JUDGMENT R. Gururajan, J. These petitions are filed by the State of Karnataka. Respondents - Assessees filed appeals under Sec. 22(1) of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act (for short 'The KST Act') and under Sec. 14(1) of the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods Act (for short 'The Entry Tax Act'). Sec. 22(3) of the KST Act would provide for proof of payment of one and a half of tax or another amount disputed and also a fee equal to two percent of the amount of assessment objected to for the purpose of maintaining an appeal. Sec. 14(3) of the Entry Tax Act would also provide for proof of payment of one and a half of tax or other amount disputed and also a fee equal of two percent of the amount of assessment objected to for the purpose of maintenance of an appeal. Assessees filed return in all these cases prior to amendment dtd. 1-8-2004. Appeals were filed subsequent to 1-8-2004 before the Karnataka appellate Tribunal. The question was as to whether these appeals require pre-deposit in terms of the amended section 22(3) of the KST Act and amended Sec. 14(3) of Entry Tax Act. The matter was referred to a Full Bench of the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal. The Full Bench by majority ruled that the amendment is not applicable to these cases in the light of the list having commenced prior to the amendment dtd. 1-8-2004. The commercial member however gave his dissention opinion. It is in these circumstances, these petitions are filed. The following questions of law would arise for our consideration; "1. Whether the amendment effected to sec. 22(3) of the KST Act Sec. 14(3) of the KTEG Act by Karnataka Amendment Act No. 26 of 2004 with effect from 1-08-2004 is procedural in nature or substantive in nature and whether the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal is justified in giving a finding that the said amendment is substantive in nature ? 2. Whether the tribunal is justified in giving a finding that the list commences on the date when the return is filed or is required to be filed ? 3. Whether the amendment effected to Sec. 22(3) of the KST Act and sec. 2. Whether the tribunal is justified in giving a finding that the list commences on the date when the return is filed or is required to be filed ? 3. Whether the amendment effected to Sec. 22(3) of the KST Act and sec. 14(3) of the KTEG Act would whittle down the substantive right of appeal acquired by the litigant under the un-amended provision of law ?" We have heard Smt. Sujatha, learned AGA, appearing for the State. She would say that subsequent amendment in terms of the amended Act is applicable to the facts of the case and pre-deposit in terms of the amended section is a must for maintaining an appeal filed under the Entry Tax Act as well as under the sales Tax Act. According to her, the date of return is not a factor for deposit in terms of the order of the Full Bench. She took us through various case laws to say that the finding of the tribunal requires our interference. Per contra, Sri Rabinathan, learned counsel and other learned counsel would argue that the list commences from the date of filing for the purpose of payment in these case. They would say that they have derived a vested right on account of non-deposit condition at the time of filing of the return. Pre deposit principal is applicable only to those proceedings, which were initiated subsequent to amendment. They would refer to various cease laws to convince the court that the tribunal was right in holding in their favour. After hearing, we have carefully perused the material on record. Sec. 22(3) would provide for an appeal being filed along with the proof of payment of one half of tax or other amount disputed and also a fee. So is the position under the Karnataka Entry Tax Act. Admittedly, in this case returns were filed prior to the Amended Act. First appeals were filed before the appellate authority and thereafter second appeals were filed before the tribunal. But the filings of the second appeals were subsequent to amendment. Therefore what is required to be considered by us is as to whether the amendment of pre-deposit is available to the assessee for the purpose of maintaining the appeal before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal. AIR 1953 SC 221 is a leading case on the subject. But the filings of the second appeals were subsequent to amendment. Therefore what is required to be considered by us is as to whether the amendment of pre-deposit is available to the assessee for the purpose of maintaining the appeal before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal. AIR 1953 SC 221 is a leading case on the subject. In the said case, the Supreme Court was considering Sec. 22(1) of the Act for the purpose of appeal. The Supreme Court in the said case would hold that for the purpose of the accrual of the right of appeal the critical and relevant date is the date of initiation of the proceedings and not the decision itself. In AIR 57 SC 540, the Supreme Court considered the right of appeal and also a vested right. The court ruled as under; "(i) .... (ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right. (iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit. (iv) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and form the date the list commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceedings and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal. (v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise." In 1960 SC 980 court ruled that amendment of statute impairing right is not merely procedural. The Court was considering the Court Fees Act. In 1970 (26) STC 10 , the Apex Court ruled that appeals against the assessments were filed after the amendment. It is therefore not correct to say that the Amending Act has been given retrospective effect in the matter. The Court was considering the Court Fees Act. In 1970 (26) STC 10 , the Apex Court ruled that appeals against the assessments were filed after the amendment. It is therefore not correct to say that the Amending Act has been given retrospective effect in the matter. In AIR 2001 SC 2472 court ruled that the Amending Act being prospective in operation does not affect the rights of the parties to the litigation on the date of adjudication of the pre-emption suit and the appellate court is not required to take into account or give effect to the substituted S. 15 introduced by the amending Act. 254 ITR 772 is a judgment of the Supreme court and in the said case, the Supreme Court ruled that the taxing provisions imposing liability is governed by the normal presumption that it is not retrospective and the settled principle of law is that the law to be applied is that which is in force in the assessment year unless otherwise provided expressly or by necessary implication. The Punjab and Haryana High Court in 136 ITR 261 ruled that right of appeal is a vested right and accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the list commences. Such right is actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced. Such right is to be governed by the law prevailing on the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails on the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal. The Court also ruled in para 36 and 37 as under; "36. In civil proceedings, list commences on the presentation of the plaint or in cases claiming compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act on filing claim application. The question is when list can be said to commence under the taxation laws. Section 25 of the HGST Act enjoins a duty upon an assessee to file quarterly return and deposit tax thereon. If such returns are accepted, there is no list. Consequently, there would be no occasion for the parties to file an appeal. However if such returns are not accepted, the cause of action which arise on the date when returns are required to be filed. If such returns are accepted, there is no list. Consequently, there would be no occasion for the parties to file an appeal. However if such returns are not accepted, the cause of action which arise on the date when returns are required to be filed. The cause of action can be said to be arisen also when an assessee is called upon to furnish return on his failure to do so in terms of the provisions of the old Act. In fact that is the relevant date as in Vitthalbhai Naranbhai Patel's case (1961) 12 STC 219 (SC) AIR 1967 SC 344 . 37. In view of the above discussion, we hold that right of appeal is a vested right as if exists on the date of commencement of list. The list can be said to commence under the HGST Act on the date when return is filed or is required to be filed. Therefore, the provisions of Sec. 39(5) of the HGST Act would continue to govern the right of appeal vested in the petitioner which is saved in terms of Sec. 4 of the Punjab General Clauses Act (as applicable to state of Haryana)." The Madras High Court in 147 STC after noticing the judgment of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in 136 ITR 261, held as under; "The crucial date on which the right of the assessees to prefer an appeal under Sec. 31 or Sec. 36 of the Act is the date on which the returns are filed under the Act. In all these appeals returns were filed long prior to the date when the provisions of Sec. 31 of the Act was amended by virtue of Act 14 of provisions of Sec. 31 of the Act was amended by virtue of Act 14 of 1999. Further more, it is not disputed by the parties that the aforesaid amendments to the Act have not been given retrospective effect as and from an anterior date and those amendments are prospective. Therefore, the appeals are liable to be entertained without insisting on pre-deposit of 25% of the dispute tax as per the amended provisions of the Act." A Division Bench of this court in 1968 22 STC 537 noticed the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1957 SC 540 referred to above and thereafter it has ruled as under : "We do not agree. Rule 30-B empowers the Deputy Commissioner to direct the appellant who asks for an order of stay in an appeal preferred to him, to furnish either personal security or property security or security in the form of bank guarantee. This rule was in force when the petitioner filed his appeal before the Deputy Commissioner, and so, the non-existence of that rule at the time when the petitioner produced his returns before the Commercial Tax Officer has no materiality. The power under that rule was exercised by the Deputy Commissioner after it became available to him, and the enunciation made by the Supreme Court in AIR 1957 SC 540 in which it was elucidated that the institution of a suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto. During the rest of the career of the suit, does not assist the argument now placed before us by Mr. Katageri." The right to prefer an appeal was not to any extent impaired by Rule 30-E and even under the proviso the Sec. 20(5) of the Act the Deputy Commissioner has the discretion to select the form of the security to be furnished by the petitioner. We are therefore of the opinion that the direction made by the Deputy Commissioner under Rule 30-B was fully within the competence and so, we dismiss these revision petitions. No costs. A Division Bench of this court in ILR 1991 KAR 582 after noticing the judgments in 1953 4 STC 14 and AIR 1957 SC 540 ruled as under; "12. It is the firmly established judicial view that the right of appeal is not an inherent right so also it is not a fundamental right. The right of appeal is a mere creature of the statute and it is open to the legislature which creates such a right equally to take away the same if necessary." The court further ruled in para 14 as under; "14. Section 22(3A) and 22(5) of the Act, as amended by Amendment Act 15/1998 has neither taken away nor curtailed nor crippled the right of appeal. What is taken away is only the power of the appellate tribunal to grant stay that too in second appeals. Section 22(3A) and 22(5) of the Act, as amended by Amendment Act 15/1998 has neither taken away nor curtailed nor crippled the right of appeal. What is taken away is only the power of the appellate tribunal to grant stay that too in second appeals. The learned Government Advocate effectively met the arguments of the writ petitioners that the amended provisions of the Act are opposed to Art. 14 of the Constitution of India by submitting that by amended provisions the power to grant stay is conferred on the tribunal in case of appeals filed against the orders made under Sec. 21 i.e., in case of first appeals and taken away the powers to grant stay in case of second appeals arising from the orders made under sec. 20 of the Act, and as such there is nothing to say that the amended provisions in question were violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. In our view, this submission of the learned Government Advocate merits acceptance." These judgments were pressed into service by the State. In fact, another Division Bench in ILR 1994 KAR 1982 considered the deposit under the Workmen's Compensation Act and ruled that it is now well settled that the appeal is the creation of statute and it is open to the legislators to give a fettered right of appeal or unfettered right of appeal as the legislative policy requires in the given set of circumstances for catering to which the statute is enacted. From the material in record, it is seen that admittedly, assessees filed return before the date amendment. Admittedly a first appeal was filed. It was only when the second appeal was filed, the amendment has come into force. All the decisions cited by the assessee were that of first appeal and not of second appeal. Even the Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court (136 STC 261) did not consider the effect of a second appeal in the light of the amendment at the time of filing of the second appeal. Therefore at this stage, we must notice two binding judgments of this court. The first case is reported in 22 STC 536, wherein this court after noticing AIR 1957 SC 540 has ruled that non-existence of the rule at the time of filing of the return before the Commercial Tax Officer has no materiality. Therefore at this stage, we must notice two binding judgments of this court. The first case is reported in 22 STC 536, wherein this court after noticing AIR 1957 SC 540 has ruled that non-existence of the rule at the time of filing of the return before the Commercial Tax Officer has no materiality. In fact in the subsequent judgment in ILR 1991 KAR 582, this court after noticing AIR 1953 SC 221 and AIR 1957 SC 540 has ruled that right of an appeal is not an inherent right and so also it is not a fundamental right. The right of appeal is a mere creature of the statute and it is open to the legislature, which creates such a right equally to take away the same if necessary. The Division Bench has further ruled that Section 22(3A) and 22(5) of the Act, as amended by Amendment Act 15/1998 has neither taken away nor curtailed nor crippled the right of appeal. What is taken away is only the power of the appellate tribunal to grant stay that too in second appeals. We are bound by the judgments of this court. In our view, the insistence on payment of pre-deposit at the time of filing of second appeal cannot be considered to be taking away any vested right as sought to be argued by the assessees. The consideration of appeal is only restricted in the sense that some deposit is insisted in terms of the Act. The said amendment in our view, cannot said to result in depriving any right of an assessee as argued before us. Though the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in 136 STC 261 and Madras High Court in 147 STC 218 have dealt with the questions of law, they have not chosen to consider the character of the second appeal in terms of the statute in those judgments. On the other hand, the two Division Benches of this court have chosen to say that no right of the assessee is taken away that too in second appeals while considering the statutory condition in the second appeal. Therefore we deem it proper to follow the judgments of this court in accepting the argument of the State. At this stage, we must observe that the State Government depends upon the tax collection for its policy and programmers. Therefore we deem it proper to follow the judgments of this court in accepting the argument of the State. At this stage, we must observe that the State Government depends upon the tax collection for its policy and programmers. Large sums of money are involved in Sales Tax matters. The Government cannot run without any money and what is insisted upon is only half of the amount in terms of the statute. Taking into consideration all aspects of the matter, we are of the view that questions of law so raised in the case on hand are to be answered in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. However, we deem it proper to say that these assessees are not to be put to any difficulty on account of this order and hence we deem it proper to direct the tribunal to accept these appeals in the event of their complying with the relevant provisions of law in the matter of deposit within four weeks from today. In the event of compliance, the tribunal is to consider the case on merits. In the result, these appeals are accepted. Questions of law are answered in favour of the revenue with the above observations. By accepting the condition in the Amendment Act, we are not giving any retrospective operation, on the other hand, we are only interpreting the section for the purpose of payment in this order. No costs.