JUDGMENT Amareshwar Sahay, J. 1. The Order dated 26.06.1992, contained in Annexure - 4 to the Writ Application, passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bokaro Steel City, Bokaro in B.S.E. Case No. 1 of 1991 has been challenged by the petitioner in this writ application whereby, the learned Labour Court dismissed the Complaint Petition filed by the petitioner purported to be under Section 26(2) of the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act, 1953 holding that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint filed by the Complainant-Petitioner in view of the fact that the provisions of the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act, 1953 would not be applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case and it was observed that the Complainant may raise an industrial dispute and get the same referred under Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for adjudication. 2. Mr. Kalyan Roy, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that against the filing of the Complaint under Section 26(2) of the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act, 1953 by the petitioner, the Respondent No. 2 - Management, challenged the same by filing a Writ Application before this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 2074 of 1991 (R) and this Court, by order dated 30.09.1991 (Annexure - 3) passed the following order: At this stage, we are not inclined to entertain this writ petition in which the jurisdiction of Respondent No. 3 to entertain the complaint filed by Respondent No. 2 under Shops Act has been challenged. The petitioner may, in the event the final order of Respondent No. 3 goes against them, challenge the order by taking all objections that may be available to them. The application is dismissed. 3. Mr. Roy submitted that in view of the above mentioned order, in fact the Labour Court was directed to decide all the points raised by the parties and therefore, it could not have dismissed the petition filed by the petitioner under Section 26(2) of the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act, 1953 on a preliminary issue of jurisdiction. In fact, the Labour Court ought to have decided the entire issue raised before it. 4. By citing a decision in the case of D.P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration and Ors. , Mr. In fact, the Labour Court ought to have decided the entire issue raised before it. 4. By citing a decision in the case of D.P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration and Ors. , Mr. Roy submitted that the Supreme Court, while dealing with case under Section 10(1)(c) and Section 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, has held that the Tribunal should decided all the issues raised before it whether preliminary or otherwise at the same time. 5. From perusal of the impugned order, it appears that the Labour Court held that the preliminary issue with regard to jurisdiction of the Court was going to the root of the case and if it was accepted than he would have no jurisdiction to proceed with the matter and the entire proceedings would become nullity. Accordingly, he took up the issue of jurisdiction of the Court as preliminary issue. The Labour Court has held that since the Respondent Company i.e. Bharat Refractories Limited of which the Complainant-Petitioner was an employee, was engaged in production, manufacture and marketing of the Fire Bricks, Furness Lining Bricks etc. which, under the declaration under Section 2 of the Industrial Development and Regulation Act, 1951 read with Item No. 34 of the First Schedule thereto, the Union has taken under its control the industries of manufacturing Fire Bricks etc. and therefore, the provisions of Bihar Shops and Establishments Act, 1953 do not apply to the establishment of the respondent Company. 6. In my view, the Labour Court did not commit any wrong in deciding the question of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue since it was going to the root of the matter. In the order of the High Court quoted above also, there is nothing that the Labour Court was precluded from deciding the issue of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue. 7. The reasoning assigned in the impugned Order for holding that Bihar Shops and Establishments Act, 1953 was not applicable so far as the respondent Company was concerned, since it was engaged in production, manufacturing and marketing of Fire Bricks etc. which was under the control of the Union, is perfectly legal and valid. I do not find any error in the impugned order. Consequently, this application has got no merit and the same is dismissed. However, there shall be nor order as to costs.