviewing the progress of investigations conducted by the Delhi Special Police Establishment into offences alleged to have been committed under the PC Act. The commission has also been entrusted with the function of reviewing the progress of investigations conducted by the Delhi Special Police Establishment into offences alleged to have been committed under the PC Act. Section 26 of the Commission Act, enumerates the amendments to the Act. By the amended Section 4 thereof, the superintendence of the Delhi Special Police Establishment in so far, as it would relate to investigation of offences alleged to be committed under the PC Act, would vest in the Commission. Section 6 Anewly inserted in the Act and of utmost significance for the instant adjudication is extracted hereinbelow for ready reference: 6A Approval of Central Government to conduct inquiry or investigation - (1) The Delhi Special Establishment shall not conduct any inquiry or investigation into any offence alleged to have been committed under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1998) except with the previous approval of the Central Government where such allegations relates to. (a) The employees of the Central Government of the level of Joint Secretary and above; and (b) Such officers as are appointed by the Central Government in corporations established by or under any Central Act, Government Companies, Societies and local authorities owned or controlled by that Government. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1), no such approval be necessary for cases involving arrest of a person on the spot on the charge of accepting or attempting to accept any gratification other than legal remuneration referred to in Clause (c) of the Explanation of Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1998 (49 of 1998). A plain reading of the above provision proclaims the legislative edict against initiation of any inquiry or investigation by the Delhi Special Police Establishment into any offence alleged to have been committed under the PC Act, except with the previous approval of the Central Government, where, inter alia, the allegations pertain to employees of the Central Government of the level of the Joint Secretary and above, subject to the exception that such an approval would not be necessary in cases involving arrest of a person on the spot on the charge of accepting or attempting to accept gratification other than legal remuneration under Clause(c) of the Explanation to Section 7 of the PC Act. The Petitioner admittedly, at all relevant times held the grade of Joint Secretary with the Central Government and was a decision making level officer. There is no reservation that the prescription of Section 6A is extendable to him. 13. A plain reading of the provisions of Commission Act, does not suggest any legislative intention to project the Commission to be the alter ego of the Central Government, so as to be synonymous with each other for the purposes of the Act. Though, explicitly, the Commission has been conferred the powers to oversee the functioning of the Delhi Special Police Establishment and to issue directions to it in the matter of investigation of offences alleged to be committed under the PC Act as well as to review the progress of the related investigations, it can by no means be equated with the Central Government for the purposes cut out for it in the Act. In other words, the Commission, though, conferred with a statutory status, has been assigned an identity and a role distinctly different from that of the Central Government under the Act. The enactment of the Commission Act, therefore, having regard to its framework has no definitive bearing on the necessity of previous approval of the Central Government as envisioned in Section 6A of the Act. To put it differently "Central Government" conceptualized in the said provision of the Act cannot be perceived to be the Commission for the approval for initiation of the inquiry and/or the investigation by the CBI. This is significant in face of the premise in which the concerned Respondent authorities appear to have preceded in the matter, as the records reveal. 14. The background of invalidation of the Single Directive by the Judicial verdict Vineet Narain (supra) and the similitude in the essentiality of prior approval for initiation of an investigation/inquiry by the CBI against the decision making level officers (i.e. Joint Secretary or equivalent or above), makes it obvious that Section 6A is the legislative manifestation of the prescript contained in directive No. 4.7(3) quoted hereinabove. As a corollary, the backdrop of the amendment would logically be of guiding relevance to identify the authority of the Central Government comprehended to grant such approval. The "Mischief Rule" so commonly applied to decipher the intention of the legislature in interpreting a statue appears to be in place in the present context. As a corollary, the backdrop of the amendment would logically be of guiding relevance to identify the authority of the Central Government comprehended to grant such approval. The "Mischief Rule" so commonly applied to decipher the intention of the legislature in interpreting a statue appears to be in place in the present context. An extract from the celebrated work "The Interpretation of Statutes" by Maxwell 12th Edition page 40 seems appropriate: In Heydon's Case,65 in 1584, it was resolved by the Barons of the Exchequer (at P.7b) "that for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and considered : (1st). What was the common law before the making of the Act. (2nd). What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide. (3rd). What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth and. (4th). The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico." In 1898, Lindley M.R. said: "In order properly to interpret any statute it is as necessary now as it was when Lord Coke reported Heydon's Case to consider how the law stood when the statute to be construed was passed, what the mischief was for which the old law did not provide, and the remedy provide by the statute to cure that mischief."66 Although Judges are unlikely to propound forma, in their judgments the four questions in Heydon's Case, consideration of the "mischief or object of the enactment 66" is common, and will often provide the solution to a problem of interpretation. The following quote from same treatise at page 45 recognizes the maxim "construction ut res megis valent quam pereat If the choice, is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. 15. The proposition found expression in Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 44 (1), 4th Edn. Reissue Para 1474 pp. 906-07as hereinunder: Parliament intends that an enactment shall remedy a particular mischief and it is therefore presumed that Parliament intends that the court, when considering, in relation to the facts of the instant case, which of the opposing constructions of the enactment corresponds to its legal meaning, should find a construction which applies the remedy provided by it in such a way as to suppress that mischief. The doctrine originates in Heydon's Case 5 where the Barons of the Exchequer resolved that for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law), four things are to be discerned and considered: (1) what was the common law before the making of the Act; (2) what was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide; (3) what remedy Parliament has resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth; and (4) the true reason of the remedy, and then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall: (a) suppress the mischief and advance the remedy; and (b) suppress subtle inventions and evasions for the continuance of the mischief pro private commodo (for private benefit); and (c) add force and life to the cure and remedy according to the true intent of the makers of the Act pro publico (for the public good). This recognized cannon of interpretation has been consistently applied and it is unnecessary to burden the judgment by referring to the judicial pronouncements to the said effect. The Apex Court in J.P. Bonsai v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. This recognized cannon of interpretation has been consistently applied and it is unnecessary to burden the judgment by referring to the judicial pronouncements to the said effect. The Apex Court in J.P. Bonsai v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. (2003) 5 SCC 134 had enunciated that a statute is an edict of the Legislature and the elementary principle of interpreting or construing it is to gather the mens or sentential legis of the Legislature. 16. The above judicially enounced axiom of Interpretation of Statutes therefore, would provide the beacon light for the necessary insight into the issue that confers this Court. Unmistakably directive 4.7 (3) of the Single Directive had stipulated a peremptory precondition of prior approval for launching an inquiry or investigation by the CBI against a decision making level officer specified therein. The same imperative is discernible in Section 6A incorporated in the Act, after the annulment of the Single Directive in Vineet Narain (supra). The perceptible nexus between the two is too manifest to be disregarded. The legislative sanction against commencement of an enquiry or investigation by the CBI against officers enumerated in Section 6A of the Act, sans the prior approval of the Central Government is in unambiguous and emphatic terms. The incorporation of Section 6Aby the amendment to the Act is evidently to supply, the deficiency in the said statute noticed by the Apex Court in Vineet Narain (supra), while repudiating the Single Directive. This assumes significance as directive 4.7 (3) enjoined prior sanction of the Secretary of the Ministry/Department concerned to authorize the Special Police Establishment to initiate an inquiry or investigation against the decision making level officer concerned. The intention of the legislature underlying the introduction of Section6A of the Act, therefore, has to be fathomed in the above perspective. Noticeably, Section 6A refers to an inquiry or investigation into an offence alleged to be committed under the PC Act. The intention of the legislature underlying the introduction of Section6A of the Act, therefore, has to be fathomed in the above perspective. Noticeably, Section 6A refers to an inquiry or investigation into an offence alleged to be committed under the PC Act. Under Section 19 of that enactment, no Court would take cognizance of an offence punishable under the sections referred to therein and allegedly committed by a public servant except with the previous sanction of the Central Government in case he is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government or that of by the State Government, if he is employed in connection with the affairs of the State and is not removable from the office either by or with sanction of the State Government. In cases of any other person, the sanction has to be of the authority competent to remove him from his office. 17. The mandatory precondition for a Court to take cognizance of an offence specified in the above legal provision and alleged to have been committed by a public servant is thus in essence, the prior sanction of the authority competent to remove him from his office, if not removable in absence its endorsement to the said effect. Considering the fact that the investigation by the CBI under the Act, would initially be a fact finding drill paving the way for the necessary follow up action amongst others in the nature of criminal prosecution and departmental proceeding against the public servant concerned, the initiation of the process may surface as the decisive inaugural step in the eventual factual panorama. Indubitably in such an eventually the investigation would provide the foundation for all consequential actions likely to visit him with serious prejudicial consequences. The analogy of the essentialities of a valid sanction envisaged in Section 19 of the PC Act, to decipher the appropriate authority of the Central Government under Section 6A cannot thus be dismissed as irrelevant, illogical or irrational. A deductible interrelation is intelligibly discernible. 18. Under the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Discipline Rules'), "disciplinary authority" has been defined to mean an authority competent thereunder to impose on a member of the service any of the penalties specified in Rule 6. A deductible interrelation is intelligibly discernible. 18. Under the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Discipline Rules'), "disciplinary authority" has been defined to mean an authority competent thereunder to impose on a member of the service any of the penalties specified in Rule 6. The Petitioner is governed by the said Rules being a member of the Indian Administrative Service. Rule 7 of the Discipline Rules illustrates the authorities competent to institute a disciplinary proceeding and impose penalties on a member of such service. It enjoins that if the delinquent act, is committed by such member after his appointment to service, then, except in the eventualities contemplated in Clauses (i) to (vi) of Sub-rule 1 (b) thereof, the Central Government would alone be competent to institute the disciplinary proceeding against him and impose the penalties specified in Rule 6, which inter alia include that of removal from service. Rule 7(2) further postulates that the penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement would not be imposed on a member of a service except by an order of the Central Government. 19. That the Department of Personnel Training etc. is the administrative department of the Petitioner and that he is removable from the service by the order of the President to be noticed by the said department is not in dispute. 20. In the above scheme of statutory prescriptions, in my view, the authority empowered to remove a public servant from his office and authorized to sanction his prosecution under the PC Act, ought to be the same to grant approval under Section 6A for initiation of an enquiry or investigation against him by the CBI. Comprehension of two authorities one for the sanction for prosecution and the other for such inquiry or investigation would be a contradiction in terms and antithetical to the legislative framework involving the two statutes. Sanction for prosecution or approval for initiation of an investigation or inquiry logically would presuppose a subjective satisfaction derivable from the coeval objective materials. Comprehension of two different authorities for dominantly identical roles on the same matter, at two different stages of the process would be illogical. It thus appears to be conceptually incongruent that the authority for sanctioning prosecution, the foundation whereof, would be laid by the inquiry or investigation by the CBI would be different from the one approving such investigative probe. Comprehension of two different authorities for dominantly identical roles on the same matter, at two different stages of the process would be illogical. It thus appears to be conceptually incongruent that the authority for sanctioning prosecution, the foundation whereof, would be laid by the inquiry or investigation by the CBI would be different from the one approving such investigative probe. Yet another aspect deserves attention. Under the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961 (as amended) framed in exercise of powers under Article 77(3) of the Constitution of India, matters relating to vigilance and discipline, have been allotted to the Department of Personnel and Training etc. The relevant portion of the Rules to the above effect is extracted hereinbelow: III. Vigilance and discipline: 20. (a) Central Vigilance Commission; (b) All policy matters pertaining to vigilance and discipline among public servants; (c) Relationship between Members of Parliament and the Administration; 20. A The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (2 of 1947); the Central Bureau of Investigation (the Delhi Special Police Establishment including the legal division, the Technical Division, the Policy Division, and the Administration Division); the Food Offences Wing; and Economic Offences Wing. On a consideration of the above as a whole, I am therefore of the view that in the instant case, the Department of Personnel and Training etc. is the authority competent to grant approval under Section 6A of the Act for initiating the investigation against the Petitioner. The purpose of the said provision being to protect high ranking officers from the scourge of vexatious, scandalous and the frivolous investigations and resultant humiliation and disgrace the authorities entrusted with the power of according approval under Section 6A of the Act and sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act have to be indubitably the one and the same. Any other interpretation, in my view would introduce a discordant feature irreconcilable with the legislative intendment underlying the newly incorporated provision in the Act. The above view accords with the exposition in Anwar Hasan Khan v. Mohd. Shaft and Ors. (2001) 8 SCC 540 expounding the cardinal principle of harmonious construction of a statute. Any other interpretation, in my view would introduce a discordant feature irreconcilable with the legislative intendment underlying the newly incorporated provision in the Act. The above view accords with the exposition in Anwar Hasan Khan v. Mohd. Shaft and Ors. (2001) 8 SCC 540 expounding the cardinal principle of harmonious construction of a statute. The following extract from the decision of the Apex Court in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gatna of Vedem Vasco De Gama, (1990) 1 SCC 277 looks appropriate: It is settled that for interpreting a particular provision of an Act, the import and effect of the meaning of the words and phrases used in the statute have to be gathered from the text, the nature of the subject-matter and the purpose and intention of the statute. It is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that effort should be made in construing its provisions by avoiding a conflict and adopting a harmonious construction. The statute or rules made thereunder should be read as a whole and one provision should be construed with reference to the other provision to make the provision consistent with the object sought to be achieved. The well-known principle of harmonious construction is that effect should be given to all the provisions and a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a "dead letter" is not harmonious construction. … … … … … … 16. The paramount object in statutory interpretation is to discover what the legislature intended. This intention is primarily to be ascertained from the text of enactment in question. That does not mean the text is to be construed merely as a piece of prose, without reference to its nature or purpose. A Statute is neither a literary text nor a divine revelation. 'Words are certainly not crystals, transparent and unchanged' as Mr. Justice Holmes has wisely and properly warned. Towne v. Eisner 2 Learned Hand, J., was equally emphatic when he said : 'Statutes should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid, but with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them. Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensagage. The above precept of statutory interpretation is extendable to the schematic lay out of the legal provisions involved for sustaining the intended legislation design. Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensagage. The above precept of statutory interpretation is extendable to the schematic lay out of the legal provisions involved for sustaining the intended legislation design. The authorities cited on behalf of the Respondents turn on their facts and, therefore, are of no assistance to them in the present factual setting. 21. A perusal of the records produced, reveal that a complaint was made by the Joint Secretary to the Govt. of India, Ministry of Human Resource Development of Secondary and Higher Education (UT) Division to the Director CBI, New Delhi, pointing out the anomalies and the issue into which investigation by the agency was requested. The Joint Secretary, HRD vide his letter dated 02.04.2005 addressed to the Additional Secretary (S & V), Department of Personnel Training etc. sought for necessary orders of the competent authority of the Department of Personnel Training to enable the CBI to undertake the inquiry, it (DOPT) being the cadre controlling authority of the Petitioner. By the communication dated 12.05.2005, however, the Department of Personnel and Training opined that as the Single Directive had been struck down by the Apex Court, the Ministry of HRD ought to grant sanction for initiating the investigation after seeking approval of the Minister-in-Charge of that Ministry, in view of the provisions of the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003. The Ministry of HRD, thereafter, on 19.05.2005, granted approval under Section 6A of the Act, whereafter the preliminary inquiry against the Petitioner was registered by the CBI on 06.06.2005. It is thus apparent from the records that the Department of Personnel & Training etc. had not accorded any approval under Section 6A of the Act. A close scrutiny of the provisions of the Commission Act, does not sustain the view taken by the Department of Personnel & Training etc. abdicating its prerogative in law to grant approval to the initiation of the investigation by the CBI against the Petitioner. The impugned investigation is thus not authorized by the previous approval ordained by Section 6A of the Act. 22. In view of the above determination, I am, therefore, of the considered opinion that the investigation launched against the Petitioner is in derogation of the mandate of Section 6A of the Act and therefore is invalid and non est in law. The petition in the result succeeds. 22. In view of the above determination, I am, therefore, of the considered opinion that the investigation launched against the Petitioner is in derogation of the mandate of Section 6A of the Act and therefore is invalid and non est in law. The petition in the result succeeds. The approval granted by the Ministry of HRD for initiating he investigation against the Petitioner by the CBI and the preliminary investigation registered by the said agency against him, are therefore quashed. No costs. Petition allowed