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2006 DIGILAW 941 (ALL)

ANUPAM JAISWAL v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

2006-04-05

B.S.CHAUHAN, DILIP GUPTA

body2006
JUDGMENT By the Court.—This writ petition has been filed by the petitioners raising the grievance that the respondent Allahabad Development Authority, Allahabad (hereinafter called the ‘Authority) has demolished the constructions raised by them and, therefore, this Court must issue a direction to the respondent authorities to initiate criminal prosecution against respondent Nos. 4 to 9 by lodging First Information Report against them; restrain the Authority from further demolishing the existing constructions of the petitioners at 3-B, Tashkant Marg, Allahabad and to pay compensation for the damages suffered by the petitioners. 2. The petition has been resisted by the Authority on the ground that it is evident from the records and own admission of the petitioners that the constructions that had been raised, are in violation of the sanction plan and also against the land user inasmuch as the area is clearly earmarked for residential purpose, whereas the petitioners are running a Nursing Home and attempting to construct the full-fledged Nursing Home. 3. This matter came up for hearing on 11.5.2005 before this Bench and again on 13.5.2005. Shri Ravi Kiran Jain, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners sought time to file supplementary affidavit. However, it was suggested by him that Shri A.K. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the Authority may file a short counter affidavit annexing the relevant documents for the purpose and petitioners be given an opportunity to file a rejoinder affidavit and matter be listed on 18th May, 2005. The counter affidavit on behalf of the Authority was served on petitioners on 17.5.2005 and it was pointed out that in view of the supplementary affidavit dated 13th May, 2005 filed by the petitioners, it was evident that the constructions which were sought to be demolished had been raised in flagrant violation of Rules in this respect. The matter was heard on 18.5.2005 and again on 24.5.2005. The hearing could not be concluded, and Shri Ravi Kiran Jain, learned Senior Counsel was replaced by Shri P.N. Saxena, learned Senior Counsel. The matter was heard on 18.5.2005 and again on 24.5.2005. The hearing could not be concluded, and Shri Ravi Kiran Jain, learned Senior Counsel was replaced by Shri P.N. Saxena, learned Senior Counsel. The matter was listed for further hearing on 25.5.2005 and after hearing the matter at length, it was directed to be listed again on 26th May, 2005 and as the arguments could not be concluded due to paucity of time on that date, the following order was passed : “During the course of the arguments it has been submitted by Shri Saxena that the validity of the provisions of Section 28 of the Act, 1973, is restricted to Clause 5 and the learned Additional Advocate General Shri Sudhir Agarwal, may advance the arguments only to the validity of the said Clause 5 of Section 28 of the Act, 1973 only and not to the whole provision. For paucity of time arguments could not be concluded. Put up tomorrow for further hearing after fresh.” 4. The matter was heard again on 27.5.2005 and the following order was passed : “Hearing could not be concluded today. The matter is, therefore, directed to be listed on 7.7.2005 for further hearing. Till 7.7.2005 no further demolition of the property in dispute shall take place but the petitioners shall not raise any construction on the property in dispute.” 5. Subsequent thereto, whenever the matter was listed, adjournment was sought by either of the parties or both the parties. The petitioners thereafter started attempting avoiding the hearing of the case by replacing the earlier Senior Counsel who had been heard at length for several days with a clear understanding that the matter was being heard finally, and substituted them by another counsel. 6. Shri C.N. Tripathi, Advocate, filed his Vakalatnama on 16.8.2005 on behalf of the petitioner No. 1 without taking ‘No Objection’ from the earlier counsel but he did not file any Vakalatnama on behalf of the petitioner no.2, Dr. Uma Jaiswal. When the matter was listed on 13.12.2005, it was adjourned for 21.12.2005 on the request of Shri C.N. Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioner No. 1. On 21st December, 2005, adjournment slips on behalf of both sides were filed and, therefore, the case was adjourned for three weeks. The matter came up for hearing on 10th March, 2006 and it was directed to be listed in the next cause list. On 21st December, 2005, adjournment slips on behalf of both sides were filed and, therefore, the case was adjourned for three weeks. The matter came up for hearing on 10th March, 2006 and it was directed to be listed in the next cause list. When the matter came up on 24.3.2006, an illness slip was sent by Shri C.N. Tripathi, learned counsel for petitioner No. 1 but Shri A.K. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the Authority opposed the adjournment pointing out that the matter had been argued at length for several days with the clear understanding that it was being heard finally and as the hearing could not be concluded and as summer vacations started, this Court granted the interim relief to the petitioners vide order dated 27.5.2005 to protect their illegally raised constructions. Adjournments were sought only as a tactics for delaying the disposal of the case. Considering the request of Shri Mishra, the matter was directed to be listed on 28.3.2006 and Shri Mishra was directed to serve notice to this effect upon Shri C.N. Tripathi, in writing. When the matter came up for hearing on 28.3.2006, illness slip was sent by Shri C.N. Tripathi and this Court passed a detailed order running to several pages taking note of the objections filed by Shri Mishra. Considering the fact that the two Senior Advocates, namely, Shri Ravi Kiran Jain and Shri P.N. Saxena had already argued the matter at length with a clear understanding that the case was being heard for final disposal, and as there were so many other counsel who had neither withdrawn from the case nor had given ‘No Objection’ to Shri C.N. Tripathi nor Shri Tripathi had filed Vakalatnama on behalf of petitioner No. 2, it was insisted that the matter be dismissed. However, considering the fact-situation, the case was adjourned for 3rd April, 2006 and Shri Mishra was directed to give notice to this effect to Shri C.N. Tripathi in writing. When the matter came up for hearing on 3.4.2006, an order of Hon’ble The Chief Justice was placed before us that the cases of Shri C.N. Tripathi have been adjourned up to 10th April, 2006 and if any of his case is listed in this Court, it may be adjourned provided it is not part-heard, date fixed or peremptorily listed. When the matter came up for hearing on 3.4.2006, an order of Hon’ble The Chief Justice was placed before us that the cases of Shri C.N. Tripathi have been adjourned up to 10th April, 2006 and if any of his case is listed in this Court, it may be adjourned provided it is not part-heard, date fixed or peremptorily listed. This case was not only part heard but was also date fixed and Shri S.M.A. Kazmi, learned Advocate General and Shri A.K. Mishra opposed the adjournment pointing out that there were other counsel in the case and illness/adjournment slips were being sent to avoid further hearing after obtaining the interim order, therefore, the petition was liable to be dismissed in default. However, in the interest of justice, we adjourned the case for 5th April, 2006 so that petitioners may make an alternative arrangement and Shri A.K. Mishra was directed to give notice in writing to Shri Tripathi to this effect. Today, again an adjournment slip has been sent on the ground of illness of Shri C.N. Tripathi. 7. Shri A.K. Mishra and Shri S.N. Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel, appearing for the respondents have opposed the adjournment raising large number of issues. It has been submitted that on the one hand, petitioners after obtaining interim orders are seeking adjournments after adjournments and on the other hand, they had been pressurising the officers of the respondents by approaching the State Authorities/other Courts and have already taken the following steps in this regard : (i) Complaint case in respect of same grievance has been lodged by the petitioners before the Hon’ble Lok Aayukt, U.P. (ii) Proceedings have been initiated by the petitioners in respect of the same grievance by making complaint before the Hon’ble Chief Minister, U.P. (iii) Proceedings have been initiated by the petitioners in respect of the same grievance by making complaint before the Hon’ble Governor, U.P. (iv) Proceedings have been initiated by the petitioners in respect of the same grievance by making complaint before the Hon’ble Prime Minister, Union of India. (v) Proceedings have been initiated by the petitioners in respect of the same grievance by making complaint before the Hon’ble President of India. (vi) Complaint with similar allegations have been made also before the Central Bureau of Investigation, New Delhi. (v) Proceedings have been initiated by the petitioners in respect of the same grievance by making complaint before the Hon’ble President of India. (vi) Complaint with similar allegations have been made also before the Central Bureau of Investigation, New Delhi. (vii) In respect of the same grievance i.e. demolition of unauthorized illegal construction of the petitioner on 14.4.2005, a Criminal Complaint under Section 156 (3) Code of Criminal Procedure has been filed on 20.2.2006 as an afterthought nearly after 20 months. An ex-parte order for registering Criminal case upon the said allegations have been passed on 28.2.2006. 8. It has further been submitted by Shri A.K. Mishra, learned counsel that delaying tactics have been adopted by change of counsel which is in violation of Rule 39, Section IV, Chapter II of Part IV of The Bar Council of India Rules (framed under Section 49 (1) (c) of the Advocates Act, 1961) and other provisions like Order III Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter called ‘C.P.C.); and Allahabad High Court Rules (Chapter XXIV) as “No Objection’ has not been taken from the counsel appearing earlier nor leave of the Court has been obtained for filing appearance by Shri Tripathi. More so, Shri Tripathi has not filed any Vakalatnama on behalf of the petitioner No. 2 Dr. Uma Jaiswal till today. Authority demolished only the portion of the construction, which petitioners have also admitted to have raised illegally. It is also admitted case of the petitioners that they are running a Nursing Home in a residential area, which is not permissible. Admission is the best evidence. Thus, petition is liable to be dismissed on merit. 9. We have considered the submissions made by Shri Mishra and Shri S.N. Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel, appearing for the respondents and also the facts of the case. 10. The grievance of the petitioners started with the order dated 6.10.2004 (Annex. 10) wherein the Authority had asked petitioners to demolish the unauthorized constructions and not to use the residential house as Nursing Home as it clearly amounted to change of user which was impermissible. It is evident from the said order/notice that the petitioners have got the plan sanctioned for construction of a residential house, after demolition of the existing building. 10) wherein the Authority had asked petitioners to demolish the unauthorized constructions and not to use the residential house as Nursing Home as it clearly amounted to change of user which was impermissible. It is evident from the said order/notice that the petitioners have got the plan sanctioned for construction of a residential house, after demolition of the existing building. However, the constructions have been raised without demolishing the old building including the open space in the back to the extent of 40 per cent of the setback, on the ground floor. Therefore, the petitioners were directed to remove the unauthorized constructions and it was also pointed out that the Nursing Home could not be run in a residential area and it was not permissible for the petitioners to have the Nursing Home in this accommodation as it did not fulfil the requirement of building byelaws particularly Clauses 2.3.2, 3.10.2 and 5.4, according to which a minimum road of 12 meters (40 ft.) or more is required in front of the house and minimum area of 100 sq. meters is required for parking and there must be minimum 9 meters setback and three meters land is to be spared on both sides of the plot. As such conditions were not fulfilled, nor the same could be fulfilled taking into account, area of the plot, they could not be permitted to have the Nursing Home at the site. It was further directed that petitioners should demolish the old building and construction raised unauthorisedly in the open area of the rear setback. This order is admittedly appealable under Section 27(2) of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 (hereinafter called the ‘Act 1973). But no appeal had ever been filed by them. The petitioners moved an application dated 14.10.2004 (Annex. 11) admitting the unauthorized and illegal construction and running of the Nursing Home but raised objections to said clauses of the building byelaws, according to which it was not permissible for having the Nursing Home at the site on the ground that about 250-300 Nursing Homes at Allahabad were being run in contravention of the said clauses and petitioners had been given a hostile discrimination without sending notices to other Nursing Homes. It has further been mentioned in the application that petitioners be given one month time to file an application for compounding the said illegal construction. It has further been mentioned in the application that petitioners be given one month time to file an application for compounding the said illegal construction. No such application was ever filed. It has also been admitted by the petitioners in paragraph 6 of the supplementary affidavit filed on 13th May, 2005 that construction which stood demolished on 14.4.2005 was altogether different, raised in the open space in the back, and had not been shown anywhere in the map sanctioned on 8.4.2004. 11. In view of the fact that the petitioners had raised illegal constructions, none of the counsel engaged by them so far, raised the allegations of malafide against the officials of the Authority and never insisted for issuing notices to the respondent Nos. 4 to 9. Notices were not issued to them at that time as prima facie, we were of the view that they had performed their duties under the Act 1973. It is settled legal proposition that if the allegations/charges stand proved, the allegations of malafide become redundant [Vide Sheo Nandan Paswan v. State of Bihar & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 877 ; State of Haryana & Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal & Ors., AIR 1992 SC 604 ; and L.K. Verma v. HMT Ltd. & Anr., (2006) 2 SCC 269 ). 12. It is also a settled proposition of law that Article 14 does not provide for negative equality, nor it can be permitted to perpetuate an illegality or wrong action by other similarly situated persons as held by Honble Apex Court in Sneh Prabha v. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 540 ; Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur v. Daulat Mal Jain & Ors., (1997) 1 SCC 35 ; State of Haryana & Ors. v. Ram Kumar Mann, (1997) 3 SCC 321 ; Faridabad CT Scan Centre v. D.G. Health Services & Ors., (1997) 7 SCC 752 ; State of Punjab & Ors. v. Dr. Rajeev Sarwal, (1999) 9 SCC 240 ; Jalandhar Improvement Trust v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1999 SC 1347 ; Finance Commissioner (Revenue) v. Gulab Chandra & Anr., 2001 AIR SCW 4774; Union of India & Ors. v. Rakesh Kumar, AIR 2001 SC 1877 ; Yogesh Kumar & Ors. v. Government of NCT of Delhi & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 1241 ; and Union of India & Anr. v. Rakesh Kumar, AIR 2001 SC 1877 ; Yogesh Kumar & Ors. v. Government of NCT of Delhi & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 1241 ; and Union of India & Anr. v. International Trading Company & Anr., AIR 2003 SC 3983 ; and M/s. Anand Button Ltd. v. State of Haryana & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 565 . 13. Shri C.N. Tripathi, learned counsel filed an application dated 3.3.2006 for releasing the case from this Bench mainly on two grounds; namely that this Bench has no jurisdiction to hear the miscellaneous cases and that as notices had not been issued to respondent Nos. 4 to 9, the case could not have been heard finally. As the application has to be heard along with the record of the case, we directed to list the same along with the record. Since then matter has been listed several times but none appeared to press the application also. 14. So far as the first ground referred to in the application moved by the petitioners is concerned, the same stood removed with the change of roster as a result whereof, jurisdiction to hear miscellaneous cases has again been given to this Bench. The apprehension, therefore, expressed in the application on the ground of non-availability of jurisdiction appears to be a flimsy excuse to avoid the hearing of the case. Even otherwise, as we had earlier heard the petition on merits in order to decide it finally, for a number of days, the plea is misconceived. 15. There is no allegation of any actual or apprehended bias nor there could be any and the application moved on behalf of the petitioners is nothing but a ploy of Bench hunting and avoidance of hearing of the case. The proceedings were allowed to continue for more than a year without any such protest on behalf of the petitioners. Considering the admission made by the petitioners themselves, and the law referred to hereinabove, we had not called upon the said respondent Nos. 4 to 9 to file reply, nor it is desirable, nor such a submission had ever been made by any of the counsel, who appeared before us. Shri C.N. Tripathi, who has filed Vakalatnama only on behalf of one of the petitioners has never made any submission before us till today. The application is accordingly rejected. 16. 4 to 9 to file reply, nor it is desirable, nor such a submission had ever been made by any of the counsel, who appeared before us. Shri C.N. Tripathi, who has filed Vakalatnama only on behalf of one of the petitioners has never made any submission before us till today. The application is accordingly rejected. 16. In order to curb this kind of menace, the provisions of Order XVII Rule 1 C.P.C. have been amended to the effect that a party cannot seek more than three adjournments during the entire trial. More so, the illness of an Advocate cannot be a ground, time and again in a matter which has already been heard at length for several days. Such request for adjournment is not permissible in view of Order XVII Rule 1 (2) proviso (d) C.P.C. Needless to say that even if the provisions of C.P.C. are not applicable in writ jurisdiction, the principles enshrined therein may be made applicable to remedy certain wrongs [Vide Gulab Chand v. State of Gujarat & Ors., AIR 1965 SC 1153 ; Babubhai v. Nandlal, AIR 1974 SC 2105 ; and M/s. Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal & Ors, AIR 1987 SC 88 ]. 17. Shri C.N. Tripathi, who is sending illness slip/adjournment slip repeatedly has neither sought ‘No Objection’ from either of the earlier counsel, nor sought any leave from the Court. Nor he has any authority to represent petitioner No. 2. 18. Rule 39, Section IV, Chapter II of Part IV of The Bar Council of India Rules (framed under Section 49 (1) (c) of the Advocates Act, 1961) provides as under : “An Advocate shall not enter appearance in any case in which there is already a vakalat or memo or appearance filed by an Advocate engaged for a party except with his consent; in case such consent is not produced he shall apply to the Court stating reasons why the said consent could not be produced and he shall appear only after obtaining the permission of the Court.” (emphasis added) 19. In such a situation we are very much doubtful about the competence of Shri C.N. Tripathi to even represent petitioner No. 1. 20. In Dr. In such a situation we are very much doubtful about the competence of Shri C.N. Tripathi to even represent petitioner No. 1. 20. In Dr. Buddhi Kota Subbarao v. K. Parasaran & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 2687 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under : “No litigant has a right to unlimited drought on the Court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner he wishes. However, access to justice should not be misused as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions.” 21. In Nirankar Nath Wahi v. Fifth Additional District Judge, Moradabad, AIR 1984 SC 1268 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held that a party should not be permitted to abuse the process of the Court but at the same time, a party should be given a reasonable time considering the dimensions of the matter bearing in mind that justice must also appears to have been done and a short adjournment with a degree of understanding should be granted to make an alternative arrangement. However, the case is to be examined in a facts and circumstances involved therein and under no circumstances, the process of the Court should be permitted to be abused by any litigant. 22. In R. Vishwanathan & Ors. v. Abdul Wazid, AIR 1963 SC 1 , the Hon’ble Apex Court while dealing with a similar issue held that seeking adjournment either to avoid a particular Bench or to enable a particular lawyer to appear cannot be held to be justified, as such an attempt at the behest of the litigant may be either for Bench hunting or for adopting dilatory tactics and in case the conduct of the litigant shows such an attitude, the refusal of adjournment is justified. 23. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Bashir Ahmed v. Mehmood Hussain Shah, AIR 1995 SC 1857 while considering the provisions of Order XVII Rule 1(2) proviso (d) C.P.C., which provides that illness of a counsel cannot be a ground for adjournment unless the Court is satisfied that the party applying for adjournment could not have engaged another counsel in time, held as under : “Therefore, the Court is enjoined to satisfy itself in that behalf. If the party engages another counsel as indicated therein, then the need for further adjournment would be obviated. If the party engages another counsel as indicated therein, then the need for further adjournment would be obviated. The words “in time” would indicate that at least reasonable time may be given when a counsel suddenly becomes unwell. There would be reasonable time for the parties to make alternative arrangement, when sufficient time intervenes between the last date of adjournment and the next date of trial. In such a case, adjournment on the ground of counsel’s ill health could be refused and the party would bear the responsibility for his failure to make alternative arrangements. (emphasis added) 24. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Salem Advocate Bar Association (II) v. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 3353 , while dealing with the issue of adjournments under Order XVII Rule 1 C.P.C., held that the case can be adjourned by the Court, provided the party satisfies the Court that there exists special and extraordinary circumstances. The Court while considering such a prayer has to keep in mind the legislative intent to restrict the grant of adjournments, as it cannot be claimed in a routine manner. The circumstances seeking adjournment must be shown to be beyond the control of such a party. 25. Similarly, in Shibanand Mukherjee v. Gopal Chandra De, (2005) 11 SCC 557 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealt with the similar issue of adjournment, wherein the case was dismissed by the High Court refusing the adjournment and the application for restoration was also rejected. The Apex Court restored the matter with the condition that a sum of Rs. 50,000/- would be paid to the other side as compensation. In the said case also, the lawyer did not appear because of ailment and had sent the illness slip. 26. In Syed Naseem Ahmed v. Mohd. Abdul Hakeem, (2005) 12 SCC 302 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held that inability of lawyer to attend the Court cannot be a ground for adjournment and dismissed the appeal without adjourning the case further. 27. Thus, from the above, the legal proposition emerges that adjournment cannot be sought by a litigant in a routine manner. It must be a bonafide attempt, on behalf of the party. Illness of the counsel cannot be a ground of seeking adjournment. In certain cases, Court can grant short time so that an alternative arrangement be made. It cannot be a means of Bench hunting or dilatory tactics. It must be a bonafide attempt, on behalf of the party. Illness of the counsel cannot be a ground of seeking adjournment. In certain cases, Court can grant short time so that an alternative arrangement be made. It cannot be a means of Bench hunting or dilatory tactics. Where there are more than one counsel, illness of one counsel is no ground to adjourn the case. 28. The aforesaid averments made by Shri A.K. Mishra clearly reveal that after obtaining the interim relief from this Court on 27.5.2005, the petitioners have been pursuing various other remedies before different forums against the officials of the Authority, but they are avoiding the hearing of the case. Petitioners have also obtained an order from the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad for investigation of the allegations against the officials of the Authority under Section 156 (3), Cr.P.C, though the same relief has been claimed in this very petition. Thus, we are very much doubtful about the bonafides of the adjournment application. The earlier counsel engaged in this case have not appeared to argue the matter further inspite of due notices. 29. In view of the above, as it is a glaring case of abuse of process of Court and adjournment sought does not seem to be bona fide, we are not inclined to grant any further adjournment. The petition, therefore, stands dismissed in default. Interim order passed on 27.05.2005 stands vacated. Petition Dismissed. ———