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2006 DIGILAW 920 (JHR)

Dula Santhal v. State of Bihar

2006-07-21

AMARESHWAR SAHAY

body2006
JUDGMENT Amareshwar Sahay, J.-The petitioner being a member of the Scheduled Tribe filed an application under Section 71-A of the Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act (hereinafter referred to as C.N.T. Act) against the Respondent No. 5 herein (Sri Shiv Charar Das) claiming restoration of 36 Decimals of land more fully described in the petition situated in village Sadpura in the District of Singhbhum (East). By Annexure-1 dated 13.5.1993, the petition filed by the petitioner was allowed and the land in question was directed to be restored in his favour. 2. The Respondent NO.5 preferred an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner against the said order dated 13.5.1993 (Annexure-1) passed by the D.C.L.R., Ghatsila which was registered as S.A.R. Appeal No. 12/93-94. The Deputy Commissioner, Singhbhum (East), by Order dated 22.11.1994 (Annexure-3) dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order passed by the D.C.L.R. Thereafter, the Respondent No. 5 preferred a revision under Section 217 of the C.N.T. Act before the Commissioner, South Chhotanagpur Division, Ranchi. The learned Commissioner, by impugned order dated 29.6.1999 (Annexure-6) allowed the Revision Application and set aside the orders of the D.C.L.R. as well as of the Deputy Commissioner holding that it is the settled principles of law that 30 years period of limitation has to be calculated from the date of disposal to the date of filing of restoration and in the present case, the restoration application was filed after a period of 50 years and therefore, the same was barred by Limitation. This order of the learned Commissioner has been challenged by the petitioner in this writ application. 3. Challenging the impugned order of the Revisional Court, the petitioner has raised various points including the point of Limitation and has submitted that the findings given by the Revisional Court that the petition for restoration filed by the petitioner was barred by Limitation was absolutely wrong. The petitioner has submitted that it was a case of surrender and settlement and the land in question was surrendered by the ancestor of the petitioner to the then landlord on 16.10.1941 for consideration of payment of amount of Rs. 25/- and therefore, the said surrender was a transfer and such was in violation of Section 46 of the C.N.T. Act and therefore, the land in question was liable to be restored in favour of the petitioner. 4. 25/- and therefore, the said surrender was a transfer and such was in violation of Section 46 of the C.N.T. Act and therefore, the land in question was liable to be restored in favour of the petitioner. 4. In support of his arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision in the case of Garaj Narain Singh vs. Babulal Khemka reported in 1975 PLJR 27. On the other hand, Mrs. Jaya Roy, learned counsel appearing for Respondent No.5, by supporting the Revisional Order dated 29.6.1999 as contained in Annexure6, submitted that the learned Commissioner has rightly held that the application for restoration filed by the petitioner was barred by Limitation as it was filed after delay of a period of 50 years. In this regard, it was submitted that according to the petitioner himself, the land in question was surrendered in the year 1941 whereas, the application for restoration was filed on 25.3.1992 before the S.D.O., Ghatsila which was subsequently been transferred in the Court of D.C.L.R., Ghatsila. Therefore, it is apparent that the application was made after more than 50 years and therefore, it was barred by Limitation. In support of her arguments, she relied in the case of Situ Sahu and Ors. VS. State of Jharkhand and Ors. reported in 2004(4) JLJR (SC)109. 5. While considering the points for Limitation, I find that the petitioner himself has annexed copy of Deed of Surrender as Annexure-5 which is of the dated 16.10.1941 by which, the ancestors of the petitioner had surrendered the land in question in favour of the Ex-landlord by means of a registered Deed of Surrender. 6. There is no dispute of the fact that the application for restoration was filed on 25.3.1992 therefore apparently it was filed after about 51 years from the date of dispossession. The Supreme Court, in the case of Situ Sahu and Ors. (supra), while dealing with a case under Section 7"'-A of the C.N.T. Act read with Section 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has held that the period of limitation intended to bar the suit brought in Civil Court where party chooses the, right of 'seeking restoration of immovable properties but where for, socio-economic reasons, the party may not even be aware of own right, the legislature has clothed an Officer of the State with sufficient power to do social justice. Even such power cannot be exercised after unreason• ably long time during which, third party interests might have come it, force. The test is not whether the period of limitation prescribed in 1963 Act had expired, but whether power' under Section 71 A was sought to be exercised after unreasonable delay. The Supreme Court held that the Special Officer ought not to have exercised his powers under Section 71 A of the Act after a delay of 40 years i.e. after such a long period of time. 7. Relying on the said decision of the Supreme Court, I find that in the present case, the petition for restoration under Section 71-A of the C.N.T. Act was filed after more than 50 years and therefore, this case is squarely covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Situ Sahu and Ors. (supra) and therefore, it is held that the Special Officer should not have exercised his powers under Section 71 A of the C.N.T. Act after such an inordinate long lapse of more than 50 years. 8. In view of the above discussions and findings above, I hold that the learned Commissioner rightly allowed the Revision Application in which he held that the application for restoration filed by the petitioner was barred by Limitation. Consequently, this application has got no merit and, the same is dismissed. However, there shall be nor order as to costs. Since this application has been dismissed only on the ground of Limitation and therefore, I did not consider. it fit to deal with the other points raised by the petitioner.