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2006 DIGILAW 937 (GAU)

Ejsynnah v. Spar Lyngdoh

2006-10-17

TINLIANTHANG VAIPHEI

body2006
JUDGMENT T. Vaiphei, J. 1. Whether the jurisdiction of the appellate Court to entertain an appeal should be determined on the value of the relief claimed in the appeal or on the value of the original suit is the moot point in this appeal. 2. The facts material for the disposal of this appeal lie in a narrow compass. The Respondent No. 1, as the Plaintiff, instituted a money suit being Money Suit No. 1(H) of 1998 before the learned Assistant District Judge, Shillong for recovery of Rs. 1,33,398/- from the Respondents No. 2 and 3 with interest from the Respondents No. 2 and 3. The Appellant herein was admittedly not impleaded as a party in the suit. He was, however, examined as DW1 in the course of trial. By the judgment and decree dated 26.06.2003, the trial Court decreed the suit to the extent of Rs. 63,796/- with interest @ 10% p.a. which were to be recovered in equal share from the Respondent No. 1 (the Plaintiff) and three other officials of the Directorate of Housing, Government of Meghalaya. The Appellant preferred an appeal from the said judgment and decree and valued his appeal at Rs. 15,949/-, being l/4th of the decretal amount. The learned District Judge, Shillong after hearing the parties, by the impugned judgment and order held that since the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District was limited to Rs. 20,000/- in terms of Section 21 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Code, 1887 and whereas the value of the original suit was Rs. 1,33,398/-, which should also determine the value of the appeal for the purpose of jurisdiction, he had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and accordingly returned the memorandum of appeal for filing the same before the appropriate forum. According to the appellate Court the value of the appeal for the purpose of jurisdiction is the value of the original suit and not the value of the relief claimed in the appeal. 3. Mr. R. Choudhury, the learned Counsel for the Appellant submits that the appellate Court grossly erred in law in holding that the pecuniary jurisdiction of the appellate Court was to be determined on the basis of the value of the original suit, which is valued at Rs. 1,33,398/- and not on the basis of the value of the relief claimed. Mr. R. Choudhury, the learned Counsel for the Appellant submits that the appellate Court grossly erred in law in holding that the pecuniary jurisdiction of the appellate Court was to be determined on the basis of the value of the original suit, which is valued at Rs. 1,33,398/- and not on the basis of the value of the relief claimed. He places reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in Nemi Chand and Anr. v. The Edward Mills Co. Ltd. and Anr. reported in AIR 1953 SC 28 , in support of his contention. On the other hand, both Mr. MF Qureshi, the learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 1 and Mr. ND Chullai, the learned Senior Government Advocate appearing for the remaining Respondents, support the impugned judgment and order and contend that no interference is called for therein. 4. In Nemi Chand case (Supra), the Apex Court held that a memorandum of appeal, as provided in Article 1 of Schedule 1, Court-Fees Act, has to be stamped according to the value of the subject-matter in dispute in appeal; in other words, the relief claimed in the memorandum of appeal determines the value of the appeal for the purpose of Court-fee. The top Court further held that it is always open to the Appellant in an appeal to give up a portion of his claim and to restrict it and that unless the relief is of such a nature that it cannot be split up, to relinquish a part of the claim and to bring it within the amount of Court-fee already paid. No doubt, the valuation of an appeal for the purpose of jurisdiction and the valuation of the same for the purpose of payment of Court-fee are not always the same and they may be different. In the instant case, the relief which the Appellant (who was not even a party in the original suit) claimed in the appeal is only in respect of 1/4th of the decretal amount, the liability for satisfying whereof has been fastened upon him by the Trial Court. In my judgment, the Appellant cannot be forced to pay the Court-fees for the value of the original suit i.e. Rs. 1,33,398/-, which is certainly not the subject matter in dispute in the appeal sought to be filed by him. In my judgment, the Appellant cannot be forced to pay the Court-fees for the value of the original suit i.e. Rs. 1,33,398/-, which is certainly not the subject matter in dispute in the appeal sought to be filed by him. If it is always open to a normal Appellant to give up a portion of his claim and to stamp the memo of appeal in accordance with the reduced claim, a fortiori, there is no reason why a third party like the present Appellant cannot value his appeal according to the relief claimed by him. Accordingly, I hold that the value of the appeal filed by the Appellant in the instant case will have to be that portion of the decree which is challenged and if either the whole suit is not challenged or the decree passed in the appeal can be valued at a lower valuation, the value of the appeal will not be the value of the original suit. 5. As observed by me earlier, the valuation of an appeal for the purpose of jurisdiction and the valuation for the purpose of Court-fees may be different. Whether this is so in this case is the core issue. Under Section 8 of the Suit Valuation Act, 1887, the valuation of suit for the purposes of Court-fees determines the valuation of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction in the specified cases and the same reads thus: 8. Court-fee value and jurisdictional value to be the same in certain suit: Where in suit other than those referred to in the Court-Fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870). Section 7, paragraphs v, vi and ix, and paragraph x, Clause (d), Court-fees are payable ad-valorem under the Court-Fees Act, 1870, the value as determinable for the computation of Court-fees and the value for purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. A cursory look at the aforesaid provision plainly shows that the value of a suit for the purpose of jurisdiction in all types of suits except those falling under Section 7, paragraphs (v), (vi), (ix) and paragraph (x), clause (d) of Court-Fees Act shall be the same as that for paying the Court-fee. A suit for recovery of money such as the one in this case falls under Section 7, paragraph (i) of the Court-fees Act, 1870. A suit for recovery of money such as the one in this case falls under Section 7, paragraph (i) of the Court-fees Act, 1870. Thus, in a case for recovery of money, the value of Court-fee for the purpose of Court-fee is fixed on the amount claimed by the Plaintiff. Appeal being a continuation of a suit, it is obvious that the value of the appeal for the purpose of jurisdiction shall necessarily also have to be the same as the value for the purpose of Court-fee. In the instant case, the value of the relief claimed by the Appellant in the appeal sought to be filled by him is Rs. 15,949/- on the valuation whereof, he paid the ad-valorem Court-fees. Consequently, the jurisdictional value of the appeal for the purpose of jurisdiction shall also be Rs. 15,949/-. In the view that I have taken, I hold that the learned District Judge has the pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the appeal in question. Resultantly, the view taken by the learned District Judge to the contrary is not sustainable in law. 6. For what has been stated in the foregoing, this appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 25.05.2005 is set aside. The appeal is now restored to the file of the learned District Judge, Shillong, who shall register it again as a regular appeal (as per the prescribed nomenclature) and dispose of the same on merits after hearing both the parties. Transmit the LC record as expeditiously as possible. No costs. Appeal allowed