JUDGMENT Hon’ble Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J.—This writ petition has been filed for issuing direction to the District Administration to provide police protection to the petitioner for cultivating and harvesting the crop standing over his land of the petitioner and further for restraining the respondent Nos. 4 to 13 from harassing the petitioner in view of the aforesaid complaint. 2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that in 1988, proceeding under the provisions of U.P. Imposition of Ceiling of Land Holdings Act (hereinafter called the Act) had been initiated against the petitioner. He filed the objection. However, the objection stood rejected and the Prescribed Authority declared certain area as surplus, possession of which was taken over. Being aggrieved, petitioner filed a case under Section 27 (4) of the Act before the Divisional Commissioner, Moradabad, which was dismissed by its judgment and order dated 22.3.1990. 3. Being aggrieved, the petitioner challenged the said order dated 22.3.1990 by filing a Writ Petition No. 8371 of 1990 before this Court, which stood disposed of finally vide order dated 15.1.1998 in terms of the interim order dated 25.5.1990. The present writ petition has been filed as the respondents are not ensuring the compliance of the said judgment and order dated 15.1.1998, and hence the petitioner is entitled for the reliefs sought for. 4. Shri D.V. Jaiswal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has vehemently submitted that once the petitioner had succeeded in the earlier writ petition, the respondent authorities are bound to render all possible assistance to the petitioner for peaceful possession of the land in dispute and the petition deserves to be allowed. 5. On the contrary, the learned Standing Counsel, appearing for respondents has submitted that the earlier writ petition had been filed against the judgment and order dated 22.3.1990, passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Moradabad, which has not been set aside by this Court. The writ petition was disposed of without giving any reason or without deciding the issue in dispute and without setting aside the said judgment and order dated 22.3.1990 of the Divisional Commissioner. Therefore, the reliefs sought for by the petitioner cannot be granted. 6. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. Therefore, the reliefs sought for by the petitioner cannot be granted. 6. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. We have also summoned the order-sheet of the earlier Writ Petition No. 8371 of 1990 and it may be pertinent to quote the entire order-sheet of the said case. “5.4.1990 Learned counsel may file the certified copy of the application dated 23.1.1989. List after three weeks. 23.5.1990 Put up tomorrow. Registry may place objection dated 23.1.1989 filed by the petitioner. 24.5.1990 Put up tomorrow. 25.5.1990 Rejoinder Affidavit filed today. List this case on 26th July, 1990. Till that date, the stay order passed on 14th June, 1990 shall be deemed to be continuing. 25.10.1990 Learned counsel prays for and is allowed three weeks’ time to file rejoinder affidavit. 15.1.1998 T he interim order dated 25.5.1990 is hereby confirmed and the matter is disposed of finally. No order as to costs." 8. In the said case, the counter affidavit was not filed by any of the respondents though the persons in whose favour the land had been allotted after taking possession from the petitioner had been impleaded, nor any rejoinder affidavit was ever filed. There is no interim order passed in this case. However, the proceeding dated 25.5.1990 shows that rejoinder affidavit has been filed today and the order passed on 14th June, 1990 shall be deemed to be continuing. There was no occasion on 15th May, 1990 to say that the interim order passed on 14th June, 1990 shall be deemed to be continuing, nor any rejoinder affidavit was ever filed. The petition has been disposed of in terms of the order dated 25.5.1990, which, in fact, has no meaning. No reasoning whatsoever has been given while disposing of the said writ petition finally. The order dated 22.3.1990 challenged in the said writ petition was not set aside. Thus, the question does arise as to whether this Court is in a position to enforce the so called judgment and order dated 15.1.1998. 9. The expression Judgment’ has been defined in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., as judgment means the statement given by the Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus, the question does arise as to whether this Court is in a position to enforce the so called judgment and order dated 15.1.1998. 9. The expression Judgment’ has been defined in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., as judgment means the statement given by the Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the essential element in the ‘judgment’ is the statement of grounds of decision, meaning thereby the Court has to state the ground on which he bases his decision. It must be intelligible and must have a meaning. It has a distinction from a word order as the latter may not contain reasons. Unless, the judgment is based on reason, it would not be possible for an Appellate/Revisional Court to decide as to whether the judgment is in accordance with law. (Vide Surendra Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 194 ; and Arjan Das Ram Lal v. Jagan Nath Sardari Lal, AIR 1966 Pun 227). 10. The expression judgment means a final adjudication by the Court of the rights of the parties; an interlocutory judgment, even if it decides an issue or issues without finally determining the rights and liabilities of the parties, is not a judgment, however, cardinal the issue may be (M/s. Tarapore & Co. Madras v. Tractors Export Moscow, AIR 1970 SC 1168 ). 11. Judgment is statement of reasons given by the Judge. [Vide Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1099 (C.B.)]. 12. A judgment is the expression of the opinion of the Court arrived at after due consideration of the evidence and the arguments, it means a judicial determination vide U.J.S. Chopra v. State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 633 and State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey & Anr., AIR 1957 SC 389 . In Ghourlal Mitra v. Smt. Hara Sundari Paul, AIR 1974 Cal 331 , it was held that ‘judgment’ means a decision which affects the merits of the question between the parties by determining some right or liability and such decision might be either final or preliminary or interlocutory. 13. In Ghourlal Mitra v. Smt. Hara Sundari Paul, AIR 1974 Cal 331 , it was held that ‘judgment’ means a decision which affects the merits of the question between the parties by determining some right or liability and such decision might be either final or preliminary or interlocutory. 13. Whether a particular order becomes a judgment or not would depend upon the facts, circumstances and nature of the decision in each case, where an issue is finally determined, like in a case, the issue of limitation is determined that may become a judgment, but the judgment must finally decide the rights of the parties as has been held in Kapoor Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1957 Pun 173 (F.B.); and Union of India v. N. Kumar Kaluram, AIR 1962 MP 190 . In Draupadi Devi v. S.K. Dutta, AIR 1957 All 48 , this Court has observed that although a decree follows a judgment that does not mean that the decree and judgment are synonymous terms. 14. Similarly in Smt. Indu Devi v. Board of Revenue, AIR 1957 All 116 , the Division Bench of this Court while considering the provisions of Article 133 of the Constitution observed that the word used therein a decision finally determining the rights of the parties in the proceedings which is altogether different from its definition given in C.P.C. 15. Judgment is the adjudication of proceedings or the suit, as the case may be, final order means an order which finally decides any matter or that which is directly an issue in the case in respect of the parties. The words judgment, decree or final order has a different connotation, though all of them refers to adjudication, determination or disposal of proceedings, suit or rights of the parties (Vide Union of India v. Kanhaiya Lal Shyam Lal, AIR 1957 Raj 173 ). 16. The words judgment, decree or final order has a different connotation, though all of them refers to adjudication, determination or disposal of proceedings, suit or rights of the parties (Vide Union of India v. Kanhaiya Lal Shyam Lal, AIR 1957 Raj 173 ). 16. In Radhey Shyam v. Shyam Behari Singh, AIR 1971 SC 2337 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court examined the issue as to whether an appeal arising out of proceedings under Order 21 Rule 90 C.P.C. could be said to be a judgment and held that an order in such proceeding is a judgment inasmuch as the proceeding raises a controversy between the parties therein affecting their valuable rights and the order allowing the application certainly debars the purchaser of rights accrued, as a result of the auction sale, therefore, the order would fall within the definition of judgment and would be appellable. While, deciding the said case, the Hon’ble Apex Court approved the (Full Bench) judgment of the Delhi High Court in Begum Aftab Zamani v. Lal Chand Khanna, AIR 1969 Delhi 1985, wherein it was held that any order which affect the merits of controversy between the parties by determining some disputed rights or liability would mean judgment. 17. In Shanti Kumar R. Canji v. The Home Insurance Co. of New York, AIR 1974 SC 1719 , while dealing with the similar issue, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under : "In finding out whether the order is a judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent it has to be found out that the order affects the merit of the action between the parties by determining some right or liability. The right of liability is to be found out by the Court. The nature of the order will have to be examined in order to ascertain whether there has been a determination of any right or liability”. 18. Thus, in view of the above, the law can be summarised that the ‘judgment’ means a decision adjudicating upon the legal rights and liabilities of the parties after appreciating the evidence on record in a particular fact-situation, and that has to be duly supported by reasons. 19. Thus, the question does arise as to whether any order passed in favour of the petitioner in earlier writ petition referred to herein above can be held to be a judgment or order, worth execution. 20. 19. Thus, the question does arise as to whether any order passed in favour of the petitioner in earlier writ petition referred to herein above can be held to be a judgment or order, worth execution. 20. It is evident that no interim order had ever been passed in favour of petitioner, the question of extending it, could not arise, nor the rights of the parties were adjudicated upon and nor the order dated 22.3.1990 passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Moradabad was set aside. In such a fact-situation the order dated 15.1.1998 is of no consequence and petitioner cannot claim any relief against the allottees of the land after being dispossessed under the garb of this order. He might have or may be willing to have possession of the said land again. 21. Petition is devoid of any merit and accordingly dismissed. Petition Dismissed. ———