ORDER In this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for a writ of certiorari to quash the order dated 26-2-1999, Annexure-H and order dated 14-6-1999 Annexure-H passed by first respondent-the Government of Karnataka permitting the second respondent to close their factory called Valliappa Textiles Limited, Hejjala, Bangalore District. 2. The second respondent-factory was established in the year 1967 and engaged in the manufacture of cotton, viscos and polyester yarns. In the year 1993 there were 291 workers on the rolls of the second respondent-factory. On 30-12-1998 the second respondent-factory filed an application before the first respondent-Government of Karnataka under Section 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ('the Act' for short) for closure of the factory. The reasons for the do sure, according to the management of second respondent-factory are, that the textile industries are in the grip of unprecedented economic and financial crisis. The protection given to the textile industry has been withdrawn gradually as per the GATT regulations Owing to financial crunch in countries like Indonesia, Korea, Japan and other Asian countries, the export of Indian Textiles drastically came down. The diversion of export oriented goods to the domestic market resulted in more supply and less demand and consequently, the prices came down. Since there was no demand, large number of power losses came to be closed. The other reason, according to the second respondent-factory was, that workers union deliberately brought in indiscipline among the workers which has resulted in decreased production and reduction in the utilisation of installed capacity. There were lockouts, strikes and suspension of operations for nearly 18 month. This worsened the situation resulting in huge losses during the years 1995-1996 to 1998-99 and during the factory was beyond the control of the management of the second respondent. 3. The petitioner-trade union representing the workers of second respondent-factory filed objections before the Government opposing the closure. The petitioner contends that loss is due to poor maintenance of the machines, procurement of poor quality of cotton and due to mismanagement. The statement of audited accounts cannot be believed. The motive behind the closure is to get rid of the permanent workmen and to nm the factory with contract labourers. The lockouts and cessation of work for nearly 18 months was use to the feudalistic and bureaucratic behaviour of the management and workmen are not responsible for the same. The statement of audited accounts cannot be believed. The motive behind the closure is to get rid of the permanent workmen and to nm the factory with contract labourers. The lockouts and cessation of work for nearly 18 months was use to the feudalistic and bureaucratic behaviour of the management and workmen are not responsible for the same. The management is anti-labour and anti-union and application for closure of factory is not bona fide and the same is to victimise the workmen. 4. The first respondent-Government, after hearing both the parties and by considering the entire material, passed an order on 26-2-1999 according sanction for closure of the factory of second respondent as per Annexure-H to the writ petition. Subsequently, the petitioner-Union filed a review petition before the Government on 12-3-1999 to review the order of closure. The Government, after healing both the parties and on appreciation of material on record, rejected the review petition vide order dated 14-6-1999 as per Annexure-O to the writ petition. It is these two orders of the first respondent Annexure-H and O are questioned in this writ petition. 5. Sri K Suhha Rao, learned Senior Counsel and Sri K.S, Subramanya, learned Counsel for petitioners contend, that the impugned orders are not speaking orders. The first respondent has not applied its mind to the fact situation of the case. It is contended, that the second respondent has not complied with the mandatory requirement of Section 25-O(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Despite objections raised by the petitioner regarding the authenticity of accounts the first respondent had not called upon the second respondent to produce the audited balance-sheets. The first respondent has only considered the interest of second respondent-management and not the interest of workers Reliance is placed on the following decisions: 1. M/s. Bareilly Electricity Supply Company Workmen and Others; 2. Associated Cement Companies Limited and Another v Union of India and Others; 3. Straw Products Limited v Union of India and Others; 4. Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh and Others v R.N Gawande, Appellate Industrial Tribunal and President Industrial Court. 6. Per contra, Sri MR.C. Ravi, learned Counsel for second respondent contends, that in furtherance of the orders passed by the first respondent the second respondent bas already closed down its factory and terminated the services of workmen with effect from 16-6.1999. Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh and Others v R.N Gawande, Appellate Industrial Tribunal and President Industrial Court. 6. Per contra, Sri MR.C. Ravi, learned Counsel for second respondent contends, that in furtherance of the orders passed by the first respondent the second respondent bas already closed down its factory and terminated the services of workmen with effect from 16-6.1999. Nearly 90% of the employees have received their dues in full and final settlement of all their claims and obtained their pension certificates. He contends, that the present writ petition will not survive for consideration and it will only be academic in nature. He contends, that the present textile crisis is a worldwide phenomenon and several mills are closed in India including the second respondent-factory due to financial and other problems. Despite all efforts the second respondent could not nm the mill in an economically viable manner due to labour unrest The first respondent, after fully examining the facts and after considering the material on record 3Ild applying its mind, had passed the orders of closure. He supports the impugned orders. Reliance is placed on the following decisions: 1 Associated Cement Companies Limited case; 2. Laxmi Starch Limited and Another v Kundara Factory Workers Union and Others. 7. Heard arguments on both the sides and perused the entire writ papers. Though several grounds are taken in the menlOrandurl1 of writ petition, finally the following are the only points that are principally canvassed. Further, on the basis of pleadings and the arguments submitted at the Bar, the following questions will arise for my consideration. They are: 1. What is the scope of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interfere with the impugned order of Government under Section 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act according permission for closure of industry? 2. Whether the Government is justified in passing the impugned orders under Section 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act according permission for closure of industry of second respondent? On Question No.1 8. Article 226 of the Constitution of India reads as under "226. 2. Whether the Government is justified in passing the impugned orders under Section 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act according permission for closure of industry of second respondent? On Question No.1 8. Article 226 of the Constitution of India reads as under "226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs.-(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, x x x every High Court .shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforC8Illent of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose" 9. In Gujarat Steel Tubes Limited u Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha and Others, Justice V.R. Krishna lyer speaking for the Bench held that Article 226, however restrictive in practice. is a power wide enough, in all conscience, to be a friend in need when the summons comes in a crisis from a victim of injustice; and more importantly, this extraordinary reserve is unsheathed to grant final relief without necessary recourse to a remand. What the Tribunal may, in its discretion do the High Court too can, under Article 226, if facts compel to do so 10. The Supreme Court of India in the case of Comptroller and Auditor Geneal of India, Gian Prakash, New Delhi and Another v K.S. Jagannathan and Another, held: "20. There is thus no doubt that the High Courts in India exercising their jurisdiction under Article 226" have the power to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or to pass orders and give necessary directions where the Government Or a public authority has failed to exercise or has wrongly exercised the discretion conferred upon it by a statute or a rule or a policy decision of the Government or has exercised such discretion mala fide or all irrelevant considerations or by ignoring the relevant considerations and materials or in such a manner as to frustrate the object of conferring such discretion or the policy for implementing which such discretion has been conferred. In all such cases and in any other fit and proper case a High Court can, the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226, issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or pass orders and give directions to compel the performance in a proper and lawful manner of the discretion conferred upon the Government or a public authority, and in a proper case, in order to prevent injustice resulting to the concerned parties, the Court may itself pass an order or give directions which the Government or the public authority should have passed or given had it properly and lawfully exercised its discretion". 11. Keeping in view the law laid down by the Apex Court in the decisions referred to supra, the fact situation in the instant case is to be examined. Prior to the amendment of Section 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act there was no machinery for an appeal or revision or review or adjudication against the orders passed by the Government under sub-section (2) of Section 25-O of the Act. By Act No. 46 of 1982 with effect from 21-8-1984, Section 25-O of the Act came to be amended by inserting sub-section (5) of Section 25-O of the Act providing that the appropriate Government may, either on its own motion or on an application made by the employer or any workman review its order granting or refusing to grant permission for closure of an industry. The object of Section 25-O(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act is to reconsider the entire matter including the facts and law omitted while passing the first order as well as the new developments that took place after the original order was passed. If the original order under sub-section (2) or the review order under sub-section (5) is against the object and spirit of Section 25-O of the Act or when it is found that the Tribunal or appropriate Government exceeded its authority, committed error of law apparent on the face of record or when findings are perverse in relation to fact situation, undoubtedly this Court can interfere In appropriate cases this Court is competent to quash an award or order passed under Section 25-O of the Act and remand the matter or even decide the matter itself. Hence, I answer the question 1 by holding that this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can interfere with order of the Government passed under Section 25-O of the Act. On Question No.2 12. The Supreme Court in the case of Excel Wear v Union of India and Others. stuck down Section 25-O of the Act as the same was in violation of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Consequent to this decision of Supreme Court the Government by Act No. 46 of 1982 with effect from 21-8-1984 amended Section 25-O of the Act The constitutional validity of amended Section 25-O of the Act came up for consideration before this Court in the case of Stumpp Schule and Somappa Limited v State of Karnataka" and the learned Single Judge struck down the amended section. But, a Division Bench of this Court in Union of India v Stumpp Schule and Somappa Limited and Others, appeal reversed the decision of learned Single Judge and upheld the validity of amended Section 25-O of the Act The Supreme Court upheld the decision of Division Bench upholding the constitutional validity of Section 25-O of the Act. The amended Section 25-O of the Act reads as under: "25-O. Procedure for closing down an undertaking.-(1) An employer who intends to close down an undertaking of an industrial establishment to which this Chapter applies shall, in the prescribed manner, apply, for prior permission at least ninety days before the date on which the intended closure is to become effective, to the appropriate Government, stating clearly the reasons for the intended closure of the undertaking and a copy of such application shall also be served simultaneously on the representatives of the workmen in the prescribed manner: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to an undertaking set up for the construction of buildings, bridges, roads, canals, dams or for other construction work. (2) Where an application for permission has been made under sub-section (1), the appropriate Government, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen and persons interested in such closure may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the general public and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen. (3) Where an application has been made under sub-section (1) and the appropriate Government does not communicate the order granting or refusing to grant permission to the employer within a period of sixty days from the date on which such application is made, the pern1ission applied for shall, be deemed to have been granted on the expiration of the said period of sixty days. (4) An order of the appropriate Government granting or refusing to grant permission shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (5), be final and binding on all the parties and shall remain in force for one year from the date of such order. (5) The appropriate Government may, either on its own motion or on the application made by the employer or any workman, review its order granting or refusing to grant permission under sub-section (2) or refer the matter to a Tribunal for adjudication: Provided that where a reference has been made to a Tribunal under this sub-section, it shall pass an award within a period of thirty days from the date of such reference. (6) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made within the period specified therein, or where the permission for closure has been refused, the closure of the undertaking shall be deemed to be illegal from the date of closure and the workmen shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time being in force as if the undertaking had not been closed down (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this section, the appropriate Government may, if it is satisfied that owing to such exceptional circumstances as accident in the undertaking or death of the employer or the like it is necessary so to do, by order, direct that the provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply in relation to such undertaking for such period as may be specified in the order. (8) Where an undertaking is permitted to be closed down under sub- section (2) or where permission for closure is deemed to be granted under sub-section (3), every workman who is employed in that undertaking immediately before the date of application for permission under this Election, shall be entitled to receive compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days average pay for every completed year of continuance service or any part thereof in excess of six months". 13. Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution guarantees to all citizens the right to practice any profession or to carryon any occupation, trade or business. Article 19(6) empowers the State to impose restrictions on the right of citizens to start, carryon or close their undertakings. Now it is settled position of law that no right is absolute in its scope. Every right or freedom guaranteed in the Constitution can certainly be restricted, regulated or controlled by law in the interest of public order, morality, health, economy and the general public. Thus, Section 25-O of the Act though called as procedure for closing down an undertaking, in reality it imposes restriction on the right of the employer to close down his industrial undertaking. Section 25-O of the Act specifies that if an employer wants to close down his undertaking, has to apply to the appropriate GDvemnlent in the prescribed 111anner for prior permission stating clearly the reasons for the intended closure of the undertaking. Section 25-O of the Act specifies that if an employer wants to close down his undertaking, has to apply to the appropriate GDvemnlent in the prescribed 111anner for prior permission stating clearly the reasons for the intended closure of the undertaking. The employer is also required to serve a copy of such application to the repres8ntatives of the worknlen in the prescribed Ulanner. The appropriate Govenll11ent after giving opportunity to the ernployer, the workn18u and the persons int8rested in such closure and after enquiry as it thinks fit grant or refi,se to grant permission to close the industry. While granting or refusing the pennission the Government shall consider the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interest of workers and the general public. It also provides for review of the order passed by the appropriate Government on its own motion or on an application mc:de by the employer 01' workmen. 14. Section 25-0(2) of the Act specifies that the appropriate Government having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer. the interests of general public and all other relevant factors grant or refilse the permission to close the industry. In Associated Cement Companies Limited's case, a Division A KLJ PUBLICATION 13. ~ .. _-- .. _-- .. Kar. L.J.1 VALLL<\PPA TEXTILES v STATE 35 Bench of High Court of Gujarat explained the meaning of the plll:lc(' "the genuineness and adequacy of reasons" as under: "It is in this context that the meaning of the phrase 'the genuineness and adequacy of reasons' will have to be ex;nnined. As pointed out earlier) this requirenlent of Section 25-0(2) is in the nature of a restriction imposed upon the right of the employer to close down his business. Therefore) this phrase Blust be so construed as to make the restriction which is imposed on the right of the employer reasonable within the meaning of Article 19(6), because, as pointed out by the Supreme Court, the right to close down a business is not an absolute right and it can ceItainly be restricted, regulated or controlled by law in the interest of general public. If it is so construed as to enable the appropriate Govemment and the Tribunal to unreasonably restrict the right of the employer, disregarding its nature and the incidents, then that would render the section ultra vires Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) The question whether the reasons given by the employer are genuine and adequate, wIll, no doubt, depend upon facts of each case. But the correct answer to the questIon as to which reasons should be regarded as genuine and adequate would not only depend upon facts of each case, hut also on the correct meaning to be given to the words 'genuine and adequate'. Though a precise meoning cannot be given to these words as it is not possible to contemplate all possible situations which might arise compelling a person to close down his business, it will have to be held that the question must be decided in the context of the nature and incidents of the right which the employer has. A right to close down a business being an integral part of the fundamental right to carry on business, words 'genuine and adequate' lllust have that nleaning which is consistent with the nature of that light. If the closun, is bona fIde or on account of unavoidable circumstances beyond tbe control of the employer then they will have to be regarded as genuine and adequate. In case of Exccl Wear v Union oj1ndia, AIR 1979 SC 25 : (1978)4 SCC 224 , the Supreme Court after referring to Section 25-FFF has further observed that the 'Explanation postulates the financial difficulties including financial losses or accunlulation of undisposed stocks, etc., as the closing of an undertaking on account of unavoidable circumstances beyond tht> control of the employer ... '. The Supreme Court has fi.lrther observed that a situation may arise both from tbe point of view of law and order and the financial aspect that the employer finds it impossible to carry on the business any longer Such a reason hos to be regarded as adequate". 15. The Kerala High Court in Laxmi Starch Limrted's case, explained the importance of the interest of general public and all other relevant factors mentioned in Section 25-0(2) of the Act in following words A KW PUBLICATION 36 VALLIAPPA TEXTILES v STAn; 12006(2) "20. 15. The Kerala High Court in Laxmi Starch Limrted's case, explained the importance of the interest of general public and all other relevant factors mentioned in Section 25-0(2) of the Act in following words A KW PUBLICATION 36 VALLIAPPA TEXTILES v STAn; 12006(2) "20. But, in such a situation, the question of bona fides is one of the essential factors Legislature wanted to be strict in the matter in order to avoid situations of closure which are not unavoidable. That is because public interest 111ay be involved in such closures which are not bona (ide. Consequences may be loss of employment, non-availability of products for the needs of the public, loss of Illarketlng facilities for the producers of raw materials, danger to the economy of the country and the like. An employer who made sufficient fortune out of the venture may attempt to close it down without making earnest attempts to overcome difficulties. Refusal of pennission, in such a situation, cannot be challenged as unreasonable restiiction on the right to carry on business. It is upto the GDvemment or the Industrial Tribunal. as the case may be, to probe into all the CirCUl11Etances in order to arrive at a conclusion regarding the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons for closure tested in the light of the interest of the general public and all other relevant factors mentioned Section 25-0(2)". 16. In the light of judicia! pronouncements as stated above, it is required to exaulin8 the ilnpugned orders of State Gove11111wnt granting pemlission for closure of the undeltaking of second respondent. FrOll1 immemorial times India exported admirable textures produced by handloom and the spinning wheel. It was the Blitish intruders who broke up the Indian handloom and destroyed the spinning wheel and introduced the twist into India. After independence the textile industry had the protection fron1 international c0111petition by inlposing duties on illlports etc. The second respondent contends, that this protection is being gradually withdrawn as per GATT Regulations. Cheap imports of textile are coming into a big way, making the local Plices of textiles not con1petitive, Korea, .Japan and other East-Asian countries which were importing 50'k of Indian textiles have now stopped imports. These expOlting mills have also started diverting the yam production to local n1arkets luaking the position still worse. Cheap imports of textile are coming into a big way, making the local Plices of textiles not con1petitive, Korea, .Japan and other East-Asian countries which were importing 50'k of Indian textiles have now stopped imports. These expOlting mills have also started diverting the yam production to local n1arkets luaking the position still worse. The buying power of large section of our countIy has corne down and as a consequence the per-capita consunlption of textile has also come down. Large nUlllber of power 1001118 have shdt dO\vn due to paucity of den1and for clothes resulting in poor demand for yam. Thus, the crisis in textile industry was beyond the control of the management including the second respondent's textile mill. In addition to this crisis in the second respondent-lllill there were strikes, lockouts and suspension of work for 18 months during 1995-96 and 1996-97. The cumulative effect of this situation resulted in low production and under-utilisation of the mill and ended in huge losses during the years 1995-96 and 1997-98. The second respondent incurred losses during these years in a sum of Rs. 11.46 crares as certified by the Chartered Accolmtant. The second respondent by borrowing fu;'ds at high rate of interest from banks and financial institutions made efforts to run the mill in an economically viahle way. Despite all efforts by the second respondent there was no A KLJ PUBLICA TJON ,- ~'-,."-~ -_"'" cf' :_"~ -~ 14. Kar.L.J.! VALLIAPPATEXTILESvSTATE 37 improvement and the losses continued and the financial institutions refuses! to extend further financial support treating the second respondent-mill as high risk unit and as a non-performing asset. The first respondent, after hearing both petitioner and the second respondent and by considering the rival contentions has satisfied as to the reasons provided by the second respondent as genuine and adequate. The conclusion of the first respondent that the second respondent is undergoing severe financial crisis and the functioning of the industry is beyond the control and capacity of the second respondent is based on nmterial on record and the sallIe is in accordance witp, ~aw and the procedure laid down in Section 25-0(2) ofthe Act. 17. The conclusion of the first respondent that the second respondent is undergoing severe financial crisis and the functioning of the industry is beyond the control and capacity of the second respondent is based on nmterial on record and the sallIe is in accordance witp, ~aw and the procedure laid down in Section 25-0(2) ofthe Act. 17. The contention of the petitIOner that the second respondent has not furnished the balance-sheet, profit and loss accounts, and the audited reports of previous three years and thus there is statutory noncomphance of Rule 77(1) of the Industrial Disputes (Karnataka) Rules, 1957 of Fornl 'QA', is unacceptable. The petitioner has produced copy of FornI 'QA' filed by the second respondent as Annexure-A to the writ petition A perusal of Form 'QA' at columns 11 and 12 discloses that the second responden t had produced the profit and loss accounts for the years 1995-96, 1996-97, 1997-98 and 1998-99 and also the key figures from 1980 to 1998. The first respondent in the impugned order observed as under "r1'he 11laterial available in the records, such as inCOllle-tax retUTIIS, the notices issued by various financial institutions, the certificate of Chartered Accountant indicates, that the Inanagelnent is in serious financial difficulties. That for the years 1995-96, 1996-97, 1997-98 and 1998-99 the mill has incurred a loss of Rs. 11.46 crores as certified by the Chmtered Accountant", 18. The petitioner again contended before the first respondent in the review petition stating that the nlanagenlent has not furnished the balance-sheet, profit and loss accounts and audited repolts of previous three years The first respondent in the review oraer dated 14-6-1999 answered this contention of petitioners as under: "With regard to non-furnishing the audited balance-sheet for three ye3rs, it is to be stated that the audit report for the period ending :iOth September, 1997 also has the accounts for the previous years, eovering a total period of thirty 1110uths. In addition, the union had obtained a copy of the accounts for the year ended 31 st March, 1995 from the Registrar of Companies which fact ha:3 not been denied by the union. From the aforesaid facts, it is clear that the required financial inf0l111ation of the C0l11pany, spread over for a period of forty-two IllOuths were available with the union. This jufollnations were extensively cited during the arguIllents. From the aforesaid facts, it is clear that the required financial inf0l111ation of the C0l11pany, spread over for a period of forty-two IllOuths were available with the union. This jufollnations were extensively cited during the arguIllents. In vie"~' of the above position, no pr~judice has been caused to the interest of the union". A KIA PUBLICATION -'';'." 15. - - ------- ;m VALLlAPPA TEXTILES v STATE 12006(2) - .. -- .. ----- The first respondent by considering the contention of the petitioner and on appreciation of material on record and by applying its mind and hy a reasoned order has rightly concluded that the financial loss in the mill was very acute and beyond the powers and control of the Emoagenlent Therefore, there is no substance and merit in the contention of the petitioners that the second respondent has not complied with statutory requirement of Rule 77(1) of Form 'QA'. 19_ The petitioner contends, that it has disputed the authenticity of fjgures furnished by the second respondent and therefore the first reSplYOUC\T.lt ought to have called upon the second respondent to produce the audited balance-sheet. In suppmt of this contention the petitioner relied on the decision of the Supreme CouLt in the case, ofAl/s. Bareilly Electricity Supply Company Limited, wherein it 1S held that mere production of the balance-sheet and profit and loss account does not amount to a proof of it or the truth of the entries therein When entries ill the accounts extract are challenged then they are to be proved by producing the books and speaking from the entries made therein. This contention of the petitioner is not acceptable to me. Firstly, in M / s. Barerlly Electricity Supply Company Limited's case, the dispute was ]'elating to the rate of bonus to be paid to the workmen and in the present case the issue relates to grant of permission to close the lmit of second respondent. Secondly, in the present case the second respondent produced the annual report of the company showing audited onbnce-soeet and profit and loss account. In addition to this the second respondent produced audit report for the period ending 30-9-1997 which also contains the accounts for the previous years covering a total period of thirty months. The Chartered Accountant certified that the second respondent-mill has incurred loss during the years 1995-96 to 1998-99. In addition to this the second respondent produced audit report for the period ending 30-9-1997 which also contains the accounts for the previous years covering a total period of thirty months. The Chartered Accountant certified that the second respondent-mill has incurred loss during the years 1995-96 to 1998-99. The first respondent by considering the income-tax returns, notices issued by vmious financial institutions dud the cert-ificate of the Chart(!red Accountant conles to the conclusion that the second responrlCc.t-Illunagernent ]S III serious financial difficulties. The petitIOner has not placed an,Y Ilmterial to substmltiate its contention 8XCi;--::pt the interested assertions that the figures contained the profit and i().,:~s ".c,n not be of 'lIlY help to the petitioner. 20c I decline to accept the contention of the petitioner that without application of mmd the first respondent by only taking into ;:oIlsideratic!11 t1w interest of second respondent has passed the tli1pugned orders. A reading of the in1pugned orders l1lakes it clear that thu first respondent has not only taken into consideration the CiJC;UIll..":; tances that led to financial crunch in the second respondent-unit but alsn the effcnis 111ade by (he :,econd respondent and its directors to illlprove the situation, the frequent strikes, lockouts and suspension of v.'(ll'k ill the unit and also the non~co-operation of workers, unner A KW PUBLICATION Kar. L.J.] VALLIAPPA TEXTILES v STATE 39 utilisation ofthe unit and drop in the production. The first respondent in its order dated 14•6•1999 hdd as lmder: "Another aspect that requires serious consideration of the Gmremnlent is the desire of the lllanagenlent. to stay in business. Tbe prinmry consideration for those who are muning the industries besides investm.ent and profit is the "desire to be in business". Like all other professions this desire is an inalienable aspect, without '.vhieh, the existence of the individual is llleaningless. The D1ilI has been functioning roughly for a period of thirty years ;-md the directors and the prOlnoters have liJlle their best to run the mill during hay days and difficult times. The prOIl1oters, as seen frOlll the lllaterials placed before the Government have given personal guarantee and obtained loans for runmng the mill. The compelling need, under these circumstances, for the closure ofthe mill should be very acute and beyond the powers and control of the management. The prOIl1oters, as seen frOlll the lllaterials placed before the Government have given personal guarantee and obtained loans for runmng the mill. The compelling need, under these circumstances, for the closure ofthe mill should be very acute and beyond the powers and control of the management. During the argument it was made clear by the Counsel for the management that the frequent violences in premises of the mill and outside, by the workmen besides the financial difficulties is also one of the reasons to extinguish the desire to be in business. This fact though agonising will have to be accepted. It has been held by the Courts that the right to close down an industry, though not a fundament a] right, is an integral part of such right. All that the managenlent has to show for the exercise of such an integral part of the fundamental right is the adequacy and genuineness of the reasons shown in the application for closure under Section 25•0 of the Act In this case the required ingredients have been amply denlonstrated". 21. It is no doubt true that the closure of an industrial unit is likely to have adverse in impact on the long term interest of the workers, share•holders, creditors, depositors and the general public. It is therefore the Legislature enacted the provisions of Section 25-0 of the Industrial Disputes Act restricting the right of employer to close down the unit Care is taken to protect the interest of workers under sub• section (8) of Section 25•0 of the Industrial Disputes Act providing for payment of compensation to workers in the event of closure of industrial lmit. Otherwise in no case the closure can be allowed as it would always have impact on workers. 22. It is necessary to notice the developments that have taken place after the order of closure dated 26-2-1999, passed by the first respondent•('""vernment permitting the second respondent to close its factory. It is stated, pursuant to the order of closure, the second respondent has closed the factory and surrendered the factory licence to the concerned authorities The second respondent has produced copies of invoices for having sold the machines in the factory. It is stated, that electrical power was disconnected to the second respondent-factory in August 1998 It is further stated, that the second respondent has sold A KLJ PUBLICATION • 16. It is stated, that electrical power was disconnected to the second respondent-factory in August 1998 It is further stated, that the second respondent has sold A KLJ PUBLICATION • 16. 40 M. MUNIVENKATAPPA v STATE OF KARNATAKA (DB) 12006(2) the entire land and building to MIs. Software Technological Park Private Limited, Bangalore and handed over the possession of the same. It is also not in dispute that all the workmen have received their dues from the second respondent in full and final settlement of all their claims and obtained their pension certificates. In addition to this the State Bank of India initiated proceedings against the second respondent for recovery of dues before the Debt Recovery Tribunal and that an award is passed. Under these cirCuulStances and in view of these developments, it is not possible to grant the relief prayed for by the petitioner. Accordingly, question 2 is answered in affimlative. 23. For the reasons stated above, the writ petition is rejected with no order as to costs.