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2006 DIGILAW 917 (GAU)

Tata Tea Limited v. B. V. P. Rao

2006-09-26

H.N.SARMA

body2006
JUDGMENT H.N. Sarma, J. 1. The Petitioners/Defendants in TS No. 192/97 pending in the Court of the Civil Judge (Sr. division) No. 1, Guwahati, having failed to get the plaint of the suit returned under Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure, from the learned trial Court as per order dated 22.7.2002 has approached this Court by filing this petition under Article 227 read with Sections 115/151, Code of Civil Procedure, challenging the same. 2. The Respondent/Plaintiff brought a civil action against the Petitioners/Defendants praying for a declaratory decree that the Respondents/Defendants have caused injury and damage to the reputation of the Plaintiff and for realization of a sum of Rs. 1 crore as damages for such loss of reputation from the Petitioners/Defendants. 3. The case as pleaded by the Plaintiff, inter alia, is that he is a member of the Indian Administrative Service and during the relevant time he was serving as the Commissioner and Secretary to the Government of Assam, Department of Power, Mines and Minerals; that the Plaintiff was a member of Indian Equestrian Team (Tent Pegging) from 1985 to 1990; that he was appointed as OSD in the Sports Authority of India in the year 1985 to 1990; that he has built up a good reputation in the field of sports; that he served as District Magistrate, Jorhat in the year 1990 during which period his service was greatly recognized by the armed forces. It is further pleaded that from early 1994 upto June 1996, the Plaintiff was posted as the Home Secretary of the State of Assam and has built up an extraordinary reputation as an outstanding officer. It is further pleaded that from early 1994 upto June 1996, the Plaintiff was posted as the Home Secretary of the State of Assam and has built up an extraordinary reputation as an outstanding officer. It is also pleaded that the Defendant No. 1 is a company of high repute having twenty three tea gardens in various States and considered to be a leader in the tea industry; that due to series of events in the month of September, 1997, the Defendant No. 1 had to face police investigation on its alleged involvement with the banned militant organization in the State and the said investigations are still continuing; that a news item published in "The Sentinel" in its issue dated 20.9.97 under the caption "TTL has contact with Paresh" disclosing that the Defendant company is maintaining regular contact with ULFA, particularly, with its Commander-in-Chief which was published over 100 leading news papers of the country publishing its purported version seeking to justify its actions which is under investigation of police and evoked strong reaction amongst the people. It is further pleaded that in the said press release it was mentioned that a copy of the letter dated 4.1.96 from the Defendant company to ULFA has been released to the press highlighting that prior to issuance of the said letter dated 4.1.96, the Defendant company met the Home Secretary of Assam and has sought protection and help to deal with the threat but no assistance or help was provided and the copy of the said letter was also sent to the State Government and the Government of Assam is fully aware of the said letter dated 4.1.96 of the company to the ULFA. Further pleaded case of the Plaintiff is that news item was published in "The Economic Times" in its issue dated 26.9.97 under the heading "Tata Tea kept Assam Govt, updated on Ulfa, reveals letter" wherein it is stated that it is evident from the letter of TATA Tea to the Plaintiff dated 9.1.96 that immediately after the company received ULFA's letter dated 18.12.95, two company officials met the Plaintiff and handed over a copy of the said letter and sought protection and help from the Government. It is also pleaded that the Defendant company through its press release by making a statement took stand that the Defendants having received the said letter dated 18.12.95 from the banned organization immediately on the next date two officials of the company met the Home Secretary of the State of Assam on 19.12.95 and requested him for arrangement of necessary protection and security but there was no response from the Plaintiff. Thereafter, the company having received several phone calls from the banned organization they wrote a letter to ULFA on 4.1.96 that it is not possible for the company to accede to their request by providing the articles they sought for, etc. and vide letter dated 9.1.96, the Plaintiff was requested to make arrangement for tightening of the security but the Plaintiff neither responded nor reacted in any manner and remained silent and did not take any action. It is the pleaded case of the Plaintiff that the Plaintiff understood that on the basis of such stands of the Defendant company they seek to sustain an inference of inaction and even tacit approval on the part of the Plaintiff to the acts and omissions on the part of the company which is now under investigation. 4. At paragraph 17 of the plaint, it is alleged that the Defendant No. 2 and 3 carried a meeting with the Union Home Minister and Home Secretary and other high officials of the Union Home Ministry and when the same resulted no response, the press statement was released and for this reason, the Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 are impleaded as party Defendants in the suit. It is also alleged that a meeting was held on 10.1.96 in the office Chamber of the Chief Minister of the State wherein the Inspector General of Police (SB) and Director General of Police were also present and it was decided therein that the Plaintiff would immediately intimate the Defendants about the stand of the Government to the effect that no dialogue with banned organization should either be entered into or continued and no written correspondences should be entered pertaining to the banned organization alleging the press statement as gross distortion; misplace and suppression of facts which has caused harm and damage to the Plaintiff's reputation as a upright, honest and efficient officer, also causing Plaintiff's tremendous mental anguish, agony and pain. That on reading of the press statement and the news item published on behalf of the Defendant company in the news paper an opinion would be formed that the Plaintiff is a highly in efficient officer and/or inapt for higher duties and responsibilities and who has knowingly compromised in matters touching the security of the State and such statements are mischievous and false. Accordingly the alleged action of the Defendant company has the potential of injury to the reputation of the Plaintiff and hence, claiming damage of Rs. 1 Crore the aforesaid suit is filed, on the basis of those allegations. 5. The Defendant No. 1 contested the suit by filing written statement denying the allegations made by the Plaintiff and the other Defendants also adopted the said written statement. 6. Although the Defendants denied discloser of any cause of action for the suit in the plaint in their written statement, they also by filing a separate application under Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure, prayed for rejection of the plaint to which the Plaintiff filed a written objection. 7. The learned trial Court after hearing the parties rejected the said application of the Defendant Petitioners vide judgment and order dated 22.07.2002, which is the subject matter of challenge in this petition. 8. I have heard Mr. P.K. Goswami, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. U. Hazarika and Mr. J. Roy, Advocates for the Petitioners and Mr. D. Baruah, learned Counsel for the Respondent. 9. Referring to various paragraphs of the plaint having relevance to the cause of action for filing such a suit for damage by the Plaintiff, who is admittedly a Government officer qua the impugned publication, it is submitted by Mr. Goswami learned senior counsel that the suit itself is not maintainable and there is no cause of action for the suit and the same has not been filed bona fide and continuance of the same is grossly an abuse of process of the Court. In support of his contention Mr. Goswami has referred to the following decisions: 1] T. Arivandanam v. TV Satyapal and Anr. (1997) 4 SCC 467. 2] ITC Limited v. Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal and Ors. (1998) 2 SCC 70 . 3] R. Rajagopal Alias P.R. Gopal and Anr. v. State of TN and Ors. (1994) 6 SCC 632 . In support of his contention Mr. Goswami has referred to the following decisions: 1] T. Arivandanam v. TV Satyapal and Anr. (1997) 4 SCC 467. 2] ITC Limited v. Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal and Ors. (1998) 2 SCC 70 . 3] R. Rajagopal Alias P.R. Gopal and Anr. v. State of TN and Ors. (1994) 6 SCC 632 . 4] Hector v. Attorney General of Antigua and Barbuda 1990 (2) AER 103. 5] Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newsparers Ltd. and Ors. 1993 (1) AER 1013. 6] New York Times Co. v. L.B. Sullivan 376 US 254. Per contra, Mr. Baruah, the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff/Respondent, submits that the plaint contains all the necessary and relevant facts disclosing cause of action and the allegations made in the plaint could prove during trial entitling the Plaintiff to a decree as prayed for and the learned trial Court has rightly rejected such prayer of the Defendants after meticulous consideration of the relevant facts which requires no interfere. Mr. Baruah placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court reported in (2006) 3 SCC 100 and also tried to distinguish and explain the decision rendered by the Apex Court in Raja Gopal's case and T Aribondanam's case (supra) and contends that in deciding an application under Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure, the Plaintiff has to be read as a whole and it should be read meaningfully. Learned Counsel further highlighted the fact that for the alleged involvement of the official of the Defendant company with the militant an FIR having been lodged against some senior officials of the Defendant company, criminal investigation was started wherein they have been enjoying the privilege of bail as granted by the Apex Court. Mr. Goswami explaining the said fact submits that after granting bail by the Apex Court with certain observations to the officials of the Defendants way back in the year 1997, they have no information about the progress of the case and it must have ended with final report. However, Mr. Baruah in spite of specific equerry from the Court for which time was also granted, could not inform the Court about the result of the said investigation or otherwise about the said case. Hence, I do not consider the said aspect to be a guiding factor in adjudicating the issue involved in this petition. 10. However, Mr. Baruah in spite of specific equerry from the Court for which time was also granted, could not inform the Court about the result of the said investigation or otherwise about the said case. Hence, I do not consider the said aspect to be a guiding factor in adjudicating the issue involved in this petition. 10. In the conspectus of the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties juxtaposing the allegations and counter allegations, the point that falls for decision is as to whether the plaint, reading as it is with the documents annexed thereto falls within the mischief of Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure, justifying its rejection at the threshold. The notable feature of this case is that the suit is filed by the Plaintiff in his personal capacity and the State of Assam is not impleaded as a co-plaintiff or even as a proforma Defendant. Scrutiny of statements and averments made in the plaint in the light of the provision of Section 79, Order 27, Rules 2 and 3, Code of Civil Procedure, are clear indicative of this fact. 11. The crux of the Plaintiff's case is that by making press release dated 22.9.97 and 26.9.97 wherein it is stated that the Defendants prior to issuance of the letter dated 4.1.96 to the militant outfit met the Home Secretary of State of Assam and sought protection and assistance to deal with the threat but unfortunately no effective protection or help was provided, has defamed and/or damaged the established reputation of the Plaintiff. 12. The aforesaid two offending statements, as published, are enclosed as Document Nos. D1 and D2 of the plaint. But these two press release/news items have not addressed to or pointed to any Government Official personally. The said two documents including the other documents on which the Plaintiff has based his claim, nowhere have alleged any action or overt act on the part of the Plaintiff personally, nor it has been pleaded to be so in the plaint. The Plaintiff at paragraph 19 of the plaint has alleged that the contents of letter dated 9.1.96 is distortion of truth and such distortion has caused tremendous harm, damaged and loss to the reputation as an upright, honest and efficient officer. The Plaintiff at paragraph 19 of the plaint has alleged that the contents of letter dated 9.1.96 is distortion of truth and such distortion has caused tremendous harm, damaged and loss to the reputation as an upright, honest and efficient officer. The objection regarding the letter dated 9.1.96 wrote by the Defendants to the Plaintiff which is a strictly confidential is that the letter contains the statements that the Defendants requested the Assam Government to tighten the security cover for the personnel of the Defendants company at Assam all points. The said letter also disclose that the Defendants have not acceded to the request of the militant, on the other hand, are receiving such demand from them occasionally. The Plaintiff alleges that due to the publication of the aforesaid two letters damage to his reputation has been caused. As indicated earlier accept addressing the letter dated 9.1.96 to the Plaintiff as Home Secretary of the State of Assam, no other in the documents, the Plaintiff has been pointed to. The allegations are, if any, have been made against the State of Assam, who is not a party to the suit. The Plaintiff who was serving as Home Secretary of the State of Assam, during the relevant time has felt that the said publication pointed to the State of Assam has caused damage to his reputation as Home Secretary and the cause of action for the suit is stated to have arose on 22.9.97 (D1) and 26.9.97 (D2) upon publication of the press statement and news items and on various dates continuing cause of action. 13. The other relevant aspect in the matter to be seen about the maintainability of such a suit filed by a Government Officer alleging cause of action against the State Government, but claiming damage by such officer. According to Mr. Goswami such claim of damage by a Government officer against the allegations of the State Government is not maintainable or available in law. 14. Admittedly, the Plaintiff's suit is for defaming him of his reputation. Every man has an absolute right to have his reputation preserved inviolate. It is a jus in rem, a right absolute and good against all the world. A man's reputation is his property, and is considered to be more valuable than other property. 14. Admittedly, the Plaintiff's suit is for defaming him of his reputation. Every man has an absolute right to have his reputation preserved inviolate. It is a jus in rem, a right absolute and good against all the world. A man's reputation is his property, and is considered to be more valuable than other property. Defamation is an injury to a man's reputation and whoever defame the reputation of another he does so at his own peril. The wrong done in defaming one's reputation consists of publication of false defamatory statement without lawful justification or excuse knowing that publication of such statements would lower the reputation of a person in the estimation of general public or hurt the feeling of that person. 15. Defamatory words, in order to be actionable must refer the same to some ascertained or ascertainable person and that person must be the Plaintiff. In general defamation of a relative or a deceased relative is not actionable. If the words used really contains no reflection on any particular individual, no averment can make them defamatory. However, it is not necessary that the Plaintiff should be mentioned by name, provided that the words used describing the person meant can be shown to have referred to him and to have so understood by others. Alleged defamatory statement to be adjudicated as a defamatory one the principle of immunity or privilege are also to looked into. In general immunity is granted to the discussion of public affairs and all acts and matters of public in nature may be published with fitting comments or strictures, provided the comment or criticism is reasonable and fair, and made with an honest purpose. That apart, generally the public acts of public men may be the subject of fair comments and criticism not only by the press, but by the members of the public also. (Ref: Corpus Juris Secondum, Vol. LIII). Thus, the Plaintiff's pleadings must sufficiently allege defamatory charge and it is actionable nature, disclosing some actionable cause of action. Again looking to the public conduct of any man who holds, or seeks, a public office or position of public trust, it is the accepted principle that one who undertakes to fill a public office offers himself to public attack and criticism and the public interest requires that a man's public conduct shall be open to the most searching criticism. Again looking to the public conduct of any man who holds, or seeks, a public office or position of public trust, it is the accepted principle that one who undertakes to fill a public office offers himself to public attack and criticism and the public interest requires that a man's public conduct shall be open to the most searching criticism. The private character and conduct of a person who fills a public office or takes part in public affairs may also be the subject for fair comment in so far as it has reference to or tends to throw light on his fitness to occupy the office or perform the duties thereof, but not otherwise. 16. The question regarding maintainability of an action for defamation by the Government and public officials came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of R. Rajagopal (Supra), wherein considering the ratio of decision of the U.S. Supreme Court rendered in New York Times v. United States 403 U.S. 713, the Apex Court, inter, alia, held at paragraph 16 as follows: We may now refer to the celebrated decision in New York Times v. Sullivan, referred to and followed in Time Inc. v. Hill. The following are the facts : In the year 1960, the New York Times carried a full page paid advertisement sponsored by the Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the struggle for freedom in the South", which asserted or implied that law-enforcement officials in Montgomery, Alabama, had improperly arrested and harassed Dr. King and other civil rights demonstrators on various occasions. Respondent, who was the elected Police Commissioner of Montegomery, brought an action for libel against the Times and several of the individual signatories to the advertisement. It was found that some of the assertions contained to the advertisement were inaccurate. The Alabama Courts found the Defendants guilty and awarded damages in a sum of $ 500,000, which was affirmed by the Alabama Supreme Court. According to the relevant Alabama law, a publication was "libelous per se" if the words "tend to injure a person...in his reputation" or to "bring (him) into public contempt". The question raised before the United States Supreme Court was whether the said enactment abridged the freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. According to the relevant Alabama law, a publication was "libelous per se" if the words "tend to injure a person...in his reputation" or to "bring (him) into public contempt". The question raised before the United States Supreme Court was whether the said enactment abridged the freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In the leading opinion delivered by Brennan, J., the learned Judge referred in the first instance to speech and of the press and observed: Authoritative interpretations of the First Amendment guarantees have consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test of truth whether administered by judge, juries, or administrative officials and especially one that puts the burden of proving the truth on the speaker. A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount leads to " self censorship". Allowance of the defence of truth, with the burden of proving it on the Defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred. Even Courts accepting this defence as an adequate safeguard have recognized the difficulties of adducing legal proofs that the alleged libel was true in all its factual particulars.... Under such a rule, would be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even through it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in Court or fear of the expense of having to do so. They tend to make only statements which 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone' The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate. It is inconsistent with the First and fourteenth Amendments. The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice' that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice' that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. In the aforesaid judgment it has also been held that the principles laid down in the decision of New York Times have been held applicable to the public figures as well, because for the reasons that public figures like public officials often play an influential role in ordering society as class of public figures have as the public officials access to mass media communication both to influence the policy and to counter criticism of their views and activities and the citizens have a legitimate and substantial interest on the conduct of such persons. The freedom of press extends to engaging in uninhibited debate about the involvement of public figures in public issues and events. In paragraph 2 of the judgment, the apex Court also approved the view of the Privy council expressed in the case of Leonard Hector v. Hector v. Attorney General of Antigua and Barbuda 2 (1990) ACC 312, to the effect that in a free democratic society it is almost too obvious to need starting that those who hold office in Government and who are responsible for public administration must always be open to criticism. Any attempt to stifle or fetter such criticism amounts to political censorship of the most insidious and actionable kind. Regarding the applicability of the principles that emerges from the United States and English decisions, the apex Court observed that it requires proper balancing of the freedom of press in making such statements and the said laws consistent with the democratic way of life ordained by the Constitution. Summarizing the broad principles arrived at after discussing various decisions of different Courts, the Apex Court at paragraph 26 of the judgment laid down as follows: We may now summarize the broad principles flowing from the above discussions: (1) The right to privacy is implicit in the right to life and liberty guaranteed to the citizens of this country by Article 21. It is a "right to be let alone". It is a "right to be let alone". A citizen has a right to safeguard the privacy of his own his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, child-bearing and education among other matters. None can publish anything concerning the above matters without his consent whether truthful or otherwise and whether laudatory or critical. If he does so, he would be violating the right to privacy of the persons concerned and would be liable in an action for damages. Position may, however, be different, if a person voluntarily trusts himself into controversy or voluntarily invites or raise a controversy. (2) The rule aforesaid is subject to the exception, that any publication concerning the aforesaid aspects becomes unobjectionable if such publication is based upon public records including court records. This is for the reason that once a matter becomes a matter of public record, the right to privacy no longer subsists and it becomes a legitimate subject for comment by press and media among others. We are, however, of the opinion that in the interests of decency Article19(2) an exception must be carved out to this rule, viz., a female who is the victim of a sexual assault, kidnap, abduction or a like offence should not further be subjected to the indignity of her name and the incident being publicized in press/media. (3) There is yet another exception to the Rule in (1) above-indeed this is not an exception but an independent rule. In the case of public officials, it is obvious, right to privacy, or for that matter, the remedy of action for damages is simply not available with respect to their acts and conduct relevant to the discharge of their official duties. This is so even where the publication is based upon facts and statements which are not true, unless the official establishes that the publication was made (by the Defendant) with reckless disregard for truth. In such a case, it would be enough for the Defendant (member of the press or media) to prove that he acted after a reasonable verification of the facts; it is not necessary for him to prove that what he has written is true. Of course, where the publication is proved to be false and actuated by malice or personal animosity, the Defendant would have no defence and would be liable to damages. Of course, where the publication is proved to be false and actuated by malice or personal animosity, the Defendant would have no defence and would be liable to damages. It is equally obvious that in matters not relevant to the discharge of his duties, the public official enjoys the same protection as any other citizen, as explained in (1) and (2) above. It needs no reiteration that judiciary, which is protected by the power to punish for contempt of court and Parliament and legislatures protected as their privileges are by Articles 105 and 104 respectively of the Constitution of India represent exceptions to this rule. (4) So far as the Government, local authority and other organs and institutions exercising governmental power are concerned, they cannot maintain a suit for damages for defaming them. (5) Rules 3 and 4 do not, however, mean that Official Secrets Act, 1923, or any similar enactment or provision having the force of law does not bind the press or media. (6) There is no law empowering the State or its officials prohibit, or to impose a prior restraint upon the press/media, 17. Looking to the New York Times case (supra) it is found that by the said judgment, the United States Supreme Court made an attempt to reduce the liability in a suit for libel by the State establishing a constitutional privilege against the liability for defamation with the public official against a complaint for official conduct unless he can prove the publisher acted with actual malice. The Court also imposed upon the Plaintiff increasingly a heavy burden to prove such malice. 18. Applying the test that emerges from the aforesaid discussions and on going through the statements made in the plaint, it is seen that admittedly the Plaintiff is a public officer and no actual malice has been pleaded by the Plaintiff against any and the Defendants. A reading of the plaint shows that the cause for bringing the action, claiming damages to the tune of one crore is the publication of the letters dated 22.09.97, 26.09.97 and 09.01.96 being of distortion of facts which have caused harm and damage to the reputation of the Plaintiff. As eluded above, the aforesaid alleged offending publications are not really pointed out to the Plaintiff personally. As eluded above, the aforesaid alleged offending publications are not really pointed out to the Plaintiff personally. Nor it can be said that by the said publication it is the Plaintiff who has been pointed out or fingered at. There is no adequate pleading in the plaint to justify to take any contrary view nor any facts alleging innuendo has also been pleaded. The Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 were impleaded as party Defendant as because the attended a meeting on 15.09.97 with the Chief Minister of the State at Delhi along with some other high officials of the State administration. Except this statement there is no iota of allegation against Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 justifying their impleadment as party Defendants in the suit to face a civil litigation. This itself is indicative of the fact disclosing base of bonafide operation in the mind of the Plaintiff in impleading the Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 in the suit. 18 A. Turning to the provisions of Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure, the Court is clothed with the power to return the plaint protect innocent Defendants from facing a vexatious or frivolous litigation at the hands of the Plaintiff with litigating attitude. This power can be exercised at any stage of the suit. Under the said provision, if on a meaningful reading of the plaint it is found to be vexatious in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue or not disclosing a cause of action, or where the suit appears to be barred by any law such plaint can be rejected (Ref: (1997) 4 SCC 467, (1992) 1 SCC 731 , (1998) 2 SCC 70 , (1998) 7 SCC 184 and (2006) 3 SCC 100 ). 19. Mr. 19. Mr. Baruah though tried to convince that on a 'meaningful reading" of the plaint it cannot be said none of the provisions contained in Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure, has attracted in the instant case and referring to the paragraphs 16, 18 and 19 of the plaint contends that those are the matters to be proved by evidence only, but could not satisfy about the disclosure of any adjudicable cause of action by the Plaintiff, a Government officer, on the basis of the impugned defamatory publication dated 22.09.97 and 26.09.97 (Annexures D1 and D2 of the plaint) in the light of the discussions made above, apart from being barred by law, laid down in Raj Gopal's case (supra). It leaves no doubt that the Plaintiff has not pleaded any actual malice against the Defendants, there is no allegation except attending a meeting with the Chief Minister of the State with other high officials by the Defendant Nos 2 and 3 and, in fact, there is no iota of allegation made against these two Defendants alleging cause of action against them justifying their impleadment. The Plaintiff has filed the suit in his personal capacity. The documents enclosed as well as the statements made in the plaint do not disclose that the letters dated 22.09.97 and 26.09.97 which are the stated to be the basis of cause of action of the suit is pointed to the Plaintiff personally and it is the only figment of imagination of the Plaintiff that he has been defamed. The Plaintiff being a highly placed Government official, in the light of the existing law of defamation against the public officials is not entitled to bring such an action. The Apex Court in R. Rajagopal (supra) at paragraph 26(4), in clear terms has held that so far as the Government, local authorities and other organs exercising governmental power, they cannot maintain a suit for defamation, in such manner. There is no dispute regarding the principles of law decided in the cases cited by Mr. Baruah, but those are not applicable in the facts of the instant case. 20. There is no dispute regarding the principles of law decided in the cases cited by Mr. Baruah, but those are not applicable in the facts of the instant case. 20. In the factual and legal position as alluded herein above, the continuation of the suit would amount to unnecessary protracting the litigation causing unnecessary wastage of Court's resources and compelling the Defendants to continue with a litigation which is bound to fail for its inherent defects, more particularly, when the plaint does not disclose cause of action to grant relief prayed for and the same is barred by law, appearing from the statements in the plaint. The Defendants/Petitioners have been able to satisfy the aforesaid contingencies in the instant case. 21. From the discussions above, it is beyond the. cavil of any doubt that the plaint filed in Title Suit No. 192/97 is hit by the provisions of Order 7, Rule 11(a) and (d), Code of Civil Procedure. The learned trial Court in passing the impugned order did not consider the aforesaid vital aspect that emerged from the undisputed facts, more particularly, on the face of the plaint along with documents filed therewith and mis-directed herself in passing the impugned order, failing to consider the relevant consideration germane to the issue. Thus, the learned trial Court acted illegally and with material irregularity in passing the impugned order. 22. In the result, impugned order dated 22.07.2002 is set aside and quashed and the plaint filed in TS No. 192/97 is directed to be returned to the Plaintiff. 23. No costs.